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Abstract 
Cyberjaya was heralded in the mid-1990s as the Multimedia Super 
Corridor's (MSC) flagship 'intelligent city' and designed to prepare Malaysia 
and its citizens for a giant leap forward into an imagined new 'information 
age'. The urban mega-project constituted a state led response to the much 
hyped 'Siliconisation of Asia' and was planned to fast-track national 
development through investment in information and communications 
technologies (ICTs). The thesis seeks to examine how the discursive 
architectures of the 'information society' were mobilised, by whom, and with 
what material consequences as technopole planning practices were 
inscribed on the Malaysian landscape. Ten years on from the excessive 
high-tech utopianism and urban boosterism that accompanied the city's 
launch, the thesis promotes qualitative methodologies to examine the critical 
human geographies of the MSC. Specifically, empirical analysis addresses 
the uneven socio-spatial consequences and 'splintering urbanisms' 
manifesting in Malaysia's emerging spaces of neoliberal modernity. 
Research methodologies included in-depth interviews with political and 
business elites in Malaysia, participant observation with residents and 
workers in Cyberjaya, and a critical discourse analysis of the MSC policy and 
promotional materials. To this end, the thesis seeks to disentangle the 
symbolic and material effects of technopole planning practices in Cyberjaya. 
Keywords: Malaysia, Cyberjaya, Technopole, Technology, Symbolism, 
Everyday Geographies. 
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Chapter 1. Introduction 
1. 1. Introduction 
Technopoles have been described by Castells and Hall (1994: 1) as the 
'mines and foundries of the informational economy'. Conceptualised in more 
than just technological terms (i.e. networking cities with 
telecommunications), technopoles are new urban-industrial complexes 
geared towards research and development activities and high value-added 
innovation in information technology (I.T.) and multimedia industries. 
Technopoles have been planned by state actors across the world to create 
'innovative milieu' (Castells and Hall 1994) where an imagined knowledge 
based, 'new economy' (Leadbeater 1999) could be cultivated. Their physical 
form consists of futuristic looking, low-rise office buildings dispersed in a 
secured campus style layout set in sylvan landscapes physically and 
infrastructurally 'splintered' (Graham and Marvin 2001) from the rest of 
society. Each aspirational project (e.g. technology parks, technoburbs, 
science parks, 'intelligent' cities etc) has sought to emphasise its purported 
'uniqueness' through a variety of urban boosterism strategies accompanying 
competing claims of becoming 'wired', 'intelligent', 'silicon', 'cyber', or 
'techno' places. However, despite this, each project follows in a long line of 
technopoles that aspires to replicate the 'model' of Silicon Valley, California, 
in an ongoing quest to become both an iconographic exemplar symbolising 
national arrival in the 'information age' and a global hub for high-tech 
industries. 
Rather than seek to identify the 'criteria' for successful technopole 
development, or compare and evaluate the planned versus actual outcomes 
of individual projects, the thesis addresses the symbolic and material effects 
of techno pole planning practices to critically examine: (1) the symbolic-
1 
discursive production of these aspiring high-tech places by international 
consultants, policy makers and government officials; (2) the material 
reproduction of 'information society' and 'new economy' discourses through 
technopole planning practices; (3) emerging human geographies focused on 
the everyday live/work practices of individuals who inhabit these spaces. In 
turn, the thesis seeks to advance existing debates concerning the uneven 
socio-spatial consequences of technopole planning practices to contest 
technologically deterministic, celebratory 'new era' accounts of national and 
regional development driven by information and communications 
technologies (e.g. Ohmae 1991 ). The thesis examines these processes 
through a critical geographical analysis of the Malaysian government's 
Multimedia Super Corridor mega-project and its flagship 'intelligent city' 
technopole of Cyberjaya. 
1.2. Background 
Technopole developments span the world and their presence can be seen in 
numerous urban regions from Silicon Valley to Singapore from Boston to 
Bangalore. However, these projects have not emerged by chance; rather 
they represent attempts by public and private sector actors to respond to 
three major socioeconomic trends. Firstly, over the last 25 years speculation 
concerning the interrelations between information and communications 
technologies (ICTs), globalisation, and urban change often led to 
technologically deterministic accounts about the coming of a utopian 
'information society' (Bell 1976; Lyon 1988; Webster 1995).1 A wave of 
commentators, business writers, futurists, journalists, novelists, and even 
social scientists predicted the coming of a new technological epoch, in which 
the increasing penetration of information technology (I.T.) was forecast to 
affect all aspects of cultural, economic, social, religious, and political life. 
These predictions were often infected by speculative futurology whereby 
potential implications of technological change were portrayed as a 
1 I place the term in inverted commas to signal my doubts about its accuracy (see Chapter 3). 
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transformative 'new wave' affecting society on an unprecedented scale 
(Mcluhan 1964; Toffler 1980). 
For example, it was predicted that the 'old economy' (industrial, 
manufacturing-based, urban, Fordist) was to be replaced by a 'new 
economy' (knowledge based, innovative, 'anywhere-anytime', flexible 
accumulation). Such 'new economy' discourses promoted the internet (i.e. e-
commerce) and information technologies as a new driver of economic 
competitiveness (Gates 1995). In response to these predictions state actors 
sought to invest in ICT based economic development and urban 
telecommunications policies in readiness for an emerging 'digital age' 
(Negroponte 1995; Gosling 1997). 
Secondly, while few can doubt the enormity of such technological changes it 
is now widely acknowledged that the 'information society' is an increasingly 
urban society (Graham 2004a). Paradoxically, despite predictions 
concerning the growth of 'anytime/anywhere' 'informationalised capitalism', 
as the global economy expanded it has become organised around specific 
cities (or parts within them) which manage, control and coordinate 
transnational flows. These 'command and control centres' for the 'new 
economy' (Sassen 1999b; Sassen 2001 b) traditionally include global cities 
(e.g. London, New York) but also extend to technopoles that have been 
optimistically prepared by national governments as 'fixing points' (Harvey 
1982) for global capital through a range of location incentives, infrastructure 
provisions, and place marketing devices. 
Thirdly, as a consequence there has been growing competition from policy 
makers to reposition urban spaces within the nation state as high-tech sites 
conducive to a globalising 'new economy'. Technopole planning strategies 
have been mobilised in urban telecommunications policy by state actors as a 
means for: (a) creating a real and symbolic node for 'hooking up' to the 
3 
global economy (Oids 2001) ; (b) utilising the perceived transformative 
potential of ICTs for local, regional, and national development; (c) re-scaling 
national competitiveness through specific globally orientated networked sub-
economies (Sassen 2001 c). 
The above processes have been exemplified in East and Southeast Asia 
where a number of developmental states were caught up in a race to realise 
the benefits of information technology for national development from the mid-
1990s onwards. The region has become the global centre for technopole 
planning practices as a number of projects have been self-consciously built -
often in collaboration with Olds' ( 1999; 2001) 'Global Intelligence Corps' of 
multinational planning and consultancy firms - as a means of 'plugging into' 
and shaping a putative 'information society' and 'new economy'. Technopole 
development strategies in these regions have not just focused on economic 
development, but moreover have emphasised the utopian potential of ICTs 
for broader social and cultural modernisation (Uimonen 2001 ). Flagship 
development 'mega-projects' include Singapore's Science Park and 
'Intelligent Island' strategy, South Korea's Taedok 'Science City', Taiwan's 
Hsinchu 'Technology Park', Japan's 'Technopolis' Programme, Hong Kong's 
'Cyberport' and Malaysia's 'Multimedia Super Corridor'. 
The growth of technopoles in the region was a process that Jessop and Sum 
(2000) labelled the 'Siliconisation of Asia' whereby a number of 
entrepreneurial developmental states imagined a shift from export-oriented 
manufacturing economies to ICT based service economies which would 
enable them to 'leapfrog' up the next round of economic development. Prior 
to the Asian Financial Crisis 1997-1998, the logic of I.T. facilitated 
'developmental catch up' (Burkett and Hart Landsberg 2003) seemed 
entirely logical when the runaway success of Asian 'tigers' and 'dragons' 
emboldened regional claims of economic supremacy (Yeoh 2005). 
Technopole developments were very much in keeping with urban 
4 
transformations at the time geared towards the spectacularisation of national 
landscapes through a series of 'urban mega-projects' (Oids 2001) and the 
reimagining of 'the [once] mystical, sleepy (post-)colonial Orient, as, at once, 
a new threat to Euro-American supremacy and a new paradise of economic 
opportunity' (Bunnell 2004: 4-5). 
Technopole planning practices attempted to raise 'global visibility' (Bunnell et 
al. 2002) and redefine national competitive advantage through two 
interrelated strategies. Firstly, growing inter-urban competition between 
technopole projects to attract global capital, internationally mobile investors 
and high quality human talent led to the mobilisation of a range of 
entrepreneurial place marketing strategies. This became increasingly evident 
as Southeast Asian economies were integrated into regional and global 
circuits, and rose to prominence in the mid-1990s, national governments 
realised the potential of technopoles for symbolically repositioning the state 
as a site for economic investment. Each project was promoted around the 
world through various conferences, official tours, and publicity events as 
Asia's "new Silicon Valley". Subsequently technopoles were heralded as 
harbingers of a new high-tech modernity, and positioned as 'world-class' 
state-spaces for technological innovation and globalised live/work practices. 
Secondly, states in the region materially reoriented technopole 
developments within their national territories as global sites for attracting 
foreign direct investment. Technopole planning strategies spawned a range 
of 'spatial products' (Easterling 2005) - intelligent cities, technology and 
science parks, new media districts - creating 'exclusive' technologised 
spaces which would provide a suitable environment for multinational I.T. 
companies and the nurturing of a new generation of would-be 'intelligent' 
citizens (Mahathir 1998). As well as providing the usual array of financial 
incentives, technopoles created new 'splintered' (Graham and Marvin 2001) 
governance spaces which combined re-scaled state authoritarianism with 
5 
neoliberal strategies for economic growth (e.g. deregulation, liberalisation). 
As a consequence, these states 'rescripted' national development through 
globalisation processes encompassing transnational networks, connections 
and affinities that unsettled bounded constructions of the state and created 
new 'splintered' urban spaces (Graham and Marvin 2001 ), or 'neoliberal 
calculations' (Ong 2007) that overlap, but do not coincide, with the national 
terrain. Concomitantly, these countries have regulated, to differing degrees, 
their opening to a 'global', read Western, space with what were seen as 
potential threats to cultural integrity and economic control (Ong 2000a). 
1.3. Foregrounding Malaysia and the Multimedia Super Corridor 
The empirical focus of the thesis is on one of the most ambitious technopole 
development projects in Southeast Asia; the Multimedia Super Corridor 
(MSC). No country more than Malaysia in the 1990s was seduced by a belief 
in the unlimited power, boundless mobility, and transformative 
socioeconomic potential ICTs could offer. Conceived by the state as 'more 
than just a technology park', the MSC was launched by the Malaysian Prime 
Minister Dr. Mahathir Mohamad on the 151 of August 1996 as a special zone 
for the growth of I.T. and multimedia industries that were seen to embody the 
power of a 'new economy'. Moreover, the creation of a proposed 'innovative 
hub' was to enable the country to 'leapfrog' up the development chain and 
promote Malaysia as an investible location for global capitalism. 
One of the world's largest ever planned urban development projects, the 
corridor stretched 1? kilometres wide and 50 kilometres long linking Kuala 
Lumpur City Centre (KLCC) in the north to Kuala Lumpur International 
Airport (KLIA) in the south in a proposed high-tech zone that would bind 
Malaysia and its citizens into the global 'information society'.2 Built on a 
rationale of 'intelligent living', the MSC has attempted to integrate ICTs into 
every aspect of its urban environment through a series of flagship 
2 Though as Chapter 4 notes, the notion of MSC as a bounded spatial milieu is contested. 
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applications (e.g. e-government, smart schools, smart homes) 
technologically determined to 'upgrade' Malaysian human capital and enable 
the country to become a global hub for I.T.. The MSC stands out amongst its 
regional competitors because the Malaysian government did not conceive of 
the technopole ideal merely as a physical hub for I.T. industries but it was 
understood more broadly as the goal to create an ideal utopian society; 
achievable through technological means. This 'high-tech strand of 
developmental utopianism' (Bunnell 2002a) followed three stages (Figure 1 ). 
PhMe 1 
• 1 Conidor 
Successfully create 
MSC Malaysia 
Accelerate.growth of 
MSC Malaysia as 11 
GIObaiiCT Hub and 
review incentives to 
encourage. R&D and 
attract greater MNC 
presence. 
Hext Leap 
: • Web of con1dors 
Grow MSC Malaysia into 
a global ICT hub 
Roll out of MSC 
Malaysia to the 
rest of the 
country and 
en chancing 
locaiiCT industry 
PhMe 3 2020 
• All of Malaysia 
Transfunn Malaysia into 
a knowledge society 
IncreaSe usage 
and -adoption of 
innovative 
domestic ICT 
.,foducb) and 
services 
Extending MSC Malaysia benefits to the wider community 
Figure 1: MSC Development Phases (Source: MDEC) 
Located 40 kilometres south of Kuala Lumpur, Cyberjaya was the MSC's 
flagship 'intelligent city' technopole and the focus for fieldwork. Firstly, the 
city was the planned centre for Malaysia's high-tech industry. A 'Bill of 
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Guarantees' was offered by the government to entice companies to relocate 
to Cyberjaya which included tax breaks, freedom to source foreign labour 
and capital, and no internet censorship. In return, the government expected 
that companies awarded 'MSC status' and allowed to locate in Cyberjaya 
would be research intensive and would transfer skills and technologies to 
local companies. All this would take place in an exclusive garden city locale 
that was to "hot-house" a culture of innovation and creativity. Secondly, 
Cyberjaya was planned as a 'wired' city and constructed with a specialist 
100% digital fibre optic backbone (5-10 Gigabits per second) and promoted 
as a national 'test bed' for the integration of ICTs into everyday life. A series 
of 'Flagship Applications' (Figure 2) were intended to facilitate 'intelligent' 
live/work practices and position the city as an 'exemplary' urban space for a 
globally orientated, Malaysian 'information society'. In turn, the MSC was 
frequently referred to by Mahathir as Malaysia's 'gift to the world' and 
envisioned as an experimental site for technopole planning practices. 
Flagship Application Objective 
1. National Multipurpose Smart Card Multipurpose identity card also enabling 
electronic commerce in MSC. 
2. Electronic Government Paperless a-government in Putrajaya 
enabled through multimedia technologies. 
3. Worldwide Manufacturing Webs MSC to· function as regional hub for 
networks of R&D, manufacturing and 
distribution. 
4. Borderless Marketing Centre Multimedia Development Corporation as 
one-stop-shop for prospective MSC 
companies worldwide. 
5. Smart Homes/Schools ICTs to manage home environment and 
multimedia technologies as central to 
education. 
6. Telemedicine Remote consultation, diagnosis and 
treatment in Malaysia's healthcare system. 
7. Research and Design Cluster Cyberjaya the planned locale for the synergy 
between global multimedia companies and 
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I multimedia university. 
Figure 2: Summary of the MSC's Seven Flagship Applications 
These utopian development plans, in-tandem with the MSC's global 
marketing campaign, promoted the project as a neoliberal economic space 
for high-technology industries and multinational research and development 
communities. However, beneath the hyperbolic sloganeering, the MSC is far 
from a politically neutral global space operating in a vacuum detached from 
its national context. In particular, racial politics permeates the "MSC story" 
just as it does in other discursive and material spaces elsewhere in 
Malaysia. Contested notions of racial identity and divisive race relations can 
be traced to the colonial period and the intervention of the British in the 
Malay archipelago (Harper 1999; Abraham 2004) in the eighteenth century. 
Critical historians observe how the linkage of race with socio-economic 
function in the British colonial economy still resonates in Malaysian society 
today with the Malays functioning as the political elite, Chinese as a capitalist 
class and Indians as agrarian labour. The thesis endeavours not to rehearse 
well-trodden debates amongst Malaysianists concerning the role of race and 
religion in the production of a socially and spatially diverse nation state since 
independence in 1957. Rather the thesis engages with, and is analytically 
sensitive to, the complex and often divisive racial politics that has 
characterised Malaysia's contested geographies of nation building in the 
context of the. MSC's development. While empirical material interrogates 
racial identity across multiple MSC field sites (Chapters 4-8) the objective of 
the thesis is not to provide a comprehensive account of Malaysia's racial 
politics through the MSC. 
Elsewhere, the cultural geographer Tim Bunnell has written at length about 
the planning and development of the MSC in relation to Malaysia's complex 
racialised politics. Despite the promotion of the MSC as an ethnically and 
territorially integrated space, Bunnell highlights how the project represented 
a reordering of Malaysian society for a new 'intelligent' phase of national 
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development that was bifurcated along racial lines according to who was 
included and excluded from the project. Bunnell, who conducted his doctoral 
fieldwork in 1996 prior to the majority of the MSC being built, exposed two 
early myths concerning the Malaysian state's utopian high-tech 
developmentalism. Firstly, he observed that despite Mahathir's claims of 
universal national benefit, the majority of MSC construction projects were 
allocated to individuals or Malay companies directly linked to the ruling 
government United Malay National Organisation (UMNO) Party. In this light, 
the MSC was cast as a site for the pursuit of Malay interests and for the 
realisation of a new kind of technologically savvy Malay subject in keeping 
with Mahathir's ethno-nationalistic economic policies. Second, Bunnell's 
main empirical enquiry addressed the evictions and subsequent relocations 
of plantation workers and indigenous groups from land allocated for MSC 
development prior to 1997. Research highlighted the case of the mainly 
lndian-Tamil Perang Besar plantation estate workers who were deliberately 
excluded and physically removed from lands allocated to MSC development. 
Both within and outside MSC territory individuals and groups were positioned 
according to 'their ability to realise themselves in "intelligent ways" through a 
number of social and spatial dividing practices at a variety of scales' (Bunnell 
2004: 7). Bunnell describes these socio-spatial divisions as the 'moral 
geography' of the MSC landscape and observes how these processes have 
historical resonances with old colonial divisions of labour and space 
combined with new bio-political regimes of state authoritarianism (see Ong 
2000a). 
The empirical enquiry is sensitive to Malaysia's racial politics and the 
geographies of exclusion that characterised the MSC's development. The 
thesis seeks to bring the "MSC story" up to date with research conducted ten 
years after Bunnell's preliminary fieldwork. The objective of the study is to 
map the MSC's utopian development plans against a more grounded 
assessment of the material and symbolic consequences of technopole 
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planning practices in Cyberjaya. Specifically, the thesis seeks to highlight a 
range of disjunctures evident in the planning of Cyberjaya as a space for 
asserting 'intelligent' national development through a 'deterritorialised' mode 
of neoliberal economic globalisation. For all its purported uniqueness, the 
MSC mimicked existing technopole exemplars (notably Silicon Valley) and 
was directly influenced by the global diffusion of consultants, real estate 
interests and . multinational corporations (MNCs) who imagined the 
production of 'intelligent' urban spaces as essential ingredients for global 
economic success (Graham and Marvin 1999). More than ten years after its 
initial launch the thesis engages with the transnational processes by which a 
unique form of high-tech utopianism was inscribed on the Malaysian 
landscape through the MSC mega-project and promotes analytical sensitivity 
to the experiences of people who now inhabit these high-tech spaces. 
1.4. Research Aims and Questions 
While there has been a large amount of academic and policy research on 
technology parks, science cities, 'intelligent' corridors they have only 
provided a partial understanding of these dramatic and costly processes of 
urban restructuring (Rogers and Laursen 1984; Castells and Hall 1994; 
Saxenian 1994; lndergaard 2004; Roper and Grimes 2005; Searle and 
Pritchard 2005). There has been a shortage of critical, empirically informed 
research to address: (a) the politically infused, symbolic role of ICTs in 
technopole place marketing; (b) the compatibility of (neoliberal) technopole 
urbanism vis-a-vis broader national development goals; (c) the critical 
intersections between power, networked infrastructures and their 
implications for everyday life. Beyond the significant contribution of Bunnell 
(2002a; 2002b; 2003; 2004) work on the MSC has been at best descriptive if 
not specifically promotional in nature (Ibrahim and Goh 1998; Mazelan 
1999). In this light, the thesis is informed by three main aims: 
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• To respond to a paradigm challenge within urban geography over how 
to conceptualise the relationship between technology, society, and 
urban form. The thesis provides a conceptual critique of 
technologically deterministic technopole planning practices by 
focusing on their urban material consequences in a specific place at a 
specific time. 
• To illuminate emerging spaces of neoliberal modernity in Southeast 
Asia through a case study of the MSC mega-project. The thesis 
engages with 'information society' and 'new economy' discourses and 
addresses the political-symbolic work these discourses enact in 
promoting privatised 'high-tech' enclaves within national spaces. 
• To promote an analytical sensitivity to the locality in which technopole 
planning practices are mobilised in order to critically unpack their 
everyday geographies and uneven socio-spatial effects. 
Consequently, the project seeks to highlight counter-hegemonic 
narratives produced by individuals who live and work in Cyberjaya. 
The thesis seeks to examine four main research questions through 
qualitative methodologies. Each question is divided into a series of sub-
questions which guides the critical enquiry. 
Question 1: What is the nature of the Malaysian 'information society'? 
Sub-questions 
• What is the MSC and what are its critical constituents? 
• Why did a unique form of high-tech developmentalism manifest itself in 
Malaysia in the mid-1990s? 
• Who are the main 'ideological agents', and how did they discursively frame 
the MSC across different scales? 
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Question 2: How are the discursive architectures of the 'information 
society' inscribed on the Malaysian landscape? 
Sub-questions 
• What is the 'intelligent city' and its critical components? 
• How is the 'information society' (re)constructed at the urban scale through 
technopole planning practices in Cyberjaya? 
• How is Cyberjaya mobilised through transnational planning strategies? 
Question 3: To what extent does Cyberjaya's discursive framing map 
onto its existing everyday geographies? 
Sub-questions 
• What are the disjunctures between Cyberjaya's symbolic positioning as 
'intelligent city' and its material consequences? 
• What socio-spatial dividing practices are evident in Cyberjaya, and what are 
their urban 'splintering' effects? 
Question 4: How is everyday life technologically mediated in 
Cyberjaya? 
Sub-questions 
• What is the nature of the lived experience in Cyberjaya? 
• What are the textures of everyday ICT usage in Cyberjaya? 
• How do technologies mediate online and offline spatialities in Cyberjaya? 
1.5. Structure of the Thesis 
The thesis addresses the research questions in the following chapters. 
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Chapter 2 is the methodology chapter which outlines a practical framework 
for how the empirical research was conducted. The chapter is written in two 
parts. The first part outlines the research strategy discussing the case study 
approach and issues of positionality, reflexivity and generalisability. The 
second part introduces and evaluates the main research methodologies of 
discourse analysis, in-depth interviews and participant observation. 
Chapter 3 introduces . the conceptual framework and provides a critical 
overview of relevant theoretical literatures as they relate to the thesis. The 
first part contextualises the MSC in terms of the discursive architectures of 
the 'information society' and 'new economy'. The second part illuminates the 
main spatial concepts of 'deterritorialisation/reterritorialisation' and 'sticky 
places/slippery space' which inform the theoretical argument of the thesis. 
The third part discusses technopole planning practices. The fourth section 
provides a critique of technological determinism. The final section promotes 
an analytical sensitivity to the places in which these processes are 
embedded to allow counter-hegemonic narratives to emerge in the field. 
Chapter 4 is the first of four empirical chapters and addresses research 
question 1 to interrogate the nature of the Malaysian 'information society' 
and its critical constituents. The chapter provides an extended gee-historical 
framing of how the discursive architectures of the MSC have been 
constructed, by whom and to what effects. The chapter dissects how the 
MSC has been produced as an ideological-textual space for (re)imagining 
the nation and its citizens in a putative 'information society'. The chapter 
identifies the main 'ideological agents' responsible for constructing MSC 
futurology and examines how these discourse have been inscribed across 
national, regional and global scales. The latter half of the chapter contrasts 
this discursive mobilisation with the everyday workings of the MSC through a 
walking tour of the physical 'urban corridor'. 
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Chapter 5 examines research question 2 concerning how the discursive 
architectures discussed in Chapter 4 have been inscribed on the landscape 
through technopole planning practices. The chapter examines how 
Cyberjaya has been planned as both technological utopia and garden city to 
produce intelligent forms of living and being in Malaysia. The chapter argues 
that the city has been mobilised through modernist transnational planning 
practices and envisaged as a 'global exemplar' for technopole development. 
The chapter observes that despite the rhetoric of producing a national 'test 
bed' for 'intelligent-led' development, the project can be reappraised as an 
exclusive urban enclave. 
Chapter 6 addresses research question 3 and highlights the disjuncture 
between the discursive framing of Cyberjaya and its everyday geographies. 
The chapter questions Cyberjaya's development plans to produce a new 
'innovative milieu' by replicating the Silicon Valley 'model' to create a global 
I.T. hub. In the first half, the chapter outlines how Cyberjaya is place 
promoted and discursively framed as a 'sticky place' where local skills, 
infrastructure and capital attracts I.T. companies and research and 
development activities. The second half highlights the disjuncture between 
this urban boosterism and the prosaic reality of Cyberjaya as 'slippery space' 
characterised by the presence of low value-added, disconnected, back-office 
activities. 
Chapter 7 addresses research question 4 by examining how everyday life in 
Cyberjaya is technologically mediated. In the first part, the chapter examines 
technologically mediated everyday work practices in the back-offices of 
Cyberjaya's multinational corporations. In the second part, the chapter draws 
upon in-depth interviews with smart home residents to examine everyday 
encounters with technology in the home. Through the critical lens of the 
everyday the chapter brings to the fore the practices of globalisation as they 
are experienced, and socially produced, in specific places, at specific times. 
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Chapter 8 concludes the thesis with a summary of the main arguments from 
the thesis and draws out the wider academic and policy implications from the 
empirical findings. 
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Chapter 2. Methodology 
2.1. Introduction 
The chapter adopts an 'auto-ethnographic' approach in outlining the 
research strategy and methodological context for the thesis. It is written in 
two parts: the first part outlines the research strategy and the second part 
introduces and discusses the main methodologies. The thesis employs an 
ethnographic approach to the case study of Cyberjaya examining both social 
practices ("what people do") and social discourses ("what people say"). 
Social practices are examined through broadly ethnographic research 
methodologies including participant observation, fieldwork diaries, 'time-
space diaries' (Zimmerman and Wieder 1977; Latham 2003), and 'go-along 
interviews' (Kusenbach 2003). Discourse analysis and in-depth interviewing 
will examine the latter, attending to how the project is symbolically framed 
through the discursive practices of the project's main ideological 'architects' 
and subsequently understood by the 'users' living and working in Cyberjaya. 
The political and ethical implications involved in mobilising these 
methodologies are also explored in the chapter. 
The thesis is informed by a 'reflexive turn' (Emerson 2001) in geography 
which followed the 'crisis of representation'. Spurred by debates in post-
structuralism, post-colonial, and feminist critiques, such developments have 
shaken authorial claims to truth and objectivity across the social sciences. 
This is summed up by Clifford (1986: 3) who asks 'how is unruly experience 
transformed into an authoritative written account?'. In turn, the research here 
is premised by the assumption there are multiple realities and therefore 
multiple truths. Drawing upon the intellectual traditions of critical theory, post-
modernism, and post-structuralism I do not seek to 'capture reality' but to 
offer one interpretation of it which is 'partial', 'situated' (specific to the 
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research milieu), 'performative' (produced in, and through action) and 
relative (to the researcher's world-view and value system) (Haraway 1991 ). 
Accompanying these recent shifts are claims that research practices have 
failed to keep pace with 'theoretical talk' (Latham 2003; Crang 2005). The 
thesis seeks to address this 'methodological timidity' (Thrift 2000) in human 
geography through innovative methods - time-space diaries, go-along 
interviews, and narrative style fieldwork diaries. The empirical enquiry 
responds to a critique from Thrift (2000: 3) regarding the narrow use of 
qualitative techniques fixated on the notion of 'bringing back data and 
representing IT (nicely packaged up with illustrative quotations) and the 
narrow range of sensate life they register'. The research therefore sought to 
innovate methodologically in order to make existing techniques 'dance a 
little' (Latham 2003). 
The methodologies utilised in the project are qualitative in nature stemming 
from a humanistic critique in social science of scientific methods with its 
emphasis on 'objective' measurement of observable phenomena and their 
interrelations. Such methods are not wholly appropriate to social science 
research as people are 'purposeful agents whose own understandings of 
their actions in the world must be incorporated into, and even allowed to 
challenge, research accounts of them' (Whatmore 2003). This challenges 
the 'God trick' that presupposes an outside standpoint from which the 
researcher can neutrally read and narrate social reality (Herbert 2000). 
Within human geography the bodily presence of the researcher is now 
acknowledged (Crang 2002) and recent work has sought to emphasis their 
corporeal performances (Dewsbury and Naylor 2002; Nairn 2002; Routledge 
2002). Following these developments, fieldwork can be re-defined as 'a 
discursive process in which the research encounter is structured by the 
researcher and the researched' (England 2001: 210). To claim this as 'pure 
knowledge' lapses into essentialism and denies the diversity of viewpoints 
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and experiences of other people in the research (Said 1978). Qualitative 
methodologies offer an embodied account sensitive to the co-production· of 
power relations between the researcher, respondents and audiences. 
2.2. Research Strategy 
2.2.1. Case Study Design 
A case study approach is chosen as the research strategy to examine a 
single project (MSC-Cyberjaya) and a single community (Cyberjaya's 
residents and workers) in a specific place and time. 3 Qualitative methods sit 
well with case study approaches where an intensive, detailed examination of 
a specific case is required utilising multiple data sources. According to Yin 
(1984), case studies have three characteristics: they investigate 
contemporary phenomena within their real life contexts; they use multiple 
sources of evidence; and they focus on events where the boundaries 
between the phenomena under study and the context are not clearly evident. 
As a result the case study approach constitutes an intensive form of 
qualitative research allowing the researcher to get closer to social 
phenomena that survey data can't reach. 
The distinctive need for case studies arises out of the desire to understand 
complex social phenomena ... [and] allows an investigation to retain the 
holistic and meaningful characteristics of real life events.' 
(Yin 1984: 4) 
The case study strategy is adopted for two main reasons. Firstly, Cyberjaya 
is chosen as a global exemplar and critical case to examine technopole 
planning practices more closely. The city was launched in 1996 as the 
3 As May (2001) argues, many of the best known studies in social science are case studies, allowing 
the researcher to gain insights into complex situations not possible via other types of research design. 
However, case studies have been critiqued for their lack of empirical rigour, their lack of 
generalisation, and the length of time taken to produce a case study. 
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flagship 'intelligent city' for the Malaysian state's MSC mega-project. The 
development was purpose-built to create an ideal environment for living and 
working with ICTs and promoted by the state to facilitate a transition to a 
'new economy' and 'information society' in order to accelerate national 
development. The MSC project is chosen for analysis because it exemplifies 
the hyperbole, futurology, and urban boosterism that has characterised the 
discursive construction, and place promotion of technopole projects. 
Moreover, the marketing of MSC-Cyberjaya is bound up with the symbolic 
(re)construction of the entire nation and its citizens. The project brought 
about one of the largest urban development projects ever undertaken in 
Asia-Pacific with its plan to transform a 50 km by 15 km tract of plantation 
land into high-tech city. 
Secondly, the MSC-Cyberjaya is approached as an analytical 'test bed' 
where certain debates are evident and specific research questions can be 
answered. Rather than seeking to prove or disprove a specific hypothesis, 
the research seeks to prompt new theorisations which can be generalisable 
in specific contexts. The single case study is justified because it seeks to 
examine sets of decisions (over a period of time) which shaped the 
conceptualisation and planning of Cyberjaya; it explores how such decisions 
were implemented; and with what material and symbolic consequences. The 
methodologies mobilised in this project sought to interrogate these 
consequences across multiple scales at a number of empirical sites from 
everyday geographies of the workplace and home to the promotional 
speeches given by former Prime Minister Mahathir since the project's 
launch. Fieldwork was conducted in two periods from May 2006 to 
December 2006 and October 2007 to December 2007. Prior to this 
secondary documentary analysis was conducted and a list of field contacts 
drawn up and contacted. 
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The case study design perhaps misrepresents the research process as a 
linear unproblematic process of theorising followed by data gathering 
followed by drawing clear conclusions; otherwise known as 'deductive 
theory'. This raises questions about ontology and assumes that reality is 
something that can be hypothesised, tested, and confirmed.4 The field 
functions as a 'spatial imaginary' (Massey 2003); something which we try 
and grasp, and manipulate from our desks with the materials of the field laid 
out in front of us to make sense of. However, as my research experience 
suggests the field is always in motion and 'ceaselessly self-transforming' 
(Clark 2003: 38). The field is not a bounded space but in a state of becoming 
whereby 'doing research' is akin to a process of continuous experimentation. 
This involves following leads 'wherever they may take us' (Allen 2003) 
whereby new theorisations are induced from empirical data. Reading 
methodology text books would have the reader believe that the research 
process is orderly, where potentially any anomalies are accounted for and 
disaster always averted. 
2.2.2. Practicing the Field 
Doing overseas fieldwork is a central component of the geographical 
tradition, as evidenced in publications such as National Geographic. These 
contribute to ideals of 'romance' and 'exoticism' about the field. This was 
something that I had to contend with amongst my peers who were envious of 
my year long fieldwork stint in tropical Southeast Asia. However, in reality 
cross-cultural research presents many significant problems. This includes 
feelings of alienation that inevitably come from 'practicing the field' in a 
foreign setting. In addition, during overseas research the researcher enters a 
new cultural setting with different norms, sensibilities, and sensitivities 
compared to the 'home' country. When undertaking fieldwork overseas 
4 This is in direct contrast to work by Jacques Derrida, Gilles Deleuze and post-structuralist school 
which denies the existence of any objective reality as 'out there'. For them, all knowledge is partial, 
situated, and the world is never entirely unknowable. 
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researchers need to be sensitive to local attitudes and customs (Nash 2000). 
In Malaysia this required avoiding any discussions or interview questions on 
the topics of race and religion. These two "sensitive issues" were prohibited 
for discussion as a condition for receiving a research visa from the state. 
Specifically, undertaking intercultural research overseas raises issues 
concerning reflexivity in theory and positionality in practice. These debates 
have become increasing important in human geography research, influenced 
by post-colonial and feminist theory (Pile 1991; Kobayashi 1994; Merrifield 
1995; Rose 1997). Such conceptual moves examine the nature of the 
relationship between what one is researching, when one is researching and 
how one is researching it to illuminate the power relations in the places and 
spaces where research is carried out. I do not want to fall into a critique that 
'divides positionality formulaically into being insiders (good but impossible) 
and outsiders (bad but inevitable)' (Crang 2003a: 296). As much work in 
recent human geography has shown such a binary opposition is untenable 
and not reflected by experiences of the field (Dowler 2001 ; Mohammad 
2001; Valentine 2002). Despite the best intensions of reflexivity, the goal of 
establishing commonality between the researcher and researched therefore 
becomes a "mission impossible". 5 Nor do I want to revert to the 'facile 
delights of self-exploration' (Bourdieu 2003: 282) evident in overly auto-
ethnographic narratives of the self. Moreover, I argue that research is bound 
up with numerous inescapable paradoxes and often unresolved ethical 
dilemmas that are unavoidable components of the research process. As 
Rose (1997) observes, while it is easy to talk about reflexivity, putting it into 
practice may be impossible to achieve, and is bound to 'end up in failure'. 
Therefore, I seek to embrace the critical politics of power/knowledge 
5 Crang (2003: 493) has critiqued claims of reflexivity reliant upon 'problematic notions of a stable, 
tightly defined, unchanging research project conducted by a singular researcher, with one stable 
essential identity, both between locations and over time, and suggests the latter is also true of the 
researched'. 
22 
production and develop an awareness of its implications in my own critical 
ethnographic work. 
Detailed accounts on positionality and the politics of identity in relation to 
practicing the field have been undertaken elsewhere (Sparke 1996; Madge 
et al. 1997). Undertaking research as a white, British, male inevitability 
brought into play certain power relations. The project does not seek to speak 
for a marginal 'other'6 but rather takes their voices seriously by promoting in-
depth methodologies that make visible the often overlooked everyday 
geographies of high-tech urbanism in Malaysia. This is fraught with ethical 
and political dilemmas. 
'Though fieldwork is often portrayed as the classic colonial encounter in 
which the fieldworker lords it over his/her respondents, the fact of the matter 
is that it doesn't usually feel much like that at all. More often it is a curious 
mixture of humiliations and intimidations mixed with moments of insight and 
even enjoyment as you begin to imagine the world you have chosen to try 
and inhabit.' 
(Thrift 2003: 1 06) 
In this light, the generation of research materials 'is produced, not found, and 
(that) the activity of producing them is not all vested in the researcher' 
(Whatmore 2003: 90). Therefore, the research process can be conceived as 
a 'co-fabrication' process, working together with those whom we are 
researching. Such a 'position' produces a view of the world 'from specific 
locations, embodied and particular, and never innocent' (Rose 1997: 308). 
In the light of these debates, the project is attentive to ethical research 
practices. Firstly, I strive to make visible the relationship between the 
researcher and the researched. Complicated and shifting power 
relationships were an inevitable component of the fieldwork process and 
6 Debates over voice and authority have been explored elsewhere (McDowell1992; Kobayashi 1994). 
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worked both to my advantage and disadvantage in the field. I was often 
treated with suspicion by interviewees who were unsure of my presence in 
the research setting: "why did I choose Malaysia?" "Why Cyberjaya?" "What 
were the intentions of my research"? Doing fieldwork and being accredited 
by the state was sometimes a doubled-edged endorsement in the eyes of 
respondents because I was still an "outsider'' both as an academic 
researcher and as a non-Malaysian. In these situations I felt relatively 
'powerless' as a researcher. 
In certain cases being an "outsider'' made people more receptive to my 
position as a foreign researcher. Some interviewees greeted me with a 
warmth and openness I had not anticipated when starting out, inviting me 
into to their home, to eat with their families and offering to assist in any way 
possible. Whether driven by genuine warmth or the exoticism of a new 
cultural encounter, people in 'everyday settings' were open to cooperation. 
Once participants overcame initial scepticism, or suspicion, I found people to 
be of great help and I left the field with many new, unexpected friendships. 
However, there was still a great distance between myself and my 
participants by virtue of the material or analytical power of the researcher 
(Moss 1995). There are no guarantees that cultural commonality would have 
made access easier, or created a power neutral relationship. 
Secondly, I received informed consent from all participants involved in the 
project. I informed participants as fully as possible about the implications for 
participating in the research. I guaranteed to treat their information as 
confidential and offer anonymity in the research process. I have also tried to 
avoid privileging Anglo-American theorisations in the 'non-Western' context 
of Malaysia. Ethno-centrism is associated with incompleteness, 
oversimplification, a lack of historical understanding, or suppression and/or 
exaggeration in explanation (Williams 1986). Through extensive literature 
reviews and immersion in the research setting for a period of 15months I feel 
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that I have developed a detailed, though by no means complete, 
understanding of Malaysian culture, society and history. This time served to 
break down any binary modes of thought which may have positioned an 
imagined 'exotic' away versus 'home'. This is not to suggest that I have 
erased any trace of ethno-centricity, but these factors may have reduced the 
damage of any 'crude ethno-centrism' (Pickvance and Preteceille 1991 ). 
In terms of representation, I am required to send copies of my thesis to the 
Malaysian government to satisfy the conditions of the research visa. 
Findings will also be circulated to those who requested feedback during 
empirical work (e.g. companies, other government ministries, personal 
contacts). Such 'interpretive communities' will produce multiple readings of 
the material (Pryke 2003). 
2.3. Participant Observation 
Participant observation is one of a number methods in the project 
constitutive of an ethnographic approach to the research setting. Following 
from Appadurai (1996: 191-196): 'the task of ethnography now becomes the 
unravelling of a conundrum: what is the nature of locality, as a lived 
experience, in a globalised, deterritorialised world?' Such a conundrum can 
only be examined through critical focus on, and prolonged engagement in 
the everyday milieu. As Latham (2003) argues, everyday life and cultures 
are two of the 'great frontiers' for contemporary human geography for 
unpacking 'tissues of relationships and events' as they unfold in the research 
setting . These local cultures cannot be 'ring-fenced' from broader political, 
social economic processes because the global is not 'out there' but instead 
always 'in here' - in the everyday. The value in shifting focus to examine 
these taken for granted life worlds is discussed by Taussig (1991: 148) who 
notes: 
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'Quite apart from its open invitation to entertain a delicious anarchy, 
exposing principles no less than dogma to the white heat of daily practicality 
and contradiction, there is plurality in everydayness. My everyday has a 
certain routine, doubtless, but is also touched by a deal of unexpectedness, 
which is what many of us like to think of as essential to life, a metaphysics of 
life, itself.' 
Work done by Thrift (1997; 1999; 2000) in human geography has been 
pioneering in recognising the importance in everyday practices that shape 
human beings in specific sites. Thrift has highlighted human geography's 
current unease with work on the everyday due to its obsession with 
representation and a lack of critical focus on how power works through the 
everyday. In numerous publications he has argued: (1) time-space is 
fundamental to human life; (2) time-space comes into being through social 
practice; (3) these practices generate subjectivities through which the world 
is lived and experienced; (4) that subjectivities are the products of complex 
mixtures of human and non-human agencies. Following these critical 
theorisations the participant observation technique seeks to examine 
everyday practices and human geographies in emerging spaces of 
globalisation and urban transformation in Malaysia. 
Participant observation is a research practice that attempts to "get at" the 
"everyday-ness" of experience. It is one of the most accessible, yet under 
utilised research methodologies. According to Cook and Crang (1995: 4): 
'the basic purpose in using these methods is to understand parts of the world 
as they are experienced and understood in the everyday lives of people who 
actually act them out'. The origins of participant observation can be found in 
three traditions: anthropology (Malinowski 1922; Evans-Pritchard 1937); the 
Chicago School of sociology (Park et al. 1925); and humanist geography 
(Tuan 1974; Buttimer 1979; Seamon 1979). The basic premise for such a 
method is that long-term engagement with the field is required in order to 
gain rich and complex understandings. However, while the ethical and 
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political implications of the method are well debated (Katz 1992; Denzin 
1997) there exists no clear 'practical handbook'. As a result, early 
ethnographer's were encouraged to 'fly on their own' (Hughes 1980) or 
simply 'play it by ear' (Evans-Pritchard 1937). 
Participant observation is a processual methodology which comes into being 
through research as it is practiced (Laurier 2003). Research questions are 
seen to arise out of the phenomena and setting which the researcher is 
investigating. Therefore the methodology relies on participation, living in the 
world alongside those who you are seeking to research. It was 'for this 
reason that I spent a year in the research setting where I was observing, 
participating, and documenting everyday life with the residents and workers 
in Cyberjaya on a daily basis. Lengthy periods of participant observation 
were combined with frantic note taking session as and when possible. 
In the early period of fieldwork a large amount of my time was spent 
endlessly strolling around Cyberjaya, and then intermittently pausing to for 
observation sessions at fieldwork sites. This was true especially in my initial 
weeks of fieldwork when I was keen to make new contacts and survey 
Cyberjaya on foot. This research practice seemed to amuse local residents 
who couldn't understand why I would voluntarily walk around in the daily 
heat and humidity of a tropical climate. Consequently, at the end of the day 
during fieldwork I was often left feeling physically exhausted not by virtue of 
the amount of miles I had walked but more due to the climatic extremity. 
The goal of participant observation was not to gain complete coverage of a 
delimited space, but rather to understand better of the ways in which people 
interpret the world and organize their lives. My role as a researcher was to 
participate in people's daily lives for an extended period of time, watching 
what happens, listening to what is said, asking questions and: 'collecting 
whatever data are available to throw light on the issues that are the focus of 
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the research' (Hammersley and Atkinson 1995: 1 ). In doing so I constantly 
asked myself a series of questions: "what is happening?" "When is it 
happening?" "Where is it happening?" "Who is (and is not) engaging in what 
kind of activities?" "How are people responding to what is happening?" Such 
prompts were concerned with not what is represented, but instead what is 
done in the research setting. Walking practices took me into the corporate 
campuses of MSC companies, into gated communities (upon showing the 
guard my research pass), along streets, and into parks. 
Alongside walking practices I focused on several key sites for participant 
observation practices which would bring me into contact with a diverse range 
of people. As I explore in the following section, some of these contacts 
participated in semi-structured interviews to provide more detailed transcripts 
of their experiences. Firstly, my main ethnographic site was the Cyberia 
smart home complex. This was where I recruited and observed a large 
number of Cyberjaya residents and workers7. Secondly, I spent a great deal 
of time at Cyberjaya's 'Street Mall' shopping complex. This was the main 
commercial and transport hub and contained a number of restaurants and 
cafes. Street Mall was frequented mostly by local residents, but also by staff 
of Cyberjaya companies during lunch times, and evenings during breaks in 
the night shift. It was therefore a conducive milieu for listening to and 
observing people. Thirdly, I had planned to undertake a large amount of 
observational analysis at Cyberjaya's city command centre (CCC), which 
was billed in the promotional materials as Cyberjaya's 'interactive community 
hub'. However, on my first visit to the CCC I soon realised the building was 
virtually empty, and few residents used its facilities (Chapter 5). 
As Junker (1960) has outlined, there are multiple roles the researcher can 
adopt during participant observation. Upon visiting these research sites my 
7 The street mall contained 4 restaurants, 2 cafes and numerous other shops and small businesses. It 
was an open plan shopping area therefore a research site to which access did not have to be 
negotiated. 
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role shifted according to the situation and circumstance of the research 
setting. While observing staff in the offices of MNCs I was a complete 
observer avoiding interaction with participants in order to observe everyday 
work practices in Cyberjaya. Observation was prioritised as a means for 
documenting these practices as they occurred 'naturally' without the 
interference of a researcher constantly asking questions. At other times I 
was an observant participant actively engaged in social interaction with 
participants in social settings (e.g. the local cafe, or park) in Cyberjaya. 
Whatever the role, I was always an active player in the research setting, 
therefore affecting the dynamic of the setting. As I was attempting to 
understand the research setting through the eyes of the participants being 
covert allowed for more naturalised conversations and observations to occur 
albeit raising the usual ethical dilemmas. I didn't feel a constant need to tell 
people in casual conversations, or during chance encounters who I was, and 
what my purpose was. If the researcher-participant relationship developed 
further then I outlined the nature of my research, and this would have led to 
arrangements for a more formalised interview. In general, I was completely 
open about my research role where formal research was conducted. I 
explained the nature of the project to participants fully. 
In participant observation I was the primary tool for collecting data. I kept a 
field diary during the fieldwork period to note down observations and reflect 
upon experiences. Keeping a diary was an invaluable tool as participant 
observation led to chance encounters and 'go-along interviews' which were 
unplanned, informal, and therefore unrecorded. Furthermore, it allowed me 
to narrate my experience of the field through my embodied experience of 
place in Cyberjaya. At the end of a day in the field, getting back 'home' to 
write in my diary was a reflexive, enjoyable, but also a subjective process. 
Ethnographic style writing is 'in part, an act of betrayal, it is the very nature of 
representation that misrepresentation occurs' (Keith 1992: 554). Therefore, 
extracts from my field diary are not attempts to represent the 'other' to a 
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specific audience but are fleeting snapshots of Cyberjaya, as I experienced 
and observed it. 
Allied to traditional ethnographic methods I embraced new research 
practices with varying degrees of success. These methodologies were to 
examine how informants conducted their activities in a naturalised 
environment.8 Methodological innovation stems from a frustration with 
traditional participant observation techniques that rely on specific insider 
knowledge and access in order to gain a 'complete' understanding of the 
research setting. This was virtually impossible achieve in Cyberjaya where 
my status as an outsider was continually problematic. 
Firstly, influenced by U.S. anthropologists Zimmerman and Wieder (1977) 
and Latham's (2003) 'diary interview, diary photograph' method, I invited 
participants to undertake 'time-space diaries'. The method reworks 
traditional methodologies (the interview, the field diary, mappings) to create 
a 'methodological hybrid' that emphasise everyday performance and 
practices. I invited interviewees to undertake participant 'time-space' diaries 
to convey a sense of how places were actually practiced. Diaries focused 
specifically on daily patterns of ICT usage paying attention to: who is 
connecting to whom? Via what media? And what information is being 
exchanged? Such questions sought to examine how ICTs affect the 
organisation of social relationships across time and space, and also 
attending to the role of technology in everyday action and practice. I asked 
participants to conduct a diary of their ICT usage during the week, within and 
outside the home. I received a total of 6 diaries, mainly from students who 
had the time to conduct diaries for the research project. Despite such 
limitations the diary data did provide valuable material on the daily textures 
8 As Kusenbach (2003) argues, one of the problems with the interview and participant observation 
method is that people do not comment on 'what is going on' while acting in natural settings. In both 
cases parts of the lived experience remain invisible, or, if noticed, unintelligible. 
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of ICT usage in Cyberia.9 The diaries were discussed in informal, unrecorded 
interviews with participants. 
Secondly, I conducted a series of 'go-along interviews' (Kusenbach 2003) 
with participants. During 'go-alongs' I accompanied participants on their 
'natural' outings in Cyberjaya. By asking questions, listening and observing I 
explored the subject's stream of experiences and practices as they moved 
through the city, interacting with its physical and social environment10 . The 
usefulness of the technique was that I could observe my informant's spatial 
practices in situ while accessing their experiences and interpretations at the 
same time. As Kusenbach (2003) argues, the method can bring the research 
closer to spatial practices, everyday perception, biographies, social 
architectures and social realms. The method has origins in the 
phenomenological tradition of experience (Tuan 1974; Relph 1976; Seamon 
1979). It is a hybrid of interviewing and participant observation techniques 
but offers a more outcome orientated version of "hanging out" with key 
informants. This method - combined with unstructured interviews - allowed 
for qualitative depth as participants talked about subjects within their own 
frames of reference. 
I tried not to direct conversations with participants, but when obvious 
features of the landscape came into view I would ask the participant to 
comment. My 'go-alongs' mostly occurred on foot with participants around 
Cyberjaya and lasted from a few minutes to approximately one hour. I 
conducted go-alongs with participants in a number of settings in Cyberjaya 
including the Multimedia University, Cyberjaya Nature Park, Cyberia Smart 
9 Though such diaries can be conceived as a form of performance in themselves, embodying the 
personal view of the diarist with his/her own unique frames of reference. The entries are not a 
definitive account but rather offer a range of snapshots and vignettes of a particular social space in the 
making. Therefore, it is important to be sensitive to the partiality of these accounts. 
10 Like participant observation and interviews the experiences are not 'natural' in the complete sense, 
and are still highly contrived. The presence of the research will undoubtedly unsettle the nature of 
everyday experience. However, 'go-alongs' do offer a better chance for uncovering aspects of 
individual experience hidden during an interview session for example. 
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Homes, and the Street Mall. Go-alongs were not recorded, though I did 
make notes during the activity where possible, and soon after completion of 
the activity. 
To analyse my participant observation data I 'collated' all the primary 
materials from the ethnographic methods including my field diary, 
participant's time-space diaries, and photographs. I coded the diary material 
for specific themes that came to prominence in conjunction with 
photographic analysis of key field sites. Rather than mapping data against 
my pre-existing theories new meaning emerged through data analysis. This 
inevitably led to re-theorising, pulling apart plans and putting them back 
together again to make sense of the piles of transcripts, two field diaries, and 
several gigabytes worth of digital photography. This stage of the research 
process attended to data critically to decontextualise and recontextualise 
parts of it in order to recognise new themes, or observations (Cook and 
Crang 2007). Unlike the accounts written in numerous methodology 
textbooks I have read, this process was messy, changing through each 
round of analysis, and highly fraught. 
2.4. Semi-Structured Interviews 
'A semi-structured interview is a verbal exchange where one person, the 
interviewer, attempts to elicit information from another person by asking 
questions. Although the interviewer prepares a list of predetermined 
questions, semi-structured interviews unfold in a conversational manner 
offering participants the chance to explore issues they feel are important.' 
(Long hurst 2003: 117) 
At its most basic form, an interview is a series of straightforward questions 
and answers (Silverman 1985). As a highly accessible technique it has 
become staple in the methodological diet of qualitative research. As Brenner 
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et al (1985: 7) note: 'if you want to know something about people's activities, 
the best way finding out is to ask them through the activity of everyday talk'. 
Although its value lies in allowing for open responses and scope for 
discussion, critics have pointed out the researcher bias, subjectivity, and lack 
of reliability inherent in the method. However, its popularity reflects the 
importance attached to 'intensive methods' within human geography in 
recent years (Eyles 1988; Pile 1991; McDowell 1992). 
Rather than follow a rigid question/answer sequence where 'the other party 
speaks, and properly offers an answer to the question and says no more 
than that' (Sacks 1992: 230) I conducted semi-structured interviews. In this 
format I devised a set of predetermined questions or topics (normally around 
8-10 for a one hour interview) which were to provide the basis for discussion 
with research participants. Often the order or depth in which topics were 
addressed depended upon feedback from the respondent and the flow of the 
discussion. This technique enabled me to probe and gain a richer 
understanding as more naturalised forms of conversation could take place. 
Although participants were clear that they were being interviewed, and 
informed consent was given, the structure of talk was more conversational 
style. The aim of such a technique, following the phenomenological tradition, 
was 'not to be representative but to understand how individuals experience 
and make sense of their own lives' (Valentine 2001: 111 ). However, 
interviews do not create a 'truth' or an external reality but rather an 'internal 
reality constructed as both parties contrive to produce the appearances of a 
recognisable interview' (Silverman 1985: 165). 
Getting people to participate is the most crucial dimension to the success or 
failure of any case study. Such persons not only provide the case study 
investigator with insights into an issue but can also suggest sources of 
corroborative evidence. In conducting interviews I acknowledge participants 
may have felt comfortable or uncomfortable depending on a whole range of 
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factors relating to how questions were framed, use of recording devices, 
their identity, my positionality, and the place where the interview was 
conducted. These factors inevitably affected the nature of the 
interviewer/interviewee relationship and data collected. Despite 
reconstructing my own identity during the research process to appear more 
'professional' - smart clothes, hair cut, clean shaven - I have no evidence 
that such strategies put interviewees at ease, or made them more anxious. 
In general interviews were taped with consent from the participant. This had 
the advantage of providing me with a verbatim transcript for the interview, 
and was therefore much easier to code and analyse, reducing the potential 
for misquotes. However, the downside was that some interviewees were less 
forthcoming in the presence of my digital dictaphone. Once the tape recorder 
was switched off at then end of interviews the body language of participants 
visibly altered. "Off the record" participants were keen to engage in more 
casual topic-related conversations. A large amount of valuable information 
was divulged in these discussions which enabled me to get much closer to 
the participants, and build up relationships of trust with interviewees. 11 
Interviews were conducted in either English or Bahasa Malaysia. Prior to 
fieldwork I spent six months in Malaysia learning Bahasa Malaysia as 
preparation. At the end of this period, though not fluent, I was more than 
conversational, and confident that interviews could be carried out in the 
'native language' if required. However, the majority of interviews were 
conducted in English due to several reasons: the majority of business elites 
used English by default as their working language; for Chinese and Indian 
Malaysians the Malay language is highly politicised and is not considered 
their 'mother tongue' (Cantonese and Tamil are); lastly, English is 
considered a politically neutral language (colonial history aside) by locals 
11 Details from these exchanges were noted in my field diary directly after the event. 
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and foreigners 12 . I conducted interviews in Malay where interviewees 
preferred to use Bahasa Malaysia, though interviews were invariably 
recorded in Bahasa Campur (mixed language) of Malay and English. 13 
Perhaps more importantly, Malay proved to be invaluable for navigating the 
field sites, and making informal conversations with taxi drivers, bus drivers, 
security guards, restaurant staff who were integral to the day-to-day rhythms 
and routines of Cyberjaya but poorly versed in English. Interviews in Malay 
were later transcribed into English. 14 
Lastly, transcription was the process whereby speech became material data, 
albeit partial, and slightly inadequate (Laurier 1998).15 Transcription was a 
'research activity' in itself as I engaged in close and repeated listening to 
recordings which often revealed previously un-noted recurring features 
relating to the organisation of talk. Transcripts include not only spoken words 
but also features of talk such as utterances, pauses, and non-verbal signals. 
Transcripts construct a certain version of talk which is partly guided by the 
researcher's questioning. This does not mean that the transcript is in some 
way misleading or false, but simply that it is not objective. Once interviews 
were transcribed they were coded to classify data into categories using the 
software application Hyper-research. This enabled me to highlight and mark 
up sections of the transcript which related to the main thematic concerns of 
each research question. 
12 It is a language which no single ethnicity can claim ownership of, therefore, it can be considered to 
be a pluralistic and inclusive language. However, in general English is poorly spoken in Malaysia 
especially beyond Kuala Lumpur in more rural areas. Although, I found that a large number of political 
and business elites were English-educated in foreign universities in the UK, USA, and Australia. 
13 This is common in Malaysia due to its multicultural and multilingual composition for people to be well 
versed in several languages. Therefore, participants would often mix their Malay with English as a 
matter of habit, or to impress people in conversation where knowledge of English is seen to be 
emblematic of higher education or social status. 
14 This is problematic in itself as meanings can be lost or invented. 
15 In his paper on 'Geographies of talk' Laurier (1998) called for more attention to turn-taking and 
dialogue, as opposed to focusing just on the answers to questions in interviews. 
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I targeted two categories of informants: firstly, residents and workers in 
Cyberjaya; secondly, political and business elites influential in framing the 
discursive architectures of the project. 
2.4. 1. Resident Interviews 
The first group of individuals I interviewed were the everyday 'users' of 
Cyberjaya including residents and workers. These interviews focused on 
how individuals made sense of Cyberjaya and paid attention to their 
everyday practices, routines. Often residents were interviewed several times 
during fieldwork period to gain a deeper understanding of the taken for 
granted aspects of the participant's everyday life and knowledge. 
Firstly, I conducted in-depth interviews with residents I recruited from the 
Cyberia 'smart home' complex within Cyberjaya. This location was chosen 
due to its position as Cyberjaya's 'flagship' smart home development. It was 
also conceptualised as one of the main 'wired' sites in Cyberjaya in the 
original project outline (together with the Multimedia University and the 
CCC). Furthermore, the management of the complex were fully cooperative 
with the study and gave numerous interviews about Cyberia and were happy 
to allow me access to undertake resident interviews and participant 
observation within the perimeter. This was crucial as Cyberia is a 'gated 
community' style development where access is restricted by a security 
barrier on entry, and security guards parole the perimeter in order to keep 
the location secure. 
I recruited participants through several means. First, I contacted the 
residents' association in Cyberia outlining nature of my research and asking 
them to circulate a leaflet calling for residents to participate in the study. 
Allied to this I put notices up on residential association notice boards. 
Secondly, I posted a similar notice on electronic message boards on the 
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internet. The most responses came from a message board run by MMU 
students living in Cyberia entitled 'Cyberia Talk'. I made contact with two 
message board administrators who were willing to cooperate and 
subsequently became gatekeepers for a large network of contacts 
comprising students and workers living in Cyberia. Thirdly, I recruited 
residents directly in situ whilst I was conducting participant observation in 
Cyberia. A large amount of time was spent 'hanging out' in Cyberia and 
observing everyday life. This inevitably brought me into contact with 
residents in communal spaces in Cyberia such as recreation grounds, 
restaurants, cafes, swimming pools etc. I took advantage of chance 
encounters to introduce myself and my project and, where appropriate, 
asked residents if they were willing to participate. All of the above 
recruitment strategies inevitably led to a 'snowball effect' as I was put in 
contact with friends and associates of participants. 
Interviews with residents were designed to talk about three specific issues: 
(1) their understanding of the 'intelligent city' discourses; (2) how they used 
ICTs in their everyday lives; (3) how ICTs intersect the on-line and off-line 
spaces of Cyberjaya. Interviews discussed in detail participants' personal 
histories about why they had come to Cyberjaya, what their experiences 
were, and their prior expectations about living in an 'intelligent city'. This then 
led onto conversations about how residents used ICTs both within and 
outside the smart home, what kind of connections they were making, to 
whom, and with what effects. After interviews I asked participants if they 
were willing to participate in 'go-along interviews' or conduct 'time-space 
diaries'. 
Secondly, I interviewed 'knowledge workers' employed by MSC companies 
in Cyberjaya. Recruitment followed similar strategies as listed above. In 
particular, two networks were the most fruitful during the research period. 
One of these was a Cyberia resident who worked at IBM in Cyberjaya. I 
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recruited him by chance during an observation session at one of Cyberia's 
cafes when I overhead him talking about his work within IBM. I introduced 
myself and asked if he would be willing to cooperate with the research. By 
chance his neighbour was also the head of the residents' association who I 
had previously made contact with, who confirmed my credentials. He was 
responsible for managing a team within the IBM Asia-Pacific contact centre 
in Cyberjaya, and put me in touch with members of his team living both 
within and outside Cyberia. Over the following months numerous interviews 
were conducted with him and his colleagues about everyday work practices 
within IBM Cyberjaya. Ironically, IBM was one of the companies which 
refused to provide an interview when I contacted their executive 
management. I explained this to the participants and they agreed to 
participate in the research as long as the data was provided anonymously 
and that interviews would be conducted away from their office. 
The second network of contacts developed from a worker within Shell IT 
Cyberjaya who was introduced to me through a friend in Cyberia. Once I 
explained the nature of the research to him he was willing to cooperate, and 
after building up trust, suggested I contact other members within his team. 
He was a senior figure within Shell IT global support team and invited me to 
visit the Shell office in order to conduct interviews with him, and then 
members of his staff within the team. I was surprised at the level of 
openness afforded to me by Saiful and his team which was in stark contrast 
to the secrecy required when researching members of the IBM team who 
constantly emphasised that I was not to use their name in quotes. 
Interviewing workers inside and outside the office inevitably created different 
power dynamics. In a non work related milieu (e.g. their homes, or in a cafe) 
participants were generally more open and perhaps willing to discuss issues 
· which they would have shied away from in the presence of management 
staff. In contrast, going inside companies gave me access to observations of 
the everyday work practices in Cyberjaya's shared services and outsourcing 
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industry (SSO). I was able to observe routines first-hand rather than listen to 
them being described to me via interview. However, when interviewed 
(invariably in a corporate meeting room) participants were less willing to talk 
openly, and were often clock-watching, conscious of the fact they were 
devoting company time to me. 
As Sin (2003) observes, social research methodology texts have often 
overlooked the spatial context in which interviews are actually carried out 
beyond recommending 'ideal social situations' where interviews should take 
place. The scenario above exemplifies the importance of 'placing interviews' 
and the subsequent effects of what Elwood and Martin (2000) term 
'particular microgeographies of socio-spatial relations' that influence the kind 
of data that can be produced from in-depth interviews. They observe how in 
different locations participants are situated differently with respect to 
identities and roles that structure their experience and actions so that 
interviewees produce different types of information depending on where they 
are interviewed. According to Oberhauser (1997) and Elwood and Martin 
(2000), interviews with both knowledge workers and residents became an 
opportunity for further participant observation to consider the physical 
attributes of the site, and observe which individuals were present, how they 
interacted with one another, and the interviewer. In the case of Cyberjaya 
workers the multiple locations (e.g. the home, workplace, or cafe) chosen for 
interviews brought to bear both advantages and disadvantages that had to 
be finally balanced and ethically reconciled during the research process. 
Interviews with 'knowledge workers' were designed to examine the nature of 
everyday work practices within Cyberjaya. Interviews followed three main 
lines of enquiry: (1) to examine the nature of work practices in Cyberjaya 
companies; (2) to observe how these work practices were mediated by ICTs; 
(3) to explore what forms of digital/non-digital connections were being made 
to whom, via what media, and what information was being exchanged. 
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Interviews discussed 'geographies of talk' (Laurier 1998) examining how 
day-to-day communications stretched out across distances, traversing 
multiple temporalities via transnational connections. Rather than researching 
cultures of practice in the research and development sector in Cyberjaya 
(which I planned to do, but found to be non-existent) my emphasis shifted 
during fieldwork to focus on the SSO industry comprising back-office and 
customer support operations for MNCs. These interviews were productive in 
highlighting the disjunctures (which became ever more prevalent) between 
the hyped discourse of 'intelligent' high-tech development and its prosaic 
reality on the ground. The case study approach enabled me to probe further 
construction of Cyberjaya as a 'discursive space' versus its experience as a 
'lived space' and served to challenge my own pre-formulated expectations 
about the field setting. As a consequence several of the original research 
questions were changed and new empirical avenues were pursued. 
2.4.2. Elite Interviews 
By elites I mean a group of individuals who 'hold, or have held, a privileged 
position in society and are likely to have had more influence on political 
outcomes than general members of the public' (Richards 1996: 199). I 
interviewed two groups of elites within Cyberjaya. Firstly, I interviewed 
political elites within the government and quasi-government organisations 
who were instrumental in framing and mobilising discourse. The main body 
of elite interviews were conducted with individuals working with MDEC- the 
government body overseeing the MSC. Within MDEC I interviewed 
individuals within numerous departments including Corporate 
Communications, Marketing Division, Cybercities Division, 
Technopreneurship Division, Shared Services and Outsourcing Division, 
MSC Innovation Centre, and the Creative Multimedia Cluster. Interviews 
were conducted at the MDEC headquarters in Cyberjaya. I also interviewed 
individuals within other government bodies including Sepang Municipal 
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Council (with administrative control over Cyberjaya) and Cyberview (the 
government holding company for Cyberjaya incorporated with the ministry of 
finance). Interviewees within these organisations provided a range of 
perspectives on policy and development. 
Secondly, I interviewed business elites. This included executive level staff 
within MSC status companies in Cyberjaya such as HSBC, BMW, Fujitsu, 
Motorola, Panasonic, Satyam, Shell, and Technomen. Interviews were 
conducted with country managers, heads of corporate communications, chief 
executives or operating officers within the companies. Where unqualified 
respondents were put forward companies were excluded as it would have 
been impolite to request for a more senior figure. 16 Interviews provided 
background to individual companies, the nature of their operations (numbers 
of staff, foreign to local ratio·, nature of work etc.) in Cyberjaya to build up a 
profile of the types of activities being undertaken. Discussions also touched 
upon how individuals understood the discursive construction of the MSC, 
and Cyberjaya, as imagined high-tech spaces, and how this related to their 
experience of Cyberjaya as a live/work environment. 
Both groups were contacted in the first instance by an 'official letter' outlining 
my background, the nature of my research, what I wanted to gain from the 
interview, and how I would use the data. I searched for contacts on 
governmental web pages, or in instances where these were not found called 
organisations directly to ask for the contact details of the relevant person. I 
was fortunate to make a contact in MDEC through a mutual friend. He 
became the gatekeeper for political elites and provided me with contact 
information for MDEC staff throughout the duration of the fieldwork period. 
For business elites, a list of MSC status companies is displayed on the 
MDEC web pages (www.mdec.com.my) providing addresses and contact 
16 By unqualified I mean respondents who could not provide information on the company as a whole, 
and the operations therein. 
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numbers for companies. Letters to both companies and government bodies 
generally remained unanswered and I followed up with personal phone calls 
to relevant individuals. Where interviewees agreed to be interviewed this 
was generally on the condition that I emailed a list of questions or topics that 
I wanted to cover in the interview. I assumed that this was to ensure that 
questions didn't touch upon on any politically 'sensitive' issues which might 
cause discomfort or embarrassment for the interviewee. After the interview 
each participant was asked to suggest other individuals who could also 
assist with the research project. 
Gaining access to power elites was crucial because they have special 
access to discourse: they are literally the ones that have the most say. It was 
important to interview these individuals to critically examine their role in the 
planning of 'intelligent' development strategies. These individuals have 
extensive 'symbolic power' by virtue of their resources to shape and control 
discourse. Their power stems from access to, and over, the planning, 
setting, organisation and agenda of discourse. The more discourse genres, 
contexts, participants, scopes and texts that power elites control the more 
powerful they become. Similarly lack of power is measured by the lack of 
active or controlled access to discourse (van Dijk 1993). I want to investigate 
the disjuncture between how discourses are constructed by power elites and 
consumed by 'ordinary people'. 
Interviewing elites was the most problematic part of the research process. 
Elites were inaccessible and highly conscious of their own importance. 
Some, especially in companies, refused requests for an interview 
altogether. 17 A great deal of time was spent on the phone, writing emails, 
being stood up or waiting for people to appear. To gain access to elites I had 
to build up relationships of trust. Elites were often highly suspicious of my 
17 Some companies were openly hostile to the idea of being 'studied' and said it was not in their 
'corporate interest' to provide academic researchers with interviews. 
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motives for doing the research and were concerned how the data provide 
would be used. Government workers were acutely aware that anything which 
may come across as being 'critical' would probably result in them losing their 
job. While business elites are among some of the most privileged groups in 
the global community, they also had concerns about corporate confidentiality 
and were worried that the information they divulged would find its way to 
competitors. I sought to build relationships of trust by assuring participants 
early on that the research was confidential in nature, and furthermore that 
anonymity would be guaranteed. Throughout the research aliases are used 
to protect the identities of the research participants. Once elites agreed to 
meet I built relationships of trust in person through several means: 
introducing myself as a 'researcher'; ensuring that I had detailed knowledge 
of the interview subject; maintaining a smart appearance to construct a 
professional identity; emphasising that the research was approved by the 
Malaysian government; communicating that I was affiliated to Universiti of 
Malaya 18; and, mentioning other individuals who had agreed to participate in 
the research. Together these factors helped to cultivate trust and create the 
'snowball effect' (Richards 1996) whereby elites opened up their network of 
contacts to me. 
Despite these problems elite interviews were one of the most fruitful parts of 
the research process and served to illuminate a set of decisions: why they 
were taken, how they were implemented, and with what result. As Crang 
(2002: 648) argues 'qualitative studies of elites can inform understandings in 
an unequal world'. The function of elite interviews is to gain inside 
information - which can rarely be gleaned from examining books - by 
providing insights from actors who played an important role in shaping the 
MSC vision. As I built up a rapport with interviewees through relationships of 
trusts I was able to ask contentious or critical questions. I acknowledge 
18 Universiti Malaya is the oldest and most prestigious Malaysian university. 
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these accounts to be highly subjective 19. Often I had the experience where 
interviewees would mislead me about an issue in order to portray certain 
events or components of the project in a more favourable light2°. Some 
interviewees wanted to control the interview and the nature of topics 
discussed. Where this occurred I had to politely, but firmly, draw the 
interviewee back to the relevant subject. Furthermore, it needs to be noted 
that elites do not have perfect, complete knowledge of the world around 
them, even if they suggest they do (Cook and Crang 2007). 
2.5. Discourse Analysis 
Alongside elite interviewing with the discursive architects of the MSC I 
conducted a discourse analysis of official speeches, corporate brochures, 
policy materials, and field photographs. Discourse analysis also examined 
media output dated 1995-2008 from a variety of sources including all major 
Malaysian newspapers (The Star, New Straits Times, The Sun, Bernama, 
Berita); leading business magazines (The Edge, Asiaweek, Asian Wall 
Street Journal, The Economist, Malaysian Business) and online sources 
(Malaysiakini, MDEC, Malaysia Government). Discourse analysis can be 
understood as a field of research rather than single practice (Taylor 2001 ). 
The technique is rooted in the history of semiotics that posits through an 
analysis of signs and symbols in text, deeper underlying meanings, imbued 
with specific power relations, can be uncovered. It also draws upon 
influence from speech. act theory and pragmatics (Filmore 1984), 
conversational analysis (Garfinkel 1967), interactional socio-linguistics 
(Goffman 1959; 1967; Gumperz 1982a; 1982b), Foucauldian discourse 
analysis and critical discourse analysis (Fowler 1981; Fairclough 1995). As 
Hastings (1999) and Lees (2004) note, discourse analysis has been an often 
19 As Richards (1996) has argued, elite interviews though often fruitful are highly subjective acts of 
data collection. This stems from concerns about the reliability of the interviewee regarding his/her 
memory for recalling events, their motives in providing interview, subjective portrayals about their own 
role in an event or process. 
20 When this happened I did not step in to correct the interviewee. These moments were important 
'gaps' between the discursive constructions of MSC by the state vis-a-vis its material development. 
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under-utilised, or poorly understood, methodology for urban geographical 
research. 
Broadly Foucauldian in nature, my discourse analysis examines how a 
hegemonic high-tech development imaginary is mobilised through specific 
discursive architectures by the state and then inscribed on the urban 
landscape. The development of Cyberjaya is shaped by competing 
discourses for political-economic development that is framed across 
national, regional, and global scales (Chapter 4). Discourse analysis 
examines the enactment of dominance via two primary means: (1) through 
text and talk in specific contexts mobilised by discursive architects; (2) 
indirectly through influencing the MSC users (e.g. attitudes, norms, values, 
ideologies). 
Discourse can be described as 'the sum of communicative interactions' 
(Sharp and Richardson 2001: 195). At the simplest level when we talk to 
each other, we are engaged in 'discourse'. On another level, discourse in 
policy making happens at meetings and in the consultation processes 
surrounding the preparation of policies, plans and programmes. Analysis of 
conversations, speeches, articles, statements can all be regarded as 
examples of discourse as text. While discourse is a communicative 
exchange it also goes beyond the text and becomes a 'complex entity that 
extends into the realms of ideology, strategy, language and practice, and is 
shaped by the relations between power and knowledge' (Sharp and 
Richardson 2001: 195). Therefore discourse is something which is both 
mobilised through and within texts (e.g. the corporate brochure, policy 
documents) and manifests as a set of practices (e.g. through speech 
communities21 ). 
21 This draws from the work on 'conversation analysis'; a detailed form of discourse analysis of speech 
pioneered three sociologists, notably, Sacks, Schegloff, Jefferson. 
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The relationship between discourse, power and hegemony is important here 
and folds into two analytical strands. 22 Firstly, it relates to the long Marxist 
tradition of political economy and ideology critique which focuses on how 
hegemonic ways of thinking and talking about things serve vested interests 
(Taylor 2001). Secondly, Foucauldian discourse analysis (a critique of 
Marxism, and the dominant strand in human geography) seeks to examine 
how discourses does not so much reflect reality, but rather create their own 
'regimes of truth'. Discourses for Michel Foucault (1976; 1977; 1979) 
comprise groups of related statements which govern the variety of ways in 
which it is possible to talk about something and which makes it difficult, if not 
impossible to think and act outside them at a specific historical moment. 
Therefore, what can be said about a specific subject matter, how it is said 
and by whom stems from a set of discursive practices (statements which 
provide a language for talking about something). Such statements are seen 
to present an unproblematic way of talking about the topic. Discursive 
practices are characterised by 'a delineation of a field of objects, the 
definition of a legitimate perspective for the agent of knowledge, and the 
fixing of norms for the elaboration of concepts and theories' (Foucault 1977: 
199). As Hajer (1995: 44) argues, this incorporates a specific ensemble of 
ideas, concepts, and categorisations that are produced, reproduced, and 
transformed in a particular set of practices through which meaning is given to 
physical and social realities'. Foucault's arguments are post-structuralist in 
nature and sought to question how, why, and by whom the truth is attributed 
to specific arguments, and not to others. Importantly, there is an "everyday-
ness" to the way in which his discourses work their way through our 
normative routines and practices. As in the work of Billig (1996) and Shotter 
(1993), discourse is something which is practiced and used to regulate the 
conduct of others. I examine through the case study how such discursive 
22 In reality these two strands have always been mixed. For example, Said's (1978) discourse analysis 
of Orientalism incorporates Gramscian ideology critique with post-structural understandings of 
discourse as constitutive. 
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practices work through everyday actions and practices to construct certain 
understandings of the relationship between technology, society and space. 
My analysis speaks to 'Critical Discourse Analysis' (CDA) which is 
concerned with how power is mobilised through discursive events and how 
texts are produced, distributed and consumed in specific sociocultural 
contexts.23 As Fairclough (1995: 2) notes: 'the power to control discourse is 
seen as the power to sustain particular discursive practices with particular 
ideological investments in dominance over other alternative (including 
oppositional) practices'. In CDA this is closely related to a theory of 
hegemony - drawing on the work of Gram sci (1971) and Hall et al (1977) -
which 'highlights both how power relations constrain and control productivity 
and creativity in discourse practice, and how a particular relatively stabilised 
configuration of discourse practices ("order of discourse") constitutes one 
domain of hegemony' (Ibid: 2). Hegemony operates in all domains of social, 
cultural life and is sustained ideologically through 'common sense' 
assumptions in everyday life. CDA examines how through certain 
'ideological-discursive formations' discourse becomes naturalised through 
the use of language. For example, this may occur through the repetition of, 
or emphasis on a series of specially selected phrases or words that serve to 
frame the discourse (Chapter 4). 
CDA assumes three analytical points of entry: discourse-as-text, discourse-
as-discursive-practice, and discourse-as-social-practice. Firstly, it examines 
the role of texts (written and spoken) with their linguistic features (e.g. 
grammar, vocabulary, text structure etc) in the production of discourse. 
Secondly, the analysis focused on the institutional and discursive practices 
within which texts are embedded. It also addresses how the texts are 
23 Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) has diverging origins including the Frankfurt and neo-Marxian 
tradition (e.g. Marx, Gramsci, Althusser), anthropological linguistics (e.g. Gumperz, Gal, and 
Silverstein), literary analysis (e.g. Cole, Wertsch, Gee), and the work of Michel Foucault. CDA gained 
prominence in the late 1980s, spearheaded by the work of Norman Fairclough, Ruth Wodak, and Teun 
van Dijk. 
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circulated in society. Thirdly, the above two run in parallel with an 
ethnographic analysis of the social contexts within which texts emerge and 
act. This examines the ideological effects and hegemonic processes in 
which the discourse is a feature. 
My objective is to highlight two points; firstly, the interpretative context, that 
is the social setting in which the discourse is located; second, the rhetorical 
organisation of the discourse, that is the argumentative schema that 
organizes a text and establishes its authority (Lees 2004). In doing so I hope 
to bring discourse back into focus within urban geography and examine how 
Cyberjaya is mobilised as a textual space. I address how meaning is 
constructed through materials, and how these materials circulate to produce 
certain effects. Utopian discourses are constructed through specific acts and 
objects - speeches by government officials, marketing materials for 
Cyberjaya-MSC, policy documents, planning guidelines, and mainstream 
media. There is a specific language (or discursive practice) that circulates 
through MSC imbued with specific power relations to create specific social 
conditions. I used CDA to de-naturalise these structures and address how 
certain power relations and orderings of space that are embedded in the 
discourses. 
At the core of this enquiry is a focus on the tension between hegemony and 
counter-hegemony. Beneath the hegemony of state mobilised discourse and 
practice empirical material highlights how counter-hegemonic narratives and 
insurgent forms of citizenship emerge on the ground in Cyberjaya. As a 
result, no discourse is truly hegemonic, and where forms of power and 
control are mobilised forms of resistance will inevitably emerge. My 
discourse analysis analyses four main 'texts' in order to examine how the 
discursive architectures of MSC-Cyberjaya are constructed. 
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2.5.1. Political Actor: Dr. Mahathir Mohamad 
The former Prime Minister Dr. Mahathir (in office 1981-2003) is the main 
policy architect for the MSC vision. Mahathir played an active role in the 
construction of the hegemonic MSC discourse, and manipulated it through 
the national media.24 Examining the speeches of Mahathir enables me to 
trace the genealogy and historical development of the MSC discourse. 
Drawing on Foucauldian analysis, I examined the mechanisms through 
which the MSC concept emerged. My analysis focused on the policy 
speeches from Mahathir, specifically during his much-vaunted MSC 
promotional "World Tour'' during 1996-1997 (Chapter 4). The discourse of 
the MSC cannot be reducible to one man, but nonetheless this particular 
man did more than anyone else to promote and frame the discourses for the 
MSC. However, Mahathir was a product of a political-economic context and 
influenced by, and able to draw upon, the authoritative discourse of a range 
of other 'information society' architects. His speeches and promotional 
events served to promote a language that was informed by these social, 
cultural and political conditions and also shaped techno-social order in 
Malaysia that framed interactions between citizen and society. 
2.5.2. Corporate Brochures 
There are numerous promotional and information brochures about the MSC 
and Cyberjaya produced by different stakeholders in the project including 
government departments (MDEC, MOSTI, MIMOS), property developers 
(Setia Haruman, MK Land) and quasi-government bodies (Cyberview, 
Technology Park Malaysia). Documents range from marketing materials 
designed to attract potential investors (such as house buyers, companies), 
24 Censorship and media control were prominent factors in Mahathir's reign which was characterised 
by semi-authoritarian rule. In Malaysia the government retains content control over all mainstream 
newspaper, and television is highly censored. This allows for tight control over discourses. Though the 
internet does offer the potential for a more critical, free-ranging new media exemplified in such new 
sites as Malaysiakini. (See 
Chin, J. (2003) 'Malaysiakini. Com and its impact on journalism and politics in Malaysia'. In: Ho, K. C., 
Kluver, R. and Yang, K. (Eds.) Asia. Com: Asia Encounters the Internet. London: Routledge. 129-142.) 
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information booklets for raising public awareness about the project to user 
gl:Jides on how to use· the flagship applications. I conducted a semiotic 
analysis of these materials to examine how the corporate vision for MSC-
Cyberjaya is constructed. Drawing upon intertextual analysis I show how 
texts function via particular configurations of conventionalised practices 
(genres, discourses, narratives etc). All of these documents convey specific 
understandings of the relationship between the MSC and 'intelligent-led' 
development. My analysis examined: how the .texts wer~ positioned? Who~e 
interests were served by this positioning? Whose interests were negated? 
What were the consequences of this positioning? 
Semiotic :analysis is concerned with the use of symbols, the placement and 
content of text, design and layout, colour, to communit:::ate meaning in the 
text. An example of how I conducted semiotic analysis is the following 
discussion of the MSG logo. This draws upon semiotic analysis of the 'image, 
an<;t interview mater.ial with the 'MSC architects' (figure 3). 
SpEarhEading Transronnatlon 
SIGN SIGNIFIER SIGNIFIED 
Logo Rising sun Dawning of a new 
t~chnological era, 
signifies a new phase in 
Malaysian national 
development. 
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Three Rays 1 )High capacity global 
telecommunications links 
and logistics 
infrastructures 
2)New policies and 
Cyberlaws 
3)Attractive environment 
to live and work in 
Heart of the Logo, green Emphasizing the 
sphere environment 
consideration in policy 
making. Epitomised in 
designing of Cyberjaya 
as intelligent garden city, 
leading to man-nature-
technology livi.ng in 
harmony 
Arch Unification of diverse 
strengths, a prerequisite 
for success. Creation of 
mutually interdependent 
webs for success. 
Figure 3: D1scourse Analysis of MSC Corporate logo 
2.5.3. 'MSC Architects' 
Interviews with government ministers, numerous actors within MDEC 
examined how discourse was constructed through specific speech acts (e.g. 
formal speeches, presentations, and interviews). Alongside Mahathir, I 
conceptualise this group of political elites as the 'MSC architects'. They are 
highly influential in constructing the MSC discourse through what they say. 
Their use of language was my major focus as speeches are discursive 
practices in themselves and serve to formulate what it is possible to say 
about a specific subject. Interviews with political elites were transcribed as a 
mode of performance speech then examined as texts which construct 
ideological-discursive formations imbued with vested interests. 
2.5.4. Field Photography 
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Photographs of Cyberjaya served as a useful aide memoire with field notes 
to reflect back upon the research site.25 Images included key features of 
Malaysia's nascent 'IT landscape' and included signs and symbols that were 
seen to be emblematic of a new high-tech modernity (smart homes, 
corporate offices of IT companies, MSC-themed street furniture). This draws 
upon work in cultural geography which has examined how discourse is 
embedded in, and articulated through material effects (Cosgrove and 
Daniels 1988; Crang 1998). In this case, landscape can be 'read' as a text 
which mobilises certain meanings and materially embeds certain discourses. 
My concern here is how discourses have been inscribed on the landscape 
and in what form. Cyberjaya is a city designed to communicate very specific 
meanings to those who inhabit and observe it. Street names are imbued with 
certain mythologies of the 'information society', bearing names seen to 
signify advanced technological achievement (e.g. Silicon Road, Multimedia 
Super Corridor Way, Technocrat Drive). Furthermore, street furniture is all 
stamped with the trademark MSC logo described above, and numerous 
place names are re-branded to correlate to MSC discourse. For example, 
residential complexes are called Cyberia, Cyberheights, Cyberia Crescent 
while local businesses I encountered were Cyber-realty (estate agent), 
Cybercafe (a cafe), Cybemasium (a gym), Cyber-prints (a printing shop). 
The use of photography in the thesis will convey how discourses are literally 
inscribed on the landscape in the place-making of Cyberjaya (Figure 4). 
25 These photographs appear in later empirical chapters to illustrate specific analytical points. Although 
field photography raises methodological issues about representation, truth and reality. 
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Figure 4: Jalan Silikon ('Silicon Road') in Cyberjaya (Source: Author's 
Photograph) 
2.6. Conclusion 
The methodological framework has two main components. Firstly, 
interviewing, participant observation combined with 'go-alongs' and diary 
methods attend to everyday practices in Cyberjaya. Secondly, a discourse 
analysis critically unpacks the construction of discursive architectures in 
Cyberjaya, and how they have been inscribed on the landscape. The chapter 
has also addressed the ethical implications of conducting fieldwork and has 
explored the power relations between the research and participants. 
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Chapter 3. Conceptua~ Framework 
3. 1. Introduction 
The chapter introduces the conceptual framework and provides an essential 
overview of relevant theoretical literatures. Challenging the high-tech 
utopianism of a coming 'information society' and 'new economy', the chapter 
critically examines the role of ICTs in the discursive framing and material 
production of urban spaces. The chapter outlines how the discursive 
architectures of the 'information society' and 'new economy' have been 
incorporated into state developmental discourses and inscribed on the 
landscape through technopole planning strategies. Following this, the 
chapter contests these 'new era' accounts of a 'powered up modernity' 
(Thrift 1996: 1463) through a call for an analytical sensitivity to everyday 
practices and lived experiences in the purported 'high-tech' city. This 'view 
from below' (Bunnell 1999; Mendieta 2001) opens a new conceptual space 
for counter-hegemonic narratives to emerge which challenges 
technologically deterministic assumptions about technology and 
development in Malaysia. 
The chapter outlines a conceptual critique of I.T.-facilitated globalisation as a 
'frictionless' - as Bill Gates (1995) would have us believe - and its 
'homogenising effect' whereby global flows are seen to be increasingly 
placeless, moving in and out of real places at will, playing to the whims of 
transnational capital. The thesis promotes a shift in analytical focus from 
'meta-theory' (Lyotard 1984) to a grounded, relational approach which 
examines the effects and material consequences of so-called globalisation in 
a specific place at a specific time; and the role of technology in this process 
(Katz 2001 ). This is not to set up a dialectical opposition between the local 
as a site of resistance to the onward march of globalisation that should be 
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retained as something inherently more authentic. Rather, the thesis 
promotes particular analytical sensitivity to the spatial milieu in which global 
processes are embedded, and addresses how they are socially reproduced 
in everyday settings. 
The structure of the chapter is as follows. Section 3.2 provides the gee-
historical context to contemporary debates on the 'information society' and 
'new economy'. Section 3.3 elucidates the 'spatial concepts' of 
'deterritorialisation' and 'reterritorialisation' (Brenner 1998a; 1998b; 1999a; 
1999b; 2004) and 'sticky places' and 'slippery space' (Markusen 1996) that 
structures my thinking on the intersections between neoliberal globalisation, 
technological change and contemporary urbanism. Section 3.4 explores how 
developmental states have materially and symbolically invested in high-tech 
utopianism through technopole planning processes. Section 3.5 provides a 
critique of the technologically deterministic ways in which science and 
technology have been appropriated in technopole planning strategies. The 
final Section 3.5 promotes a focus on the nature of lived "everyday-ness" 
and practices in technopoles to allow non-deterministic, counter-hegemonic 
narratives to emerge. 
3.2. Quantum Leaps and 1New Era' Globalisation Speak 
The section contextualises the 'information society' and 'new economy' 
concepts that have become integral components of contemporary 
globalisation discourse. The concepts have played an integral role in 
constructing a form of high-tech utopianism manifest in the discursive 
framing of the MSC. The thesis approaches these 'new era' accounts both 
critically and interrogatively by recognising their utopian tendencies towards 
an empirically thin, technologically deterministic account of contemporary 
globalisation which overplays state roll-back, a perceived 'death of distance', 
and the erosion of borders (Ohmae 1991; 0' Brien 1992; Ohmae 1995; 
55 
Lead beater 1999; Cairncross 2001; Online 2003). The proposed transition to 
an 'information society' and 'new economy' has been based on the 
assumption we live in a new technological epoch whereby ICTs were seen to 
affect all aspects of cultural, economic, social, religious, and political life. As 
Thrift (1996: 1465) expertly observed, the growing technologisation of the 
everyday was greeted with 'fin-de-siecle celebrations of the end of life as we 
know it'. Both the 'information society' and 'new economy' concepts have 
become key tenets of contemporary 'globalisation speak' encompassing a 
'metanarrative' that seeks to capture just about everything that is happening 
in the world today. This has been rightly critiqued as grand theory at its most 
excessive, characterised by theoretical laxity evident in the constant 
reference to the classic hollow concept of 'globalisation in action' 
(Swyngedouw 2000). This ranges from claims that each Big Mac eaten is 
confirmation of cultural homogenisation to the hypothesis that all-powerful 
global cities are becoming planetary centres for just about anything, and 
everything. According to the global purveyors of globalisation hype we now 
live in a globally integrated 'network society' (Castells 1996) in which nothing 
is untouched by omnipresent global forces. The section does not seek to 
provide a comprehensive overview of contemporary globalisation debates 
but rather seeks to illuminate the gee-historical background from which 
Malaysia's 'information society' ideal emerged. 
3.2.1. Foregrounding the 1/nformation Society' Utopia 
Speculation concerning the coming of a new 'information society' has 
accelerated as the rate of technological advancement rose exponentially 
over the past 25 years. For instance, as Graham (2004b) notes, between the 
1980s and late 1990s computing speed was doubling every year; thus, 
following the rate of technological advancement predicted in Moore's Law. 
During this time societies across the planet encountered a whole range of 
new technologies from TVs, digital cameras to mobile phones and personal 
data assistants. As each technology emerged it created a new mythology 
56 
--------------------------
about its capacity to wreak social change. However, the evolution of the 
Internet in the mid-1990s both created and accelerated a new wave of 
unparalleled 'techno-hype'. Cyberspace was seen as a new 'electronic 
frontier' ripe for colonisation, thus enabling 'a country like Malaysia to more 
easily 'leapfrog' ahead to the 'information age' (Mahathir 1998) via material 
and symbolic investment in information technology as a national 
development strategy. Malaysia uncritically accepted a futuristic vision of 
how the Internet would create a new 'information society' as outlined by 
Microsoft founder Bill Gates: 
'We are all beginning another great journey. We can't be sure exactly where 
this one will lead either, but I'm certain it will touch many lives and take us 
even farther. The major changes will be in how people communicate with 
each other. The benefits and problems arising from this upcoming 
communications revolution - which in its early stages we might call the 
"Internet Revolution" -will be much greater that those brought about by the 
PC revolution.' 
(Gates 1995: xiii) 
The 'information society' encompasses a broad array of terms including the 
'cybersociety' (Jones 1995), 'post-industrial society' (Bell 1976), 'knowledge 
society' (Ever 2003) and 'network society' (Castells 1996) which each seek 
to describe the nature of a high-tech society. The 'information society' 
concept was constantly referred to in MSC policy and promotional materials 
as the imagined end-state for a Malaysian high-tech modernity whereby 'the 
nation takes a quantum leap into the age of information technology' (The 
Star, 01.1 0.2006). This utopian vision arose out of technologically 
deterministic assumptions that a technologically infused society would 
ultimately become a progressive 'information society' whereby universal 
benefits would be experienced by all. This was based on the hypothesis: (1) 
that the internet necessarily promotes democratisation; (2) that a 'new 
economy' operates on entirely different principles from that of the 'old 
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economy'; and (3) that an IT-based economy would allow developing 
nations, such as Malaysia, to 'leapfrog' to 'developed nation status' without 
going through the kinds of reforms that were necessary in other societies. 
Despite the state's claims to be at the vanguard of a 'new era', the 
'information society' concept which the MSC sought to mobilise has clear 
gee-historical origins. In order to extrapolate the origins of MSC Malaysia we 
make a brief detour to trace the origins of these 'information society' and 
'new economy' discourses. 
Firstly, Malaysia's proposed linear transition to a 'new stage' of national post-
colonial development resonates with modernisation theories and notions of 
knowledge 'trickle down'. By investing in the new technologies which were 
conceived as the drivers of globalisation, the state sought to create the 
socio-psychological preconditions for 'take off into a new 'information 
society' era. Such modernisation theories were far from politically neutral 
development paradigms but rather have significant Cold War ideological 
baggage. Walt Rostow, who served in both the Kennedy and Johnson 
administrations, described the stages of economic growth in his 'non-
communist manifesto' that provided the U.S. Cold War Left with a credible 
capitalist version of economic history and future. 
'It is possible to identify all societies, in their economic dimensions, as lying 
within one of five categories: the traditional society, the preconditions for 
take off, the take off, the drive to maturity, and the age of high mass-
consumption.' 
(Rostow 1960: 4) 
Rostow emphasised the importance of science and technology in making the 
transition from a 'traditional' society to a 'developed' society. In particular, 
Rostow argued that foreign investment and technology transfer of 
technology by wealthy (Western) countries would allow 'backward' countries 
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to modernise faster. The notions of 'trickle-down' were expanded upon by 
Basalla (1967) who outlined the stages by which scientific knowledge and 
technical expertise could be transferred from the centre to periphery. 
Secondly, notions of technology-enabled developmental 'leapfrogging' were 
tied into another U.S. Cold War ideology; the 'information society'. A range of 
intellectuals supported by the American government, often through CIA-
funded research agencies, sought to articulate the 'end state' for the 'mass 
society' which characterised the final stage of Rostow's development model 
(Kahn and Wiener 1967; Wiener 1967; Drucker 1969; Brezinski 1970). Of 
these Daniel Bell was foremost, building on Mcluhan's (1964) 'global village' 
hypothesis, he imagined a technologically determined utopian future in his 
influential book The Coming of a Post-Industrial Society (Bell 1976). 
Bell's 'post-industrial society' was to emerge as a consequence of a 
proposed transition from an industrial society, based on manufacturing, to an 
economy based on computerised service industries with information as the 
primary 'raw material'. Bell predicted this would enable a new utopian society 
to develop based around the creation and distribution of knowledge across 
economic, cultural, and political spheres. The vast numbers of people in 
advanced societies (e.g. UK, USA) employed in the service economy was 
seen to confirm Bell's hypothesis. Such 'information society' futurism 
continued in the work of Alvin Tattler (1970; 1980) who foresaw the coming 
of a new 'third wave'. The first and second were agricultural and industrial 
respectively but the third would be a high-speed technological revolution 
signalling a quantum jump forward in history. He claimed the Third Wave 
signalled 'not just a technological revolution but the coming of a whole new 
civilisation in the fullest sense of the term'. 
With obvious Cold War overtones, for both Bell and Toffler their 'information 
society' represented the 'end of ideology' and a social utopia to which all 
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advanced nations should aspire. The U.S. Cold War Left pioneered the 
quasi-academic discipline of futurology that still persist~ today in 'new era' 
speak about a coming 'information society' that in turn has become 
influential in modernisation discourses. In 1994, the U.S. Vice President, AI 
Gore, outlined the virtues of the global 'information society' in his vision of a 
Global Information Infrastructure (Gil). As Matterlart (1999: 18) notes, the 
underlying message of his speech was: 'only by opening national 
telecommunications systems to the logic of the market, that is their 
privatisation, secures development'. These techno-utopian visions have 
been promulgated by a number of "business gurus" selling future scenarios 
of a digital future (e.g. Bill Gates, Nicholas Negroponte, Kenichi Ohmae, and 
Wired Magazine). 
'Information society' futurology has influenced developmental states like 
Malaysia to mobilise the 'information age paradigm' (Uimonen 2001) as a 
means of fast-tracking national development strategies through neoliberal 
policies of deregulation and material investment in science and technology 
and as the drivers of a "soon to arrive" high-tech modernity. The obvious 
critiques of these discourses are explored later in the chapter when 
highlighting Malaysia's alternative/hybrid modernities. What is important for 
now is the primary role information technology was afforded in Malaysian 
'new era' development discourses and perpetuated through specific 
ideological agents or institutions (Chapter 4). 
3.2.2. The Contemporary 'New Era' of Globalisation? 
Information technologies remain a key aspect of current globalisation and 
modernisation theories. For example, globe-spanning telecommunications 
infrastructures are widely seen by globalisation theorists (e.g. Virilio 1993) to 
be 'speeding up' and 'stretching' social processes following Harvey's (1990) 
work on 'time-space compression'. Such notions of a 'shrinking world' have 
60 
intellectual origins in McLuhan's (1964) 'global village' that helped to create 
an image of emerging global interconnectedness and simultaneity that still 
resonates today (Kirsch 1995). The current contours of the 'information 
society' in an era of globalisation are characterised by simultaneity, 
instantaneity, and excessive talk about 'the acceleration of just about 
everything' (Gieick 1999). From the real-time circulation of global finance to 
the near instant reporting of news events, or the mediation of everyday life 
by mobile phones or email, there appear to be virtually no aspects of human 
existence left untouched by new technologies. 
'With acceleration there is no more here and there, only the mental 
confusion of near and far, present and future, real and unreal- a mix of 
histories, stories, and the hallucinatory utopia of communication 
technologies.' 
(Virilio 1995a: 34) 
Contemporary predictions concerning a 'new era' are based on several 
assumptions about the nature of ongoing spatial restructuring through 
globalisation. Firstly, the promotion of deregulation, liberalisation and 
privatisation policies over the last two decades signal a neoliberalist 
ascendance in shaping the latest phase of globalisation, or 'the realisation of 
the world-as-a-whole' (Chin 2000). Neoliberal globalisation has been 
conceptualised as a highly unequal and selective process of global 
economic integration whereby the benefits of growth are likely to be 
distributed unevenly between and within nation states (Gill 1995; Tickell and 
Peck 2001; 2003; Ong 2006). This is a process defined by Massey (2004: 
97) as: 
'A form of globalisation working primarily to the benefit of major 
multinational corporations, legitimated by particular forms of economic 
understanding (for instance, as promulgated, and enforced, through the 
International Monetary Fund) and energetically pursued by numerous elites 
61 
and national governments around the world, most notably in the United 
States of America and the United Kingdom.' 
Neoliberal globalisation is imagined to create economic, social and cultural 
conditions that are seemingly 'borderless' (Ohmae 1991) producing a spatial 
homogenising effect, whereby, the diffusion of ICTs has enabled capital, 
management, labour, knowledge and markets to be integrated across 
'planetary urban networks' (Graham and Marvin 1996: 125) in real-time. 
While evidence of a globally integrated economy can be traced back to the 
13th century (Abu-Lughod 1989), ICTs are facilitating rapid structural 
changes in urban economies based on high levels of capital mobility, the 
hegemony of MNCs and the concentration of service industries in world 
metropoles. Despite utopian predictions of an 'interconnected' world (notably 
Mcluhan 1964), neoliberal globalisation is a process resulting in uneven 
geographical development and widening digital divides between those who 
have/don't have access to ICTs across all scales. 
Secondly, as economic processes are globalised urban places can be 
literally "wired" into the neoliberal capitalist system and re-orientated to 
global markets through state-of-the-art telecommunications infrastructures. 
Consequently, it is perceived that otherwise geographically peripheral 
spaces can join in with the 'new economy' of 'anytime/anywhere' 
'informationalised ·capitalism' (Castells 2000a) and overcome the 'new 
international division of labour' (Frobel 1980). This is a process by which the 
global economy is separated into core (in the developed world) and 
peripheral areas (in the developing world) that divide skills and tasks 
between different regions or countries in the global capitalist economy. It 
describes the mechanism by which MNCs have shifted production and 
business processes services to the developing world in order to speed up 
the motion of capital, overcoming spatial, temporal, and political restrictions. 
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The 'new economy' is seen to 'flatten out' regional competitive advantages 
through investment in information technologies (Ohmae 1991 ). 
Thirdly, is the emergence of a new form of economic production and 
management that is 'information-driven', whereby international 
competitiveness is increasingly determined by access to knowledge and the 
ability to generate new knowledge. As national economies are re-orientated 
towards producer services, knowledge production, management and 
diffusion that have become the dominant mechanisms through which value 
is added in production processes. These theories have historical precursors 
in Drucker's (1969) 'knowledge economy', Machlup's (1962) 'information 
industries', and Porat's (1977) 'information economy'. 
3.2.3. ~Anytime/Anywhere': The 1New Economy' Calling? 
The latest version of economic change has been broadly theorised as a 
transition from the 'old economy' (industrial, manufacturing-based, urban, 
Fordist) to a 'new economy' (knowledge-led, innovative, 'anytime/anywhere', 
flexible accumulation). The 'new economy' discourse promotes the internet 
(i.e. e-commerce) and ICTs as the new driver of economic competitiveness, 
which according to Gates (1995), will lead to: 'a new world of low-friction, 
low-overhead capitalism, in which market information will be plentiful and 
transaction costs low'. Following on from work done by Castells (2001a), the 
'new economy' been characterised in three ways. 
Firstly, it is assumed economic development is dependent upon knowledge 
innovation and that the capacity of knowledge creation which works directly 
through new technologies mobilising, as Leadbetter (1999) claims, a 
'weightless economy'. Secondly, the 'new economy' operates in an 
institutional environment geared towards deregulation and liberalisation 
superficially intended to 'jump start' regional economies. This neoliberal 
economic model has become a 'truly hegemonic ideology' (Tickell and Peck 
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2003: 16) mobilised through global organisations such as the World Bank, 
World Trade Organisation 0NTO) and the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF). Neoliberalism promotes a "free market utopia" whereby capital can 
move in and out of states in order to maximise profits. Thirdly, the 'new 
economy' is dependent on the organisational form of the network. For 
instance, globally integrated telecommunications and transport networks are 
able to operate 24 hours a day. Contrasted to the old economy of the 
industrial age the networks are highly flexible, contingent and tie economies, 
MNCs, and markets together over vast distances. This has led to some 
commentators writing a requiem for traditional urban economies as 
telecommunications provide the glue for a spatially fragmented but 
electronically integrated economy (Winger 1997). 
In sum, globalisation has been interpreted by a number of scholars (Virilio 
1987b; Harvey 1990) as a range of processes involving distanciation (the 
stretching of social, cultural, political, economic relations across space and 
time) and time-space compression (the apparent annihilation of space by 
time through ICTs). However, while technology is an agent of social change, 
the thesis promotes a non-deterministic view of such changes and 
approaches such hyperbolic accounts critically as an 'image of the world' 
(Heidegger 1977) a manifestation as a classic hegemonic representation of 
planetary space. Instead, the chapter works with a more grounded definition 
of globalisation as a process which leads to: 
'The stretching and deepening of social relations and institutions across 
space and time such that, on the one hand, day-to-day activities are 
increasingly influenced by events happening on the other side of the globe, 
and on the other hand, the practices and decisions of local groups could 
have significant global reverberations.' 
(Held 1995: 20) 
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Following Doel and Hubbard (2002), globalisation can be reconceptualised 
not as universal or unitary, but heterogeneous and fragmented: a 
geography created by discourses engineered by those who have most to 
benefit from the opening up of borders, deregulation, and privatisation. 
Historically, the 'information society' concept was promoted by the USA in 
an ideological Cold War against Soviet cybernetic communism. Now talk of 
an 'information society' or 'new economy' is mobilised by political and 
business groups who promote globalisation discourses to ensure that 
national development policies are formulated in a 'market friendly' 
neoliberal environment. It is sustained primarily through 'capital-centric' 
business discourses that have a vested interest in proposing the image of 
a coherent, universally beneficial global economy while extolling the 
benefits of 'open markets'. The rhetoric of Ohmae's (1991, 1995) 
'borderless economies' and Gates' (1995) 'friction free capitalism' has 
become a euphemism for deregulation and the triumphalism of the 
neoliberal economic model. In these terms USA Cold War ideologies of 
creating the perfect capitalist market utopia of the 'global village' have 
succeeded. 
'Techno-utopia has become an ideological weapon of the first order in 
trading influence to sustain a free market vision of global order. Despite 
proclamations which periodically sign the death warrant of the nation state, 
together with history and ideology, this remains the enemy whose 
prerogatives have to be challenged well beyond its complicity in 
deregulation ... Techno-utopia gives birth to the dream of unmediated 
planetarism.' 
(Matterlart 1999: 19) 
The thesis sounds a note of caution against the abstract theorisations which 
characterise the globalisation debate. These have been often rooted in 
claims about the dawning of a new 'techno epoch' (a habitually recycled 
term) which serves to obfuscate underlying political-economic motives and 
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actual existing patterns of urban change. Often, within these debates there is 
a blurring between what is presented as fact and what is down to sheer 
academic interpretation (Bell1976; Toffler 1980). The chapter seeks to avoid 
lapsing into disposable theories, and in turn, argues that globalisation does 
not alter cities in predetermined ways, as these sites are relationally figured 
in multiple national, social, and economic contexts from which emerge 
different strategies for the management or resistance of globalisation. While 
the Malaysian state embraces notions of modernisation and a utopian belief 
in science and technology it does so on its own terms, producing a 
hybridised version of the 'information society' which incorporates global and 
local narratives (Chapters 4 and 5). 
3.3. (Re)conceptualising the 'Information Society': In-Between 
Fixity and Motion 
The thesis reflects a shifting mood in the globalisation debate from the 
construction of globalisation as an abstract, irreversible process announced 
through the advent of a 'borderless world' (Ohmae 1991 ), marked by the 
'death of distance' (Cairncross 2001), to growing talk about the messiness of 
globalisation and its social and political contestation (Bauman 1998; Beck 
2000; Scholte 2000). Prior to these recent interventions globalisation had 
been conceptualised as a powerful planetary force homogenising spatial 
conditions with the effect of "washing over" local places, culture, and people 
via a process that is as frictionless as it is placeless. In line with scholars that 
are critical of globalisation the research challenges the premise of 
globalisation as an 'irrevocable process to which there are no alternatives' 
(Barnett and Low 2000: 56). The pre-given sense of globalisation as 
leviathan can be reconceptualised as 'an immanent and aleatory effect of 
contingent encounters' (Doel and Hubbard 2002: 355) in which place, rather 
being obliterated by technological overkill, becomes increasingly important 
as a fixing point for transnational flows, circuits, exchanges within the global 
capitalist system. 
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From a post-structural perspective, place can be conceptualised relationally 
as both mobile and fixed, whereby flows drift in and drift out, speed up and 
slow down, contract and expand within a networked space (Doel 1999) that 
is part local, and part global. In Cyberjaya, this creates geographies that are 
both deeply territorial and deterrito.rial in nature- a new networked space 
which is connected in certain ways ('sticky'), but highly disconnected in 
others ('slippery') (Markusen 1996). For example, while social and economic 
practices occur 'out there' in the 'slippery space' of Castells' (1996) 'global 
space of flows' as they become distanciated, and stretched, they are fixed 
towards certain 'sticky' places that possess the characteristics to harness, 
manage and coordinate these flows. 
In this light the thesis moves forward with two main aims. Firstly, to mobilise 
a relational perspective to critique the meta-ideologies of globalisation and 
expose the 'wobbly discursive architectures' of the MSC's proposed 
'quantum leap' into an imagined new 'information age'. Following Jones and 
Carranco (2007: 147), it is by 'exposing these "rough edges" to the shiny 
new megaproject that we can reveal the instability of a contemporary 
urbanism seen to be dictated by an all powerful globalisation'. Secondly, 
while as Giddens (1990: 17-21) notes, the social organisation of time and 
space has been partly abstracted or 'pulled away' from locales under 
conditions of modernity; the thesis observes how the capabilities for global 
operation, coordination, and control mobilised via ICTs need to be produced 
in places. This dialectical relationship between motion and fixity can be 
summarised by Brenner (1999b: 435) who writes: 
'For present purposes, the term globalisation refers to a double-edged, 
dialectical process through which: the movement of commodities, capital, 
money, people and information through geographical space is continually 
expanded and accelerated; and relatively fixed and immobile spatial 
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structures are produced, reconfigured and/or transformed to enable such 
expanded, accelerated movement.' 
A critical geographical viewpoint, is developed to examine the embedding of 
global transactions, practices, flows in local contexts and their material 
consequences to critique 'a dissociation between abstract flows in space and 
concrete valorisation in place' (Jessop 2000: 5). In essence a relational 
perspective highlights the multiple disjunctures that appear in the MSC 
project which hybridises national development goals with deterritorialised 
neoliberal globalisation. The thesis empirically engages with globalisation in 
action, as it touches down at strategic geographical site, in a unique time-
space. In turn, geography functions as a 'mediating discipline which is 
particularly sensitive to the continued salience of the local. The local, in turn, 
becomes the object through which geographers emphasise the value of 
difference, variety, and specificity' (Barnett and Low 2000: 54). 
3.3. 1. Towards a New Networked Sub-Economy? Reterritorialising 
Transnational Flows in Local Places 
Deterritorialisation26 has been one of the main tenets of contemporary 
globalisation 'speak' crystallised in The Economist's (1995) famous caption 
proclaiming 'suddenly .... distance no longer mattered'. Such a hypothesis 
promotes the view that territory is losing its significance for everyday life via 
a reconfiguration of locally-based social relations to globally mediated ones 
that are transnational, post-national, post-colonial in nature (0' Tuthail 1999). 
The geographical stretching-out of social relations is a process which 
Giddens termed 'time-space distanciation' (Giddens 1990: 21). In popular 
and academic accounts this has been characterised as a disembedding 
process, partly driven by neoliberal economic practices, whereby: geography 
is 'dissolved' or simply eradicated by ICTs (Cairncross 2001); national 
26The concept of deterritorialisation first appeared in the work of Deleuze and Guattari in Anti-Oepidus 
(1972). The term has since evolved to become part of the analytical vocabulary for describing 
contemporary globalisation trends. 
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borders become obsolete (Ohmae 1995); political-cultural identities 
deterritorialised (Appadurai 1996); and supra-national political organisations 
become dominant. Such arguments propose that deterritorialisation is the 
dominant spatiality of globalisation in which place is interchangeable, 
distance collapsed through ICTs, and borders can easily be overcome. In 
this hypothesis it is argued that the acceleration of globally circulating flows 
(capital, commodities, people, symbols, identities), social relations become 
increasingly detached from locality and less place-based. 
Castells (1996; 2001b) articulates this deterritorialisation process as the 
emergence of a 'network society' whereby individuals are more tied into 
networks, mediated by ICTs, than to the places themselves. He 
conceptualises the impact of ICTs on space in terms of their potential for 
endless deterritorialisation whereby a 'space of places' is being replaced by 
a 'space of flows'. His 'informationalised capitalism' imagines a patchwork 
geography of economic winners and losers in which 'the space of flows links 
up distant locales around shared functions and meanings on the basis of 
electronic circuits and fast transportation corridors, while isolating and 
subduing the logic of experience embodied in the space of places' (Castells 
2001 b: 155). This form of capitalism is driven by technological systems 
which: 
' ... appear to supersede functional need for spatial proximity as the basis of 
economic efficiency and personal interaction. The emergence of a global 
economy and of global communication systems subdue the local into the 
global, blurring social meanings and hampering political control, traditionally 
exercised from localities. Flows seem to overwhelm places, as human 
interaction increasingly relies on electronic communication networks ... Thus 
cities, as specific forms of social organisation and cultural expression, 
materially rooted in spatially concentrated human settlements, could be 
made obsolete in the new technological environment.' 
(Castells 2002: 367) 
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According to Castells, this produces a dominant mode of 'informationalised 
capitalism' operating round-the-clock from any point in the globe where 
economic transactions occur digitally, leading to a loss of chronological 
rhythm or 'timeless time'. This is an inherently uneven process in which the 
application of ICTs is used to fragment or 'splinter' urban space (Graham 
and Marvin 2001 ). 
'They can operate in real-time or in chosen time, and furthermore, the 
flexibility of the new technological system makes it possible for the new 
economy to select its components around the planet, in an endlessly 
variable geometry of value searching. This implies bypassing economically 
valueless or devalued territories and people... domestic deregulation, 
liberalisation of trans-border transactions, financial wizardry and new 
information technology have succeeded in mobilising potential sources for 
investment everywhere to everywhere, and from whatever to whenever.' 
(Castells 2001 b: 53-54) 
Castells 'network society' hypothesis has become a hegemonic mode of 
thinking about the 'information society'. However, it says surprising little 
about the nature of the networks which constitute this new globalism. 
Alarmingly it advocates an overtly simplistic substitutionist perspective that 
sees an ontologically fixed, localised space of places substituted for an 
omnipresent space of digital flows. Castells 'space of flows' articulates with 
what Negroponte (1995) terms 'physical atoms' being replaced by 'digital 
bits'. Alongside his MIT Media Lab colleague, Bill Mitchell (1995; 1999; 
2004), both are the main advocates of the substitutionist perspective. 
'The city Will be uprooted to any definite spot on the surface of the earth, 
shaped by connectivity and bandwidth constraints ... largely asynchronous in 
its operation, and inhabited by disembodied and fragmented subjects who 
exist as collections of aliases and agents. Its places will be constructed 
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virtually by software instead of physically from stones and timbers, and they 
will be connected by logical linkages rather than by doors, passageways, 
and streets.' 
(Mitchell 1995: 24) 
Such a hypothesis argues new technologies supersede the functional need 
for territorial-based physical proximity. As a result, as Moss (1987: 536) has 
observed, 'the operational boundaries of the city are no longer defined by 
geography or law, but by the reach of phone lines and computer networks'. 
Substitutionists argue that eventually the city becomes redundant as the 
primary site for human interaction as digitised time-spaces can simulate the 
lost geophysical urban spaces of human habitation (Pascal 1987; Bukatman 
1993). In a now familiar 'shrinking world' metaphor, Mcluhan's (1964) 
'global village' is paralleled by urban dissolution and finally 'a withering away' 
(Winger 1997) of cities as ICTs create a new mode of spatial organisation 
not tied to established urban hierarchies or diurnal regimes of night and day. 
' ... with instant electrical technology, the global itself can never again be 
more than a village, and the very nature of the city as a form of major 
dimensions must inevitably dissolve like a fading shot in a movie.' 
(McLuhan 1964: 343) 
Webber evaluates the impact of long-distance communications- what he 
terms 'the nonplace urban realm' - on physical propinquity and the need for 
centralisation in the traditional city. In a forerunner to the globalisation 
debate, Webber (1963; 1964) argued that communications media enables 
social relationships and communities to become less tied to the territoriality 
of the neighbourhood, suburb, metropolis, region, or nation. This anti-urban 
vision of an idealised pastoral retreat resonates with modernist planning 
utopias (e.g. Le Corbusier, Lloyd Wright) and their emphasis on urban 
decentralisation (Chapter 5). 
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Furthermore, anti-urban notions of network transcendence again have 
historical genealogies in Cold War geopolitics. The Internet emerged out of 
ARPANET, a 1969 Cold War operation of the U.S. Defence Department to 
link together strategic military centres in the preparation for any Soviet 
military attack. Notably, networked utopianism was manifest in the work of 
chief U.S. Cold War planner Doxiadis who merged urban planning, network 
forms and cybernetics in his influential 'Eksistics' movement (Wigley 2001; 
Provoost 2006). This movement drew upon both Mcluhan's 'global village' 
and Le Corbusier's modernist grid, to argue that future urban planning would 
resemble a process of making a communications network visible in space. 
Doxiadis imagined a form of planetary scale dwelling as 'a continuous 
network of centres and lines of communication' in which 'all parts of the 
settlement and lines of communication will be woven together into a 
meaningful organism' (Doxiadis, cited in Wigley 2003: 88). 
In a different vein, notions of networked geographical transcendence are 
supported today by evidence from the digitisation of economic relations in 
the global financial markets - even though these markets support a fraction 
of financial products, and are concentrated in a small number of cities. The 
planetary span of networked telecommunications infrastructures has enabled 
the automation and integration of financial markets via an always on, real-
time global economy in selected places. This is what Kellner (1989) labelled 
'technocapitalism'; a form of capitalism characterised by its reliance on ICTs 
both in its conception and dissemination. As O'Brien (1992: 1) optimistically 
observes, the latest wave of 'informationalised capitalism' has led to a 'state 
of economic development where geographical location no longer matters'. 
As social and economic relations become (partly) lifted out from localised 
contexts, the economic order of the globalised world becomes increasingly 
volatile as multinational capital moves in and out of nation states. As 
Swyngedouw (2000) notes, the concept of deterritorialisation is used to 
summarise an imagined process seen to be 'a-geographical' or 'a-spatial', 
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and as a result, disempowering. In this schema the local is helpless, under 
the attack of colonising globalising forces washing over places with tsunami 
like effects. 
This was exemplified in the Asian Financial Crisis 1997-1998 which was 
caused, in part, by speculation on local currencies by outside investors. As 
Southeast Asian states implemented policies for financial liberalisation in the 
1990s - buoyed by the success of the heralded 'Asian Miracle - massive 
irreversible capital inflows into the region occurred. Ultimately this proved to 
be a fateful mechanism as 'the combination of increased capital flows, credit 
expansion and exchange rate appreciation raised aggregate demand more 
rapidly than GOP, further increasing the current account deficit' (Jomo 2003: 
14). When crisis enveloped Southeast Asia following the devaluation of the 
Thai Bhat massive capital flight occurred. This was a near-virtual process, 
enabled through digitally integrated markets which allowed investors to 
speculate on currencies remotely. For those who stood to make a loss from 
the devaluation of currencies, investors were able to virtually withdraw from 
the country by the click of a mouse. This seemingly detached process had 
very real and tangible effects in Malaysia. Giddens (2000) characterises this 
as 'turbo-capitalism'; a new technologically mediated form of capitalism 
increasingly characterised by its ruthless, instable nature built on logics of 
deregulation, removal of borders, whereby capital is free to move in and out 
of countries in a quest for profit. 
According to Marxist-structuralist approaches the ability to transcend space 
and time are embedded in spatial infrastructures and driven by the economic 
imperatives of modern capitalism (Marx 1976; 1978; Harvey 1985; 1996). 
Telemediated globalisation has enabled new forms of capital accumulation 
to emerge that operate transnationally, through the circulation of capital 
beyond the traditional boundaries of the state. This is a dialectical process in 
which on the one hand capital is intensely globalising, orientated to the 
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continual acceleration of production times, overcoming geographical barriers 
to expand accumulation via 'the annihilation of space by time' with 
technologies. On the other; 
' ... the impulsion to reduce the socially necessary, turnover time of capital 
(the moment of deterritorialisation) can only be pursued, through the 
production of relatively fixed and immobile configurations of territorial 
organisation that enable such accelerated movement (the moment of 
reterritorialisation)' 
(Brenner 1998a: 462). 
Therefore, despite the global integration of economic functions it is the major 
international financial centres which still serves to satisfy the needs of 
capitalism that cannot be met through electronic communications (e.g. face 
to face communication, relationships of trust, body language). As capitalism 
expands geographically ·it inevitably needs to be fixed and embedded in 
produced space (Swyngedouw 1993). Historically urban places have 
provided this 'spatial fix' (Harvey 1989), however, contemporary neoliberal 
globalisation produces a networked economy of strategic nodes, hubs, and 
bypassed places structured according to the variable geometry of the 
network. 
To suggest that the computerisation of finance will lead to the 'end of 
geography' (0' Brien 1992) is somewhat premature and technologically 
deterministic. Metaphors of a 'shrinking world', 'global village' et al only serve 
to mystify the relations between technology and space and say little about 
how places themselves have been transformed. This is not a straightforward 
process whereby certain activities have been deterritorialised from one 
scale, to be reterritorialised at another leading to the substitution of physical 
places by electronic cyberspaces. Nor is the assumption to be of nested 
spatial scales from the local (micro, slow) up to the global (macro, fast) 
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(Marston 2000; Marston et al. 2005). Rather, looking forward to the empirical 
enquiry my argument is twofold. 
Firstly, that while the deterritorialisation of certain economic functions and 
activities has been made possible by ICTs (e.g. global markets, capital 
mobility, back-office offshoring) this has not led to the obliteration of (urban) 
place. For example as Thrift (1996), Sassen (2001b), and Beaverstock et al 
(2007) have shown a globally integrated financial system doesn't make place 
irrelevant. Rather, as Thrift argued in his study on the City of London, an 
increase in the intensity of digital forms of community requires increased 
face to face interactions, meaning, in his words, 'there will be no end of 
geography'. Therefore, as my empirical evidence suggests this is changing 
the form and composition of places as they are engineered, or re-orientated, 
by state, regional and urban policy makers for a world imagined, and partly 
executed, through more mobile economic flows, circuits, and exchanges 
(Chapters 4 and 5). 
Secondly, as a consequence, place is not so much disappearing from view 
but being reconfigured via transnational connections, in a new 'networked 
sub-economy' (Sassen 2001 c) rich in dynamic articulations of transnational 
mobility and local fixity. This is a relational sense of place containing multiple 
time-spaces that are often conflicting, and operating at juxtapositions to one 
another (Chapters 6 and 7). These processes create what Sassen (2001) 
termed a 'new networked sub-economy'. 
'These networked sub-economies operating partly in actual space and partly 
in globe-spanning digital space cannot easily be contextualised in terms of 
their surroundings. Nor can the individual firm or markets. The orientation of 
this type of sub-economy is simultaneously towards itself and towards the 
global. The intensity of internal transactions of the sub-economy (whether 
global finance or cutting edge high-tech sectors) is such that it overrides all 
considerations of the broader locality or urban areas in which it exists ... The 
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new networked sub-economy occupies a strategic geography, partly 
deterritorialised, that cuts across borders and connects a variety of points 
across the globe. It occupies only a fraction of its "local" setting; its 
boundaries are not those of the city where it is partly located, nor those of 
the "neighbourhood". The sub-economy functions as an intermediary 
institutional order between the vast concentrations of material resources it 
needs when it hits the ground and the fact of its global span or cross-border 
geography. Its interlocutor is not the surrounding, the context, but the fact of 
the global' 
(Sassen 2001c: 414-415) 
3.3.2. A New Strategic Geography: 'Sticky Places' in 'Slippery Space' 
While transnational flows are being partly deterritorialised, they also become 
reterritorialised in specific places where local characteristics, infrastructural 
conditions, and human capital can add value for certain economic activities. 
This is not a case of simply 'scaling up~ all socioeconomic activities to much 
celebrated global cities, rather as the thesis examines, a varied assortment 
of places are being relationally reconfigured as 'assemblages of more or less 
distanciated economic relations which will have different intensities at 
different locations' (Amin and Thrift 2002: 52). Paradoxically, ICT enabled 
distance transcendence and time-space compression has led to the salience 
of strategic places as economic locations for specific kinds of activities. 
Consequently, the global urban hierarchy is characterised by a multitude of 
emerging spatial units (e.g. global cities, research hubs, technology parks). 
Adapting Markusen's (1996) typology of new industrial districts the thesis 
critically unpacks how Cyberjaya has been symbolically and materially 
positioned as a 'sticky place' within the global capitalist system. Markusen 
outlines the numerous strategies employed by national governments, local 
coalitions in order to create dynamic, innovative milieu to which high value-
added industries and expert labour will stick. These include Marshallian new 
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industrial districts, hub and spoke models and satellite platforms for MNC 
operations. In reviewing these strategies she asks: 
'In a world of dramatically improved communications systems and 
corporations that are increasingly mobile internationally, it is puzzling why 
certain places are able to sustain their attractiveness to both capital and 
labour.' 
(Markusen 1996: 293) 
'Sticky places' are embedded in the urban fabric as vast accumulations of 
networked infrastructures, physical and human capital concentrated in 
specific places. As global economic space becomes increasingly volatile, 
there are still strategic sites that retain (e.g. global cities), or seek to 
engineer through entrepreneurial urban planning practices (e.g. high-tech 
zones), 'sticky-ness'. These 'command and control' (Sassen 2001 b) centres 
drive global flows in the 'new economy' through a variety of mechanisms 
including stock exchanges (London, New York), R&D centres (Silicon Valley, 
Cambridge), media hubs (Hollywood, Soho), and software hubs (Bangalore). 
These are places where local skills, transport and logistics linkages, socio-
cultural factors, telecommunications capacities, makes high value-added 
operations like R&D and corporate headquarters reluctant to leave. 
Technological connectivity is complemented by social connectivity whereby 
the spatial proximity of certain industries promotes networking, trust, and the 
sharing of ideas. 
The classic 'sticky places' have traditionally been global cities that have 
become 'command and control' centres for the global capitalist system due 
to a wide range of social, cultural, political, economic, infrastructural 
advantages that have been historically embedded over centuries. Building 
on Wallerstein's world systems model, the Global and World Cities (GaWC) 
research group at Loughborough University has been influential in theorising 
a hierarchy of global cities (Alpha, Beta and Gamma) and the rise of global 
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urban networks (Beaverstock et al. 1999; Beaverstock et al. 2002; Taylor 
2003a). In a similar vein to the work done by Sassen (1999b; 2001 b; 2002), 
they have identified the inter-city relations that occur between the top tier 
(Alpha) cities of the global economy. Kuala Lumpur is one of a number of 
aspiring cities striving to become a global city (Oids and Wai-Chung Yeung 
2004). The Malaysian state has deployed vast resources to compete with 
other ASEAN capitals (e.g. Singapore, Jakarta, Manila, and Bangkok) and 
re-orientate the city towards the global economy at the expense of local 
linkages (Morshidi and Suriati 1999; Morshidi 2000). 
'Sticky places' cannot be contextualised in terms of their immediate 
surroundings because they are electronically, and often materially 
'splintered' (Graham and Marvin 2001 ). from their hinterlands. 'Sticky places' 
attract clusters of related activities (e.g. I.T and multimedia in Silicon Valley), 
forming networked sub-economies, which are more globally linked to other 
'sticky places' than to the nation state in which they are situated. For 
example, Saxenian (1994; 2006) argues, Silicon Valley has retained its 
competitive advantage by maintaining deep transnational connections to I.T. 
hubs elsewhere (e.g. Hsinchu, Taiwan) via migrant communities of 
entrepreneurs constructing technological and financial bridges between 
distant regional economies. In another case, the financial centres of the City 
of London, or Frankfurt are more closely entwined with one another than to 
their physical neighbourhoods and hinterlands. They become tied together 
through intense forms of digital communications which transcend the 
national borders of the state, bypassing the localities in between, meaning 
that localities are geographically proximate, but relationally distant. 
Networked infrastructures become the 'glue' that binds geographically 
disparate places together to create the impression of an integrated economy, 
as seen in Sassen's (2001 b) research on the transnational connections 
between New York, London: and Tokyo. In the case of global cities their sub-
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economies display a dominant orientation to one another, rather than to their 
surrounding national spaces. The process of global integration running 
cheek by jowl with local fragmentation has historical antecedents in the 
transnational colonial economy outlined by King (1976; 1991). 'Sticky places' 
therefore create what Castells (1996) terms 'global bubbles', or Easterling 
(2005) 'spatial products', in that often they produce a globally linked, locally 
disconnected 'splintered urbanism' (Graham and Marvin 2001) where 
investment and infrastructure is channelled into fortified landscapes for 
techno-elites and withdrawn from surrounding areas. As Graham and Marvin 
(2001) note, highlighting London's financial district as an exemplar, 
unparalleled global connectivity is often combined with massive local 
disconnection. This is a theme explored later via empirical material in 
reference to Cyberjaya's 'global aspirations'. 
Therefore, as national and urban telecommunications infrastructures look to 
global interaction they becomes systems that 'link nodes together into 
networks whilst using such tunnel effects to exclude and bypass much of the 
intervening space, excluding them, in turn, from accessing networks' 
(Graham et al. 1997). These telecommunications represent vast sunken 
infrastructures in themselves in the form of servers, cabling, power systems 
which support and facilitate the time-space mobilities of global capitalism. In 
the competition for creating 'sticky places' in national territories the race to 
provide the best infrastructure is imperative; whereby competitiveness is 
determined by bandwidth, infrastructure reliability, and the provision of vast 
data farms to support the 'new economy'. These strategic sites are actually 
produced through very deliberate practices that are not the culmination of 
random chance but rather a mixture of neoliberal economic policies (e.g. 
deregulation) and urban planning to create 'premium network. spaces' 
(Graham 2000). 
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While global economic flows are increasingly mobile, 'neoliberal 
globalisation' actually demands these strategic territorial enclave economies 
for capital investment (i.e. mobility require fixity). Moreover, in the battle to 
win capital the unique characteristics of physical places is becoming crucially 
important. In this light the familiar vision of neoliberal globalisation as an 
'economic tsunami that is gathering force across the planet, pummelling 
each country in its path' (Ong 2007: 3) can be contested. Rather, this mode 
of spatial restructuring can be seen in the context of the 'next round' of 
neoliberal globalisation. 
'From this perspective, the current round of globalisation can be interpreted 
as a multidimensional process of re-scaling in which the scalar organisation 
of both cities and states is being reterritorialised in the conflictual search for 
'glocal' scalar fixes.' 
(Brenner 1998a: 462) 
The scalar argument here is that while capitalism seeks to annihilate space it 
does so through investment in, and control over, certain physical places, 
what Jessop (1999; 2004) calls 'spatia-temporal fixes'. So while 'time-space 
compression' has become a reality, it has not occurred at the expense or 
eradication of actual urban places, as imagined in the debates summarised 
in the previous section. In turn, rather than being eradicated, the uniqueness 
of place becomes ever more important as state planners promote urban 
nodes as sites for what Swyngedouw (1992; 1997) terms strategic 
'glocalisation' which he defined as the 'combined processes of globalisation 
and local-territorial reconfiguration'. This Marxist reading of globalisation 
argues that capitalism is constantly restless in its desire to circulate capital, 
and finds new means through territorial restructuring to do so. Thus 
according to Sassen (2001 b) the latest round of restructuring has led to the 
dominance of core global cities as drivers of capital accumulation in the 
finance industry. 
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According to this hypothesis, place, is restructured in order to make way for 
a new round of economic growth. This is an inherently uneven process, 
creating multiple disparities between those milieux which are desirable for 
capital, and those that are not. Therefore, contemporary 'informationalised 
capitalism' has merely exacerbated inequalities between those 'wired', 
'intelligent', or 'siliconised' global hubs, and those that remain on the 
periphery of the 'friction free' word. This has been magnified as states have 
'unbundled' their networked infrastructures and opened up spaces of the 
state for global development. Foreign capital has quickly moved in to 
colonise space; often making use of local financial incentives in the form of 
tax relief. Later empirical chapters examine this process in more detail, 
arguing that behind the state led rhetoric of creating an inclusive 'intelligent' 
high-tech development, Cyberjaya has become little more than a 
disconnected, foreign direct investment enclave characteristic of emerging 
neoliberal modernities in Southeast Asia. 
An overview of the role of the state vis-a-vis neoliberalism requires some 
context here. Both Brenner's and Jessop's work draw from theories by 
Lefebvre (1976; 1991) and Harvey (1982; 1985) on state re-scaling through 
reterritorialisation as it applies to different regimes of global capital 
accumulation. Their main concern has been to dissect the tension between 
motion and fixity in capital's desire to enhance its spatial mobility by 
diminishing its place dependency versus 'states' attempts to fix capital within 
their territories through the provision of immobile, space specific externalities 
that either cannot be found elsewhere or cannot be abandoned without 
considerable devalorisation costs to capital' (Jessop and Sum 2000: 2295) . 
. Lefebvre argued that since the late 191h century the dynamic of 
deterritorialisation and reterritorialisation has occurred through a wide range 
of scalar configurations each produced through an intermeshing of urban 
networks and state territorial structures at a given moment in the historical 
round of capitalist expansion. 
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Prior to the 1970s this was done within the confines of the state, however 
with the spread of neoliberal economics and the rescaling of economic 
processes to the global scale. Increasingly the state has been seen as under 
the influence of these flows, rather than controlling t~em. Harvey (1982; 
1985; 1989) observes that for capitalism to overcome space, new forms of 
spatial organisation were needed whereby 'there is a perpetual struggle in 
which capital builds a physical landscape appropriate to its own conditions at 
a particular moment in time, only to have to destroy it at a subsequent point 
in time'. Therefore capitalist expansion is captured in the constant search for 
'spatial fixes', as immobile socio-territorial configurations, within which 
expanded capital accumulation can be generated. 
As the doctrine of neoliberalism advances through its policies of 
deregulation, privatisation and the 'rolling back' of the state, urban 
economies must become competitive in order to survive. With nation states 
undergoing a partial 'hollowing out' process as an economic unit in our now 
'borderless world' (Ohmae 1995) other spatial-scalar units are mobilised for 
economic activity by policy makers, and national governments; often 
encouraged by an array of global consultancy firms (Chapters 4 and 5). 
'It is in this context that we see a rescaling of what are the strategic 
territories that articulate the new system. With the partial unbundling or at 
least weakening of the national as a spatial unit due to privatisation and 
deregulation and the associated strengthening of globalisation, come 
conditions for the ascendance of other spatial units or scales.' 
(Sassen 2001b: 105) 
States are therefore altering strategies of territorial development to prepare 
sub-national 'spatial units' as competitive nodes in the international economy 
through 'glocalisation' strategies. As Brenner and Theodore (2002) observe 
this has led to the creation of privatised spaces for corporate consumption 
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within large-scale mega-projects designed to attract foreign investment and 
reconfigure local land-use patterns. Cyberjaya is a classic example of this, 
functioning as a sub-national, extra-territorial, neoliberal economic space. 
The Malaysian state, like many others, is rushing to restructure the urban 
hierarchy of the nation to enhance its "global competitiveness". The multi-
scalar spatial restructuring of urban economies vis-a-vis globalisation 
provides the backdrop for my analysis, though the thesis draws more directly 
upon relational approaches explored later in the chapter. 
To summarise, 'sticky places' are conceptualised as the 'command and 
control' centres for the global economy and include global cities, research 
and development hubs, media centres etc. As spatial infrastructure is 
embedded within the global capitalist system a complex terrain of winners 
and losers inevitably accompanies the production of neoliberal place-making 
strategies. Juxtaposed to 'sticky places' are a range of new 'slippery spaces' 
including back-office hubs, call centres, offshore data centres, logistics 
enclaves that operate on the periphery of global system. These 'slippery 
spaces' constitute a networked sub-economy of low value-added offshore 
service functions for the global economy. Contrary to predictions of the 'end 
of geography' the 'new economy' is increasingly defined by a stark spatial 
division of labour. Notably, it has been back-office functions - with their 
codified knowledge processes - that have been moved 'offshore' to low cost 
locations found in the developing word. 
'Slippery spaces' are often 'self-contained, glocally orientated enclaves, 
surrounded by social and economic spaces from which it seems increasingly 
disconnected' (Graham and Marvin 2001: 376). The growth of 'slippery 
spaces' been influenced by the reshaping of the 'production cost map' 
(Wilson 1998) of: (a) firms seeking low cost labour and work environments; 
(b) public sector enhancement of infrastructure quality and capacity at 
strategic locations within the nation state. Allied to these factors, 
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improvements in telecommunications enabled the spatial separation of front-
office and back-office activities in MNCs with the. latter being 'unbundled' and 
'reterritorialised' offshore because they require little direct interaction with 
other parts of the firm. 
Mirroring the offshoring of manufacturing jobs for the global assembly line, 
back-office operations have been relocated to low cost, politically stable 
countries (e.g. India, the Philippines, Malaysia) in deregulated, privatised 
'high-tech' enclaves underwritten by national governments (e.g. Penang's 
Enterprise Zone).27 Often these economic functions have been decentralised 
to peripheral locations under the auspices of the 'new international division 
labour' (Frobel 1980). The success of these areas has not led to economic 
or technological independence via plugging into specific global circuits. 
Back-offices have a different position in the global assembly line as 
emerging transnational service hubs (e.g. Bangalore, Cyberjaya) in 
managing accounts, servicing customers, and processing data on a round-
the-clock basis for the back-offices of major MNCs. The offshoring of these 
operations was not the product of a need to improve customer service per 
se, nor a response to customer wishes but driven by the imperatives of 
capital accumulation and profit maximisation. Back-office work practices are 
often seen as being of a low technological order: low skilled, low paid, and 
low value-added compared to the occupational lifestyles of the 'transnational 
elites' identified by Sklair (2000). As a result back-office staff have been 
labelled as 'cyber coolies' or an 'offshore proletariat', undertaking work that 
is 'mind numbing and de-skilling' (Stanworth 1998; Gaerlan 2004; 
Gurumurthy 2004). 
The development of 'slippery spaces' has been underpinned by neoliberal 
policies of customising local spaces and opening them up for the global 
27 Penang is a major global hub for the electronics production industry, though the industry is almost 
exclusively dominated by MNCs. For example, the U.S. company Seagate produces 80% of its 
worldwide manufacturing output in Penang (Sussmann 1998). 
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economy. In this context, the aim of the thesis is to examine how Cyberjaya 
has been sold as a new 'global hub', which is an extremely 'sticky space' 
within the global capitalist system - i.e. where local skills, infrastructure, 
fiscal incentives makes R&D and corporate headquarters reluctant to leave. 
However, behind the giant, messianic, facade, it has become little more than 
an urban zone of disconnected outsourcing spaces and low value-added 
activities - what Markusen calls 'slippery space'. Through empirical material, 
this slippy-ness is approached in several ways: temporally through everyday 
work practices which follow the hegemonic beat of time zones elsewhere; 
economically, through spatial restructuring within the 'new international 
division of labour'; physically through geographies of urban splintering and 
disconnection; and politically through state 'roll-back' and emerging 
neoliberal modernities in the region. While Cyberjaya has been successful in 
attracting specific kinds of back-office operations, these operations are not 
self-sustaining and require continuous subsidising by the state via tax 
breaks, provision of low· rents, and low cost high capacity infrastructure 
provision. Furthermore, these industries occupy a fragile position and are 
susceptible to reterrorialisation in other places as political economic 
conditions change (i.e. when a new location becomes more cost-efficient). 
Such places are 'slippery' as they are susceptible to economic fluctuations of 
labour, location costs and the vagaries of the increasingly volatile global 
market. 
As a result of the deregulation and privatisation of domestic spaces by 
international capital, MNCs have become the dominant players in these 
urban enclaves. These deregulated national spaces are actively complicit in 
what Greider (1997) labels a 'global jobs auction' where MNCs are, in effect, 
conducting a peripatetic global jobs competition, awarding shares of 
production to the countries which can offer the most inviting locational 
incentives. The bidding war for employment opportunities via tax incentives 
and 'corporate retention' kick-backs has short-term advantages but also 
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broader long-term uncertainties. While government deregulation policies 
have enabled the country to access foreign capital it has done so at the 
reduced control over, and risky exposure, to the kind of financial risks that 
precipitated the Asian Financial Crisis (Beeson 1998). Often these policies 
have occurred despite, rather than because of national policy makers in 
Malaysia (like elsewhere in Southeast Asia) due to a complex mix of 
domestic forces and external factors promoting financialliberalisation. 
Though the quote below borders on hyperbole, it emphasises the potentially 
grave consequences for national policy makers who roll back their 
infrastructures without due consideration. 'Sticky place' development in the 
form of urban mega-projects dressed in the rhetoric of embracing a nascent 
'information society', or 'new economy' about to take off, produces neoliberal 
forms of modernity in Southeast Asia manifest in a fragmented urban 
geography of foreign direct investment enclaves, deregulated zones, and 
fortified technology parks for MNCs. 
'Electronic communication and financial flows at the speed of light have 
freed corporations from space and afforded them a global power that is 
rooted in their deterritorialisation. Unencumbered by locality and territorial 
constraints, TNCs [Transnational Corporations] are disconnected from the 
lives of their immobile employees and the social needs of their host 
countries. Now-here and no-where become interchangeable. Money is both 
the lifeline and the exclusive measure of corporate value. With locality and 
place becoming increasingly irrelevant, the prices of labour, tax breaks and 
other relocation enticements are becoming the prime determinants of 
physical location.' 
(Adam 2002: 21) 
At the bottom end of the production chain, the principle concern is not 
generating innovation through genuine worker participation, but primarily low 
cost production stability, and control. Therefore, when state power is 
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weakened, global networks are able to reach inside the national territory and 
directly impact upon the lives of the disempowered local citizens (Lawson 
2002). Under neoliberalism citizens are divided according to their value for 
capitalism, often according to gender, ethnicity, and human capital skills 
(Ong 2000a; 2000b). This speaks to Massey's (1993) power-geometry of 
time-space compression where different social groups and individuals are 
positioned in very distinct ways in relations to the flows and connections of a 
globalising world (Chapter 7). The empirical analysis argues against an 
overtly deterministic theorisation whereby globalised economic processes 
operate in some 'rarefied stratosphere' by attending to how these processes 
are embedded in and socially reproduced in specific places. 
3.4. Inscribing High-Tech Utopia: Technopole Planning 
Practices 
National governments, policy makers, and regional planners across the 
world have been influenced by the hyperbolic discourses of the 'information 
society' and 'new economy' to develop technopoles as aspiring 'sticky 
places' within the global economy. Technopoles have been designed to 
perform three main functions. Firstly, technopoles are symbolically 
positioned by states to tap into the 'new economy' and creating a new 'global 
hub' that will link up with a transnational 'research and development' 
community. Secondly, they are deliberately planned 'sticky places' for the 
high-tech economy; locales where high value tacit knowledge can be 
produced in the global economic system. Thirdly, technopoles function as 
new state spaces in the developing world intended as motors of 
development and modernisation. They are intended to symbolise national 
'arrival' in the 'information age' and an imagined 'new economy'. 
Technopoles are envisaged as a 'new spatial unit' (Sassen 1999b) or 'spatial 
product' (Easterling 2005), and throughout the world geographically 
delimited enclaves have been mobilised to embody attempts by state to 
87 
control the processes of economic globalisation and competition. 
Technopoles have been promoted and planned by central, regional or local 
governments as customised new industrial complexes for high-tech. Using 
the label of 'technoburbs', Fishman (1987) defined technopoles as a 
peripheral zone that has emerged as a viable socioeconomic unit on the 
outskirts of all major urban centres. Within these developments residents 
increasingly look to their immediate surroundings rather than.the city for their 
employment needs. Each project attempts to replicate the Silicon Valley 
experience and lure advanced technological laboratories and high-tech 
production facilities from the urban core to the periphery. Silicon Valley was 
a world first, and as the original global I.T. technopole, was imbued with 
numerous myths about how investment in technopole planning could 
accelerate regional or national growth. Despite there being no clear formula 
for creating a high-tech industrial space, Cyberjaya is one of a long line of 
real estate projects that attempt to become a successful technopole, and 
replicate the Silicon Valley "model" (Chapter 6). 
The proliferation of technopole planning strategies has led to intense city 
versus city competition to try and reterritorialise high value-added production 
activities for the I.T. economy. The climate of free market neoliberalism has 
increased global competitiveness between technopoles in what is perceived 
to be a 'zero-sum' game of economic survival. As Tickell and Peck (2001) 
argue, this is part of a broader move towards a 'growth-first' approach to 
urban development which is entrepreneurial and pro-active in its quest to fix 
capital. An alliance of corporate and political objectives has given rise to a 
utopian belief in technopole planning within a neoliberalist framework of tax-
breaks, deregulation to fix global capital in local places. 
The perception of the force of globalisation exhorts the state to focus on 
local space in an effort to provide a real and symbolic node, a state-of-the-
art command and control centre, to "hook up" to the global economy, 
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thereby theoretically improving city, regional, and national comparative 
advantage in the global sense.' 
(Oids 2001: 33) 
Prior to the Financial Crisis 1997-1998, the adoption of neoliberal policies 
was heralded as key contributing factor to the World Bank's (1993) 
observation of an "Asian Miracle". These financial policies represent a belief 
in the efficacy of the markets for achieving developmental catch up (Burkett 
and Hart Landsberg 2003). During this time neoliberals were extolling the 
virtues of their free market policies, and this in turn promoted a previously 
unseen Southeast Asian openness to international trade and investment. 
Notably Kuala Lumpur in the 1990s, under the direction Prime Minister 
Mahathir, sought to reposition itself as a global city through a massive 
infrastructural development programme to attract foreign direct investment. 
In a broader context, such strategies represent a shift from urban 
managerialism to entrepreneurialism - as documented by Harvey (1989) -
leading to the construction of new real estate projects geared towards 
making cities more attractive for investment. Massive infrastructural 
investment is used to 're-orientate the international imagery' (Oids 1995: 
1713) of cities for attracting foreign investment. These policies have been 
legitimated by a number of multinational planning, design and business 
consultancy firms that have promoted global city discourse and a set of 
criteria that is constitutive of 'world-city-ness' to which local planners aspire 
(Chapter 5). 
In East and Southeast Asia states have been active players in "selling" local 
conditions via urban entrepreneurial place promotion strategies to attract 
inward investment according to neoliberal policies (e.g. Thailand, Indonesia, 
and Malaysia). Governance has become increasingly entrepreneurial 
whereby the state assumes the burden for financial risk to simulate growth 
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(e.g. public-private partnerships). In the scramble to provide a 'fixing point' 
(Harvey 1982) for increasingly mobile flows local actors have resorted to 
hyped place marketing strategies; to the point where excessive urban 
boosterism far exceeds any underlying socioeconomic changes. 
Entrepreneurial strategies are reflexive, and self-consciously mobilised by 
states to imagine, promote themselves as knowledge-intensive, globally 
competitive, and world-class (Doel and Hubbard 2002). 
As a result, 'peripheral' areas have been re-branded under the auspices of a 
new high-tech driven stage of development in a putative 'information age' 
seen to sweep up everything in its path. Although these products may be 
'dressed' differently they all contain a familiar in-built logic. The goal is to 
'sex-up' mundane industrial districts, or faceless offshore shared services 
and outsourcing (SS0)28 industrial parks via the language of being 'wired', 
'plugged-in', or 'cyber-', 'silicon-' space to create the illusion of cutting edge 
'sticky-ness' in the 'information age'. Each technopole - Cyberjaya included -
makes equally grand claims in self-promotion materials about offering the 
most cutting edge infrastructures, a luxury live/work environment, and 
fortified urbanism to support its goal of becoming a regional command and 
control centre for the information economy. 
Technopole development projects have been most actively sought in Asia-
Pacific where projects like Japan's 'Technopolis' program, Malaysia's 
'Multimedia Super Corridor', Hong Kong's 'Cyberport' and Singapore's 
'Intelligent Island' have reframed national space for a world supposedly 
imagined, processed and executed through high-technology. This represents 
both an ideological and material investment in the (neoliberal) discourse of 
globalisation. Jessop (1999) highlights four trends: the introduction of new 
live/work spaces within the city; new methods of place production to create a 
28 SSO is sometimes referred to as Business Process Outsourcing (BPO). 
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competitive advantage (e.g. infrastructural); repositioning of urban places to 
new markets; and the refiguring of the urban hierarchy for global appeal. 
Multiple strategies have been employed by different states in the region to 
imagine high-tech urban futures. Intelligent cities, cyber-districts, science 
cities, technology parks have been conceived as 'wired', interconnected 
urban nodes conducive for innovation, foreign direct investment and the 'new 
economy'. Technopole projects are mobilised in different ways depending on 
national policy contexts. Firstly, Japan's technopolis is a classic example of a 
large, state led technopole development project. Under the direction of MITI 
(Japan's Ministry of International Trade and Industry) the programme 
created a whole series of 'science cities' in the country's peripheral areas to 
promote new technology. MITI's goal was to create a whole range of 
innovative milieu that would concentrate public resources and funding with 
goal of creating a new range of R&D centres across the nation.29 
Secondly, at the urban scale, technology parks aim to spur industrial growth 
through attracting high-tech firms to a privileged enclave within or just 
outside the city. It is expected that once these firms come they will create 
jobs and spur production. These parks function as growth poles intended to 
create a critical mass of firms that will lead to self-sustained economic 
growth. Often these parks have manifested in the Asia-Pacific as special 
economic zones populated by foreign corporations (e.g. Penang Cybercity, 
Hong Kong Cyberport3°). 
29 Technopolis is in keeping with Japan's role as a developmental state whereby capitalism is planned 
and directed by government bureaucrats, in close association with conglomerate corporations in the 
Japanese economy. 
30 The $2 billion project is planned by the state to become the regional home for foreign ICT 
companies and also for local companies. It is built on a 24 hectare parcel of land at Telegraph Bay on 
the island to house around 100 companies in a specific cyber district. The Cyberport was promoted as 
Hong Kong's response to the 'new economy' in the wake of a government report in 1999 that 
highlighted the need to build a technopole to house I. T. and multimedia sectors. 
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Thirdly, science cities are built by governments aimed at generating scientific 
excellence and synergistic research activities by concentrating a critical 
mass of research organisations and scientists within a high quality urban 
space. Science cities differ· from technology parks due to their focus on 
science and research goals rather than productive output. For example, 
Singapore Science Park or Japan's Tsukuba Science City are symbolic of 
their state's commitment to science and technology. Often they are based on 
the spatial logic of utopian separation of campus architecture whereby 
isolating a community of researchers from the rest of society is seen to 
produce a potentially more creative environment (think green, eco-friendly, 
suburban setting). 
This is exactly the kind of urbanism that Cyberjaya strives to create with its 
garden city design principles and provisions for green spaces, lakes, and 
parkland geared towards creating an ideal environment conducive to 
creativity (Chapter 5). These environments create privileged, physically 
excluded (often gated) spaces that imagine themselves as spatial vacuums 
separated from the potentially disruptive influences of societal engagement. 
The isolation has the dual purpose of spurring the 'cohesion of intellectual 
networks that will support the emergence, consolidation, reproduction of a 
scientific milieu, with its own set of values and mechanisms to promote the 
collective advancement of scientific enquiry' (Castells and Hall 1994: 39). 
However, these property led developments (Cyberjaya, Hong Kong Teleport 
included) produce a splintering effect between privatised corporate spaces 
on the inside, versus everyone else on the outside. Strategies for creating 
'innovative spaces' cannot be universalised through a specific national 
territory, but must selectively target specific populations and people (Ong 
2007). This requires a large degree of government support from 
developmental states where high levels of public expenditure are needed for 
infrastructure provisions 
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Technopole planners assume the deliberate concentration of infrastructure, 
people and buildings will create a 'milieu of innovation' (Castells and Hall 
1994). In these terms there is assumed to be a direct causal relationship 
between spatial proximity and the capacity to innovate. The thesis does not 
seek to evaluate these claims but rather approaches them critically as part of 
the ideological baggage of technopole planning practice. For instance, 
research on agglomeration economies (Rosenfeld 1996; Beaverstock et al. 
2007), spatial clustering (Porter 1998), industrial districts (Scott 1988), urban 
and regional economics (Storper and Walker 1989; Malecki 2000) has 
argued that the creation of knowledge is impacted by the spatial interaction 
of technology parks, universities, ~nd companies in local economies. Often 
studies have emphasised - following the Silicon Valley model - the 
importance of universities as producers of basic research and also creating 
human capital in the form of highly skilled labour. The argument follows that 
when knowledge is diffuse and tacit, interactions and exchange are 
dependent upon spatial proximity, often within a localised cluster (Bathelt et 
al. 2004). Tacit knowledge is 'sticky' in geographical space because its 
acquisition can occur only through social interaction (observation, 
demonstration, imitation, correction, repetition, etc), which is greatly aided by 
geographical proximity especially when such proximity is coupled with the 
contextual homogeneity or common culture' that exists within 
agglomerations (Beaverstock et al. 2007). Therefore, such theories assume 
a link between geographical concentration of production and innovation and 
superior economic performance. 
However, the relationship between spatial proximity of strategic activities and 
the creation of an innovative milieu is contested, and in some studies they 
are shown to be mutually exclusive (Fiorax 1992; Malmberg and Maskell 
2002). Such theories have sought to draw generalised patterns from a 
limited number of case studies, or specific sets of data. As Malmberg and 
Maskell (2002: 429) argue 'the abundance of theoretical concepts and 
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explanations stands in sharp contrast with the general lack of work aimed at 
validating these mechanisms empirically'. The thesis approaches the above 
'clustering' discourses critically and addresses their mobilisation in 
technologically and economically deterministic technopole planning 
practices. 
3.5. Technological Determinism and its Discontents 
While the MSC project is underpinned by the rationale for constructing a new 
global technopole, it also seeks to create a new utopian urban space within 
Malaysia. Cyberjaya is the flagship for the broader MSC project which self-
consciously attempts to articulate a national conception of the 'information 
society'. The development of intelligent cities is bound up with the 
'imaginative (re)construction of Malaysian citizen-subjects as much as with 
the physical construction of new high-tech space' (Bunnell 2004: 91 ). The 
thesis observes how this process of technopole planning has been 
conceived as a linear process that is guilty of both ecological and 
technological determinism. The section examines each in turn. 
Firstly, Cyberjaya has been conceived as a new state space and 
iconographic exemplar of national arrival in the 'information age'. The 
'intelligent city' has been planned by the state in collaboration with 
multinational planning and design firms to mobilise certain predetermined 
technological and ecological effects on the citizen-subjects which inhabit it. 
Drawing upon modernist epistemologies, the planning of Cyberjaya as 
garden city was envisaged to create a rational, ordered environment 
conducive to creative work practices and high value-added research 
activities in the 'new economy'. The design principles incorporated man, 
nature, and technology in a harmonious whole in the hope it would lead to 
moral reform, and in turn, the evolutionary transformation of society. The 
'intelligent city' therefore was designed as an urban 'exemplar' which could 
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be marketed around the world as a global 'test bed' for technopole 
development and transplanted into to other states in Malaysia to facilitate a 
state led transition from an industrial to informational economy by 2020. 
Modernist planning histories and the circuits of imitation and exemplars 
through which specific planning 'models' are 'exported' (Nasr and Volait 
2003) is explored in more detail in Chapter 5. 
Secondly, ICTs are technologically determined in the MSC development 
plans to. enable economic and social development by 'leapfrogging'. There is 
a wide ranging critique concerning the role of technology in development 
discourses. As mentioned earlier, the association of technological 
development with national progress is rooted in modernisation theories 
(Rostow 1960). However, as Howard (2007) has examined with his study of 
technological change in 200 countries over a ten year period (1995-2005) 
cases of successful 'leapfrogging' are virtually non-existent. Therefore, the 
'information society' is bound up with what Ferguson (1999: 13) calls the 
'mythology of modernisation' - a mythology anchored by narratives of 'linear 
progressions and optimistic teleologies'. This is based on the assumption 
that: (1) technology is a driver of a new modernity; and (2) that this form of 
modernity is universally achievable and appropriate. 
As Escobar (1995) has argued, development discourse is seen in terms of a 
proposed transition from a 'non-Western' development state to a 'Western' 
model of national modernity. The dual ideologies of capitalism and modernity 
are given primacy in a development script that reads: "there is no 
alternative". This is exemplified in current debates about the 'information 
society' which rely on nakedly evolutionist narratives that reduce a complex 
and differentiated global political-economy to a race for a very specific type 
of economic and political progress (Gibson-Graham 1996). This rings true 
with the developmental catch up rhetoric of Mahathir's notion of 
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'leapfrogging' towards a new 'information society' that presupposes that such 
a leap is: (a) possible and; (b) desirable (Chapter 4). 
With the growth of the internet, information technologies are increasingly tied 
into the ideologies of modernisation and globalisation. This is what Uimonen 
(2001) calls the 'information development paradigm' that has now become a 
hegemonic form of development praxis. This is based on the concept of 
linear progression, that technologies will have certain predicted impacts in a 
pre-given development paradigm. As discussed, this has led numerous 
aspiring-entrepreneurial states in Southeast Asia to construct technopoles as 
a means of utilising the perceived transformative effects of technologies 
(while ignoring the negative outcomes). The MSC follows a similar logic and 
seeks to mobilise, on a national scale an 'information society' through the 
diffusion of ICTs into everyday life. 
Cyberjaya performs the role of new state space emblematic of Malaysia's 
coming high-tech modernity and a space technologically determined to 
produce specific effects on the behaviour of citizens who inhabit it. By 
embracing ICTs from the home, to the neighbourhood, to the workplace, it is 
imagined Cyberjaya will become a new urban utopia. In turn, Cyberjaya will 
become an exemplary space to be replicated elsewhere as other cybercities 
are built in Malaysia according to 'Phase 2' of the MSC development plans. 
However, as later empirical analysis demonstrates, 'on the ground' there is a 
blurring of these utopian objectives as Cyberjaya has developed as a 
privatised space for MNCs and affluent groups able to afford the high cost of 
living. Technopole planning has been mobilised in four technologically 
deterministic ways. 
Firstly, Cyberjaya seeks to become a globally central technopole location by 
the construction of networked technological infrastructures (e.g. high-
bandwidth fibre, redundancies on power) to attract companies to a newly 
96 
"Siliconised" Malaysia. Accordingly this will happen in a linear, unproblematic 
manner in what Thrift (1996: 1470) has labelled 'the logic of historical 
inevitability'. However, as Chapters 6 and 7 discuss, such a perspective 
assumes that these networked infrastructures operate in a political vacuum 
and ignores the topographies of power and control that operate over and 
through them. 
Secondly, technology is seen to be the driver of the Malaysian progression 
to an imagined 'information society', based on certain assumptions about 
how people will use these technologies. As a result, ICTs are seen as a 
mechanism for creating a utopian urban vision based on the principles of 
unlimited flow of information, new possibilities for human interaction, and the 
expediency of always on, powered up intelligent living. This presents an 
overly simplistic view of development that sees ICT as a means of catch up. 
Post-development critics (Escobar 1995; Rahnema and Bawtree 1997; 
Sachs 2001) meanwhile have sought to argue against essentialist and over 
generalised views of technology as a "miracle cure" for the development 
question. Sardar (1996) goes further in his critique arguing that underneath 
the glossy exterior of informationalised 'friction free' capitalism it is little more 
than an exercise in 'cybercolonialism'. In this sense high-tech utopianism 
functions as a spatial camouflage to encourage states to deregulate, 
privatise, roll back politico-legal infrastructures to facilitate new neoliberal 
spaces of production. The thesis later explores how this spatial camouflage 
merely serves to perpetuate new forms of economic dependency from the 
developing world to the first and also ensure Malaysian political vested 
interests are maintained. 
Thirdly, deterritorialisation and its post-urban fantasies ignore global 
urbanisation trends and the geographical distribution of ICTs. As Graham 
(2004b: 12) argues, it is still the traditional urban cores (and not the wannabe 
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'sticky places') that are the 'dominant hubs which shape and configure all 
aspects of global ICT infrastructure investment and global Internet and 
telephone traffic'. Furthermore, allied with soft infrastructures (e.g. 
recreation, arts, cultures, history, fine dining etc) it is the historical global 
centres that are still the most 'sticky' places for global capitalism (think 
London, New York, Tokyo, Paris). These historic world cities with requisite 
capital, infrastructure, and human capital contrast with to those new tabula 
rasa technopole spaces which seek to manufacture a new global centrality 
from scratch. 
As Jessop (2000: 6) observes, there is also a temporal dimension at play 
evident in a major contradiction between the short-term economic calculation 
of constructing a technopole to produce instant effects and the 'long-term 
dynamic of 'real competition' rooted in resources (skills, trust, heightened 
reflexivity, collective mastery of techniques, economies of agglomeration and 
size) that may take years to create, stabilise, and reproduce'. The most 
dynamic places are those which are socially embedded over time, whereby 
collective learning has evolved over centuries, not years. Therefore, the logic 
of replicating 'paradigmatic cities' (Amin and Graham 1997) to become 
exemplary new 'sticky places' is a seductive myth. 
Fourthly, contemporary debates present a historically limited understanding 
of the 'information society'. It assumes that previous centuries or 
technological epochs were somehow 'non-informational' or knowledge 
redundant. As Tarr (1987), de Sola Pool (1977) and Winston (1998) have 
demonstrated, by tracing the evolutionary history of ICTs one can see that 
this is not the case. Individuals have exchanged information using machines 
since the early telegraph, often resulting in an increased demand for face to 
face contact in the city. While the current round of globalisation does 
represent a qualitatively new phase in terms of intensity, it is important to 
recognise that these processes do in fact have historical precursors. They 
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are not part of some (as the Malaysian government has conceptualised) 
"giant quantum leap" into an as yet unknown new 'information age'. Instead 
the 'information society' can be seen as a long, evolutionary process rather 
than one characterised by shock, wave or revolution (Graham 1997a; 1997b; 
1998). 
Rather than accepting the ideological versions of the 'information society', or 
the dystopian and utopian imageries of the 'cybercity' as its consequence, 
this research calls for a more nuanced analysis of how technological change 
articulates with urban restructuring processes, and to what effects - e.g. 
differentiating macro-scale socioeconomic transformations vis-a-vis the 
intensification of everyday experiences. The global space economy brought 
into being through high-technology is not simply 'given' but can rather be re-
thought as a precarious and complex achievement. Often overlooked in this 
'globalisation talk' is the elementary notion that despite the undeniably 
transnational nature of the high-tech 'new economy', it is still constituted by, 
and in someplace, by specific people engaged in specific activities in specific 
locations around the planet (McKay 2006). Therefore, in this relational 
approach 'the commonplace activities of everyday life are not residual 
products of globalisation but are themselves formative of the global' (Doel 
and Hubbard 2002: 358). 
A critical, empirically grounded, approach to Malaysia's putative 'information 
society' seeks to avoid exaggerated forms of 'highway hype', techno-babble' 
or 'digital dreaming' (Thrift 1996: 1466) by turning to the subtle interrelations 
between the urban politics of technopole planning practices, place 
marketing, and everyday geographies that tend to be glossed over in such 
hyperbolic discourse. A 'view from below' will examine everyday milieu and 
allow me to expose the counter-hegemonic narratives emerging beneath the 
figurative cloud of Malaysia's giant leap into the technological unknown. 
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3.6. Making a Space for Counter-Hegemonic Narratives 
This thesis critiques the technologically deterministic logic of technopole 
planning practices couched in high-tech utopian discourses of the 
'information society' and 'new economy'. The thesis emerges in response to 
the overwhelming sense from writings on the 'new economy' that 'culture is 
subordinate to the logic of inevitable economic and technological changes' 
(Mee 1998: 228). The project challenges a linear narrative towards 
Malaysian high-tech modernity documented in a plethora of uncritical 
perspectives on MSC-Cyberjaya (Arif and Chaun 1998; Mazelan 1999; 
Ramasamy et al. 2002; Tyndall 2002; Taylor 2003b) which pander to the 
rhetoric of a coming Malaysian 'information age' while obfuscating its political 
implications. Avoiding such sycophantism, the thesis addresses how 
technopole planning practices were mobilised in a specific place at a specific 
time, but moreover the multiple disjunctures that are evident in this 
mobilisation. The section briefly outlines an alternative conceptual 
framework, thinking about technopoles not as they are planned from above 
to engage with some utopian 'information society'; but rather how they are 
experience from below through 'the everyday'. 
Firstly, the thesis highlights the experience of place as it is transformed via 
technopole planning practices. As the 'globalisation craze' hit, bringing with it 
a new wave of anti-urban futurology, place was too often written out of 
analysis and discarded as something too small, too localised, therefore, 
academically insignificant. Place and the spatiality of the local were rejected 
by Harvey (1990), Jameson (1992) as a diversion, or as Massey critiques, a 
use of place as being 'almost necessarily reactionary' (Massey 1993: 63). 
Such self-generative meta-narratives prophesised a new technological 
epoch without ever devoting detailed analysis, or empirical research, to how 
new information and communications technologies resonated with the 
everyday places we inhabit: what did they do to people's lives? How were 
they reconfiguring urban spaces, life, spatial or temporal modes? How are 
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such experiences felt locally? What are its politics? It is only by attending to 
how these processes are experienced in specific time-space contexts can 
we find analytical points of friction. 
My approach follows calls of recent work in sociology (Latour 2004; Urry 
2004) for scholars to work more closely with the objects of their study and to 
be sensitive to the locality in which these relations are embedded. Though 
often overlooked in globalist discourses place always has been, and will 
continue to be important to any form of geographical analysis. 
'Yet the fact remains that place continues to be important in the lives of 
many people, perhaps, most, if we understand place the experience of a 
particular location with some measure of groundedness (however unstable), 
sense of boundaries (however, permeable), and connection to everyday life, 
even if its identity is constructed, traversed by power, and never fixed.' 
(Escobar 2001: 140) 
Secondly, the thesis conceptualises place as relational. Thinking relationally 
about place can reveal the connections and disconnections between cities 
and problematise a simple hierarchical progression of nested geographical 
scales from the local to the global. In turn, relational thinking reveals the 
multiple time-spaces in places that are simultaneously rooted in local 
histories, geographies, cultures and inextricably linked to external influences 
through translocal connectivities, flows, scales. Following work by Giddens 
(1990), the thesis argues that now these global and local scales are so 
intertwined through connectivities, points of transgression, flows, that it is 
nearly impossible to talk of them as distinct and separate wholes. Or 
following Lefebvrian arguments, if space is socially produced then so is 
scale, and if scale itself is socially constructed it therefore loses importance 
as an analytical category (Marston 2000; Marston et al. 2005). 31 In this vein, 
31 Marston (2000) argues that scale is socially constructed and has no pre-given or fixed ontological 
status but is socially constructed and produced according to the logic of global capitalism. 
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as Sassen (2000) has shown, it is difficult, or downright unproductive, to 
search for where/when the local ends and the global begins. The danger of a 
scale-obsessed approach is that it falls into another deterministic trap where 
deterritorialisation of the national is followed by reterritorialisation at the 
global. Even when there is talk of circulation or flow these tend to be fixed 
back into these scales. The thesis questions the social construction of scale, 
instead recognising that if scale is produced, then it must also be contested. 
A relational approach explores - through ethnographic methods - how 
multiple interconnections are made, across and between scales so that 
Cyberjaya is both caught up in global processes while remaining resilient to 
local conditions. 
The research seeks to overcome such binary ways of thinking - the global as 
always 'out there' and the local 'in here' as distinct, unitary spatial 
containers. As several urt?an scholars have noted (Amin and Graham 1999; 
Graham and Healy 1999; Amin and Thrift 2002), this promotes a language of 
exclusionary dualisms that obscures the heterogeneous, multiplex nature of 
contemporary urbanism. So rather than 'pitch local heterogeneous sets of 
practices full of meaning against bland, generic, empty global styles 
promoted by neoliberals' (Jones and Carranco 2007: 147), the thesis 
promotes a sense of locality as hybridised. The tension between multiple 
technologically mediated spatialities and temporalities pulsing through and 
within the local setting is summed up by Cosgrove (1996: 1495) who wrote: 
'The urban world networked by Gates' technology, strung out on the wire, is 
not disconnected, abstract, inhuman; it is bound in the places and times of 
actual lives, into human experiences that are as connected, sensuous and 
personal as ever they have been.' 
The empirical enquiry is therefore positioned in the context of recent work in 
human geography by Ash Amin, Stephen Graham, Doreen Massey, Nigel 
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Thrift who have conceptualised a relational approach to place. Examples 
include Amin and Thrift's (2002) work on re-imagining the urban, Graham 
and Marvin's (1996; 2001) work on the city and networked infrastructures, 
and Massey (1993; 2004) on a progressive sense of place. These viewpoints 
conceptualise place, space and time as 'co-constituted, folded together, 
produced through practices, situated, multiple, mobile' (Amin 2001: 389). In 
different ways, they advocate a new ontological framework critiquing the 
traditional conception of place as a unitary phenomenon with a singular time-
space. A relational sense of place leads to a more nuanced empiricism as 
Cyberjaya gains its specifity by being constructed from a specific 
' 
constellation of power relations, articulated together at a specific setting, 
rather than being a delineated area mapped onto the landscape. 
'The uniqueness of a place, or a locality, in other words is constructed out of 
particular interactions and mutual articulations of social relations, social 
processes, experiences and understanding, in a situation co-presence, but 
where a large proportion of those relations, experiences and understandings 
are actually constructed on far larger scale than what we happen to define 
for that moment as the place itself ... this allows a sense of place which is 
extra-verted, which includes a consciousness of its links with the wider 
world, which integrates in a positive way the global and the local.' 
(Massey 1993: 66) 
Massey's relational thinking articulates with Smith's 'transnational urbanism', 
defined as: 
' ... a marker of the criss-crossing transnational circuits of communication 
and cross-cutting local, translocal, and transnantional social practices that 
"come together" in particular places and particular times and enter into the 
contested politics of place-making.' 
(Smith 2001: 5) 
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This relational sense of place is permeated by multiple 'flow spaces', without 
a fixed singular identity. It operates antithetically to Euclidean space- jostling 
between scales, spatialities, temporalities which criss-cross certain localities 
to produce places. This relational approach can 'unsettle' any bounded 
sense of cities imagined in the utopian diagrams of technopole planners 
which positions space as something to be rationally controlled and ordered 
(Chapter 5). Therefore, the empirical enquiry focuses on how space and time 
are socially constructed together producing uneven geographies of 
'connection and disconnection' (Amin and Graham 1999) in Cyberjaya. 
Thirdly, the above points inevitably lead to a (re)focusing on 'the everyday' 
not as eternally tedious, or the residue of contemporary globalisation, but 
instead the real space in which everyday practices occur. Often the dazzling 
transformations - the metaphorical spaces of the 'information society' -
obscure how the increasingly technological aspects of society are spatialised 
through material practices at the scale of everyday experiences. Needless to 
say an "grounded perspective" - to use that most over-used of qualitative 
research phrases - provides an insight into both what is articulated (the 
discursive, symbolic representational effects of ICTs) and embodied (the 
practical relationalities of ICTs) in the case study. As Moran (2005) notes, 
'the everyday is a space where practice and representation are complexly 
interrelated, where the lived reality of the quotidian co-exists with cliches, 
mythologies, stereotypes and unsourced quotations'. By focusing on how 
people live (in their smart homes) and work (in the corporate campuses) 
empirical evidence points to how Cyberjaya is both a lived space, and a 
space of representation. Moreover, this perspective elucidates the 
sociocultural and political-economic forces that resonate with the politics of 
everyday life across multiple scales (Allen et al. 1999). 
Focusing on the 'view from below' creates an analytical space to illustrate 
how multiple disjunctures and gaps occur between how the state 
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ideologically frames the MSC project against how it is experienced by people 
living in the 'intelligent city'. This discussion on resistance or counter-
hegemonic narratives inevitably brings to mind De Certeau's (1984) 
vocabulary of 'strategies' and 'tactics' in The Practice of Everyday Life. In 
reference to Cyberjaya, 'strategies' can be thought of as how state power is 
mobilised through the disciplining and operation of space. The state 
conception of a Malaysian 'information society' literally becomes carved, 
inscribed onto the landscape. As Bunnell (2004) has documented, state 
biopower was mobilised via socio-spatial dividing practices which 
conceptualised the MSC as a space for intelligent citizens. Consequently, 
those who did not realise themselves in 'intelligent ways' were therefore 
deemed 'out of place' (Cresswell 1996), and, in the case of plantation 
workers, removed. Bringing these debates up to date the thesis examines 
how the state seeks to create a purified space that is devoid of mental 
(distractions) and physical (undesirable bodies and their 'non-intelligent 
practices') pollutants (Chapter 5). Space becomes a dominant mode for 
reordering society according to certain codes and power relations. 
Secondly, 'tactics' are the way in which the 'ordinary people' potentially 
undermine the ideology of the state and create alternative spaces for 
themselves. These are means of subversion which challenge hegemonic 
discourse through everyday practices. As the empirical analysis shows in 
relation to smart homes; this creates counter-hegemonic narratives as 
individuals reappropriate both the spaces (of the home) and the technologies 
of control (ICTs) for their own ends. These tactics are not so much the 
'weapons of the weak', as Scott ( 1985) has argued, because the citizens of 
Cyberjaya are in many ways very much empowered, in relation to residents 
in surrounding 'non-intelligent' spaces (e.g. the kampung32). Instead, 
resistance occurs here against technologically deterministic narratives of 
how the state conceived the 'information society' ideal in Malaysia. 
32 Kampung is the Malay word to describe a traditional village settlement. 
105 
Resistance occurs because people do not "follow the script": individuals 
living in smart homes mobilise 'insurgent' forms of digital living. These 
citizen-subjects are not passive recipients of their environment; they also 
shape and mould the space through everyday rhythms, routines. These are 
all bound up in the specifity of practices within a certain place. 
Therefore, through the empirical lens of the 'everyday' space is made for 
alternative narratives which cannot be reduced to abstract imagery on flows 
or networks. These emerge to produce a very different account of place than 
that imagined in the utopian ideologies of the 'information age'. This brings 
me back to the chapter's opening statement and resonates with Lefebvre's 
(1991) notion that space is a socially produced, with each society producing 
a space that is suited to its own reproduction. Lefebvre, building on Marxian 
and Hegelian notions of production, sees space as a product of social 
processes producing different kinds of space - conceived, perceived, and 
lived (Kirsch 1995). He examined how social production occurs by 
distinguishing three forms of space: spatial practices (the routines that 
constitute the everyday); representations of space (the knowledge, images 
and discourses that order space); and spaces of representation (which are 
created bodily). According to this theory, the spaces of Cyberjaya are 
remade through a complex folding of real, imagined and represented space. 
It is a space that is highly mediated via representation in promotional 
materials, it is a utopian space imagined as an 'intelligent city', and it is a 
space which is experienced by those bodies that inhabit it. Following 
Lefebvre, the thesis seeks to examine the outcome of the ongoing 
relationship between the ordering of space by the state (in constructing its 
discursive architecture) and the negotiation of this ordering enacted by those 
who inhabit the space (the residents and workers of Cyberjaya). 
The tension between 'sticky place' and 'slippery space' can be seen in this 
context. The 'sticky place' is the representation of space of the state which 
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seeks to both impose order on that space and how it is represented (e.g. 
place marketing). This directly conflicts with spaces of representation which 
emerge in the research setting from the bodily engagements with subjects in 
the space (e.g. working in a call centre). The end result of this conflict is the 
production of 'slippery space' which is a space of resistance, counter-
hegemonic narratives as experienced from below. This is the classic 
example of what Lefebvre has termed the production of space which is 
characterised by a tension between the representation of space (as 'sticky') 
and the space of representation (as 'slippery'). As the thesis examines, this 
leads to a series of paradoxes in Cyberjaya as neoliberal forms of economic 
globalisation are melded to national development objectives in the MSC. 
3. 7. Looking Forwards I Looking Backwards 
Looking backwards, the conceptual chapter has performed three main roles. 
Firstly, the chapter contextualised current debates on the 'information 
society' and 'new economy'. This forms the background out of which the 
MSC-Cyberjaya project emerged. Secondly, the chapter examined the 
process of (neoliberal) globalisation and urban restructuring through the 
spatial concepts of deterritorialisation and reterritorialisation and the strategic 
mobilisation of 'sticky places' as sub-national scales for economic 
development. Nation states have mobilised technopole planning strategies 
as a strategic response to 'informationalised' capitalism based on the 
premise of plugging-in to globally mobile flows. Thirdly, the chapter argued 
that a (re)theorisation needs to occur which challenges conventional notions 
of scale, space/place binaries, and technological agency. 
Looking forward to the empirical analysis in the first half of the analysis, 
Chapters 4 and 5 examine the representation of space by focusing on the 
'strategies' employed by the state to frame Cyberjaya as 'sticky place'. This 
follows two main empirical routes: the material construction of place and the 
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discursive construction of space by planners, policy makers, and political 
elites .. This 'view from above' narrates how high-tech utopianism is inscribed 
on the landscape in the form of the 'intelligent city'. Chapters 6 and 7 attend 
to the 'view from below' which examines everyday spatial practices and the 
social production of space in Cyberjaya. This addresses: (a) the disjunctures 
between representations of space (as 'sticky') and spaces of representation 
(as 'slippery') in Cyberjaya; and (b) the alternative counter-hegemonic 
narratives that emerge out of spatial practices. 
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Chapter 4. Going for a "Multimedia Utopia": The 
Discursive Mobilisation of the MSC 
' 
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Figure 5: MSC Central Monument in Cyberjaya (Source: Author's Photograph) 
4. 1. Introduction 
The aim of the chapter is to examine how the 'discursive architectures' of the 
MSC have been constructed, by whom, and with what effects. The chapter 
argues that a range of discursive strategies have been undertaken by the 
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state actors to position the MSC as a discursive-ideological space for 
(re)imagining the nation and its citizens. These strategies have been 
influenced by the 'information society' and 'new economy' discourses, 
discussed in Chapter 3, and a range of institutions were established by the 
state to inscribe these discourses on the landscape to promote Malaysia as 
a 'fixing' point for global flows. The chapter examines how this inscription 
has taken place across multiple scales (local, regional, global), framing the 
MSC as a 'multimedia utopia' and an imagined space that will transform 
Malaysia on its road to 'developed nation status' by the year 2020. These 
discourses are approached critically, observing that the MSC has failed to 
live up to its own hype. 
The structure of the chapter is as follows. Section 4.2 examines the context 
out of which the MSC has emerged and the influences of key 'information 
society' ideologues on the MSC planning process. Section 4.3 attends to the 
discursive practices mobilised by two main ideological agents: the former 
Malaysian Prime Minister Dr. Mahathir; and the Multimedia Development 
Corporation (MDEC). These discursive machinations are contrasted with 
how the MSC is experienced as a material-physical space through a 'walking 
tour' in Section 4.4. Drawing on fieldwork diary extracts it is argued that the 
MSC has become a paradoxical space whereby its self-promotion as 
'multimedia utopia' can be contrasted to its 'everyday geographies'. The 
conclusion is in the final Section 4.5. 
4.2. Imagining the "Multimedia Utopia": The Backdrop for 
Malaysia's High-Tech Push 
· The opening argument comprises two parts and addresses the background 
context from which the MSC Malaysia project emerged. Firstly, following 
from conceptual material, it is argued that advances in telecommunications 
in the mid-1990s led to widespread speculation about a coming 'information 
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age' (Slack 1987). These narratives were highly influential in persuading the 
Malaysian government to invest in telecommunications infrastructure and 
ICTs as a national development strategy. Secondly, the section goes on to 
examine how Mahathir was directly influenced by a number of foreign 
'experts' who became international purveyors of 'information society' 
hyperbole during this era. Kenichi Ohmae, Bill Gates, Alvin Toffler all had 
direct contact with the Prime Minister during the planning stages of the MSC. 
'Information society' discourses operated through transnational flows of 
people, policy documents, and media reports translated in Malaysia through 
influential 'MSC architects'. These two processes served to reterritorialise 
the concept of the 'information society' in Malaysia manifesting in the 
physical construction of an urban corridor for high-technology with perceived 
benefits for national development. 
4.2.1. "A New Spirit for a New Era": Historicising the High-Tech 
Optimism of the MSC 
Although the MSC project was self-consciously promoted by the state as the 
vanguard of 'information age' Malaysia it has a specific geo-history that 
requires contextualisation. The project represents the imagined conclusion of 
the Malaysian development project. Through state management of the 
economy Malaysia had progressed from one of the poorest countries in the 
developing world at the time of independence in 1957 to a much celebrated 
'model' for developing countries some 20 years later (World Bank 1993). 
During this time the state facilitated a successful transition from a racialised 
colonial economy led by the export of primary commodities (e.g. rubber, 
palm oil, tin and tropical hardwood)33 to an industrial-based manufacturing 
economy. From 1970 to 1990, under the New Economic Policy (NEP), 
manufactured goods overtook primary commodities as Malaysia's largest 
33 According to the colonial division of labour, the Chinese diaspora were the dominant merchant 
class, the Malays active in agriculture and fishing, and the Indians utilised as labour in commodity 
production for rubber, sugar, or coffee estates. 
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exports under a period of industrial developmentalism mimicking the 'Asian 
Tiger' economies (Jomo 1993). 34 
Despite this impressive economic track record the government had become 
increasingly concerned by the mid-1990s about how to facilitate the 
transition to the 'next phase' of development. In 1991 Prime Minister Dr. 
Mahathir Mohamad promoted the National Development Policy (NDP) 
(1991-2000), followed by the National Vision Policy (2001-2010), as the next 
motors for the state development discourse. Both policies continued the 
legacy of the NEP while striving to improve economic competitiveness, 
resilience, and productivity in the face of globalisation. 'Wawasan 2020'35 
first introduced in the NDP, outlined how the country could move into higher 
value-added manufacturing, and then high-tech sectors, as a means of 
accelerating Malaysian national development. The policy imagined a 
doubling of real gross domestic product every ten years from 1990 to 2020 
so that by 2020 the GDP would be $920 billion in real terms. The aim was to 
achieve first world status by the year 2020 by raising the average incomes of 
Malaysians to the same level as advanced highly industrialised nations. 
'Wawasan 2020' sounded improbably optimistic even in the context of the 
dynamic Southeast Asian development experienced in the early 1990s (see 
Rigg 2002; Jomo 2003). However, Malaysia had partly earned its self-
confidence. In the twenty years since 1971 its GNP had risen from 13 million 
to 124 million Ringgits (RM). Per capita income exploded from an 
impoverished level of $140 a year to more than $3,000 and the poverty rate 
in Peninsular Malaysia declined from 49% in 1970 to 16% in 1990 (Andaya 
and Andaya 2001). From 1971-1990 annual growth rates had averaged at 
6.7% and 8.5% between 1991 and 1997. In sum, in the years since 
34 The NEP also had a social agenda to eradicate poverty amongst all races and lead to the 
restructuring of Malaysian society to correct the economic imbalance, so as to reduce or actually 
eliminate the identification of race with economic status. It was characterised by a series of pro-
Bumiputera (Malay) economic policies. 
35 Translated into English as Vision 2020'. 
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independence the Malaysia had defied the odds to become Southeast Asia's 
latest newly industrialised country (NIC) following in the footsteps of South 
Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Singapore (Greider 1997). Remarkably, this 
spectacular growth occurred under a semi-authoritarian one-party regime 
where post-colonial development produced an often corrupt mix of racialised 
politics, patronage, and wealth accumulation in Malaysia (Gomez 1990; 
Gomez and Jomo 1997; Searle 1999). 
However, despite these achievements 'Wawasan 2020' still represented a 
grandiose move on the part of the Malaysian state. The MSC was 
announced in 1996 to accelerate the path towards 2020 and spearhead the 
next stage of planned Malaysian modernity in an era of a much-hyped new 
'information age'. Although the MSC was to create a 'new economy', 
Malaysia's 'high-tech' legacy dates back to its prominence as an electronics 
manufacturing hub (e.g. semiconductors, hard disks, processor chips). In the 
1970s foreign direct investment (FDI) from MNCs was channelled into Export 
Processing Zones (EPZs) such as the Penang Free Trade Zone, Kulim 
Tech-Park, and Shah Alam industrial park.36 These locations were promoted 
by HICOM (Heavy Industries Corporation of Malaysia), by the then Minister 
for Trade Dr. Mahathir, as engines of industrial growth as Malaysia placed 
increasing importance on science and technology as drivers of modernity. 
However, in each of the EPZs, technical expertise and knowledge transfer 
has been elusive with MNCs using Malaysia as a low cost manufacturing 
and product assembly base. 
As a consequence of the above policies, technology institutions like MIMOS 
(Malaysian Institute of Microelectric Systems), founded in 1985, pioneered 
government policies to promote 'indigenous' high-tech led development. In 
1992 the Malaysian Technology Development Corporation (MTDC) was 
36 For example, Intel, AMD, and Fairchild have all had a manufacturing presence in Malaysia for over 
30 years. 
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established to provide venture capital to Malaysian research and 
development technology projects. Two years later Technology Park Malaysia 
(TPM) was built as an innovative hub for high-tech companies and national 
projects.37 The growing emphasis on 'high-tech national development' 
culminated in the MSC vision and led to the creation of the National 
Information Technology Agenda (NITA), in 1996, to manage Malaysia's 
'giant leap' into a new 'information age' era. 
'A new spirit for a new era. Distances will not separate you. There will be no 
barriers to communication. Ideas and information will flow seamlessly across 
borders. Technology will liberate the imagination. The possible will become 
probable. The probable, real. This is the world of tomorrow being created 
today in Malaysia.' 
(Telekoms Malaysia Advert for the MSC, 1996) 
The MSC was planned and discussed in 1995, and officially launched and 
"opened to the world" by the Malaysian government in 1996 as part of the 
Seventh Development Plan 1996-2000 (Malaysia 1996). There were two 
significant historical moments that combined to create the conditions for the 
development of the MSC Malaysia project. 
Firstly, the mid-1990s marked a period of national re-imagination after the 
effects of rapid Malaysian industrialisation and economic growth in the 1980s 
and early 1990s. During this time Malaysia experienced a 'bubble economy' 
resulting in the country's rise to prominence as the prime centre for capital 
accumulation and foreign direct investment in Asia-Pacific. As the Malaysian 
economy became increasingly integrated into the global capitalist system the 
globalisation project of economic integration quickly became a nationalist 
project under the auspices of Mahathir's 'Wawasan 2020'. 
37 These formed part of the Sixth Malaysia Plan (1991-1995) whereby several science and technology 
centres were established to stimulate national development. 
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Secondly, the mid-1990s was a historical period of unparalleled utopianism 
predicting the advent of a new technological epoch in which the whole world 
would be able to reap the benefits of information technologies. Utopian 
discourses of an imagined 'information society' were enthusiastically 
promoted by national governments, international organisations, business 
consultants, and the popular and business press. It became part of a 
transnational culture - global in reach and orientation - ingrained with 
technologically deterministic assumptions concerning the relationship 
between technology and society. As examined in Chapter 3, technologies 
were bring about wholesale shifts in our economy, society and culture 
ushering in a new 'information society' whereby the revolutionary impacts of 
ICTs were seen to constitute a rare interval in history. 
In this context, it was therefore entirely logical that an ambitious developing 
nation such as Malaysia embraced the 'information society' as a means for 
national development. The state promoted the MSC as a vehicle through 
which Malaysia could both connect to, and integrate with, the global 
economy. Consequently, global discourses on neoliberal economic forces 
and advancements in science and technology captured the imaginations of 
policy makers and were appropriated in Malaysian ideas of progress and 
policy for nation building. The MSC drew heavily on the rhetoric of 
globalisation; which posits that in an increasingly 'borderless world' nation 
states must reposition themselves as attractive nodes in a networked global 
economy through advanced infrastructures, locational incentives and high 
quality human capital. As a former MDEC chairman commented to me: 
'In international society the MSC symbolises the inevitable collaboration of 
interdependent lives. The flow of money, trade, people and ideas across 
national boundaries have never been stronger in history' 
(Research Interview: MDEC Technopreneur Division) 
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Through these hegemonic discourses the MSC project became legitimised 
as a high-tech mega-project that was deemed to be essential for national 
success in a new era. The MSC was imagined as an ideological space and 
promoted through specific language mobilised in the MSC policy documents 
and promotional materials. The new vocabulary of 'gateways', 'revolution', 
'hubs' and 'networks' mobilised by the state sought to (re)configure 
Malaysian society, and (re)imagine itself in relation to a putative 'information 
society'. The next three points illustrate how the MSC self-consciously 
positioned itself as a node for plugging into and reterritorialising cultural-
economic flows. 
Firstly, the MSC was articulated as an urban 'gateway' (see Short et al. 
2000) and promoted as Malaysia's entry ticket into both the global 
information economy and the future world of cyberspace; The newspaper 
headlines 'Malaysia maps out the road to Cyberspace' (The Star, 
02.08.1996) 'Advent of a new Cyber-era' (Malaysian Business, 16.08.1997), 
'Road map to the future' (Asiaweek Magazine, 13.06.1997) circa 1996-1997 
were symptomatic of the 'new-age' futurology. Numerous articles, reports 
declared that the MSC would become 'Malaysia's gateway to a high-tech 
future'. In turn, the MSC was to provide the 'ideal environment' for 
technology and global capitalism to flourish whereby Malaysia would 'not 
merely to ride the waves of technological change, but master them' 
(Mahathir 1998). In all of the state-owned press coverage (e.g. The Star, 
New Straits Times, Berita, Bernama), the MSC was discursively framed as 
an endeavour that will eventually result in the nation entering a new 
technological epoch. 
Secondly, technological change was presented as a new 'revolution' to 
which the state must respond to remain internationally competitive. Castells 
(1992) labels this 'the ideology of survival' whereby national development is 
linked to scientific and technological advancement. As a result, national 
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development policy has been inextricably linked to an ideological investment 
in telecommunications as a future driver of economic competitiveness. 
Investment in telecommunications infrastructures, human capital techno-
upgrading, and the provision of new spaces for global capital was planned to 
enable Malaysia to achieve a 'competitive edge' in a new era. For example, 
the state spent $2billion on high capacity fibre optic telecommunications that 
were optimistically intended to bring Malaysia's infrastructure up to the level 
of its neighbours Singapore and Hong Kong. This was imagined as a linear 
process whereby investment in urban telecommunications policies would 
enable a 'giant cyber leap' into the global 'information society' thus enabling 
Malaysia to 'take part in a new technology wave' (The Star, 02.08.1996). It 
was therefore uncritically accepted by the government that a 'technological 
revolution' was in place and that the MSC should become Malaysia's 
strategic response to it. 
Thirdly, the MSC was presented as global 'hub' in a new 'networked' space 
drawing economic, social, and cultural flows into the state. The boundaries 
and limits of the nation were redrawn and redefined; the representation of 
Malaysia as global 'informational hub' is qualitatively different from that of, 
say, Malaysia as an electronics manufacturing hub. Malaysia sought to 
reposition its relationship with the world via two mechanisms: firstly, the state 
was symbolically framed as 'globally visible' through a series of ambitious 
urban mega-projects (e.g. Petronas Towers, Kuala Lumpur International 
Airport, MSC, Sepang Formula One Circuit) that served to put Malaysia on 
the global map as a result feats of engineering, technical expertise, and 
sheer ambitiol_l; secondly, Malaysia has been physically linked to the world 
through an upgrading of technological (MSC, fibre optics, national 
information infrastructure), logistical (KLIA, KL Sentral), and economic-legal 
(neoliberal roll-back, deregulation, liberalisation) infrastructures. The 
construction of these 'signature' architectural projects, in tandem with state-
managed promotional strategies, were to take Malaysia from the periphery to 
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the centre of the global capitalist system. Specifically, the MSC was 
promoted as Malaysia's 'global connection' to spectacularise national 
territory and create a fictional linkage to a global 'information society'. 
The MSC originated during the formative years of the internet when it was 
unclear what the future direction of cyberspace would be. It was apparent 
that new media technologies were converging but how this would take shape 
was difficult to predict. Although talk of a neo-Fordist information revolution 
proved to be wildly futuristic (Robins and Hepworth 1988), the internet had 
profound economic, social, political, and cultural implications for society. 
However, the relationship between the MSC and the internet was, and still is, 
highly ambiguous. The MSC was built to become an urban corridor at a time 
when "cyber gurus" were claiming that with the proliferation of the internet, 
connectivity not location was paramount. For instance, Bill Gates (1995: 31) 
argued that 'as documents become more flexible, richer in multimedia 
content, and less tethered to paper, the ways in which people collaborate 
and communicate will become richer and less tied to location'. In an era that 
predicted the advent of 'anytime/anywhere' global capitalism and a 
ubiquitous 'information society', it was paradoxical that Malaysia should build 
a physical hub for a purportedly footloose high-tech industry. This disjuncture 
appears glaringly obvious now. However, at the time of conception the MSC 
was a baby of the internet era. It was a project borne out of Mahathir's 
conviction that if Malaysia joined up to the IT -enabled 'information age' first, 
then the country would not be left behind. In the rush to sign up however the 
concept of the MSC was poorly defined. The project superficially embraced 
the rhetoric of 'electronic commerce', 'borderless marketing', 'worldwide 
manufacturing hubs' without a clearly defined strategy for implementation. 
One of the participants at the initial MSC launch summarises the confusion 
that surrounded Malaysia's new technological era. 
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'Everyone was talking about ICT and asking about what it was. I remember 
during the launch people were asking about it, even I didn't know about it. I 
think MSC was badly defined. I know in 1997 and 1998 people were 
wondering what to do, so that is why they created this international advisory 
panel, to get people there from Sun and Intel, and all these big boys 
advising the government this is the way to go. So you can have the yearly 
meetings with them and do it. You meet annually then things will start to 
take off. I think most people you know, at that time, they hadn't started using 
the internet. So when MSC was conceptualised the internet wasn't properly 
factored in.' 
(Research Interview: Editor, Net Value Magazine) 
4.2.2. Importing the ~Information Society' Ideal and the Role of 
Foreign ~Experts' in Conceptualising the MSC 
'We have read the charts and studied the trends. We have tried to put our 
finger on the pulse of the forces that will shape the socioeconomic tapestry 
of the future. One consistent pounding beat was digital technology. Thus, we 
decided to make the Information and Communication Technologies (ICT) 
the engine of growth within all economic sectors.' 
(Mahathir 1998: 19) 
Mahathir and the state placed faith in 'expert knowledge' provided by 
transnational planning firms (Chapter 5), members of the MSC's 
International' Advisory Panel (lAP), 'information society' gurus and specialist 
government advisors to articulate a universal 'quick-fix' to the national 
problem of how to accelerate national development and become a 
developed country by the year 2020. The discursive construction of the MSC 
was influenced by several prominent 'information society' ideologues who 
advised the state on how to create the conditions for a 'new economy'. As 
members of what Olds (2001) and Rimmer (1991) term the 'Global Intelligent 
Corps' these individuals played a crucial role in 'enrolling actors' into 
discursive networks. They are part of an 'epistemic community' (Haas 1992) 
with the capacity to shape the ongoing constitution of networks that reach 
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across space with global effects. In the planning and consultation process for 
the MSC a range of elite 'foreign experts' were invited to become members 
of the state's lAP. These influential individuals were seen as the 'harbingers 
of modernisation' (Oids 2001: 150) and able to deliver economic results for 
the Malaysian state. 
Prominent members of the lAP included Alvin Tattler, Bill Gates, Kenichi 
Ohmae, and the CEOs of Apple, IBM, HP and Sun Microsystems. These 
individuals formed a 'cultural circuit of capital' (Thrift 2001: 415) 
disseminating knowledge about the 'information society' through business 
seminars, management consultancies, media appearances, and often the 
publication of their ideas in books. Of these futurists, Kenichi Ohmae and the 
consultancy firm he worked for, McKinsey and Co, were most influential in 
Malaysia?8 Ohmae is a self-styled "global business guru" and corporate 
strategist who coined the term 'borderless world' (Ohmae 1991; 1995). He 
was the main consultant used by Mahathir to advise the Malaysian 
government on the nation's strategic response to the new 'information age'. 
The MSC project is, in part, based on Ohmae's own vision to turn Tokyo into 
a 'Multimedia Super City'. This was used as an electoral slogan during his 
unsuccessful campaign to become governor of Tokyo in the 1990s. 
The close relationship between Mahathir and Ohmae can be traced back to 
the 1980s when the latter acted as a consultant on Malaysian national IT 
policy. When conducting interviews with the 'MSC architects' Ohmae was 
repeatedly identified as an important influence on the MSC vision. Before the 
MSC was formulated there was little clear strategy or consensus on how 
38 The McKinsey & Co corporate website outlines their role in conceptualising the MSC vision and 
working with the Malaysian government. We have advised the Malaysian Government on public policy 
and economic development since the mid-1980s. For example, we helped conceptualise and launch 
the Malaysian Multimedia Super Corridor (MSC) in the mid-1990s. And today we continue to advise 
the government on critical strategies for growth and competitiveness, e.g., in high-technology or 
logistics.' (McKinsey & Co website, accessed 28/05/2007) 
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Malaysia should respond to, or take advantage of the new 'information age'. 
Ohmae pronounced his thoughts on the corridor in 1996: 
'The world will view the Multimedia Super Corridor as the first real attempt at 
a massive migration from the industrial era to cyberspace.' 
(Ohmae, cited in Asiaweek Magazine, 16.08.1996) 
McKinsey had published a report as early as 1994 outlining the 'leapfrogging 
imperative' of the MSC vision predicting that GOP per capital would increase 
exponentially if Malaysia followed their route to 'multimedia utopia' (Huff 
2002). Ohmae suggested the preparation of a specialised urban corridor as 
a strategic response to his 'borderless' world. At the time there were even 
reports that Ohmae was going to live in Cyberjaya himself (The Star, 
28.11.1996). A summary of Ohmae's influence is provided below by the 
editor of Malaysia's most influential technology magazine, NetValue. 
'It [MSC] was actually created by McKinsey consultants, you know this 
Japanese guy Kenichi Ohmae. These consultants have the benefit of global 
offices everywhere, and they felt that ICT was going to be a huge driver for 
the world, so they really went for it I think. So they presented this to 
Mahathir, and said if you want to leap frog Malaysia must move out from 
being a commodity country based on rubber and tin. The demand for these 
fluctuates and depends on the vagaries of the market, depending on 
demand and supply. So if Malaysia moved to ICTs then the growth could be 
sustainable and it can be an industry for the future, it is not a resource that 
can run out. ICTs are all about brain power, knowledge, and these things. 
He convinced Mahathir this is the way to go, so he went down that 
road ... That was the big picture, or idea, and Mahathir bought into that for 
sure.' 
(Research Interview: Editor of Net Value Magazine) 
Ohmae had direct and clear influence on the MSC both in terms of: (a) its 
material and conceptual planning through the McKinsey & Co consultancy 
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firm and; (b) how the MSC was discursively articulated in Mahathir's 
speeches of the time. In public pronouncements Mahathir often drew directly 
from the rhetoric of Ohmae's 'borderless world' hypothesis in policy 
speeches comprising metaphors of 'circulation', 'webs', 'networks' which 
framed the imagined spatiality of a new era. 
'I see MSC as a multicultural "web" of mutually interdependent international 
and Malaysian companies collaborating to deliver new products and 
services to customers across an economically vibrant Asia and the world. I 
fully expect this web will extend beyond Malaysia's borders and out across 
Malaysia's multicultural links to our neighbours. Component manufacturing 
can be done in China, on machines programmed from Japan, with software 
written in India, and financing coming from Labuan IOFC. The product may 
be assembled in Penang and shipped to global customers direct from our 
new airport in Sepang.' 
(Mahathir, cited in The Star, 02.08.1996) 
'As we approach the 21 51 century, fantastic changes are taking place which 
make what was impossible in the old economy of the industrial age suddenly 
possible in the "information age". For practical purposes, borders have 
already disappeared because knowledge, capital, company activities and 
consumer preferences ignore lines on a map.' 
(Mahathir 1997b) 
Speeches framed according to the management rhetoric of Ohmae led many 
observers of the time to claim that the MSC vision was a direct attempt to 
'create a borderless world' (The Star, 25.08.1996). The discourse of the 
MSC is littered with Ohmae's buzzwords and talk of a 'new age of 
information' in which the power of the state is receding, and borders become 
less significant. This process imagined a multicultural reworking of the nation 
and national identity through what were very transnational processes. While 
Mahathir and the Malaysian government uncritically accepted that a new 
'information age' was upon them there were also key local, regional, and 
122 
international drivers to the MSC (next section). Seen in this light, the MSC 
became an ideological vehicle that enabled the state to promote its own 
political and economic agenda within Malaysia. 
In practical terms neoliberal rhetoric outlining a 'borderless' world sat 
uncomfortably with the legacy of Malaysian state-led economic intervention. 
Attempts at social engineering through the longstanding New Economic 
Policy (NEP) - geared at promoting indigenous Malay (Bumiputera)39 
development - directly contradicted Ohmae's assertions that 'it was the 
regulators we have to fear'. Growing state authoritarianism and control of the 
MSC project led the relationship between Ohmae and Mahathir to break 
down. This culminated in Ohmae's resignation in protest at the arrest and 
imprisonment of former deputy prime minister Anwar Ibrahim in 1998 due to 
a power-struggle within the government. This high profile event rocked public 
confidence in the MSC and caused several high-profile supporters (including 
Bill Gates, Alvin T offler40) to distance themselves from the MSC project. As 
the quote below demonstrates, the "Anwar Affair'' (as it became known in the 
media) severely knocked the confidence of international investors. 
'The internet cannot deliver its full economic and cultural benefits in a 
climate of political fear. Mr. Mahathir cannot expect the world's greatest 
high-tech companies and leaders, to whom he promised complete freedom 
of information and· a host of other guarantees, to help bring the digital future 
to his own country while his police throw his former protege into jail.' 
(Toffler, cited in Los Angeles Times, 29.1 0.1998) 
To summarise, the section has highlighted the gee-historical context for 
MSC Malaysia 'new era' rhetoric. The section observed how members of the 
39 
'Bumiputera' is the name given by the state to describe Malay and indigenous groups in Malaysia. 
These groups have been subject to ethnic positive discrimination policies since 1970 in Malaysia 
under the NEP. 
40 Toffler wrote two open letters to Mahathir in protest at the imprisonment of Anwar Ibrahim that were 
widely circulated in the international Press. 
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'global intelligence corps' (GIC), who through their connections with 
business, political and policy networks have the power to mobilise specific 
technological-economic discourses. GIC elites like Ohmae were influential in 
shaping the discursive architectures of the 'information society'. These 
individuals are hyper-mobile, moving beyond physical borders to spread their 
discourses throughout the globe in corporate seminars, public events, and 
reports in the business press. Such individuals work for GIC firms (like 
McKinsey) located in global cities, with highly respected global reputations in 
consultancy work. These connections give GIC elites and their firm's access 
to governments through consultation processes with political elites. Mahathir 
was eager to invite GICs to collaborate on the MSC due to: (1) their 
perceived expertise in planning for the 'information society'; (2) their capacity 
to add important symbolic capital to the project. 
4.3. Building Discursive Architectures: Strategies in the 
Mobilisation of the MSC 
The section examines how the MSC has been discursively mobilised in 
Malaysia by two main ideological agents - the Multimedia Development 
Corporation, and former Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad. Behind the 
glossy image of the MSC as a global multimedia hub is a complex 
assemblage of politicians, technocrats and policy makers projecting a 
'successful image' for the MSC. The MSC came into being as an ideological 
space through the circulation of multiple objects that include state-controlled 
promotional leaflets, press interviews, progress reports, newspaper stories, 
and media output. Together these produce a state-controlled 'representation 
of space' (Lefebvre 1991) through the normalisation of a hegemonic 
discourse that seeks to reframe Malaysia and its citizens for high-tech 
development. 
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Figure 6: MDEC Promotional Advertisement (The Edge Magazine, 24.04.2006) 
MDEC (Multimedia Development Corporation) is billed by the Malaysian 
government as the 'one-stop shop' for MSC companies. Bearing the slogan 
"Leadership in the Information Age" MDEC is the lead government agency 
commissioned to roll-out the MSC vision. The mission statement of MDEC is 
to "to realise Malaysia as a global hub and preferred location for ICT and 
multimedia innovations, services and operations." The MDEC headquarters 
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is located in Cyberjaya, at the imagined centre of MSC space. Recently 
MDEC has opened offices in overseas locations to promote the MSC 
doctrine in other parts of the world (Hyderabad, India; Dalian, China; Jeddah, 
Saudi Arabia). MDEC's goal is to create a 'global brand' that can be 
marketed around the world. It produces a vast number of promotional 
leaflets and frequently runs adverts in the state-controlled print media to 
promote the MSC (Figure 6). The slogans are characterised by two 
prominent themes which permeates all the MSC promotional material; 
technological determinism and high-tech futurology. 
Theme 1: Technological Determinism 
Endless possibilities through ICT 
Spearheading transformation 
Bridging ideas and reality 
Bridging knowledge and technology 
Championing growth and development via ICT transformation 
Harnessing ICT fundamentals for growth and transformation 
Enabling synergies, enhancing potentials, building innovative communities 
Theme 2: High-tech futurology 
Turning dreams into realities, transforming hopes into realities 
Leadership in the information Age 
Transforming tomorrow today 
Pessimists change, optimists transform 
Yesterday's science fiction is rapidly becoming fact in MSC 
Figure 7: MDEC Slogans Used From 2006-2007 
These promotional themes can be read in two ways. Firstly, they promote 
technological determinism whereby it is assumed that: (a) ICTs can drive 
economic and social development; (b) changes will be "rapid" and 
"transformative"; (c) high-tech growth will have an exclusively positive impact 
on the nation. The promotional slogans suggest that change will take place 
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rapidly, bringing to bear wholesale changes in the organisation, content, and 
nature of Malaysian society. Secondly, according to MDEC, Malaysia is 
entering the 'new information age' - though what the 'information age' is, or 
how it functions is never defined. It offers the country utopian possibilities to 
fast-track the development process through information technologies. 
Phrases like "endless possibilities through ICT", "transforming tomorrow 
today" and "transforming hopes into realities" are all symptomatic of a new 
era in which ICTs are seen to accelerate the arrival of a new 'information 
society' in the form of a 'multimedia utopia'. 
The second ideological architect of the MSC project is the former Malaysian 
Prime Minister Dr. Mahathir. While Mahathir often consumed and promoted 
'information society' discourse he did so on his own terms to both: (a) justify 
the high levels of state expenditure channelled into the MSC project; (b) 
push his own political agenda through the MSC project. He had such direct 
involvement in the MSC vision that it became known as "Mahathir's 
project".41 When Mahathir retired in October 2001 he had been in office for 
22 years, and, he more than anyone, had shaped 'modern Malaysia'. It was 
in the last 12 years of his leadership that the concept of 'Wawasan 2020' 
was borne, with the MSC conceived the MSC as both its economic driver 
and a new way of imagining the nation. Mahathir was 'Malaysia's super 
salesman' (New Straits Times, 16.02.1997) and he played an active role in 
the discursive mobilisation of the project across multiple scales. 
There are important factors in Mahathir's own background that contributed to 
the formulation of the MSC policy. Since his time as Education Minister in 
1975 Mahathir had outlined the need for 'education for the masses'. He 
placed greater emphasis on maths and science, at high school level as a 
means to accelerate national development. After his election as Prime 
41 This had led observers to speculate that the new Malaysian Prime Minister, Abdullah Badawi, has 
deliberately distanced himself from the MSC project due to its close association with Dr. Mahathir. 
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Minister in 1981 Mahathir stressed the economic benefits of science and 
technology and the 'indigenisation of technology development'. In the 1980s 
Mahathir's heavy industrialisation policy was a strategy for reducing 
Malaysia's economic dependence on advanced capitalist states and on 
world commodity markets. The shift from an import-substitution to export-
oriented, technologically driven phase of economic development was 
undertaken for both economic and nationalistic reasons. 
As one interviewee commented, Mahathir always a 'man in a hurry', 
promoted the MSC to accelerate the process of national development that 
he had successfully set in motion during the 1980s with large-scale 
industrialisation. Mahathir was conscious of technological changes in an era 
of globalisation, and saw the opportunity for the Malaysian economy to shift 
to an industrial to knowledge based model. The MSC was part of his grand 
vision, and he was therefore the main 'cheerleader' for the project. 
'Mahathir was the leader of the state, and he met many IT companies, and 
he told them about his vision of the future for MSC. I think it stuck on him 
that it was going to be big in the world. At that time no one really knew, with 
the internet what was going to happen. But Mahathir just had a belief it 
would be ICTs and this was the way to go, and he wanted to make ICTs the 
pillar of the economy ... This is what he did. He was a man in a hurry; he 
wanted to do everything so quickly. He wanted to drag the country up from 
an industrial age economy into the next stage. He saw MSC as the way to 
do it. This was his grand vision, so this was down to Mahathir trying to get 
Malaysia by the scruff of the neck. But when you talk to people, it made 
Malaysia realise the importance of IT quicker than we might have done 
otherwise.' 
(Research Interview: Manager, Panasonic) 
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The discursive mobilisation of the MSC as ideological space is enacted on 
three scales: nationally, regionally, and globally. The following three sections 
examine each in turn. 
4.3.1. High-Tech Nationalism? The MSC as a Push Towards 
Technological Independence 
Firstly, the MSC discourse is not about information technologies per se, but 
part of an overall strategy that appropriates discourses of nation-building, 
post-colonial technological independence, and high modernity. Mahathir 
argued that without the MSC, Malaysia would be dominated by foreign 
countries that had superior skills in, and access to, telecommunications (Mee 
2002). Despite international scepticism, Mahathir argued that the MSC was a 
national necessity in order to reach 'Wawasan 2020' so that the country 
would be 'subservient to no-one'. Mahathir argued that failing to enter the 
'information age' involved a far greater risk, leaving Malaysia behind its more 
technologically advanced neighbours. Therefore, the MSC could provide the 
ideal environment for jump-starting a new telemediated economic revolution 
in which every country had equal opportunity for success in the 'new 
economy'. 
Mahathir's brand of high-tech nationalism can be seen in the context of his 
often strained relationship with the West- particularly UK, USA, and 
Australia.42 Mahathir's animosity to the West led to the formulation of a "Look 
East" policy in the 1980s whereby Malaysia looked to emulate successful 
Japanese and Korean developmental-statist models of growth. His campaign 
for "Malaysia incorporated" sought to directly replicate the success of the 
"Japan Incorporated" model. Japan's economic triumph had reversed five 
centuries of world history and allowed European-American hegemony to be 
superseded by people of colour. Despite of the ambivalence the Malays felt 
42 Mahathir famously started a boycott of British goods known as the "Buy British Last Policy" which 
was started in response to a row over tuition fees between the UK and Malaysia. 
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towards the Japanese in the wake of their Second World War occupation, 
they tried to emulate Japan's economic model through strong central 
government that would command, protect or subsidise markets and 
enterprises through nationalistic strategies of control and protectionism. 
During the Malaysian economic boom of the 1980s and 1990s the "Look 
East" policy appeared vindicated. Mahathir's confidence buoyed by 
predictions that the world was on the threshold of a new 'Asia-Pacific 
century' (Savage et al. 1998). Mahathir was a central agent in the discursive 
construction of the 'East' as disciplined and ordered, opposed to the 'West' 
as decaying and decadent (Bunnell 2004). His position as a visionary in 
Malaysian politics was juxtaposed with his image as pariah of the Asia-
Pacific region amongst some quarters of the international press. For 
Mahathir "Look East" opened a new possibility for a potential Asian 
modernity beyond the imagined territorial spaces of the West. This concept 
was pushed by Mahathir's former protege Anwar Ibrahim. Anwar's emphasis 
on "Asian Values" were presented in the 'East' as an alternative model to 
liberal democratic development models and Euro-American laissez-faire 
capitalism. This concept, much in vogue in the mid-1990s, was grounded in 
the belief that Asian countries possessed a unique set of institutions and 
political ideologies which reflected the region's culture and history. 
In sum, the region no longer needed to "Look West" for models of national 
economic and social development. Mahathir combined Asian post-colonial 
confidence with his own self-promotion as visionary for the developing world. 
With the MSC Malaysia was now to dance to its own tune in a quest to join 
the elite group of developed countries by the year 2020. Out of this new-
found (pre-Asian Financial Crisis) self-confidence Mahathir carved out the 
slogan 'Malaysia Boleh' (Malaysia can do it) to symbolise the nation's new 
attitude. The launch of the Proton national car, Malaysian Airlines (MAS) as 
the national air carrier and the series of mega-projects became symptomatic 
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of boom time Malaysia. This was a time when Malaysians self-confidence 
often exceeded its material constraints as a small, young post-colonial state. 
Despite this, Mahathir gave the nation both a sense that they could believe 
buoyed by fact that under his stewardship 'most Malaysian could not 
remember a time of greater prosperity or lesser inter-ethnic recrimination 
than in the mid-1990s' (Khoo 1999: 263). 
Mahathir promoted the MSC as both a physical space and a new paradigm 
for the next phase of his national development project. 
'The MSC is not just a physical location, or just another industrial or 
technology park- and it is not a far Eastern imitation of the Silicon Valley - it 
represents a new paradigm in the creation of value for the for the 
information age. MSC is envisioned to be a high-tech test bed which will 
unlock the full potential of multimedia. We aspire to be a world centre for the 
applications and testing of leading edge IT advances and discoveries. For 
us, this will primarily be the vehicle for our country's entry into the new 
knowledge based economy, moving us from labour intensive to high-tech 
industry and so on in the information age. It will also be our fast-track to the 
fully developed nation status we have targeted for ourselves in the second 
decade of the century, which we call our Vision 2020.' 
(Mahathir 1997b: 130) 
However, Mahathir's utopian rhetoric that the 'best way to control future is to 
invent it', appeared to dazzle and confuse in equal measure as this extract 
from interview with a government worker in Cyberjaya exemplifies. 
'At first when I heard about it, I couldn't really understand it, like too big, or 
too good to be true. I think it was the same with many people who didn't 
know what MSC was. But knowing the then prime Minister Tun Mahathir, 
knowing him, his character, I did think he could pull it off, because he was 
famous for his mega-projects. We have our tallest twin towers in the world, 
we have the huge Kuala Lumpur airport which is now part of the whole 
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corridor which is across from Kuala Lumpur, down to KLIA, so knowing him, 
I thought this could be something just huge, and I thought it would be nice to 
be right in the middle of it. But there was a bit of scepticism, because it 
sounded almost too good to be true you know. I think people were 
wondering if he could do it.' 
(Research Interview: Government worker, Putrajaya) 
Added to this, there was a central paradox inherent in the MSC vision as a 
Malaysian project for technological independence, but one that sought to 
emulate the West in terms of: (a) a desire to replicate California's Silicon 
Valley model and; (b) to reposition Malaysia as a developed (read 'Western') 
country. This seems to directly contradict the "Look East" policy that sought 
to emulate Japan and not the USA. While Mahathir joked that if you 'look far 
enough East you see California' (Mahathir, cited in Asian Wall Street 
Journal, 11.06.1997), it fails to hide the fact the MSC sought to both learn 
from and replicate a global centre which is always imagined elsewhere, 
outside its own territory. 
By connecting to and reterritorialising cultural-economic flows - Western 
investment, flows of expert workers, technical expertise etc - in national 
space Malaysia could be repositioned as a new 'globally visible' intelligent 
nation. Ohmae argued that through investment in telecommunications 
'Malaysia could well become a global focal point' (Asiaweek Magazine, 
16.08.1996) for cutting edge research and development in I.T. He imagined 
that through technology Malaysia could move from the periphery to the 
centre of the information era. Mahathir also argued that 'there was no barrier 
as to why the MSC could not become a new point of global centrality. As a 
connected space it aspires to be 'globally linked across the world 24 hours a 
day, 365 days a year allowing for real-time operational control' (The Star, 
02.08.1996). Yet the over-reliance of MSC's success on enticing foreign 
investors and companies is problematic. For example, Malaysia had her 
fingers burnt once before due to over reliance on foreign capital when at the 
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height of Malaysian financial neoliberalisation and foreign direct investment 
the Asian Financial Crisis caused the economy to contract by 6. 7% in 1998 
(Shari 2001 ). 
In previous rounds of economic development foreign producers drove the 
Malaysian economy, not the Proton Saga or the nationalistic projects of 
HICOM. For example, in the 1980s, Japanese and American manufacturing 
branch plants in the electronics sector accounted for half of all Malaysia's 
exports and employed some 150,000 people (Greider 1997). By the end of 
the decade Malaysia Was producing nearly 1% of the world's entire 
electronics products for exports (Riaz 1997). However, despite these 
impressive figures the sector was almost entirely foreign-owned and didn't 
represent the success of Malaysian industry. As empirical evidence in 
Chapter 6 and 7 argues these cultural-economic flows (e.g. in SSO 
industries) merely serve to reaffirm Malaysia's peripheral status in the global 
economy. However, between 1996 and 1997 the majority of Mahathir's 
speeches invited the global community to participate in the MSC. The 
reliance of the MSC on foreign companies transferring technology to local 
start ups was uneasily married to the nationalistic vocabulary of Mahathir. 
The state tied the MSC policy to a growing sense of urgency where its social 
and economic development was couched in the Mahathirist rhetoric of 'do or 
die' or 'there is no alternative' (TINA43). Mahathir frequently argued that 
investment in high-technology was the future for national development and 
that any deviation from this policy would lead to an economic disaster. This 
was exemplified in a quote from a former manager of Technology Park 
Malaysia who argued at the time 'if the MSC does not come into the 
economic picture, there will be a recession.' Mahathir strived to 
psychologically prepare the nation for what he termed a 'giant leap forward' 
43 This slogan was popularised by the former British Prime Minister Lady Thatcher in the 1980s to 
promote her neoliberal economic policy agenda focused on deregulation, liberalisation, and open 
markets. 
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into a potential 'information society'. In promotional materials the state 
directly appealed to Malaysians to 'shed misconceptions and, old mindsets 
and fears, as opening minds to change will bring more possibilities and a 
better quality of life' (MSC.com Magazine, 2004). Smart schools, smart 
homes, e-government and other flagship applications were to equip the 
nation with the technical know-how needed to exceed in this brave new 
world. The MSC was positioned as paradigmatic space bound up with 
notions of economic development, national ideology, and social 
transformation. 
'The Multimedia Super Corridor is the world's most comprehensive 
Information & Communications Technology (ICT) development project. 
Much more than a technology park, the corridor is a vehicle for transforming 
the economic and social landscape of Malaysia. The MSC vision is to create 
the ideal multimedia environment for businesses to thrive in and transform 
Malaysia into a knowledge society by 2020. The MSC offers a Malaysian 
initiative for the Information Age.' 
(MDEC promotional leaflet for flagship applications, 2003) 
Discourses of the 'information society' were inscribed onto the 
consciousness of the population via newspapers, state-owned broadcasters, 
and through public awareness leaflets. In order to get Malaysia to embrace 
the 'information society' ideal the population was 'enthused, mobilised and 
the MSC became part of everyday discourse. Public pronouncements in the 
print media and on television extolled its virtues, politicians sought MSC 
photo opportunities, and conversation everywhere revolved around aspects 
of the MSC' (Wong 2003: 296). The following quote from a Cyberjaya 
student sums up the wave of euphoria which accompanied the early years of 
the MSC vision. 
·~emembering back to when I came here in '98 there was a lot of hype. It 
was one of the reasons I chose MMU over other universities, as it was being 
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linked to this MSC vision. But Cyberjaya at that time was just trees and dirt 
roads, so we had to use our imaginations. Nearly everyday MSC was in the 
national press, sometimes on the cover, everywhere people were talking 
about it .... I think this was a genuine excitement. Mahathir was great about 
creating a fuss about mega-projects. When he supported something people 
would listen.' 
(Research Interview: MMU student 7) 
The project was sold as an inclusive ideological space in which all citizens 
were invited to participate regardless of race. The project ties into stated 
goals of 'Wawasan 2020' to create a Bangsa Malaysia (Malaysian nation) 
and heightened sense of 'Malaysian-ness' that was a prominent theme in 
Mahathir's National Development Plan (1991 ). The MSC was conceived as 
an imagined territory neutral from the racial divisions that had plagued 
Malaysian society since the ethnic riots of 1969.44 In the MSC all Malaysians 
were encouraged to undertake a process of self-improvement, the end goal 
of which would be to become an 'intelligent citizen'. As a result Malaysia 
could nurture 'world-class scientists, researchers, innovators to develop 
international brands' (Minister of Science, Technology and Innovation 2004). 
Local entrepreneurs and start up IT companies could potentially thrive and 
promote Malaysia as a multicultural international brand. MDEC runs 
'knowledge worker' and 'technopreneur development' programmes that are 
geared with the specific goal of creating a new generation of intelligent 
Malaysia citizens. Through these schemes a range of competency and skills 
development programmes are offered with the objective of up-skilling the 
nation. The ultimate goal here is for the MSC to create a home-grown 
Malaysian version of Bill Gates (Fortune Magazine, 18.08.1997). 
Wiring the MSC with 'world-class state-of-the-art' infrastructures were 
intended as a vehicle not just for enticing the foreign companies to Malaysia, 
44 Ethnic riots between Malay and Chinese Malaysians occurred in the aftermath of the 1969 national 
election in which the Malay dominated government lost a large number of seats. 
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but also creating a 'test bed' in which Malaysians could experiment with ICTs 
in their daily lives. In the promotional literature MDEC envisaged the MSC as 
· a 'world of smart homes, smart schools, smart cards and smart 
partnerships'. The different flagship applications were designed to change 
the way Malaysians participated in politics, paid their bills, communicated 
with their doctor, kept up to date on community information. The "everyday-
ness" of the technological vision was exemplified in Mahathir's 
'Teleconferencing Dialogue' of April 1997 which saw Mahathir linked to 
13,000 Malaysians in 28 locations across Malaysia. During a two hour 
teleconference Mahathir took questions from the nation about the MSC 
including a computer teacher from Kota Baru, a Kuching businessman, a 
village head in Langkawi, a form two student from Kota Kinabalu. The 
dialogue was designed to position Malaysia as a homogenous space which 
would receive universal benefits from the MSC. 
The dialogue was part of the state's strategy to 'engage ICTs in people's 
day-to-day lives, bringing about a change in the ways ICT is looked at' 
(Othman, cited in MSC.com Magazine, 2004). Therefore the MSC was 
imagined to flatten regional inequalities linking everyone together via high-
tech connectivity in one large, networked space. Though the details were 
vague, Mahathir participated with a carefully selected group of "ordinary" 
Malaysians to outline what the MSC was, and more importantly how they 
could benefit from it. In the dialogue the MSC was framed as a national 
project that would empower all Malaysians in equal ways from the fisherman 
in Penang, to the rice farmer in Kedah, to the programmer in Cyberjaya. 
Everyone would be in on the MSC. Despite Mahathir's promotional 
posturing, material and ideological investment in a new urban corridor south 
of Klang Valley appears at odds with the goal of the MSC promoting its 
benefits across the whole of Malaysia. 
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4.3.2. The 'Siliconisation of Asia' as a Zero-Sum Game of Regional 
Competition? 
The second element of the MSC's discursive mobilisation was growing 
regional competition in the I.T. economy. The transformation of Malaysia's 
neighbours added a new urgency to imperatives of technological and 
economic upgrading. Specifically, intensifying competition from other 
technopoles - notably Singapore's 'Intelligent Island' strategy, and Hong 
Kong 'Cyberport' - forced the MSC into wildly futuristic 'cyberboosterism' 
strategies (Brunn and Cottle 1997). Like the MSC, these projects 'posit high-
tech modernity and total global connectivity as a means to national success 
in a new technological epoch' (Bunnell 2002a: 266). The MSC was therefore 
in direct competition with other high-tech parks to become 'command and 
control centres' for multimedia research and design, information 
management and processing circuits of techno-social exchange for the 
global economy in the region. 
The threat of regional competition enabled Mahathir to promote the MSC at 
the national scale as an imperative for economic survival and enlist national 
support for the project. Furthermore, growing inter-national competitiveness 
drove Mahathir to position the MSC as the most ambitious technopole 
project in Southeast Asia. In his speeches he constantly emphasised that the 
MSC was unique in offering· a purpose-built greenfield site available for 
potential I.T. companies to relocate to. The MSC was symbolically 
constructed as the 'biggest', the 'longest', the most 'expensive', the most 
'ambitious', the most 'unique', and the most 'innovative'. The hyperlatives 
were constant and never ending in an effort to promote the MSC as the 
ultimate investment location for I.T. and multimedia companies in Southeast 
Asia. 
'No other country is even considering anything similar, I see the MSC as a 
global facilitator of the Information Age, a carefully constructed mechanism 
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to enable mutual enrichment of companies and countries using leading 
technologies and the borderless world. Other plans may sound similar 
because they all use "IT', "Cyber", or "Multimedia" to market one 
development or another. But we are not adding new facilities to existing 
ones; we are building and installing the latest on a huge 15-by-50 km 
Greenfield site. We are not just upgrading.' 
(Mahathir, cited in Makur Uddin 2000: 125) 
In particular, rivalry from Singapore's 'Intelligent Island' led to intensifying 
competition between technopole development policies. During the Mahathir 
era relations between Malaysia and Singapore were continually strained 
leading to increased regional competition on all fronts. 45 Singapore's 
continued prosperity since its acrimonious divorce from the Federation of 
Malaysia has been met with jealousy and resentment from the Malaysian 
government. The island state experienced rapid economic development in 
the 30 year period since independence whereby its wealth increased eight-
fold to make it one of the world's most affluent nations (Lee 2007). No other 
country in the world, let alone the region, has managed so successfully to 
develop without the advantage of favourable locational conditions, or the 
plentiful supply of raw materials. Singapore's citizens experience one of the 
highest standards of living of any nation with high levels of home ownership, 
low crime rate, a developed public education system, and a stable (albeit 
undemocratic) political environment. 
Singapore's 'Intelligent Island' strategy was enthusiastically embraced to 
carry Singapore and its citizens (much in the way the MSC was in Malaysia) 
to IT-led development in the 'information age'. The project imagined 
45 Singapore was expelled after an ideological rift between its ruling PAP party, and the federal 
government in Kuala Lumpur. The conflict is also rooted in ethnic tensions between Malaysian Muslim-
Malay dominated government and Singapore's Chinese government. Both have accused the other of 
neglecting their ethnic minorities in respective countries. Conflict has arisen over several issues 
including: the low price of raw water paid by Singapore to Malaysia; the proposed replacement of the 
causeway bridge linking Johor Baru to Singapore with a new scenic bridge; Singapore's land 
reclamation work; the use of Malaysian airspace by Singapore's Air Force; the sovereignty of the 
railway crossing from Malaysia to Singapore. 
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Singapore society would become totally wired, and I.T. sawy. For 
government strategists it represented the latest in a long line of state-led 
infrastructure upgrading strategies - e.g. air, sea port facilities, and now 
telecommunications- designed to make Singapore globally competitive. 
'Singapore will be one of the first countries in the world to have a national 
information infrastructure (Nil). It will be a pervasive network through which 
every home, school, and office will be interconnected. In doing so, it will 
provide broadband capacity - through wired or wireless connections - that 
will virtually remove any constraints on bandwidth. Singaporeans will be able 
to conduct a wide range of transactions - business, government, or leisure 
related - from their own home, office, or public kiosks.' 
(Mahizhnan 1999: 15) 
As Crang (2003b) writes, the 'Intelligent Island' strategy was geared towards 
positioning Singapore as regional and global informational hub through 
engaging in the utopian rhetoric of 'world without borders' and 'friction free 
capitalism'. The Singapore government therefore sought to realise the value 
of new technologies to move up the value chain, and perhaps more 
significantly to create an image of Singapore as innovative, forward-looking, 
and cutting edge. Couched in a similar rhetoric to that of the MSC, the 
Singapore strategy also aimed to make it 'a global centre for science and · 
technology, a high value location for production and a critical node in global 
networks of commerce, communications and information' (Singapore 
National Computer Board, cited in Crang 2003b). Even prior to the 
'Intelligent Island' vision Singapore had a better claim than Malaysia to 
compete for the title of digital nation due to the high penetration of internet 
usage. The Singaporean government has resisted public discourses of post-
colonial nation building, rather instead they have emphasised the island's 
outward-looking nature, and open borders (albeit on their terms). With a 
population of 3.9 million encompassing some 700,000 foreigners, Singapore 
is Southeast Asia's only cosmopolitan city. The plans to create an 'Intelligent 
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Island' based on an always on, ubiquitous broadband network is designed to 
take Singapore to the edge of real (not imagined in the case of the MSC) 
utopia. Singapore can point to its excellent public service, housing, 
healthcare, low crime rights, high literacy, and high standards of living to 
endorse such a claim. 
Symbolically, one year after the launch of the MSC, Singapore launched 
'Singapore ONE' (One Network for Everyone) that showcased the cutting 
edge technological infrastructures Singapore had to offer as an 'Intelligent 
Island'. The rivalry with Singapore's 'Intelligent Island' strategy was played 
out in the local media as a zero-sum game in which there would only be one 
winner. The project in many ways stole the limelight from the MSC and 
ensured Singapore remained the most globally visible high-tech nation in 
Southeast Asia. Unlike the MSC, Singapore's strategy was clear and 
concise. The goal being to wire the whole island with high capacity fibre 
networks that allowed universal connectivity to a whole new range of public 
services, multimedia, and software platforms that would affect business, 
communication, politics etc. In effect the whole of Singapore would become 
one giant 'super corridor'. It envisioned an 'Intelligent Island' in which 
everyone was connected everywhere through a pervasive high-tech network 
that was planned to reach 99% of the population. The project was supported 
by Microsoft, IBM, NEC, HP, Reuters, Sun, and Yahoo and was intended to 
be a launch pad for new multimedia content, hardware and software 
platforms across Asia-Pacific and thus reaffirm Singapore's status as a 
global high-tech hub. 
The Malaysian government self-consciously positioned the MSC in 
opposition to Singapore's 'Intelligent Island' strategy in two ways. Firstly, 
MDEC emphasised that at 750 square kilometres the MSC 'territory' is 
bigger than that of Singapore's 682.7 square kilometres. This resonates with 
Mahathir's mega-project doctrine that in order to make Malaysia more 
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globally visible it had to build the tallest buildings (KLCC), the biggest airport 
(KLIA), the tallest flagpole, and the longest building (Linear city). 
The second example concerns the issue of Singaporean censorship of 
internet content, as well as with satellite TV and print media. While 
Singapore built some of the most advanced ICT infrastructures in the world 
the government has shown no intention of surrendering political control in 
the process (Rodan 2002). In a bid to attract global multimedia content 
industries (e.g. film, gaming, animation TV) the Malaysian government 
openly declared the MSC would not censor. In marketing materials Malaysia 
was (re)branded as a modern, liberal location in order to attract the global 
(read Western) I.T. and multimedia community. This was borne out of a fear 
that foreign experts may be put off from working in a perceived authoritarian 
environment that could stifle creativity and innovation. As this quote from an 
MDEC official indicates, having an open internet was as much a marketing 
move as a signal of a new era of political openness in Malaysia. 
'This is changing here [the relationship between the internet, censorship and 
Malaysia]. AI-Jazeera coming in, as a news organisation, they are no holds 
barred, so I was wondering how the government will react to this. This is 
why they didn't move to Singapore, they wanted to put money in, but they 
can't say anything bad about Lee Kuan Yew, or the government. You can't 
get them to do that. I think the government is quite relaxed here. Now the 
media is global, the internet is there, so this going to happen a lot more now 
I think. The government here can't control it so they don't censor anymore, 
this was part of the MSC deal right? I mean, China tried and they have just 
started an ongoing battle. So the government is being a bit more mature 
here.' 
(Research Interview: Head of MDEC Creative Multimedia Cluster) 
Two points can be noted. Firstly, guarantees by the state not to censor, and 
the promotion of a more liberal Malaysia, were based on the economic 
141 
motive of attracting foreign investment. Secondly, that claims of an unfiltered 
cyberspace promising the dawn of a new open, transparent democratic 
Malaysian society have not materialised. In September 1998 Mahathir 
famously ordered the arrest and imprisonment of the former Malaysian 
Deputy Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim on the grounds of sodomy charges, 
and corruption. The underlying motive for the charges was Mahathir's fear 
that Anwar was planning a challenge to his leadership, and his disagreement 
with Anwar over Malaysia's response to the Asian Financial Crisis. This led 
to the formation of a large anti-government movement ("Reformasi") calling 
for social and economic reforms in a series of public protests. In the 
aftermath of these traumatic events in Malaysian politics the government 
initiated a crackdown on its political opponents. Those posting potential 
inflammatory material on the internet faced the possible fines or 
imprisonment. People running pro-Anwar websites were arrested, and 
computers were confiscated after a series of government raids censoring 
political thought in Malaysia. 
Mahathir was often criticised for his over-frequent use of the ISA (Internal 
Security Act) in the 1980s to suppress political opposition .. The ISA was a 
legacy from the 1969 ethnic riots used to imprison those seen to be 
disrupting Malaysian public life through inflaming ethnic tensions. Mahathir 
also passed a series of other laws during his time in power that were 
perceived to be authoritarian. These included other forms of detention 
without trial through the Societies Act (1966), the Sedition Act (1971 ), the 
Universities and University Colleges Act (1972), the Official Secrets Act 
(1972) and finally the Printing Presses and Publications Act (1988). 
To summarise, projecting the image of the MSC as a business hub became 
as important as building the material infrastructures that would allow the 
MSC to become a hub. Both the MSC and the 'intelligent Island' technopole 
projects were self-consciously optimistic in the way they conceived the 
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impacts of ICTs within and beyond their own territories. In the discursive 
construction of the MSC high-technology became a marketing tool designed 
to promote Malaysia as a more technological advanced nation vis-a-vis its 
regional economic competitors 
4.3.3. Digital Dreaming: Promoting the MSC as a Globai'Test Bed' 
The MSC was (re)framed globally as a location for reterritorialising mobile 
transnational flows by providing a 'test bed' for MNCs. Mahathir undertook a 
promotional world tour to raise awareness about the MSC amongst potential 
foreign investors. The bulk of Mahathir's time was spent in Europe and North 
America, indicating which type of cultural-economic flows he wanted to 
attract to the MSC. At these events- ranging from international conferences 
and business exhibitions to meetings with elite groups of potential investors 
- Mahathir spoke about the MSC in terms of its investment opportunities. 
Malaysia was presented as a fertile territory for foreign investors with a 
domestic market of 25 million, and a projected 8% annual growth rate (circa 
1996). Participation in the project was marketed as a "win-win" situation in 
which there would be shared benefits for Malaysia and foreign capital. 
Paradoxically, while Mahathir frequently criticised the damaging impacts of 
Westernised culture in Malaysia (e.g. liberal values) during his world tour he 
sought to superficially reposition Malaysia as an open, progressive (read 
globalising) state. Once again a different agenda for the MSC Malaysia was 
promoted across a different scale requisite to the specific political-economic 
agenda the state wished to promote. 
The world tour incorporated a famous trip to Los Angeles billed as 'Dr. M 
goes to Hollywood' and attended by 'almost the entire world leadership in 
information technology' (Asiaweek Magazine, 07.02.1997). The Los Angeles 
visit incorporated the first lAP meeting held at Stanford University on 
January 161h 1997 in the heart of Silicon Valley and not, symbolically, in 
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Malaysia. This highly symbolic event was self-consciously designed to liken 
the planned MSC development to Silicon Valley. In these formative years the 
MSC was sold using the tag lines of 'Asia's answer to Silicon Valley', or 
simply 'Silicon Valley East'. The Malaysian government symbolically 
positioned the MSC as an alternative to Silicon Valley, emblematic of the 
Asian 'can do' attitude and challenging U.S. economic hegemony in high-
tech industries. 
Ohmae was influential in arranging Mahathir's visit to Stanford, acting in his 
capacity as Visiting Professor of Management at Stanford Business School. 
The inaugural lAP meeting at Stanford attracted a famous roll call of original 
Silicon Valley pioneers including: Gilbert Amelio (Chairman and CEO of 
Apple), Lou Gertsner (CEO of IBM), Lewis Platt (Chairman, President and 
CEO of Hewlett Packard), James Barksdale (President and CEO of 
Netscape), Larry Ellison (Chairman and CEO of Oracle), Scott McNealy 
(Chairman and CEO of Sun Microsystems). Other international attendees 
included Stan Shih (Chairman and CEO of Acer), Nobuyuki ldei (President 
and CEO of Sony). The lAP meeting partly fulfilled Mahathir's goal to bring 
the best minds from the 'East' and 'West' together to collaborate on the MSC 
project. For the MSC to succeed Mahathir realised these CEOs must be 
persuaded to relocate some of their brain power to Cyberjaya. 
The profile of the MSC was buoyed by the support of the I.T. industry 
pioneers. In particular, Bill Gates - the founder and Chairman of Microsoft 
Corporation - was a supporter of the MSC vision.46 Gates philosophy of 
'friction free capitalism' outlined in the book The Road Ahead (1995) 
appeared to go hand in hand with the MSC vision as a global 'test bed' for 
new ways of doing business. 
46 Mahathir first marketed the MSC concept to Bill Gates at the Microsoft HQ in Seattle in 1996. 
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'Malaysia offers a blueprint through the MSC initiative for how a developing 
country can use technology to move to the forefront of modern technology. 
All of the technology projects in the MSC initiative involve approaches that I 
have called the "digital nervous system" and the "web lifestyle". These are 
ways to use technology to create greater efficiencies in government 
operations, to serve citizens better, to improve and broaden education and 
to help business to compete globally.' 
(Bill Gates, cited in Wong 2003: 290) 
Gates later had a direct influence on the MSC policy as an expert advisor 
with the lAP, and his name was often cited on promotional documents to 
give the project credibility. Microsoft at one stage even planned to relocate 
its Southeast Asian headquarters from Singapore to Malaysia. Although, ten 
years on Microsoft has invested little in practical terms in the MSC project 
and the Malaysian government is still waiting for collaborations to 
materialise. Despite Bill Gates claiming that the MSC was 'awesome' (New 
Straits Times, 14.09.2000) Microsoft set up its regional R&D centre in 
Singapore instead pledging just RM 1 million. ($264,000) to nurture 
Malaysian programmers. Microsoft's investment in the MSC over its first five 
years was $2.5 million compared to $50 million in India (Mellor 2001). It 
wasn't until September 2000 that Gates actually visited Cyberjaya and 
promises of opening an R&D centre in Cyberjaya never materialised. This 
irony was not lost on the satirical Malaysian cartoonist Lat who sardonically 
poked fun at Bill Gates' MSC no-show (Figure 8). 
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Figure 8: Lat Daily Cartoon (Source: New Straits Times, 14.09.2000} 
The world tour was widely covered in the international press and raised the 
profile of the MSC within business, political, and academic circles. The MSC 
was frequently referred to as Malaysia's 'gift to the world' as a 'global test 
bed' for experimenting with new technologies and new ways of living and 
working. According to a former MDEC CEO this would create a 'multimedia 
utopia for knowledge workers by developing the ideal environment to 
generate creativity' (Chapter 5). The goal of the MSC was to spur domestic 
growth by Malaysian up-skilling and progress in indigenous IT -related 
industries. However, Mahathir was acutely aware that to succeed the MSC 
was reliant on the help from world-class foreign investors. 
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The MSC was presented as a selfless endeavour undertaken by the 
Malaysian government on behalf of the global IT community. Kuala Lumpur's 
The Star newspaper (14.01.1996) commented on how the project had 
ushered in a 'new wave of excitement' not just in Malaysia, but also in 
Singapore, USA, and Japan. The project was presented as a 'multimedia 
utopia' in which all races, nations were invited to participate to realise the 
benefits of new communications technologies in the new age of information. 
This was a process optimistically described by the Asian Financial Times 
(19.05.1997) as 'flocking to the cybercity'. The excerpt below from a 
Mahathir speech outlines how the MSC's discursive architectures were 
mobilised at the global scale. 
'The Multimedia Super Corridor (MSC) concept has spread across the 
international community like wildfire. I think there is not a single country 
which does not know about the MSC. I hear people talking about MSC all 
the time, wherever I go, even Mongolia. They asked me about the MSC and 
how they can learn from it. The MSC is a giant "test bed" for experimenting 
not only with multimedia technology, but also, and more importantly, the 
evolution of a new way of life in the unfolding age of information and 
knowledge. The MSC is therefore, "Malaysia's gift to the world", a creation 
that welcomes the involvement of the global community in sharing the useful 
lessons of Multimedia development.' 
(Mahathir 1998) 
Superficially Mahathir couched his speeches in the logic of neoliberal friction 
free economics to 'invite' global participation. However, the social and 
political consequences (or desirability) of this mode of globalisation were a 
point of concern for the state. Beneath the veneer of the 'borderless world', 
MNCs raise questions about territorial sovereignty and the re-scaling of state 
power. While seeking to reterritorialise global flows, the state does so via a 
national policy of containment which seeks to safeguard Malaysian vested 
interests. As Searle (1999) observes, whatever the economic arguments for 
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privatisation the raison d'etre was political, namely, the consolidation and 
safeguarding of Malay elite political and economic power in securing 
development contracts in the MSC and maintaining dominance elsewhere in 
Malaysia. Chin (2000) documents further that despite this globalisation hype 
the economic privatisation projects mainly fell into the hands of politicians 
within UMNO, and to a lesser extent, MCA and MIC.47 This resulted in the 
emergence of a multi-ethnic group of politically connected Malaysian tycoons 
at the helm of publicly listed conglomerates gradually built from vertical and 
horizontal integration and control of industries. 
Unlike the free wheeling entrepreneurial climate - underwritten by U.S. 
government defence spending - found in Silicon Valley, the MSC has been 
subject to state control and coercion. This flies in the face of predictions that 
nation states are becoming 'hollowed out' and increasing powerless to resist 
omnipresent globalising forces. The MSC has become a 'test bed' not only 
for new information technology applications, but also it tests out new forms 
of cultural-economic governmentality. This is what Ong (2000b) refers to as 
'zones of graduated sovereignty' characterised by: (a) the differential state 
treatment of segments of the population in relation to market calculations, 
thus intensifying the fragmentation of citizenship already pre-formed by 
social distinctions of race, ethnicity, gender, class, region; (b) the state 
transnational network whereby some aspects of state power and authority 
are taken up by foreign corporations located in special economic zones. For 
Bunnell and Coe (2005), the MSC was not a 'test bed' for 'multimedia utopia' 
but, in more practical terms, a 'zone of exception' separated from normal 
legal infrastructures but still linked ethnically and politically to the nation. 
While Mahathir emphasised the projects aspirations to become a new Silicon 
Valley, he often warned that it differed because 'the MSC cannot be totally 
uncontrolled'. Therefore, Cyberjaya became a disciplined space in which the 
47 The Malaysian Chinese Association (MCA) and Malaysian Indian Congress (MIC) have been junior 
partners in the ruling coalition government since 1969. 
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state could control global cultural-economic flows and manage the activity of 
knowledge workers and companies (Chapter 5). 
The MSC became a bounded space in which new forms of economic and 
social activity were invited in on the one hand, and regulated on the other. It 
bears similarities to what Ong and Collier (2005) term a 'global assemblage' 
identified as 'an unstable constellation shaped by interacting global forms 
and situated political regimes'. For instance, the MSC is still subject to a 'Bill 
of Guarantees' that do not apply in non-MSC territory in Malaysia. MSC 
status companies are free from local ownership requirements and 
companies are given rights to employ local and foreign knowledge workers 
without restrictions. However, in order to make the project more palatable to 
a Malay-majority concerned about the effects of an unregulated global 
environment - where importantly the normal rules don't apply - the 
government decided to restrict the policies to a 'test bed'. Limiting the 
potentially harmful effects of MSC policies to a small urban corridor south of 
Kuala Lumpur appeared to act as a compromise for those fearing the 
negative impacts of globalisation. So, despite the rhetoric of the MSC 
offering a 'gift to the world' Mahathir was wary of the potential damage of 
allowing a planetary free-for-all in Malaysian territory which would be 
unacceptable to the majority Muslim population. However, despite the 
production of a fragmented zone of governmentality the state has been 
unsuccessful in its management of filtering which cultural-economic flows 
enter Malaysia and which do not (Chapter 6). In particular Malaysia's 
reliance on foreign capital for industrial-led development has left the state 
with little bargaining authority against relatively footloose MNCs. 
To summarise, as the MSC was framed across multiple scales there was an 
ongoing tension between counter-hegemonic and hegemonic discourses of 
nationalism, technology, culture, and globalisation in its discursive 
mobilisation. First, the MSC has been framed at the national and regional 
scale as a counter-hegemonic project for technological independence to 
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combat the perceived negative effects of neoliberal globalisation. The MSC 
was created for Malaysia to reap the benefits of a perceived 'information 
age'. Importantly, counter-hegemonic narratives affirmed the state's 
awareness of their globally peripheral position as a 'developing', and 'non-
technologically innovative nation'. Despite these obvious limitations, 
Mahathir and MDEC both promote the MSC as a means for 'leapfrogging'; 
thereby accelerating the transition from industrial nation to 'information 
society'. The only way centrality can be achieved is through citizen-led 
intelligent development encompassing up-skilling, increased IT literacy, and 
a new generation of local start up companies. Mahathir frequently positioned 
this as a national economic necessity to avoid being left behind in the race to 
enter a new global 'information age'. Secondly, the MSC has been mobilised 
through the hegemonic narrative of globalisation whereby the state must 
prepare national territory for global neoliberal forces to which there is no 
alternative. This was clearly seen in the rhetoric of the MSC becoming a 'test 
bed' for MNCs involved in IT and Multimedia. Mahathir framed the project to 
a global audience in terms of potential investment opportunities, low running 
costs, and locational advantages of doing business in Malaysia. While the 
need to attract foreign interest is essential to the project's success the 
regional and global promotion of the MSC has enabled the state to push its 
own political-economic agenda. 
4.4. Locating the MSC: Journeying Along Malaysia's Information 
Superhighway 
The closing section critiques the discursive mobilisation of the MSC as a 
'multimedia utopia' by focusing on the places where an imagined high-tech 
transformation might take place. Juxtaposed to the ideological mobilisation 
of the MSC as a discursive space are the physical places intended to 
promote national connectivity to the 'information society' and 'new economy'. 
The section introduces conceptual points that are explored in the remaining 
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chapters relating to how below the utopian discursive construction of the 
MSC as 'multimedia utopia' the high-tech corridor has manifested as a 
splintered urban landscape which is physically proximate but rel~tionally 
distant to its hinterland of disconnected, 'non-technologised' spaces. 
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Figure 9: lmag_ined .MSC Boundaries in Klang Valley, Malaysia. 
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On the above map has been inserted the imagined boundary of the MSC. 
However, if one looks on any official map of Malaysia the MSC is 
conspicuous by its absence (Figure 9). For the first-time visitor in search of 
Malaysia's self-prophesised 'multimedia utopia' one could be forgiven for 
thinking that the MSC does not exist at all. In planning documents the project 
is presented as a discrete urban locale, clearly demarcated from the rest of 
Malaysia as an extra-territorial zone for high-tech industries. 
'The MSC is a dedicated corridor measuring 15 km wide and 50 km long. 
The area stretches from the worlds tallest twin towers - Petronas Twin 
Towers - at the Kuala Lumpur City Centre (KLCC) in the north to the new 
Kuala Lumpur International Airport (KLIA) in the south.' 
(MDEC information leaflet, 2004) 
The second quote from an MDEC official offers an alternative perspective on 
the MSC. 
'It started out with the physical location of the corridor, but since then it has 
developed a lot further and we are spreading our wings with the country. 
This can benefit the whole of Malaysia. It is not just a science park. It is a 
science park in the sense of Cyberjaya, but the concept is bigger. It is about 
changing the way of life in Malaysia, the way we live and the way we work. 
That embodies the MSC concept. Cyberjaya is not just MSC. It is bigger 
than that. Now it is everywhere.' 
(Research Interview: Head of MDEC Cybercities Division) 
The quotes above present two conflicting viewpoints on the topography of 
the MSC that resonate with the remainder of the thesis. On the one hand the 
MSC has been conceptualised as a new urban technopole corridor located 
south of Kuala Lumpur within Klang Valley. On the other hand the MSC is 
framed as an abstract psychological space for promoting 'intelligent' ways of 
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living and being. However, as the quote below demonstrates, there is also 
contestation as to whether the MSC materialised to produce any tangible 
effects more than ten years after the project's launch. 
'.1 think even the MSC, the whole concept didn't materialise even ten years 
on, because we talk about a corridor, a huge space of land from KLCC to 
KLIA. But that didn't happen. There needs to be an effort to make the 
corridor into a physical space. Now it doesn't exist physically just in their [the 
government] imagination.' 
(Research Interview: government worker, Putrajaya) 
The thesis critically approaches the MSC to contest any sense of the project 
as a bounded, 15 by 50 km urban corridor. Rather, the MSC has emerged as 
a number of geographically splintered pockets of connectivity incorporating 
'cybercities' such as Kuala Lumpur City Centre, KL Tower, Technology Park 
Malaysia, KL Sentral, and Cyberjaya Flagship Zone. Through a narrative 
journey through the corridor it is argued that the high-tech landscape of the 
MSC only really exists in the planning models, development guidelines as an 
imagined 'multimedia utopia'. 
The journey begins at the northern most point of the MSC bounded by the 
Petronas Towers at Kuala Lumpur City Centre (KLCC).48 The towers have 
been billed as the global gateway to the MSC, and along with KLIA are two 
centres of planned global connectivity. KLIA aspires to become a regional 
transport logistics hub while the towers are marketed as a global city 
business centre. The towers form one of a series of 'mega-projects' 
characteristic of recent urban developments in Asia, and is intended to mark 
out Malaysia on a global scale as peringkat antarabangsa ('world-class' in 
48 The towers are named after Petronas, the national oil company which fully occupies Tower 1, and 
which also provided a large amount of the financial backing for the project. Tower 2 is home to several 
MNCs including Accenture, AI Jazeera, Bloomberg, Boeing, IBM, McKins~y & Co, Microsoft and 
Reuters. The KLCC development incorporates the twin towers, the six story Suria KLCC shopping 
mall, the Petronas Concert Hall, adjacent office blocks including the Maxis tower, and a 20.25 hectare 
public park. 
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English). The MSC was conceived to link together several mega-projects 
including: KL Sentral, the biggest train station in Southeast Asia; KL Tower, 
the fourth largest telecommunications tower in the world; KLIA, the biggest 
airport in the region. Together these mega-projects constitute an 
iconographic landscape that has been heavily exploited in place promotion 
strategies to (re)brand Malaysia as 'modern' and 'developed'. 
At the time of construction the Petronas Towers were the tallest buildings in 
the world (Figure 1 0). Kuala Lumpur's obsession with high-rise projects in 
the 1990s was a product of Mahathir's desire to (re)construct it as a 'global 
city' (Jeshuran 2004). Designed by the Argentine architect Cesar Pelli49 452 
metres' high, the 88-story towers have become a signifier of national 
modernity. The Petronas Towers more than any other mega-project has 
helped to make Malaysia globally visible as a potential investment hub for 
global capital. Bunnell (2004) highlights the dual role of the towers in globally 
(re)orientating Kuala Lumpur to the world, and Kuala Lumpur to Malaysians. 
Bunnell notes that KLCC was thus 'not merely diagnostic of an optimistic 
moment in Malaysian development, but was also intended to provide a new 
gee-historical vantage point for would-be "world-class" Malaysia(ns)' 
(Bunnell 2004: 68). 
49 Cesar Pelli is the architect who designed Canary Wharf. He won a competition of international 
architects to design the Petronas Towers project. The final design plans were chosen by Dr. Mahathir 
himself. It was also rumoured that during the construction process Mahathir constantly made site visits 
to check on the progress of the development. 
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Figure 10: Kuala Lumpur City Centre (Source: Author's Photograph) 
For many of the first MSC status companies (e.g. NTT, Telekoms Malaysia) 
in 1996-1997 the only designated 'cybercity' areas were either KLCC or 
Cyberjaya. Many preferred a Kuala Lumpur location to gain the benefits of its 
amenities, transport services, proximity to potential clients etc. However, the 
high cost of renting office space in KLCC meant many of these companies 
decided to relocate to Cyberjaya. Several companies chose to exploit the 
MSC's fuzzy boundaries and registered their company address within the 
MSC, but relocating the majority of their operations outside of it. This 
administrative loophole allows companies to gain the benefits of the 'Bill of 
Guarantees' without locating in actual MSC territory. 
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The inclusion of KLCC in the corridor adds important symbolic capital to the 
MSC. On the MSC promotional material the Petronas Towers are used 
despite the MSC epicentre being located some 40 km south in Cyberjaya. 
For MNCs locating in a signature building adds important appeal for potential 
clients. For example, the McKinsey global consultancy is located in Tower 2. 
On the McKinsey website a picture of the towers are shown, and its location 
emphasised as McKinsey's 'highest office' in the world. By being in the 
towers the company becomes more globally visible. Its global audience of 
potential clients and investors can identify with the towers as symbolic of 
progress, modernity and advanced architectural achievement. 
South of KLCC the next stop along the MSC is the Kuala Lumpur tower. The 
KL tower stands taller than KLCC by virtue of its elevated location in 
downtown Kuala Lumpur. The top of the KL tower observation deck level 
contains a permanent visitor exhibition documenting the vision for the MSC. 
The display claims the Menara KL ('KL tower') is the telecommunications 
hub of the MSC. The gallery identifies the significance of Menara KL as 'a 
telecommunications tower to upgrade the quality of telecommunications and 
the clarity of broadcast transmissions.' The KL tower is one of a series of 
connective nodes (others include the MEASAT Satellite farm and the 
Telekoms Malaysia hub in Cyberjaya) intended to connect the MSC to the 
global telecommunications network. 
In casual conversation with visit~rs to the MSC exhibition during fieldwork it 
became clear just how little people knew about the MSC. Invariably the MSC 
was something they had heard of, as "something I.T. related", but little more 
than that. KL tower contains no office space for MSC status companies 
rather it performs the role of 'functional icon' for the MSC. If KLCC is 
symbolic of a new national modernity, KL Tower signifies global 
technological connectivity. Firstly, as functional icons they serve to make 
Malaysian space more globally visible to an international audience. 
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Secondly, as architectural achievements they are embodiments of the 
'Malaysia Boleh' attitude. 
Opened on the 161h of April as the largest railway station in Southeast Asia, 
KL Sentral has been planned as the transport hub of the MSC. It was built 
alongside the colonial landmark of Kuala Lumpur Railway station. KL Sentral 
is one of a number of designated cybercities in Klang Valley allowed to 
house MSC status companies. The awarding of MSC status to KL Sentral 
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served to boost the property development industry which was severely hit by 
the Asian financial crisis. Only a small number of companies are located at 
KL Sentral (the incubator has space for 10 start up companies). The re-
branding of KL Sentral as 'MSC cybercity' functions as spatial camouflage to 
re-brand what has traditionally been seen as run down transport hub, as new 
exclusive residential address. This has in turn filtered out to the surrounding 
former industrial area of Brickfields that is now booming on the back of the 
development of KL Sentral and recently listed by KLUE magazine as one of 
the three 'hottest neighbourhoods' in Kuala Lumpur. 
It is from KL Sentral that the real journey into the heart of the MSC takes 
place. Travellers use the Express Rail Link (ERL) specially opened in 2002 
to link the MSC from KL Sentral to Kuala Lumpur international airport in the 
south. The ERL is the most expensive form of public transport in Malaysia at 
35RM for a single trip from KL Sentral to KLIA. The journey time is 
approximately 38 minutes to KLIA, and 20 minutes to the 
Putrajaya/Cyberjaya. The ERL is noticeably much cleaner, and more pristine 
than the other train lines (Putra, STAR, KTM, KL Monorail) serving the Klang 
Valley area. The interior of the trains contain video screens with information 
about the service and events going on in Kuala Lumpur aimed at the 
professional/business community. 5° All of these factors serve to differentiate 
50 These included adverts for luxury hotels, shopping experiences and restaurants. It is expected that 
the people using these services would be middle-class Malaysians and foreign visitors able to afford 
the service. 
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the journey to the MSC from other journeys on public transport elsewhere in 
Klang Valley. 
The experience of travelling down the corridor is worth expanding on. The 
service extends south from KL Sentral towards Cheras which is a major 
residential era south of Kuala Lumpur City. The train then passes through 
several kilometres of residential high-rise blocks characteristic of Kuala 
Lumpur's faceless commuter townships. When the houses disperse the track 
stretches into open plantation land for another 10 minutes, no buildings are 
in sight, just what appears to be dense vegetation. If Cyberjaya was borne 
out of jungle, as is a common misconception, this is where the jungle begins. 
The rolling hills of palm oil and rubber plantations fly past the window in a 
blur of green serving to disorientate, and unsettle any notion of the MSC as 
an urban space. Upon getting closer to Putrajaya constructing work is visible 
- conveying the impression to passengers that the MSC is still 'work in 
progress'. Shanty towns housing imported construction labour from 
Indonesia are visible from the train. These workers live in wooden 
dormitories often with limited supplies of electricity and water. This is part of 
the hidden underbelly of the MSC, what Bunnell (2004) has termed its 'moral 
geographies'. The image of squatter housing clustered together by 
entrances to construction sites is far removed from the marketing tag line of 
~he MSC as 'multimedia utopia'. It is here at the epicentre of the MSC that 
state mobilised discursive framings starts to be unmade. 
My field diary recalls the experience of alighting at the Putrajaya ERL station 
to make my journey to the heart of the MSC at Cyberjaya. 
'Cyberjaya awaits. The final leg of the journey into the heart of "multimedia 
utopia". Yet the ERL station seems strangely deserted, eerie almost, it has 
this "end of the world" quality about it. The monorail line leading away to 
Putrajaya is half finished and offers only the vague promise of things to 
come. Why didn't they build it? Was it another project scaled back by the 
158 
financial crisis? Meanwhile where is Cyberjaya? The ERL station is called 
Putrajaya/Cyberjaya but upon checking with the ticket office I am informed 
Cyberjaya is a further 15 minute bus ride away. This place seems deserted. 
Yet, I am supposed to be venturing into the frontline of Malaysia's onward 
march towards Vision 2020 and high-tech utopia. I can't help but asking 
myself: am I missing something?'. 
(Field Diary extract, 16.1 0.2006) 
As the bus snakes from the transport terminal in Putrajaya to Cyberjaya 
through old plantation land across newly constructed, near empty roads the 
lack of development becomes visible. 
'Is this it? The excitement had been building for days. But Cyberjaya itself is 
very much under construction. A model city containing the infrastructures for 
potential future development without yet the impetus to make it happen. The 
roads that reach dead ends and remain unfinished suggests the promise of 
a utopian vision that was never (and may never) be realised. The city itself is 
sparse and disconnected, containing large faceless offices bearing the 
names of multinational companies. As the bus reaches the centre of 
Cyberjaya I see an old faded sign by the road reading "Cyberjaya: The 
Intelligent City".' 
(Field Diary extract, 04.11.2006) 
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Figure 11: Entrance to Cyberjaya (Source Author's Photograph) 
4.5. Conclusion: Sobering Up Time? Ten Years After 'Multimedia 
Utopia' 
'All this is very bold and risky. After all, Malaysia it still a developing country. 
In the countryside, village life has changed little for decades. The nation 
lacks a strong high-tech base and is chronically short of high-tech 
professionals. In the view of a 16 hour power blackout that hit the entire 
Malaysian peninsular last year, the infrastructure seems fragile for state-of-
the-art multimedia.' 
(Asian Wall Street Journal, 11.06.1997) 
'Here we are, a small, allegedly Third World country confronting head-on the 
convergence of telecommunications, broadcasting and computers on a 
global scale even as we are still attempting to provide basic telephony in our 
rural villages. It is a formidable leapfrog.' 
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(New Straits Times, 15.02.1997) 
These headlines from both the international press and a national editorial 
highlight concerns with the achievability of the MSC vision of 'going for a 
multimedia utopia'. The chapter has examined how at the time of the MSC 
launch frequent references to a new 'information age' ushering in 'new ways 
of living, and doing business' were commonplace. As The Star wrote in 
(14.03.1997) 'buzzwords like Multimedia Super Corridor, cyberlaws, 
Cyberjaya, teleshopping, telebanking, telemedicine, smart schools, virtual 
reality, and the internet have now become ingrained in our minds in the MSC 
era.' 
The MSC celebrated its 1 01h anniversary in April 2006. This event signalled a 
new wave of optimism detailing the predicted future success of the MSC. 
Once again discursive architectures were mobilised and the MSC became 
the talk of Malaysia again, albeit for a few weeks. The project was re-
branded with new tag lines- 'Spearheading transformation through ICT' and 
'Endless possibilities through ICT'.51 During the anniversary the status of the 
MSC as a 'national project' seemed to preclude any critical assessment. A 
government advertisement accompanying all major newspapers on the day 
of the tenth anniversary launch wrote: 
'Since 1996, MSC Malaysia has greatly transformed the nation and changed 
the way we live. With ICT as the catalyst for socioeconomic growth, MSC 
Malaysia continues to play an invaluable role to attract investments and 
ensure the right conditions are in place for ICT based business and 
industries to grow. The socioeconomic growth brought about by MSC 
Malaysia will transform the country into a knowledge based economy and 
society.' 
51 The re-branding was part of the goal to position MSC as a national project in phase 2 of 
development: The re-branding of its image will give more focus to the MSC's creative multimedia 
content initiatives as a national project where its benefits can be reaped by Malaysians of all races and 
status.' (Abdullah Badawi 2006) 
161 
(New Straits Times, 08.04. 2006) 
According to these 'official sources' everything is proceeding according to 
plan and by the end of the first phase the MSC has successfully created: one 
corridor, 50 world-class companies, launched seven flagship applications, 
created a world leading framework of Cyberlaws, and Cyberjaya as the 
world's 'intelligent city'. The ten year reports on the MSC were awash with 
features containing MSC success stories which included the numbers of 
MSC status companies, estimates of number of jobs created. The NST 
report estimates that in 1996 Malaysia had less than 300 IT companies but 
today there are over 3,400 MSC status companies. 
McKinsey Consultancy produced a report in 2001 criticising the lack of 
progress stating the MSC had not attracted significant interest from global 
I.T. companies, nor had it made a tangible impact on the Malaysian 
economy. This presented a major setback for the MSC and ran under the 
headline 'Glitches Zap Malaysian Tech Corridor' in the Asian Wall Street 
Journal (26.03.2001 ). The McKinsey report was the first independent 
analysis of the MSC and provided a sober assessment of the project's 
achievements to date. The reports recommended several measures: award 
high value contracts to global technology companies; hire top managers with 
a strong industry record; grant special incentives to big local companies to 
entice them to work with smaller companies in the corridor; quild more 
offices, residential space; and build a stronger talent pool by bringing in top 
universities. Reports allude to the fact that the MSC flagship applications 
have pushed the socioeconomic agenda but failed to bring ICTs closer to the 
people at large. This was confirmed by a Cyberjaya resident who observed: 
'Basically MSC was established more than 10 years ago and even then they 
were promising a lot of things, I mean a lot of things. They had the city 
command centre, they've got urn (.2), internet backbones, they've got 
modern high-tech infrastructure and until today they are still selling the same 
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things. So its pretty much what they were trying to sell before is the same 
thing, there is pretty much no improvement and no development, everything 
is still (.2) even the city command centre in Cyberjaya, which is suppose to 
be the intelligent hub of the city, check out the website, but its probably not 
been updated. It is like this with a lot of the flagship applications. What 
happened to telemedicine? Smart schools? I don't see it happening now.' 
(Research Interview: Cyberia resident 3) 
This chapter has provided the reader with a background to the ideological 
context and discursive architectures of the MSC. The representations of the 
MSC discourse do not merely allude to the technologisation or 
informatisation of Malaysia - they constitute, incite, and normalise this 
representation by promoting and endorsing a specific form of high-tech 
urbanity and the requisite behaviour and conduct to achieve this utopian 
vision. The chapter has examined how this vision was promoted by the state 
(i.e. Mahathir and MDEC) across multiple scales and drew heavily from the 
'information society' discourses of the time. The remainder of the thesis 
examines how these 'discursive architectures' have been inscribed on a very 
physical place - the 'intelligent city' of Cyberjaya. Moreover the thesis 
examines the extent to which these discursive framings map onto the 
everyday geographies of Cyberjaya. 
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Chapter 5. Welcome to Cyberjaya: "The World's 
Intelligent City" 
5. 1. Introducing Cyberjaya 
'Utopian thinking: the capacity to imagine a future that departs significantly 
from what we know to be the general condition of the present.' 
(Freidmann 2000: 462) 
'Welcome to Cyberjaya. Come into a world blanketed by lush greenscapes 
interwoven with high-tech valleys and intelligent homes. All wrapped within a 
refreshing environment in which stress and pollution are simply unheard of.' 
(Setia Haruman Advert, 2005) 
The chapter shifts focus from the discursive spaces of the MSC to the 
physical place of Cyberjaya. The journey south through the MSC from the 
congestion of Kuala Lumpur to open plantation lands immediately 
establishes the identity of Cyberjaya as frontier city and national project. The 
city is the planned "blank slate" for Malaysia's giant leap into the 'information 
age', and symbolically positioned as an 'intelligent city' utopia with the twin 
goals of preparing the nation and its citizens for a new phase of high-tech 
development. Cyberjaya's planners invited both the nation and the world to 
participate in realising the perceived benefits of ICTs in a garden city 
environment suitable for creative work practices. The development was not 
seen by the state in purely technical terms (i.e. "getting people to use IT') 
but, more holistically, embraced new ways of 'intelligent living' as a means 
for wider societal development. As the deputy director of the Malaysian 
Federal Department for Town and Country Planning (JPBM) remarked: 
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'Technology comes in the first part. Then the sustainable development into 
the second part of the doctrine alongside the spiritual and health aspects of 
the Cyberjaya environment.' 
(The Edge Magazine, 26.05.1997) 
The chapter examines how Cyberjaya became the site onto which utopian 
imaginings about the 'information society' were inscribed on the landscape 
against which the entire nation could be mapped. This process has been 
mobilised through transnational planning networks, and influenced by 
modernist planning discourse which introduced nature as a means of 
restoring a healthy vitality to modern urban living while maintaining a belief in 
the power of technology to change society. The chapter is structured 
according to five main sections. Section 5.2 attends to how Cyberjaya was 
planned to produce 'intelligent nationhood' through the provision of a high-
tech urban enclave. This was conceived in technical terms through the 
provision of telecommunications infrastructures and 'flagship' IT applications. 
Both Sections 5.3 and 5.4 examine how Cyberjaya was planned as a 
psychological space fostering 'intelligent living' and working practices 
· through transnational planning practices. Section 5.5 focuses on how 
Cyberjaya has become a global exemplar as 'intelligent development' 
discourses have been translated and inscribed in other urban locations in 
Malaysia and beyond. The closing Section 5.6 addresses the socio-spatial 
'splintering' effects that have emerged as a consequence of 'intelligent' 
technopole planning practices. 
Cyberjaya was officially launched on the 81h July 1999 by Dr. Mahathir. In the 
planning stages the city was mobilised through specific 'representations of 
space' (Lefebvre · 1991 ): namely technological visions of an 'IT City', 
'Multimedia City', before the name for Cyberjaya (meaning 'Cyber-success' 
in Malay) was settled upon. Situated centrally in the corridor, Cyberjaya is 
the MSC 'flagship' Cybercity and promoted as 'one of the world's leading 
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smart cities' (MDEC Cybercities Leaflet, 2005). The technological utopianism 
of the time was exemplified by a newspaper headline claiming 'Malaysia has 
entered the age of Cybercity living' (The Star, 05.08.1996). The government 
claimed that the city would usher in a new epoch that would shape the future 
of Malaysian urbanism. 
Prior to its development Cyberjaya was a collection of rubber and palm oil 
plantation estates owned by Golden Hope Plantation Berhad. Following the 
modernist design principles adopted by its planners, local genealogies (e.g. 
colonial histories, vernacular) were erased from Cyberjaya's planning 
history. Cyberjaya's development was re-framed in promotional materials 
with a rhetoric of turning a 'jungle' wilderness into 'high-tech' city. This 
discursive re-framing followed two main themes. Firstly, plantation estates 
were viewed as 'undeveloped' spaces, and along with their mainly Tamil 
Indian inhabitants, seen to be incompatible with the rationalities of 
'intelligent' development (see Bunnell 2004). This represents an interesting 
historical reversal of British colonial practices which emphasised the rational 
ordering of the landscape when justifying the transformation of rainforest into 
rubber plantations during the colonial period in Malaya (Sioh 2004). In an act 
of post-colonial intervention, the plantation was reconceptualised under 
Mahathir as an obstacle and removed to meet standards of discipline, 
purpose, and order needed for the state's drive for economic and social 
development. Such modernist visions promoted an aesthetic of erasure and 
state controlled re-inscription. Secondly, Cyberjaya was conceptualised as a 
tabula rasa and 'empty space' beckoning the unhindered construction of 
high-tech Malaysia. The project set in motion the 'clearing unbelievable 
sections of ground in an orgy of tabula rasa where it seems the act of 
clearing becomes an act of faith' (Koolhaas 2001 ). Cyberjaya's planning 
team perceived the plantation as their playground on which they could 
imprint an aspirational landscape for high-tech Malaysians who would 
become 'world-class' citizens. 
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'Basically it was jungle. At that time it was just like a blank slate. Cyberjaya 
was a planned city, so before we set foot on in, the government has a 
master plan. They had a planner come in and draw up plans for the area. He 
factored in towns, and residences and these things. So when we came on 
board our role is to implement the master plan.' 
(Research Interview: former Setia Haruman executive) 
The discursive positioning of Cyberjaya as a development carved out of 
jungle has the effect of making the urban achievement of Cyberjaya's 
'intelligent city' appear more spectacular. 
'It was very exciting to begin with, it was a national project you know, but .it 
had a global outlook. You have the dynamic Dr. Mahathir leading it. 
Internationally it is getting good attention because this kind of thing hadn't 
been done before, and it was pretty special. I think to me, it is very 
challenging project. From Setia Haruman, which I was involved in, we were 
challenged by getting Cyberjaya up and running. When we first stepped foot 
on it, in May 1997, it was nothing you know. Just 100% palm oil plantation. 
So it was a big challenge, a lot of people saying it can't be done, that it was 
a mega-project that will fail, So for us a big challenge, but something we are 
proud of.' 
(Research Interview: former Setia Haruman executive) 
In a complex conundrum typical of Malaysian money politics, land was 
acquired by the state under the National Land Acquisition Act and 'parked' 
under a newly created government owned company called Cyberview Sdn 
Bhd. Cyberview have a development agreement with Setia Haruman who is 
the master developer of the Cyberjaya flagship zone and a private 
consortium of government linked companies (originally MK Land, Renong 
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Bhd, Landmarks Bhd, and Country Heights Holdings52). Cyberview are 
authorised to sell the land for development, and Setia Haruman are 
permitted to develop key flagship projects and infrastructures according to 
the planning guidelines set out by the JPBM53 (Malaysia 1997). 
Cyberjaya's development comprises 3 phases: Phase 1A (1 ,063 hectares), 
Phase 1 B (397 hectares), and finally Phase 2 (1 ,424 hectares). The target 
population upon completion was originally set at 120,000 by 2011, although 
at the time of writing, MDEC have revised the figure to an ambitious 280,000 
full-time residents. The current population is substantially lower, peaking at 
30,000 during the day, with around 10,000 permanent residents at night.54 
Cyberjaya Flagship Zone (CFZ) is the central area of Cyberjaya and covers 
an area of 2,890ha (7,000 acres) becoming operational in 1998. The MSC 
Cybercities division in MDEC is the custodian for Cyberjaya though their role 
is limited to marketing work, and facilitating the move of companies into 
Cyberjaya. 
5.2. Envisioning the Cybercity: Cyberjaya as 21st Century Urban 
Utopia 
'This is unlike any high-tech city in the world, this is Cyberjaya.' 
(Setia Haruman promotional slogan, 2006) 
Cyberjaya has been imagined as 'more than just a technology park' and was 
planned to 'transform the social and economic landscape of Malaysia' 
(Research Interview: MDEC Cybercities Division). The state set about 
52 After a series of buy outs the current ownership of Setia Haruman is 75% held by MK Land and 25% 
held by Renong Bhd. 
53 Under this arrangement Setia Haruman, the master developer of Cyberjaya, forfeited its sale and 
development rights over a 252-acre plot of land to Cyberview due to financial difficulties. In return, 
Setia Haruman is released from a percentage of its debt obligation of more than RM 2 billion. Despite 
allegations of "crony capitalism" the government has stated the deal was struck along commercial 
lines. 
54 Such a modest population has failed to reach a critical mass to support amenities for the township. 
Many of the 'MSC architects' referred to this as a "chicken and egg" problem whereby companies and 
people would not move to Cyberjaya due to the lack of amenities, and the amenities would not move in 
until a critical population mass is in place. 
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producing Cyberjaya not just as a physical place but also as a psychological 
space (the intelligent-garden city), textual space (inscribed by plans and 
figures), and an experimental space (for testing new technologies). Urban 
futurology was prevalent in promotional claims that Cyberjaya would become 
a '21 51 century city', 'city of the future', 'zero emissions city', 'cosmopolitan 
city', 'city of tomorrow'. Cyberjaya sought to offer a model environment which 
would 'emulate the Stanford inspired setting of Silicon Valley and create a 
networked, creative and productive society in Cyberjaya' (Mahathir 1997b). 
The planners of Cyberjaya endeavoured to create not just a technopole for 
I.T. and multimedia industries, but more broadly the creation of a 
technological utopia for 'realising the technological benefits of the new 
information age' (MDEC MSC leaflet, 2005). 
The city was to be saturated with 'state-of-the-art' telecommunications 
networks, a command centre, and new infrastructures were put in place to 
create 'truly a world first - the careful creation of a region with the 
infrastructure, laws, policies, and practices that will enable companies to 
explore the information age without the usual constraints' (Mahathir 1997). 
As in the modernist utopias planned by Le Corbusier et al, technology 
symbolised progress with the way to a better society presented in the 
construction in a city 'paved with networks' (Kaika 2005: 38). 
The cybercity concept operated on two levels in the planning of Cyberjaya as 
national project. First, Cyberjaya seeks to create a wired space connected to 
networked 'sub-economies' in the region and beyond. Cyberjaya was 
planned to become a focal point for the knowledge based 'new economy' 
executed by ICTs. Secondly, the city exemplified the search for a yet to be 
discovered ideal space for realising the utopian benefits of ICTs - 'to lead in 
the making of a global 'test bed' of cyber-culture and cyber-society' (MDEC 
Cybercities Leaflet, 2007). 
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5.2.1. Building a Cybercity, Creating a High-Tech Node 
'This cybercity is rapidly becoming a reality and fulfilling its promise to 
become the nucleus of the country's vision for the 21st century.' 
Figure 12: Poster Promoting 
Author's Photograph) 
(Cyberia marketing leaflet, 2006) 
Whereas traditional utopias like Plato's city-state or More's urbanised island 
imagine a fixed, static urban form Cyberjaya was a planned machinic city of 
networked technological utopia (Figure 12). As highlighted in Chapter 3, 
notions of network transcendence have clear genealogies in the urban 
utopias proposed by Doxiadis and the Eksitics movement. These historical 
origins foreground the construction of Cyberjaya and resonate with 
contemporary accounts of 'anytime/anywhere' capitalism imagined by Gates, 
Cairncross, Leadbeater and Ohmae. Such technologically deterministic 
perspectives on the 'new economy' predicted the 'spatial dynamic of the 
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whole world will collapse to those of a pinhead' (Robins and Hepworth 1988: 
156). 
Cyberjaya's planning team were convinced the 'telematic revolution' and 
worldwide diffusion of ICTs was creating a need for post-Euclidean cities as 
the world became one extended 'global village' (Mcluhan 1964). Mcluhan's 
catchphrase helped to create an image of the emerging connectedness and 
'simultaneity' of places in the global economy (Kirsch 1995). To survive this 
new global explosion Cyberjaya was planned as a networked space; a form 
of 'planetary scale dwelling' (Wigley 2001) which aspired to connect to any 
point in the planet within a continuous network. Cyberjaya's boosterists 
therefore presented the physical image of place connected to a global 
'borderless' network across all scales. 
'MSC will serve as a better interlink for the global village and give the world 
a place where the full potential of the information age can be explored 
without any artificial limits.' 
(Mahathir 1998) 
'I fully expect that the "multicultural web" emanating from the MSC will 
extend beyond Malaysia's borders and out across our multicultural links to 
our neighbours.' 
(Mahathir 1998) 
According to MDEC planning guidelines in Phase 2 (2003-201 0) Cyberjaya 
will link to a networked sub-economy comprising the world's leading 
intelligent cities. While in Phase 3 (201 0-2020) the entire MSC will contain 
'12 intelligent cities linked to a global information highway'. Therefore, the 
physical distance from the global economic nodes centred elsewhere can be 
overcome via telecommunications that seemingly allow for instantaneous 
real-time communications to anywhere, at anytime. For Cyberjaya's 
planners, the 2.5-10 gigabits per second fibre optic connection was to 
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function as the gateway to the world allowing Cyberjaya to remain always 
connected, always online. Cyberjaya sought to replace the need for physical 
proximity by electronically networking its spaces into other globally 
orientated spaces - e.g. global cities, and other IT hubs like Silicon Valley-
via a high capacity fibre optic network. 
The basis for this networked urbanism was an anti-urban sentiment that the 
linear city was the place of the 'old economy'. As examined in Chapter 3, 
'new economy' theories conceptualised as a place of inertia, physical stasis 
and congestion, impeding the hypermobility needed in an era of 
'anytime/anywhere' 'informationalised capitalism'. The city is imagined as 
congested, disordered, and chaotic juxtaposed to an idyllic, peaceful, 
harmonious rural setting. This anti-urban bias permeates the promotional 
materials for Cyberjaya which asks would-be residents: "why be stuck in 
traffic jam to a board meeting in downtown Kuala Lumpur when you can tele-
conference from the eco-friendly city of Cyberaya?" Kuala Lumpur is re-
framed as a congested city replete with its infamous long 'traffic jams' 
snarling up roads. The role of global economic hub for Malaysia was 
originally earmarked for KL, yet bad planning as well as a catalogue of urban 
social problems such as crime, pollution, and congestion has lowered the 
international appeal of the capital (Lee 1995). The city is undergoing a period 
of extensive urban renewal with numerous infrastructure projects - new 
highways, an extension to the railway network, 'slum' clearances - to 
improve the appeal of KL for international capital. Cyberjaya is promoted as 
the polar opposite to metropolitan KL, as an idealised, technologically-
enabled retreat from the capital, out to a connected garden city location 
suitable for creative industries. Cyberjaya planners shunned the chaotic 
Southeast Asian urbanism of Kuala Lumpur to construct a new high-tech 
capital. 
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Figure 13·: MDEC Poster Promoting Cyberjaya as a "Globally Linked" Space 
(Source: Author's Photograph) 
In the planning documents for Cyberjaya, its physical isolation from Kuala 
Lumpur and geographical distance from the major markets of Europe, North 
America and Japan was to be overcome through telecommunications 
(F"igure 1.3). For example, the MSC's 'Borderless Marketing' flagship'55 , was 
based on the premise of technologically plugging into the electronic circuits 
of the global economy. 
'In a globalising and fast-shrinking world, businesses face unprecedented 
opportunities and challenges. The Borderless Marketing flagship application 
is developed on the premise that multimedia technology can be used by 
businesses more efficiently, and serve their <;ustqmers better across 
different time zon~s. ~nd effectively reaching out to new customers. The 
55 Later renamed the 'e-Business' flagship. 
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traditional barriers of time, space and form will be eliminated in the process 
by use of technology.' 
(MDEC leaflet for Borderless Marketing Flagship, 2006) 
The networked urbanism of Cyberjaya was planned to allow MSC 
companies to 'reach customers regardless of physical location', and 'interact 
with customers and conduct business round-the-clock' (Research Interview: 
Head of MDEC SSO Division). Couched in the logic of electronic substitution 
Cyberjaya will therefore reduce the 'compulsion of proximity' (Boden and 
Molotoch 1994). The physical isolation of Cyberjaya can be overcome by 
acquiring a new centrality as a strategic node on the global lattice of 
networked telecommunications infrastructures. According to MDEC 
(Research Interview: MDEC Marketing Division) the planning of the city as 
an electronic hub 'recognises the borderless and global nature of electronic 
business'. Just as Webber imagined being connected from a mountain top, 
or Negroponte from the Alps (Chapter 3) - Cyberjaya planned total 
connectivity from a former palm oil plantation built as a borderless 
technological utopia. 
Cyberjaya has been planned without the traditional locational advantages of 
the urban form (e.g. social amenities, proximity to the CBD, transport links), 
instead relying on technologies to do business, and connect citizens to one 
another, and the city. Cyberjaya aspires to be the perfect 'edge city' 
(Garreau 1991) for the 'information age' where flows of bits - i.e. people, 
goods - can be literally substituted by electronic flows through fibre optic 
networks. It imagined a new technological Eden in a perfectly functioning 
green-field environment eliminating the social ills of the city. A schizophrenic 
attitude to the city was mobilised whereby the metropole (Kuala Lumpur) is 
scripted as a site of anomie, crime etc while the new city of Cyberjaya is 
imagined as a pinnacle of 'information society' civilisation. 
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5.2.2. The 'Intelligent City' as Cybernetic organism 
'If MSC is at the heart of Malaysia's push into the multimedia age, then 
Cyberjaya is the brain.' 
(The Edge Magazine, 26.05.1997) 
The planning of Cyberjaya as networked urban space was designed to 
promote three scalar effects: first, to globally link Malaysia to other high-tech 
centres; secondly, to nationally link Cyberjaya to other state cybercities so 
that the entire nation would become one MSC and thirdly, to link the citizens 
of the city together. In these terms the city would become a cybernetic 
organism whose tentacles stretched out into the infinite universe of 
Cyberspace. This networked conception of digital space articulates with 
Benedikt's (1992: 1 0) assertion that Cyberspace is: 'a new universe, a 
parallel universe created and sustained by the world's computers and 
communication lines'. This network architecture problematises the notion of 
the city as a fixed and bounded site for interaction: 
' .... urbanisation can indeed be viewed as a process of continuous 
deterritorialisation and reterritorialisation through metabolic circulatory flows, 
organised through social and physical conduits or networks of "metabolic vehicles."' 
(Swyngedouw 2006: 22) 
Cyberjaya planned to both reterritorialise flows through networked 
infrastructures and construct a space of flows within the city. The city was 
modelled on bio-informational metaphors of digital circulation, information 
flow, electronic backbones, and fibre optic arteries. The planning of 
Cyberjaya as a healthy "intelligent" city links to modernist planning strategies 
that conceptualised human settlement as an evolving organism via the "city-
as-body" (Doxiadis) or the "city as machine" (Le Corbusier) metaphors of 
networked circulation. Moreover, anti-urban notions of the cybernetic city 
had historical origins in the work of Norbert Wiener in the U.S. during the 
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1950s and 1960s (Wiener 1967) and implicit Cold War military strategies of 
command, control, communication and information (Bishop 2004). These 
military origins of 'information society' discourse with its emphasis on speed 
and circulation has been explored further by Matterlart (2003). 
The chapter does not wish to suggest that Cyberjaya's planners modelled 
the city directly on the networked utopias and military-industrial complex of 
Cold War America. Moreover, what can be highlighted is how the planning 
vision for Cyberjaya as cybernetic organism has historical precursors in 
notions of circulation, control and information that have now become 
essential to government and business practices globally. Specifically, the 
way in which Cyberjaya's planners conceived the city as an. ICT enabled 
information processing node for the creation/management of 'intelligent' 
people and linked into a global grid of command centre points for the 
information economy. 
Cyberjaya was conceived as one efficient machine for the management of 
people and communications with closely calibrated parts operated from a 
central command hub. Costing 150RM million (£23 million), the City 
Command Centre (CCC) was the centrepiece for the 'intelligent citY' vision56 
which lent credence to state claims of a 'world-class' urban site. The CCC 
was the planned 'nucleus' for the city; an electronic brain that integrates 
technology, the city, and its citizens into a functional whole. The design of 
Cyberjaya as cybernetic city correlates with Wiener's (1967) predictions 
about the capacity of new machines to function as communicative organisms 
and regulate social. relations by supplementing human intelligent and 
complements. 
56 The CCC was developed by SH Technology, a subsidiary of Setia Haruman, responsible for 
constructing the telecommunications infrastructure in Cyberjaya. After the first two years of its 
operation SH Technology handed the facility over to Majlis Daerah Sepang who are the local council 
for the Cyberjaya area. The council staff were tasked with the day-to-day operations of the CCC 
facility. 
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Figure 14: Cyberjaya City Command Centre (CCC} (Source: Author's 
Photograph} 
'The dynamics for humans, environment and technology have harmonised in 
the world we live in. Here in Cyberjaya, the City Command Centre (CCC) is 
the core that will implement and spearhead the overwhelming changes in 
the way a city is managed.' 
(ln. TOUCH Magazine, 2003) 
The CCC has two principle functions. First, the CCC functions as physical 
hub and 'nerve centre' for the telecommunications infrastructure in 
Cyberjaya. It contains large server rooms in the lower-ground floors, and 
redundant infrastructures. Cyberjaya's 2.5-10 gigabits infrastructure is 
centrally operated through CCC. Secondly, CCC was planned as the driver 
of the city management applications that would enable Cyberjaya to become 
intelligent space. These applications ranged from traffic management and 
surveillance, to community portals, to, at one time, Cyberjaya's own 
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television and radio station operated from CCC. Integrated community 
functions include an online portal whereby residents can pay bills through 
EBPP (Electronic Bill Presentment and Payment); CyberjayaNet (the local 
web-based e-mail system; information kiosk where information about 
Cyberjaya can be accessed (at a planned 1 ORM per hour). 
'A 2.5-10 Gigabits per second fibre optic network, with 99.9% performance 
guarantee on uninterrupted communication. A fully integrated city command 
centre which monitors and manages transportation, utilities and public 
amenities. A citywide broadband network with high speed internet access 
and interactive community services. A back-up power grid which will further 
be supplemented by alternative energy sources. All in the heart of 
MSC ... Cyberjaya, what century are you living in?' 
(Poster Caption in Cyberia Crescent Sales Gallery, 2006) 
'When the Cyberjaya City Command Centre is fully operational, it will write 
history as the first command centre in the world to fully integrate three major 
city management systems encompassing utilities, and municipal services, 
community services and transportation.' 
(The Star, 31.03.2003) 
The 'intelligent city' was conceptualised as an autonomous techno-ecological 
system immersing citizens in a new environment, to produce specific 
technologically determined effects. As well as connecting to any point in the 
globe, Cyberjaya's networked infrastructures were planned to bring 
technology closer to the people. Simultaneously people have been cast as 
mere components of a bio-informational system that they cannot control. The 
pervasive network is imagined to affect all citizens in equal ways through a 
series of 'flagship applications' aimed at broader socioeconomic 
development. Communication between points (e.g. smart homes, 
companies, CCC) in the network is seen to breathe life into the organic 
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organisation of the city, and therefore resuscitate the economic life of the 
nation at large. 
The provision of a ubiquitous digital network was promoted by the state as a 
democratic exercise, premised on an assumption the internet will create a 
new interconnected, inclusive public sphere. These utopian predictions have 
historical precedents in early models of the 'wired city' (Dutton et al. 1987) 
that were essentially utopian social experiments that embodied visions of 
electronic democracy, education and social interaction. In Mitchell's (1995) 
City of Bits a new 'electronic agora' redefines our notion of place, community 
and urban life. Such egalitarian 'information age' discourses are based on 
the assumption that the rise of digital communications media, and the new 
flexibility of interactive, any to any communications can fashion a more 
interconnected, inclusive and democratic society. 
The "E-government" and "Telemedicine" flagship applications embraced the 
rhetoric of egalitarian technological connectivity between citizen and state. 
The flagship applications were planned to effect citizens (via e-voting, filing 
tax returns, registration of births, deaths etc), business (business 
registration, tax payments, government interactions) and government 
employees (online forums, video-conferencing, electronic work flow 
systems). New web kiosks and internet portals were to connect citizens to 
government regardless of their location in a way never seen before in 
Malaysia, or even the rest of the world. 
The electronic government initiative uses multimedia technologies to 
transform the way the government operates. It seeks to improve the 
convenience, accessibility, and quality of interactions between citizens, the 
private sector and the public sector. Electronic government simultaneously 
improves the speed and· quality of information flow and the processes of 
policy development, coordination and enforcement.' 
(Research Interview: MDEC Cybercities Division) 
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'Telehealth' is another 'frictionless' flagship. In an MDEC promotional leaflet 
'industrial age' medicine is describe as 'physical, centralised, and 
fragmented' contrasted to 'information age' healthcare is seen as 'virtual, 
distributed, and integrated'. With teleconsultation any user (connected to the 
network) can communicate with their doctor. The state outlines how the 
average Malaysian will experience healthcare in a new way as: 'telemedicine 
allows a patient to go home and undergo rehabilitation under the constant 
supeNision of a physician via videoconferencing' (Malaysian Business. 
01.14.1997). In both flagships, ICTs here are seen to flatten Malaysian 
national space and affect all citizens in a similar way as, by phase 3 (201 0-
2020) all of Malaysia becomes one MSC. However, as my later analysis 
demonstrates, such utopian predictions ignore uneven access to I.T., their 
selective distribution amongst the population and the material effects of 
socio-spatial dividing practices which networked infrastructures engender. 
Furthermore, as Chapter 7 highlights, the implementation of these strategies 
under the guise of liberation masked state goals of control and management 
of its population. 
5.3. The "World's Intelligent City": Transnational Planning 
Practices in the Making of a Global Space 
'Cyberjaya: where man, nature and technology live in harmony.' 
(Setia Haruman promotional leaflet, 2006) 
'Cyberjaya, the world's first truly intelligent city. 7,000 acres planned and 
built bottom up. Incorporating the most advanced city management systems, 
world-class IT infrastructure and a healthy respect for the 
environment. .. Cyberjaya, which century are you living in?' 
(Poster in Setia Haruman sales gallery, 2006) 
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'Cyberjaya, is a city designed to provide the physical and psychological 
spaces needed for creativity, the pursuit of information age technologies, 
and business and relaxation.' 
(Mahathir 1997) 
The section elucidates how the planning of Cyberjaya as 'intelligent city' 
draws upon modernist urban planning traditions that were mobilised through 
transnational planning networks and practices. Cyberjaya was conceived as 
an eco-friendly city of the future where lush tropical landscapes, parkland 
would create a 'green high-tech city conducive for creativity centred work' 
(The Edge Magazine, 26.05.1997). The framing of Cyberjaya as an urban 
utopia links to: (a) how ICTs were imagined as an enabler of pastoral retreat 
out of the city; and (b) idealised notions about what the technologically 
mediated city of tomorrow should look like. The resulting model of the 
'intelligent city' can be seen in the context of other modernist utopian 
schemes (e.g. the Garden City, Broadacre City, Radiant City) that provided 
spatial alternatives to the traditional urban centre. This is not just a technical 
vision based on simply wiring physical spaces with fibre optic cables; it 
encompasses the goal to create a psychological space conducive to 
creativity. 
The promotion of Cyberjaya as a literal 'field of dreams' (Fortune Magazine, 
18.08 1997) represents a conflation of the technological imagination of 
Cyberjaya as cybernetic city and the urban imagination of Cyberjaya as 
garden city. In contrast to Kuala Lumpur, Cyberjaya was promoted as an 
ideal live/work environment both in terms of high-tech connectivity and 
creating a space for work in the 'new economy. In common with high-tech 
futurism a move from an urban to rural setting is seen to offer an idyllic, 
romanticised vision of physical isolation, but being connected to the world via 
a ubiquitous network. A technologically enabled rural retreat seeks to realise 
Toffler's vision of the 'electronic cottage' or Webber's 'non-place urban 
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realm'. In the post-urban utopia of the 'intelligent city' everyday life will be 
conducted through depthless, electronic non-space abolishing geography 
and proximity in one click. 
The 'intelligent city' aspired to replicate two global planning exemplars. 
Firstly, as the next chapter examines, Cyberjaya strives to replicate the 
world's premier technopole development and emulate the entrepreneurial 
culture of Silicon Valley. Secondly, the focus of this section is how Cyberjaya 
emulated the garden city 'model'. Cyberjaya's goal to build a new 'ideal city' 
is placed in the context of the utopian modernist movement and a desire to 
incorporate man, technology and nature into one integrated whole. While 
Cyberjaya was a product of Mahathir's high-tech push its development has 
been heavily influenced ·by Anglo-American modernist planning discourses 
about technology and nature. These discourses have been reterritorialised 
through transnational planning practices that subsequently script ideologies 
of the 'intelligent city' onto the tabula rasa of Cyberjaya. 
The planning blueprint for Cyberjaya was devised by 13 Malaysian planners 
at the Malaysian Federal Department of Town and Country Planning 
(Jabatan Perancangan Bandar dan Desa or JPBD), alongside one American 
planning firm (KCV+RNL Designs57), and one Australian firm (Burchill 
Partners Consulting58). Both of these firms were invited by the state to 
consult on Cyberjaya's planning and design process. Despite Mahathir's 
'Asian renaissance' sloganeering (Chapter 4), the Malaysian government 
was keen that .'foreign expertise' should participate to both give the MSC 
international credibility, and to supplement the skills of existing Malaysian 
planners within the JPBD. The thesis avoids conceptualising these 
development plans as the simple diffusion of 'Western' planning techniques 
57 This is the one of the largest, design, planning and civil engineering firm in the U.S .. They were 
chosen to provide expertise partly due to their successful involvement with KLCC. 
58 Burchill Partners is a major Australian civil and structural engineering, and planning consultancy 
firm. They were the lead firm on the development of the planning guidelines. 
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and doctrines to a post-colonial setting. Challenging an image of the 
Malaysian state as passive or impotent in the planning process, the chapter 
observes how the state played an active role in the adoption of the 
'intelligent city' ideal. 
The self-promotion of Cyberjaya as global planning exemplar can be linked 
to two transnational processes. Firstly, the 'intelligent city' can be interpreted 
as a 'corporate global strategic calculation' (Ruggie 1993) to add important 
symbolic capital to the state's high-tech push, and the (re)positoning of the 
nation vis-a-vis global flows. Secondly, Cyberjaya is an 'imported' urban 
model mobilised by the spread of transnational planning practices that has 
supplanted specific urban design principles from the 'West' into 'non-
Wesb3rn' contexts (e.g. new urbanism). Despite Malaysia posturing about a 
rebirth of Asian culture, the states drew upon 'Western' urban design, 
planning and development models. This process is not necessarily coercive, 
but mobilised through dynamic hybridised interactions between local actors 
and a network of 'foreign experts'. 
5.3. 1. Transnational Planning Practices 
As part of the state's drive for global competitiveness it hired global 
consultants (e.g. Toffler, Ohmae, Gates), firms (e.g. McKinsey, KCV+RNL 
Designs, Burchill Partners Consulting), and architects (e.g. Cesar Pelli on 
KLCC, Kisho Kurokawa on KLIA, Robert Burle Marx on KLCC Park) to help 
formulate the urban component of MSC's ideological grand vision. These 
experts had knowledge and experience in working on global city formation 
projects elsewhere. For example, the Argentine Cesar Pelli had worked on 
numerous world-class projects including Canary Wharf in London, and the 
World Financial Centre in Manhattan; Kisho Kurowaka, a Tokyo based 
Japanese architect had designed Sony Tower in Osaka and the Melbourne 
Centre in Australia; and the late Brazilian landscape architect Roberto Burle 
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Marx was known for his work on the boardwalk along Rio de Janeiro's 
Copacabana Beach. 
In a global context, these planning and consultancy firms are central actors 
in the discursive constitution of transnational flows through the production of 
images, brochures, planning models. Their expertise is an 'international 
commodity' (Pawley 1992) which is instrumental in shaping the urban form 
through a series of mega-projects in Malaysia (e.g. KLCC, KLIA, Cyberjaya). 
All of these projects have been designed entirely, or in part, by foreign 
experts enlisted by the state to construct an urban vision for a modern, 
developed Malaysia. These actors literally inscribe specific planning 
discourses on the landscape in strategic sites in a specific time and place. 
The 'intelligent city' aspires to become a global exemplar for transnational 
planning practices as a successful model which can be marketed around the 
world, and translated to other national contexts. 
A very small number of elite architectural and planning firms are responsible 
for high profile commissions throughout different locations across the globe. 
Olds (2001) and Rimmer (1991) have called these individuals a 'global 
intelligence corps'. These architects and planners (e.g. Norman Foster, 
Richard Rogers, Rem Koolhaus, Jean Nouvel, Cesar Pelli) play a significant 
role in the transnational creation of images, ideas, expertise, technology, and 
development models which are often rooted in the modernist tradition. In 
particular, they have been influential in the preparation of new urban spaces 
with the goal of becoming an 'investible location' or nodal point through 
which global flows (e.g. capital, MNCs, tacit knowledge) may pass. 
Cyberjaya was constructed not by a specific signature architect, but a series 
of global consultancy firms and advisors. 
The current wave of neoliberal economic development, characterised by 
growing inter-urban competitiveness and entrepreneurialism (Hubbard and 
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Hall 1998), has created a new demand amongst the 'global intelligence 
corps' for architectural and planning services for aspiring cities, regions and 
states. Nowhere has global urban transformation been more visible in the 
aspiring global cities of Asia including Singapore, Hong Kong, Shanghai, 
Tokyo and to a lesser extent Kuala Lumpur. The Asian economic boom of 
the 1980s continuing into the 1990s led to an acute demand for urban 
planning, development, and architectural expertise in a growing economic 
region. In the wake of modernisation and growing inter-urban competition 
many Asian cities were repositioned, and therefore rebuilt, to enhance their 
appeal to global capital (see Yeoh 2005). In particular, state development of 
technopoles as global investment hubs for I.T. and Multimedia companies 
has gained ground as a strategy for ensuring global visibility in a competitive 
world. Flagship projects are further enhanced by the presence of a 
prominent architect, designer, or consultancy firm involved in the project 
(e.g. Cesar Pelli, McKinsey on MSC, Jon. A. Jerde on Hong Kong 
Cyberport). 
There are historical precedents in the enrolment of GIC elites and their 
utopian planning strategies in transnational networks. Bristow (2000) 
observes how the British colonial administration imported expert knowledge 
from across the commonwealth in the development of town planning in the 
Federation of Malay states (e.g. Captain Richards from Singapore and 
Charles Reade from New Zealand).59 In the global context, during the Cold 
War in the 1950s elite architects and planners (e.g. Doxiadis, Le Corbusier, 
Lloyd Wright) were invited by puppet regimes supported by the British-
American 'coalition' to design many new towns throughout the Middle East 
and Africa (Provoost 2006). With U.S. support, Doxiadis designed and built 
cities all over the world in Ghana, Zambia, Sudan, Lebanon, Pakistan, and 
Iraq. 
59 The name of the colonial antecedent to modern day Malaysia. 
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Le Corbusier - working at Congres lnternationaux d'Architecture Moderne 
(ClAM) - was the ultimate urban modernist who produced numerous highly 
influential utopian city plans. Most of his urban blueprints were wildly futurist, 
though he did play a significant role in urban modernisation programmes in 
post-colonial India (Chandigarh) and Latin America (Buenos Aires) (see 
Novick 2003; Kalia 2004; 2006). Lloyd Wright was equally vanguard, and 
mobilised garden city ideologies in his plans for Broadacre City. Such large-
scale development projects were often rooted in modernist planning 
principles that were philosophically supportive of rational and objective 
orderings of the built environment (e.g. zoning, grid patterns). For example, 
Le Corbusier's grand urban designs embraced huge, machine age, 
hierarchical, centralised cities to create ordered, harmonious societies. 
Cyberjaya doesn't strive to emulate the pure Cartesian forms of Le 
Corbusier's utopias. Instead, it combines pastoralism with the bio-
informational metaphors of the telecommunications age (e.g. flow, 
circulation). As with the construction of Cyberjaya, no compromise was 
made with the pre-existing city; the new design plan completely supplants 
and writes over its predecessor. 
While critics in the West have lamented the 'crisis of modernist urbanism' 
(Pinder 2002), planning utopias are still highly influential today. These 
models directly appeal to state led planning strategies mobilised in East and 
~outheast Asia (Douglass 2000). 'Urban mega-projects' (Oids 1995) have 
been planned by government technocrats who promote utopian planning 
models for the public good. As Ward (1999) argues, in his theory of global 
planning diffusion, these planning exemplars are 'imported' as much as they 
are 'exported' by a GIC. Malaysia, like other states in Asia-Pacific, provided 
many projects during the 1980s (during the Kuala Lumpur property boom) 
and in the 1990s (during rapid economic growth) up until the financial crisis 
when state spending was tightened, and mega-projects rolled back. 
Significantly, the MSC offered an unprecedented 'global contract' in terms of 
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its size, scope, and state support. Modernist planners rarely had the 
opportunity to carry out development projects on such a gargantuan scale. 
Therefore, the project could provide an international Consultancy with the 
opportunity to build a signature development and enhance its own global 
reputation. 
'When MSC was first muted the world started to take notice. Not just the 
international press, but also the big consultancies who wanted a slice of the 
pie. It was a big opportunity just with the scale and size of it all.' 
(Research Interview: Marketing Manager, Cyberview) 
It was a project supportive of modernist approaches to city building based on 
technocratic planning models whereby all powerful master planners would 
demolish the city and replace it with his/her own utopian vision. For global 
planning consultancies their models represent a uniform concept which 
should work equally well for all cities regardless of location (Chapter 6). 
Often GIC planning firms and consultants export their 'global blueprints' to 
nations where they have precious little understanding of the local social, 
cultural, political and economic context. As is typical in the modernist 
tradition, none of the plans for Cyberjaya make obvious reference to the 
urban history, traditions, or the aesthetic tastes of the place in which it is to 
be located. This chimes with Le Corbusier's suggestion that new calculations 
should start from zero with city planning starting from a "blank piece of 
paper''. 
5.3.2. "You See We Have the Lake": Building a Garden City Utopia 
In the construction of Cyberjaya as a garden city, urbanised nature was re-
framed as a moralising force sanitising the untamed, and uncivilised 'non-
intelligent' spaces of the jungle. The planned spaces of Cyberjaya were seen 
to ecologically determine desired 'civilising' effects upon its citizen-subjects, 
preparing them for intelligent-led development. Modernist epistemologies 
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can be traced back to the planned utopias imagined by the likes of Ebenezer 
Howard, Frank Lloyd Wright, and Le Corbusier.60 Planners by name, these 
futurists set out a vision for building cities that incorporated man, nature, and 
new technology in a harmonious whole in the hope that it would lead to 
moral reform, and in turn, the evolutionary transformation of society. While 
none had their utopian visions realised in their entirety all had a highly 
significant impact on urban planning in the twentieth century. All three set out 
models of 'ideal' types of cities, which have been diffused throughout the 
world via the transnational diffusion of planning ideas and practices (see 
Nasr and Volait 2003). 
The design principles for Cyberjaya have much in common with Howard's 
garden city. 61 Central to his vision was the model of a self-contained pastoral 
community far from the disrupting influences of urban life as the utopian 
model for a new society. Like Le Corbusier, he viewed systematic, rational, 
and "scientific" planning practice as the solution to social ills. Howard's work 
influenced a new suburban tradition of British New Towns exemplified in the 
construction of Milton Keynes. In the 1920s and 1930s the garden city ideal 
was transplanted from England to the USA. Direct followers of Howard 
include Patrick Geddes and Lewis Mumford who spread the garden city idea. 
In the U.S. the garden city movement was seen as an attempt tore-embrace 
'the American way of life' and tackle the problems of urban lawlessness, loss 
of community, and excessive mobility that broke down social ties. With 
increased mobility, mass car ownership and plentiful supplies of inhabitable 
land, America was the perfect setting for the realisation of the garden city 
utopias. An idealised retreat to nature is best exemplified in nineteenth 
century American pastoralism - outlined by Thomas Jefferson, Ralph Waldo 
60 The visions of these three pioneers could be traced back further to Frederick Law Olmsted (1822-
1903) who pioneered and dominated the urban parks movement. 
61 In 1899 Howard founded the Garden City Association, which went on to build England's first garden 
city, Letchworth in Hertfordshire. Howard's vision was truly utopian and an attempt to construct self-
sufficient communities dispersed through the land whereby town and country could be combined in a 
harmonious manner. Howard's garden city vision had a profound impact on city planning which went 
beyond the planned utopias of Letchworth or Welwyn Garden City. 
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Emerson, Henry David Thoreau - which constructed a utopian vision for life 
· beyond the city, and saw technology as the primary vehicle to make it 
happen (Marx 1987). 
In the early 1930s Frank Lloyd Wright's Broadacre City project planned for 
the mass decentralisation of American cities, and a retreat to an (imagined) 
rural landscape. Where Cyberjaya imagines telecommunications as the 
means for overcoming geography, Lloyd Wright (like Bel Geddes) foresaw 
the motorcar and telephone signalling the 'death of distance'. Lloyd Wright 
argued this would give rise to a new kind of 'anti-spatial' community based 
on individualism and self-reliance away from urban centres. He believed that 
through these new technologies the dense urban conglomerations found in 
places such as New York or Chicago would simply wither away and become 
a thing of the past. 
Seaside and Celebration townships in Florida are contemporary examples of 
North America's 'New Urbanism' pioneered by Miami based architects 
Andres Duany and Elizbeth Plater-Zyberk. 'New Urbanism' seeks to recreate 
idyllic communities based on the garden city model. Both Seaside and 
Celebration62 are influenced by Lloyd Wright's planned utopias and 
constructed as throwbacks to old town America with white colonial houses, 
enclosed by picket fences, surrounded by substantial tracts of common land 
(Archer 2001 ). The Malaysian government organised a team of MDEC 
officials alongside Cyberjaya's JPBM planning team to undertake a fact 
finding tour of model U.S. cities during the design consultation process for 
Cyberjaya. Their trip to Celebration was one stop on a tour which took them 
to various garden city influenced locations in California, USA, including San 
Jose (Silicon Valley), Redwood Shores (San Francisco), and Irvine 
62 The film was used as the setting for the Truman Show (1998) in which Jim Carey plays a man 
trapped in a utopian world constructed as a reality TV show following the life of the unsuspecting 
central protagonist Truman Burbank. 
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(California). All are planned real estate projects designed to create exclusive 
planned suburbs comprising luxury properties. 
Cyberjaya's planners wanted to reassert a similar neotraditional sense of 
place and community in order to create a utopian space for the post-
industrial age embedded in assumptions about the psychological and 
spiritual benefits of urbanised natures. However, while Cyberjaya's plans 
(2000) drew selectively on Howard's garden city ideals they politely ignored 
his concerns for democratic planning, equality and social ownership of the 
land (McKenzie 1994; March 2004). Instead the socialist utopia of the 
garden city was replaced with a globalised free market 'revanchist utopia' 
(Baeten 2002) which directly appeals to Cyberjaya's middle-class 
aspirations. As a consequence, the cottage architecture of the British garden 
city has been usurped with a new capitalist aesthetic of corporate offices for 
MNCs (Chapter 6) and gated communities for the international community 
(Chapter 7). 
The planning process in Cyberjaya was not a simple case of transplanting 
global exemplars into a national territory through the transnational diffusion 
of modernist planning ideas. In particular, the state expressed a desire for 
references to 'vernacular architecture' and 'tropicality' (Lepawsky 2005). 
These genealogies can be mapped as a cross-pollination of Southeast Asian 
architects and the 'pedagogical theologies of Western architecture schools' 
(Easterling 2005: 52). As a national project, the designs for intelligent cities -
Cyberjaya and Putrajaya - contained plans incorporating Islamic 
architecture, design principles, and symbolism in order to appease the 
Malay-dominated government's claims of cultural ownership. However, in the 
final version, Islamic features were watered down in Cyberjaya in order to 
enhance the location's appeal to global MNCs. Cyberjaya produced an 
imbroglio of concrete and glass spaces of perfunctory modernist offices 
parks interspersed with intermittent references to 'locality' (Chapter 6). 
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The transnational nature of the planning processes serves to contest any 
binary notion of the GIC as 'global' versus the JPBM as more authentically 
'local'. Within JPBM all of the Malaysian planners who worked on the 
planning guidelines for Cyberjaya were educated in UK planning schools. 
This is not to suggest that they underwent 'post-colonial indoctrination', 
however, evidence suggests they were directly influenced by Anglo-
American planning principles. As Lepawsky (2005: 707) noted, some of 
these modernist planning tendencies relate to assumptions about: 'notions of 
sub-urban, middle-class urban design conventional in specific North 
American cities as universally applicable to, and desirable for, the broader 
national developments.' For instance, Cyberjaya contains gated 
communities, condominiums, a Street Mall all of which are evidence of 'non-
indigenous', non-Islamic planning practices. The technopole, the garden city, 
the eco-friendly city planning concepts are evidence of broadly non-
contextual foreign 'implants' into Malaysian urbanity. This exemplifies how 
modernist planning practices create urban models which are inserted over, 
and into local spaces. 
Transnational planning networks and practices play an important role in 
reterritorialising specific planning discourses in national space, which in turn, 
influence state urban planning policies. To summarise, modernist plans for 
the garden city have been mobilised in Cyberjaya through transnational 
practices. This has occurred through several means: firstly, through the 
employment of international planning and consultancy firms to assist the 
state in developing the MSC vision; secondly, 'expeditions' by government 
planners to exemplary global spaces for garden city planning models in the 
USA; and thirdly, the training of Malaysian planners from JPBM in Anglo-
American planning schools. Often urban utopian visions remain only cities 
on paper, and many observers have argued that the utopia is destroyed 
once planners attempt to build it (the same could be argued about 
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Cyberjaya). However, as the following quotes illustrate, for Cyberjaya's 
planners the 'intelligent city' represented a genuine attempt to conflate the 
technological infrastructures of the cybernetic city and the bucolic urbanism 
of the garden city. In doing so they fused two diverging technological and 
urban imaginations in a viable model for Malaysian urbanism. 
'I think we were building something like an ideal city. The tag line we used 
was a place where man, nature and technology lives together, so it is like a 
sci-fi vision. The only difference instead of high-rise, it was low-rise, and 
very eco-friendly.' 
(Research Interview: former executive with Setia Haruman) 
'Yes, we have been the real pioneers. We provided the totality, the blue-print 
for all of this. We have the environment here to utilise it in business, in living, 
and in play also. So you can do all three here because it is a self contained 
intelligent city. We have all the infrastructure also the natural surroundings 
and these things. You see we have the lake, it is all planned in the 
infrastructure. This is the unique thing about Cyberjaya. It is an eco-friendly 
place, a manageable landscape.' 
(Research Interview: Senior Planner, Setia Haruman) 
5.4. Towards Ecological Determinism? 
In modernist planning epistemologies the city was not a place where 
inhabitants determined its role in their daily lives, rather, the city determined 
the roles of its inhabitants. In Cyberjaya, the state desired to create particular 
subject positions through design which would transform the inhabitants into 
modern subjects who could fill these positions. The design of an 'intelligent' 
garden city more 'in tune' with the rhythm of nature was planned to create a 
harmonious society. The section examines how Cyberjaya was mobilised as: 
(1) a psychological space for creativity; (2) a disciplined space for 
productivity. 
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Firstly, Cyberjaya was engineered as a psychological space in which its 
inhabitants would be able to think, create, and innovate. As with the garden 
city of Howard, attachment to the land was seen to be morally beneficial 
enabling the inhabitants of Cyberjaya to live away from the perceived social 
ills and disruption of the city. To achieve this 35% of land in Cyberjaya was 
set aside as green spaces of vegetation, parkland and water features. 
'Low density buildings, well-planned neighbourhoods with waterfront 
houses, public parks and promenades are some of the enhancing attributes 
of Cyberjaya.' 
(The Star, 31.07.1997) 
'Cyberjaya sets the standard for modern-day living within a stress-free 
environment.' 
(Setia Haruman information booklet, 2006) 
Cyberjaya contains two large man-made lakes, two parks. Cyberjaya's 
flagship Cyberpark (nearly everything in Cyberjaya comes with the 'cyber' 
prefix) is the largest green space. The park is symptomatic of Cyberjaya's 
sylvan landscaping and modelled around a central lake consisting of several 
wooden walkways branded as '460 acres of inspiration' (Research Interview: 
Marketing Manger, Setia Haruman). The promotional brochure invites the 
reader to 'cross the floating boardwalk wander past the water lily lakes until 
your find yourself alone on an ethereal island populated by thousands of 
restless wind chimes' (Promotional Advert: Setia Haruman 2003). The 
design of the park was to create a cerebral environment suitable for 
relaxation and psychological well-being in order to 'coax the senses into 
slowing down'. This was based on ecologically deterministic assumptions 
that the creative subject needs so many square meters of living space, so 
much fresh air, so much sunlight, so much open space, or so many endless 
jogging trails in order to function as an 'intelligent citizen'. The garden city 
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design principles seek not just to promote R&D activities, but moreover, to 
promote R&D as a way of life. As a former MDEC CEO remarked at the 
time, 'we are aiming to create a 'multimedia utopia' for knowledge workers 
by developing the ideal environment to generate creativity'. In the planning of 
Cyberjaya a link was made between the provision of green spaces and the 
ability to foster creative live/work practices in the city. 
Furthermore, in the planning guidelines (Malaysia 2000) Cyberjaya was to 
become an 'environmentally-friendly' zero-emissions city through energy 
conservation, recycling schemes, and measures to prevent pollution. 
Cyberjaya was intended to be a car-free campus city with transport systems 
based on plans for a 'solar-powered people-mover' that would harness the 
tropical climate in an environmentally-friendly manner (The Star, 
04.06.1997). A smart refuse disposal system was planned to channel 
Cyberjaya refuse away from the city and be disposed of elsewhere via a 
large network of underground pipes. Both projects were halted after the 
1997-1998 Asian Financial Crisis. 
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Figure 15: Cyberjaya Zoning Strategy (Source: Setia Haruman) 
Following the modernist tradition, Cyberjaya followed a zonal pattern 
corresponding to each function of the city. This genealogy of these urban 
design conventions can be traced back to the grand designs of Le Corbusier 
who argued that a zone can be planned easier if it has just one purpose. 
When zones are planned for several purposes in view they present problems 
for the planner. As a result, Cyberjaya was divided into a flagship zone (for 
IT and multimedia companies), residential zones (housing knowledge 
workers in green lakeside spaces), commercial zones (containing the Street 
Mall), and recreation zones (parkland) (Figure 15). As Le Corbusier (1927) 
argued, with mixed functions in one zone the human mind loses itself and 
'becomes fatigued'. Zoning was designed to produce specific psychological 
effects on the citizens who inhabit the 'intelligent city'. The built environment 
created the impression of an ideal 'analogous to the precision and 
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flawlessness required of the space of research itself (Wakeman 2003: 262). 
The conscious formalism of the landscape, the parks, was to create an 
ordered, rational setting for thought set in idyllic landscape of greenery and 
water (Figure 16). 
'Close to Cyberia is the park, in the evenings people go there to hang out, 
and just get away for a while. I even saw some of the I.T. people down 
there. Mostly it's used for jogging, or just walking around with friends. I like 
to go down there and take pictures before the sunset, it's really peaceful. 
You can't get the same kind of thing in KL. You know sometimes we get 
bored here, because there isn't stuff to do, but I also like the peace.' 
(Research Interview: Cyberia resident 1) 
Figure 16: Creative Spaces? A View Across the Cyberpark in Cyberjaya 
(Source: Author's Photograph) 
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Secondly, Cyberjaya was designed to create a disciplined space where 
'creativity and innovation can thrive' (Mahathir, cited in The Star, 
18.05.1997). The built environment has been controlled through several 
disciplinary tactics. Cyberjaya was designed as 'dry city' to avoid the 
potential disrupting affects of alcohol on 'intelligent' living. The perceived lack 
of social amenities, and nightlife in particular was viewed by Cyberjaya 
companies as highly desirable from a management perspective. However, 
these planning guidelines were at odds with the needs of the expatriate 
community who work in Cyberjaya (two bars have since been opened to 
service their needs). The example underlines how the city planners strived to 
create an environment for creativity, but the underlying rationale was to 
maximise productivity, limit distractions, and manage the daily routines of 
workers more effectively. As the quote below demonstrates, Cyberjaya's 
built environment strived to create an environment geared towards work, and 
not pleasure. 
'In Cyberjaya, its space, it is about the space. You can't build this in KL. 
Firstly, you would have to find the right location, then you would be paying 
more money for it. What is great is this is a great working environment. 
People go to lunch and they come back. There is no opportunity to while 
away the time in KLCC or get stuck in traffic somewhere, it is a really good 
working environment. You come in and its all about work, so you can stay 
focused until you finish, then you go back. From a staff management 
perspective, I love it.' 
(Research Interview: Corporate Affairs Manager, BMW Malaysia) 
The citizen-subjects of Cyberjaya experience a city not of freedom and 
autonomy, but rather control and surveillance. The cybernetic systems of the 
city complement the urban design features in the built environment of 
Cyberjaya. For example, the city command centre functions as a 
'surveillance hub' that not only monitors the operation of city, but also the 
behaviour of the citizens who inhabit the spaces. Omnipotent CCTV 
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cameras capture the everyday movements and flows of the city, and citizen-
subjects. The usage of the city must fit logically into the plan of the 
'intelligent city' where certain activities or people are deemed 'out of place' 
by virtue of their perceived 'non-intelligence' (Bunnell 2004). Palm oil 
tappers, who used to work on the plantations, were evicted from Cyberjaya 
as part of the strategy for 'intelligent-led development'. Despite this some 
individuals still practiced palm oil tapping in Cyberjaya against the wishes of 
the management who conceptualised it as an 'undeveloped' activity (Figure 
17). 
Figure 17: Palm Oil Tapper in Cyberjaya (Source: Author's Photograph) 
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In another example, street hawkers were banned from conducting business 
in Cyberjaya due to their incompatibility with the planner's vision of intelligent 
work practices. 
'How do you create the intelligent lifestyle? Some people like the hawker 
stalls with some Malay guy from the kampung ['village'] frying, the smoke 
billowing, a guy fanning the satay. Some people like that; I am not saying it 
is no good, but for us no. It is more unique, more refined I think. We want to 
retain these people by some kind of image that we provide for them. The 
intelligent city, or something.' 
(Research Interview: Marketing Manager, Setia Haruman) 
The quote above implies that the presence of hawkers or palm oil tappers is 
incompatible with the image of an 'intelligent city' and may offend citizens in 
Cyberjaya. It exemplifies the selective nurturing, or exclusion, of the 
elements of urbanity judged appropriate for scientific elites. A retreat to an 
imagined utopian city space is designed to insulate these individuals 
emotionally and psychologically from the distracting, or polluting elements of 
traditional Malaysian urbanism. Urban planning in Cyberjaya spatially 
segregates specific urban functions according to zones creating an exclusive 
enclave for the "best qualified" scientific and technocratic elites. The strategy 
reduces urbanity to an organised retreat to a garden suburb designed as a 
live/work paradise for engineers, and scientists. However, in one of the few 
critical accounts, A/iran Monthly sounded a note of caution in constructing a 
planned space of exclusivity for foreign knowledge workers and their 'world-
class' companies. 
'We must be wary of ushering in a new wave of economic cybercolonialism-
one where the tools of information will be controlled by foreign companies in 
the MSC. These companies will employ highly-paid expatriates to run their 
operations here. Instead of hanging out at the Selangor Cricket Club and at 
199 
the Bangsar's posh watering holes, these cyber colonialists will have a 
whole new city, Cyberjaya, to play around in.' 
(A/iran, Issue 2 1997) 
Design strategies involved not only the exclusion of certain groups, but also 
the exclusion of specific indigenous urban forms. For example, development 
plans deliberately excluded public squares, and traditional Malaysian street 
patterns (e.g. shop houses, terraces) in order to remove spaces where 
Cyberjaya's citizens may waste time, or participate in the frowned upon 
practice of "Iepak Iepak" ("hanging out" in English) (Research Interview: 
Senior Planner, Setia Haruman). This harks back to Le Corbusier's (1927) 
announcement that "we must kill the street". The urban planning of 
Cyberjaya was not a politically neutral exercise for creating a viable utopia 
but is embedded with specific notions of inclusion and exclusion as citizens 
are divided according to class and their ability to pay. This is far cry from 
Howard's vision of the "good life" in his garden city plan, which like other 
modernist visions, was motivated by 'the erasure of social difference and 
creation of equality in the rational city' (Caldeira 1999). 
Compared to the variegated, vibrant urbanism of downtown Kuala Lumpur 
life for Cyberjaya residents resembles the experience of being submerged in 
a sensory deprivation tank. While the garden city plan did create order and 
functional segregation it did so at the cost of producing a sensorially 
impoverished and bland environment. It is now recognised that the 
modernist utopias, with their quest for order, damaged urban eroticism, 
vitality, and playfulness (Sandercock 1998). Cyberjaya, like traditional 
technopoles such as the science park (Massey 1992), was not designed to 
function as a conventional urban place, instead it was imagined that work 
would be the greatest pleasure. Consequently, little effort was made to 
imprint, or create any urban character on the sanitised corporate landscape 
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of Cyberjaya. The quotes below from Cyberia residents reflect the 
sentiments of numerous residents I interviewed. 
'It is a personal opinion. People say it's the "intelligent city" but there is 
nothing to do here, so people don't like to stay here. I think some people 
would prefer to stay in KL, and drive over an hour or something. We are 
students, so we don't just want to study, we like to go out and explore, but it 
is boring. Here you are just stuck in one place. Your friends, your room, your 
classes, that's it in Cyberjaya, that's all there is. I will go mentally sick, if I 
stay here, it is like a torture to us.' 
(Research Interview: LKW student 2) 
'When I came here, first time I came, I had this feeling it was the middle of 
nowhere. There were few amenities, not much stimulation and a lot of open 
spaces. Since then we just got used to it I think.' 
(Research Interview: Cyberia resident 2) 
Feelings of monotony were exacerbated by architectural repetition and 
uniformity consisting of numerous corporate offices interspersed with open 
land primed for 'further development'. The almost total lack of recreation and 
leisure amenities (excluding the park and a dilapidated Street Mall) has led 
to a feeling of general boredom amongst Cyberia's residents who were 
interviewed during fieldwork. For many, living in Cyberjaya was a traumatic 
experience characterised by bland anonymity, open green spaces, and a 
total lack of mental stimulation. Residents commented that the design of 
Cyberjaya had created a literal "siberia" - a work camp deliberately cut off 
from the city. These narratives conceptualising Cyberjaya as a disconnected, 
"dead city" or "ghost city" contrasts markedly to the planning vision of 
Cyberjaya as organism in which the city was modelled on an "intelligent 
urban body" replete with smart brain, fibre optic arteries etc. As Chapter 7 
explores, feelings of boredom have been accommodated by heavy usage of 
the internet as a perceived means of 'reconnecting with the world.' 
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In summary, Cyberjaya's planning as an ideal environment for 'world-class' 
creativity welded together two distinct technological and urban utopian 
versions of the city. Firstly, technologically deterministic planning assumes 
electronic flows and spaces can substitute for physical ones; and the scale 
of the nation, region or world collapses to the geometry of the network. 
Consequently, the city was a wired telecommunications infrastructure to 
enable an idealised retreat from the chaotic post-colonial urbanism of Kuala 
Lumpur to an imagined garden city. Secondly, the garden city is ecologically 
determined to produce psychological space for creativity and innov~tion. 
However, these modernist planning strategies allied to cybernetic systems 
created a sterile, controlled physical space. However, any monotony or 
feelings of disconnection were to be overcome by the 'total connectivity' of 
telecommunications infrastructures that were imagined to substitute the 
physical spaces of the city with the electronic realm of Cyberspace. It was 
planned residents would be able to communicate with one another digitally 
and conduct the majority of their day-to-day routines through a computer 
terminal wired into their smart homes. 
5.5. Becoming an Urban Exemplar: Imitation, Circulation and 
Travelling Discourses 
Mobilised via transnational planning practices, a coalition of global and local 
planners sought to integrate man, nature, technology to produce a 
harmonious environment conducive to an imagined 'information society'. 
This utopian vision has been mobilised through specific urban planning 
discourses and technological imaginations each with their own specific 
genealogies. While the development of Cyberjaya sought to replicate 
specific utopian models (e.g. Howard's garden city, Wiener's cybernetics), 
the city has become an urban exemplar and imitated locally and globally. 
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Firstly, at the national scale, a range of standard bricks and mortar 
residential property developments have been place promoted as 'smart', 
'intelligent', 'high-tech', 'cyber', 'digital' locales. Due to regulatory laxity often 
developments have often branded themselves as high-tech by virtue of 
incorporating LAN (Local Area Network) connections into their 
condominiums or the provision of an internet ready communal computer 
room.63 Leading developers like MK Land and SP Setia marketed these 
developments to a 'new generation of technologically sawy homeowners' 
(The Star, 21.07.1996). In 1996-1997 townships that were launched as 
gated "smart" communities included Nilai Utama (developed by Negara 
Properties), Bandar Bukit Puchong (Bukit Hitam Development), Bandar Seri 
Permaisuri (Dwitasik), Sepang Orchard Resort, Bukit lndah Johor (SP Setia), 
Enquine Park (Taman Enquine Sdn Bhd), Bandar Nusajaya (Prolink), and 
finally several projects within Putrajaya. 
This trend has been seen dramatically with developments located within 
close proximity (within 15;,20 km) of Cyberjaya. Often developers have 
strived to utilise the location as a powerful marketing tool to attract potential 
investors. For example, Kota Warisan development, a 600 acre freehold 
township in Sepang, markets itself as 'smart township' due to its physical 
proximity to 'RM35 billion of infrastructure' in the MSC (Figure 18). Like 
many developments it markets broadband connectivity as a unique selling 
point; even though Telekoms Malaysia (TM) provides these connections as 
standard to most areas in Klang Valley. Sri Palma Villa, another property 
development located close to the MSC, claims to promote 'intelligent living" 
through I.T. enabled support infrastructures and free broadband access for 
one year upon occupancy. /-resort in Kajang, an adjoining area to Cyberjaya, 
promotes itself as 'the 1st intelligent resort living in Kajang'. 1-resort claims to 
63 Despite the sector's growing popularity it remains unregulated with no accepted definition on what 
constitutes a smart home by the JPBM (personal correspondence with Dr. Jamaluddin 2006). 
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offer a holistic vision of a 'feng shui' landscaped environment to give its 
residents harmonious living whilst being wired with technologies. 
Kota Warisan, Truly in the 'Right l,ocatton, Is .. 
• a freehold unique township 
• strateHIGLIIy lol'atcd right in the nucleus nf a dynamic growth arc;• 
• scn'cd hy a sophisticated network of highways(toll-fn•c) and cxpn·ss •·ail link 
• surrounded by the country's most prestigious pmjecl'i 
• cnjo\'ing broadband access and world-ci;L-;s tclccurnmunication :-vstcms 
• serene anti comfortable 
Well Placed wit bin the Highest Gt"Q.WtiJ ReRton m l!a/ay\1<1 
Figure 18: Promotional Advert for Kota Warisan "Smart Township" (Source: 
Kota Warisan Developer) 
Cyberjaya's closest imitator is the 1-City 'digital city' project located in 
Selangor state capital, Shah Alam. Like Cyberjaya it combined high-tech 
infrastructure with abundant green spaces to usher in a new era of 'digital 
living'. 
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'Under its skin lies a raft of technology and infrastructure, cloaked in a 
cooling green and landscaped setting that forms the basis of this uniquely 
original development designed to host tomorrow's increasingly discerning 
lifestyle conscious denizen.' 
(New Straits Times, 24.07.2006) 
'Ultimately the objective is to create in 1-City a campus style live/work 
environment integrated into a large open space that boasts a lake that will 
also provide a waterfront environment.' 
(The Edge Magazine, 17.10.2005) 
Developed by 1-City properties Sdn Bhd and encompassing 72 acres of 
freehold land, 1-City is planned as a 'RM1.5 billion ICT based super regional 
integrated urban township that melds the state-of-the-art with the spirit of 
community'. The 'digital fabric' of 1-City encompasses fibre optic enabled 
broadband connectivity alongside new wireless applications that will enable 
the entire community to be linked into one giant network. 1-City plans to 
contain the usual list of smart features including smart homes, e-business, 
intelligent school, city command centres, 24 hour surveillance. The 
components of 1-City include: two public parks, a 'cyberport' acting as the 
ICT backbone, a retail mall, CityWalk64 commercial precinct, corporate office 
lots, two hotels, an innovation centre, intelligent school and serviced 
residences. 
The project was master planned by Jon A. Jerde a Los Angeles based 
planner responsible for Universal CityWalk in Hollywood, Mall of America in 
Minnesota, Canal City Hakata in Japan, and the Arcade at Hong Kong 
Cyberport. As with Cyberjaya, associating the names of the global 
intelligence corps with the project can add important symbolic capital The 
64 Modelled on Jon Jerde's design of Universal Studio CityWalk in Los Angeles, the 1-City CityWalk will 
contain 74 retail suites and a RM 40 million programmable light and sound display encompassing 
video walls. 
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local government even claimed 1-City would eventually become a "mini 
Cyberjaya" as part of the Selangor state government's plan to turn the state 
into an 'I.T. Valley' to rival the federal level MSC project. Cybernetic 
metaphors of circulation are also a central component of the 1-City vision as 
shown below with the excerpt from a promotional video. Once again the 
themes of universal connectivity, 'anytime/anywhere' connections permeate 
how 1-City was discursively mobilised. 
'Imagine a city where people are totally connected. A digital city that 
fundamentally transforms the way we live, work, and play. Instead of being 
tied to offices, homes, or individual hotspots people can get fast and 
convenient access to information and each other from virtually every corner 
of their community. This digital city is not just a visionary concept for the 
future, it is a model that is already being implemented in cities around the 
globe enabling government to operate more efficiently, improving safety and 
security, promote economic vitality, and foster greater citizen satisfaction.' 
(Extract from 1-City Promotional Video) 
According to 1-Berhad, 1-City will 'take the cybercity to the next level' (1-
Berhad, cited in The Star, 17.07.2006) creating a fully integrated digital 
community in a garden city setting. Currently under construction, it is the first 
planned 'wireless city' in Southeast Asia (New Straits Times, 14.09.2006). 
To reach this goal the project has linked up with Intel who will become the 
project's main technology partner. Some RM 40 million will be spent on the 
telecommunications infrastructure prior to its completion enabling the 
township to become an 'ecosystem for the digital lifestyle, conducive for 
people to live, work and play' (New Straits Times, 18.09.2006). The project 
seeks to join a group of digital communities led by Intel across Asia Pacific, 
America and Europe. 1-City provides clear evidence of the "bandwagon 
effect" started by Cyberjaya whereby other property developments have 
sought to capitalise on the attractive 'cyber' branding to add value to their 
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own projects. Whether any of the utopian promises of the 'digital city' 
materialises is highly doubtful. 
The private interests at the vanguard of the 'intelligent living' concept they 
have appropriated the 'smart' branding strategies for their own ends as 
government departments (e.g. Ministry of Finance), local councils (e.g. 
Sepang Municipal) were cajoled into handing over large swathes of land to 
private construction firms for 'intelligent' developments. Therefore- following 
Graham and Marvin (2002) - as national spaces have been 'unbundled' 
through privatisation, deregulation, and state 'roll back' new socio-spatial 
divisions were mobilised via differentiated geographies of 
inclusion/exclusion. As a result 'smart homes', 'intelligent districts' et a/ 
became new 'premium networked spaces' on the Malaysian landscape for 
housing affluent middle-classes and expat communities. As Chapter 7 
through the Cyberia Smart Home study, this produced a parallel process of 
global engagement and connectivity through ICTs as well as withdrawal, 
secession and securitisation in a gated smart community. 
Despite the hype surrounding 1-City as Klang Valley's latest smart 
development a property market analyst gave a more realistic view of the 
development to me in interview. 
'1-City has a long way to go. Like many of these projects, it's just a hype. As 
a property guy, I will be surprised if it succeeds, it is the third time they are 
launching it. The first time, failed, the second time failed. The first time it was 
suppose to be some electronic city. It keeps on changing so I don't know. 
Just hype for me.' 
(Research Interview: CEO of Zerin Properties) 
Place marketing through I.T. is designed to create interest and publicly sell 
the image of the 'cybercity'. Often the practical reality of how these new 
technologies will take shape is undefined or speculative at best. The techno-
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ecological branding becomes more than anything a powerful marketing tool 
that creates a competitive image for aspiring new urban developments. 
Consequently, while the concept of the cybercity sounds futuristic and grand, 
a truer description would be prosaic urban planning. 
Secondly, at the global scale Cyberjaya has become an exemplar for 
technopole planning strategies amongst other aspiring developmental states. 
For example, a delegation from Dubai Internet City (DIC) visited Cyberjaya 
several times and consulted with MDEC on their technopole planning 
strategies. This was proudly referred to in interview as confirmation that 
Cyberjaya had arrived on the 'world stage': 
'So Dubai have learned from us, while we sell the land, they give away land. 
Their laws are different, Sheik Maktoum has different laws, but they got Sun 
Microsystems, Dell, Microsoft, they also have the Dubai Media City and 
Reuters is there. So this is a different thing. But they modelled it on 
Cyberjaya, this is the case. It's good for us, it means we are doing 
something right, and people are sitting up and taking notice.' 
(Research Interview: Marketing Manager, Setia Haruman) 
Dubai Internet City (www.dubaiinternetcity.com) has striking similarities with 
Cyberjaya. Offering a vast array of financial incentives, DIC is a free trade 
zone of sorts for IT and multimedia, located in one of the most rapidly 
developing urban landscapes in the world (some $100 billion sunk into real 
estate projects at the last count). It contains a familiar list of IT tenants 
including Microsoft, Cisco Systems, IBM, HP, Dell, Siemens, Sun 
Microsystems, Computer Associates, PeopleSoft and Sony Ericsson. The 
marriage of Dubai to the utopian technopole ideal to represent the logical 
continuation of Dubai's goal of providing all the world's 'spatial products' 
(resort enclaves, mega-hotels, cyber districts, gated communities, financial 
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centres etc) in a truly global village. 55 As a result the city-state is fragmenting 
into a series of extra-territorial spaces including Dubai Outsourcing Zone, 
Dubai Knowledge Village, Dubai Ideas Oasis, Dubai Healthcare City, Dubai 
Maritime City, Dubai Humanitarian City, Dubai Textile City, and Dubai Media 
City. 
DIC has been billed as the Middle East's premier technopole. It offers 
freedom of ownership, no taxation, and the usual claims to provide facilities 
for global community set in (yet another) cutting edge campus style 
environment. It is the literal realisation of the perfect free market utopia 
imagined by the likes of Tattler, Gates and rest of the 'global village' 
boosterists. Eager to position itself as a regional player in IT and Multimedia, 
it has heavily copied the Cyberjaya model, transplanting it into its own space. 
Although it has adopted the same hard and soft infrastructures it has gone 
further in terms of deregulation offering 50 year tax-breaks as opposed to the 
10 in Malaysia. 
The above example illustrates how aspiring states attempt to mobilise 
'information age' discourses to fast-track national development via l.ocalised 
projects in national territorial space. Whether the strategy will work or not is 
highly debateable. As Harvey (1989: 12) asks: 'how many successful 
convention centres, sports stadia, Disney worlds, harbour places and 
spectacular shopping malls can there be?' One can add to the list global 
technopoles (in their numerous guises), and growing scepticism that beyond 
the hype each project will find its own niche as peripheral economic space. 
In the post-MSC era 'cyber' cities, 'intelligent' districts, or 'silicon' enclaves 
have become the buzzwords for new aspiring property developments. The 
excitement has created a "bandwagon effect" where the discourse circulates 
across multiple contexts. Each new property development strives to self-
65 In 1998 83% of the population were expatriates. 
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promote as unique, or different from others that have gone before. 
Increasingly developers seize upon the rhetoric mobilised in the 'information 
age' discourses to promote their own property developments as investible 
locations. What these brief examples demonstrate is how ambiguous the 
'cyber' branding has become as there is no definition or common 
understanding of what is 'smart' or 'intelligent' (Chapter 7). Consequently, 
developers use 'cyber' place marketing strategies to add value and symbolic 
capital to property developments. As one industry observer noted: 
'But what I see after a while. After other developers trying to sell the same 
concept. There is a big difference in terms of what they are saying, and then 
what they will provide you with. I don't think the smart thing means a lot. I 
see that it is not a great big deal. I mean as a home buyer. I do not need to 
switch on my lights from my phone when I am not at home. So I mean 
unless we can identify a better benefit or re-categorise what a smart home 
is, or what it is suppose to be then what is the point. Is it just about selling?' 
(Research Interview: Director, C2Media) 
5.6. Spaces of Privatopia: Towards an Intelligent Fortified 
Urbanism 
Despite the utopian branding strategies each 'cybercity' project has created 
little more than privatised enclaves where global connectivity is realised by 
the few and not the many. Speculative predictions that the world will become 
one 'global village' Mcluhan (1964) or modernist planning utopias could 
produce a 'classless city' (Corbusier 1967) tend to ignore the intersecting 
dynamics of power and politics in urban development. Who are the 
privileged citizens able take membership in this new technocratic planetarist 
vision? Is this just a continuation of digital divide between the information 
"haves" (e.g. Sklair's 'transnational capitalist class') and "have-nets" (e.g. the 
imported construction workers building Malaysia's high-tech dream)? 
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Aspiring technopole developments, intelligent cities, digital cities are akin to 
what Caldeira (1999: 114) has termed 'fortified enclaves', i.e. these are 
'privatised, enclosed, and monitored spaces for residence, consumption, 
leisure, and work'. Here global 'information society' discourse functions as 
scalar camouflage to mask the underlying political-economic rationale of 
undertaking large-scale property developments. Underneath the glossy 
fac;ade of 'intelligent living' in the new shiny 'edge city' campuses is a more 
prosaic reality of selling property to the highest bidder or inviting MNCs to 
invest by setting up - often peripherally economic - offshore back-offices. 
This has created a new wave in property developments of manicured gated 
estates, fortified enclaves, and exclusive suburbs marketed under the 
auspices of national development. 
Although Cyberjaya was a state led project the development of the city was 
driven by a select group of government linked private property developers 
(Setia Haruman et al) and corporate interests (e.g. MNCs) who wished to 
maximise profits and did not share utopian visions. Cyberjaya was imagined 
as 'constitutive of high-tech Malaysian urbanity onto which the whole nation 
can eventually be mapped' (Bunnell 2002a: 281). The section contests this 
utopian vision to argue that the city has created a splintered space which is 
both digitally disconnected and physically estranged from its surrounding 
territory. Cyberjaya's high-tech landscape produces specific everyday 
geographies which give rise to an anomie and alienating urban fabric. 
Firstly, visions of technological utopia ignore the materiality of ICT 
infrastructure provision in terms of access, levels of PC ownership, and IT 
literacy. According to official government figures 14 in 100 residents in 
Malaysia have access to internet dial up, but just 4.5 out of 100 have access 
to broadband (MCMC 2007). Unsurprisingly, internet penetration is highest 
in states on the urbanised west coast of peninsular Malaysia. For example, 
broadband penetration rates for the Federal Territory of Kuala Lumpur is 11 
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people per 100 inhabitants compared to just 0.9 in the northern rural state of 
Kelantan. While Selangor state on the west coast has 360 public access 
wireless hotspots, Perlis in the North has just 2. This data suggests there are 
clear and problematic regional disparities in terms of internet usage and 
access. Furthermore, it is unclear exactly how the concentration of 
centralised ICT infrastructures and investment in the MSC will even out 
these digital divides. 
In the MSC, the utopian vision of creating a new democratic space was 
based on the na·ive assumption that the network reaches all households, at 
all times in an egalitarian non-discriminatory manner. However, Malaysia is 
vast, rural, and its population dispersed across two land masses separated 
by a 4 hour flight. The lesson here is that 'geography matters'. There are 
serious doubts about whether the project of wiring every single kampung 
('village') into the MSC project by Phase 3 is: (a) do-able; or, (b) desirable. 
Often telecommunications providers avoid providing services to rural 
communities which are too poor or sparsely populated to make a significant 
profit. For instance, will Telekoms Malaysia (the state telecommunications 
monopoly) lay fibre cables to the rural outposts of Sabah in East Malaysia? 
As Riaz (1997) argues, the upgrading, and subsequent partial privatisation, 
of the Malaysian telecommunications infrastructure in the 1980s was 
designed to ensure that key business sectors were interconnected to the 
global marketplace. The resulting urban biases for technological upgrading 
in Kuala Lumpur, Johor and Penang were therefore very deliberate 
strategies fully endorsed by the state at this time, and there is little to 
suggest a reversal in strategy. 
Universal connectivity is an impossible vision. This is in contrast to the 
situation in the MSC's main competitor; the aspiring 'Intelligent Island' of 
Singapore (Chapter 4). As a highly affluent island state, its expertly managed 
resources are pooled into a 683 square kilometre landmass. Singapore's I.T. 
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infrastructure has been developed over a 25 year period since the 
conception of their national information infrastructure strategies in the 1980s 
(Chapter 4). The 'Intelligent Island' strategy, though mobilised in the 
superficial rhetoric of building a new Athenian democracy was grounded in 
more economic objectives. The project was to promote Singapore as a 
platform for software applications in Asia-Pacific and maintain the upgrading 
of human capital as the capacity of technology increased (Arun and Yap 
2000). In marked contrast to the MSC it has delivered on its promise to 
create a global I.T. hub. 
While state rhetoric still panders to dated utopianism that 
telecommunications can link Malaysia to the global village; this village 'is 
characterised by a functional global apartheid that separates and segregates 
certain affluent and wired neighbourhoods from other deprived and 
disconnected zones and neighbourhoods (0' Tuthail 1999: 143). If Malaysia 
continues to open its national markets to new telecommunications providers 
('Telcos') then economic liberalisation will increasingly lead to further socio-
spatial divisions and widening digital divides.66 The most advanced 
infrastructures will be channelled into the 'premium networked spaces' 
(Graham and Marvin 2001: 191) at the service of global technocratic elites 
whereby 'spatial infrastructure is embedded within capitalism, and complex 
terrains of winners and losers inevitably accompany urban infrastructural 
change.' The telecommunications grid allows the dismemberment of specific 
sites or individuals deemed not profitable enough for intelligent living. 
Infrastructure provision is driven by private companies who seek to make 
profits and maximise returns for their customers. These projects can be 
placed in the context of new urban telecommunications strategies that 
produce 'complex patchworks of special interest zones and public-private 
governance initiatives' (Graham and Marvin 2000: 93). For example, the 
66 The state owned monopoly Telekoms Malaysia is facing increasing competition from other internet 
service providers such as Time, Celcom, Jaring and Maxis. 
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egalitarian CCC was to provide access to information kiosks at 1 ORM per 
hour, a cost beyond the means of most Malaysians. 
Behind the glossy fa9ade of the government's 'internet for all' and 
'intelligent living' sloganeering -with its new band of Imitators it - inevitably 
comes down to a simple case of capitalist economics. While 
cyberlibertarianism is seductive, utopianists have often decided ignore 
over its political ends, and its more general failure to live up to its promises 
(Kelemen and Smith 2001). As Luke (1999: 34) notes: 'it is far more 
accurate to envision these undertakings as extraterritorial domains of 
telemetrical space, being turned into exclusive zones of service-provision, 
profit-generation, power-creation or goods-invention by their corporate 
vendors.' The continued bias towards wiring the most profitable - invariably 
urban - locations with the engines of the 'information age' - fibre, servers, 
wireless capability - will paradoxically have the effect of concentrating 
those elites and businesses which require them to stay close to the hub 
locations, or the 'premium bubbles'. The question remains whether the 
MSC can even out the regional inequalities to make Malaysia into a fully 
developed nation by the year 2020? 
It is no coincidence that the champions of the 'anywhere-anytime' cyber-
capitalist model were the CEOs and leaders of Multinational I.T. companies 
who stood to benefit from fibre optic connections in Cyberjaya. They aspire 
to take the economic model for cyberspace- unregulated, privatised, market 
utopia - and translate the same principles onto Cyberjaya. Most of these 
CEOs served as consultants to the state as members of the annual lAP 
(Chapter 4). The creation of a global space for neoliberal capitalism in 
Cyberjaya has been a veritable pursuit aided and abetted by transnational 
planning firms who create ideal spaces for global capital accumulation 
designed to 'promote' productivity. While the companies which inhabit the 
shiny new technopoles pander to state rhetoric on 'national intelligent 
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development', they are driven by their own desire to maximise profits, utilise 
lower labour costs, and ensure a minimum level of government interference 
in their activities. 
On the ground, Cyberjaya's electronic networks were privatised into 
corporate VPNs (Virtual Private Networks) which are selectively distributed 
across the MSC. While promotional materials claim 100% fibre optic network 
connectivity this is reliant on developers installing the 'last mile' and linking 
fibre to the door of buildings. Most MNCs in Cyberjaya have financed this 
process individually; however, property developers have predictably cut 
corners and avoided wiring fibre to individual smart homes. Many residents 
interviewed were surprised how slow and unreliable the internet connection 
was in Cyberjaya compared to other places in the Klang Valley area. 
Furthermore, as Chapter 7 examines, the surrounding kampung ('village') 
spaces sit cheek by jowl with Cyberjaya and have no internet access at all. 
The 'global village' is therefore characterised by these exemplary 'bipolar 
places of uneven development' (Boyer 1992: 119). As Poster (1999: 239) 
argues, telecommunications infrastructure creates a series of digital dividing 
practices which often exacerbates the gap between the information rich and 
information poor. 
'One must recognise that the Internet creates new invisibilities, filters out 
those who are not wired to its machine tentacles, disempowers those who 
cannot afford the start up fees, those who belong to communities that reject 
modernising technologies or are too poor to distribute them.' 
Secondly, in physical terms Cyberjaya has created a splintered enclave in 
national territory. Cyberjaya's planners endeavoured to 'close off the 
community from outside influences to produce a cerebral environment 
conducive to knowledge creation, and high value-added work practices. 
However, this had the double effect of producing a 'gated enclave' for 
privileged 'intelligent citizens'. The space of the technopole was designed to 
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isolate and protect elite groups who were seen to personify the future of 
'Wawasan 2020' Malaysia (especially the new urban Malay middle-classes). 
This produced the strategic effect of creating a highly fortified extra-territorial 
space. As a result, the city has become more akin to an urban dystopia, as 
noted in my field diary: 
'The more time I spend here, the more I think of Cyberjaya in techno-
dystopian, rather than utopian terms. The data serfs of the "information age" 
leave their offices to become cocooned in smart homes terminals to surf the 
infinite frontier of cyberspace while keeping tapped into events in Cyberjaya 
via live webcam streams. In another citadelled corporate enclave highly 
skilled experts are monitoring computer systems for offshore oil production 
for one of the world's largest corporations. Connection and disconnection 
are interchangeable in this place.' 
(Field Diary extract, 29.1 0.2006) 
In these terms, Cyberjaya's technological urban future has more in common 
with dystopian Cyberpunk classics such as Blade Runner, or the fortified 
surveillance overload of contemporary Los Angeles (Davis 1990; Davis 
1998). 
Fears about the 'exclusive' nature of Cyberjaya were first muted in a rare 
critical piece in Kuala Lumpur's The Star newspaper in 1997 which posed 
the question 'whether urban living would be privatised to the highest bidder'? 
The caption featured alongside a cartoon of a car entering a sealed urban 
lifestyle utopia (named "Luxuriaville") with a sign reading 1 RM million 
entrance fee; a price well beyond the means of most Malaysians. 
Cyberjaya's exclusivity was reflected by comments from developers who 
commented: 
'So Cyberjaya was basically a place, with nature and all the technologies, it 
is created for a very niche market, upmarket if you like. We want people who 
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love nature, people who love the serenity, the tranquillity, the quietness, 
these will be the ones to stay in Cyberjaya.' 
(Research Interview: Executive, Cyberview) 
Despite the framing of the 'intelligent city' as a classless, inclusive space it 
has instead been marked by spatial segregation according to social class. 
Cyberjaya sadly represents the literal realisation of the cartoonist's dystopian 
future. For example, while Malaysians are cramped into residential blocks 
scattered around the inhumane sprawl of Klang Valley the residents of 
Cyberjaya can enjoy the sanctity of an eco-friendly city inspired by North 
American suburban planning models (Lepawsky 2005). Though access to 
Cyberjaya is open in a physical sense it is gated via many other socio-spatial 
dividing practices (Chapter 7). This analysis builds upon work by Bunnell 
(2004) who addressed how the state evicted citizens (mainly Indian in 
plantations, or Orang Asli in squatter settlements) from planned MSC spaces 
based on the assessment they were living in 'non-intelligent spaces'. 
'Land required for infrastructure projects undertaken by state private sector 
partnerships for various forms were acquired by the government and people 
displaced in the name of national progress. The cheapest land identified and 
targeted for land rights and/or legal claims to compensation. As such the 
greatest social costs of transformation were borne by already socio-spatially 
marginalised individuals and groups.' 
(Bunnell 2004: 117) 
Marginal groups were excluded by being deemed 'out of place'. Despite the 
capacity of electronic networks to reconnect Cyberjaya to global centres, 
certain places and groups are always on the margins, peripheral to the MSC 
vision. This reflects broader patterns of urban polarisation whereby 'elite 
spaces' are produced for 'elite individuals', to exist in cocooned, privatised 
enclaves. This articulates with Boyer's (1992; 1996) 'Mini-Max' urbanism and 
is examined further in the following chapters. Such trends occur in the 
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context of the growing urban securitisation practices, and a proliferation of 
gated planned exclusive suburban communities through Southeast Asia. In 
Kuala Lumpur, as in other cities the world over, 'voluntary ghettoisation' 
(Mclaughlin and Muncie 1999) has been driven by a fear of crime, and 
growing awareness of the 'social ills' of the city leading to a growing 
preference for suburban homogenous living arrangements (specifically in 
terms of class). A recent report on the Malaysian property scene brought into 
focus the growth of gated communities in the urban landscape: 
'There has been a new disturbing trend towards the creation of gated 
communities to house large scale low-rise housing developments. In the 
wake of the ready adoption of American models of "New Urbanism" has 
come a socially divisive suburban landscape based around homogenous 
economic, social and ethnic groupings. This has been driven by the stark 
reality of contemporary life in urban Malaysia, a need for security (which 
indeed is often real) but bolstered in large part by real estate marketing 
images of resort exclusivity and boutique lifestyles: realities of a burgeoning 
wealthy class and its aspirations.' 
(Goad and Ngiom 2007: 15) 
Cyberjaya's planners were candid about their desire to create an 'exclusive 
suburb' (Corbin Sies 1997) for individuals of privileged status and wealth. In 
interview Setia Haruman officials identified potential Cyberjaya investors as 
university educated Malaysian middle-classes intermingling (presumably 
creatively?) with managerial global elites looking for the quiet life away from 
Kuala Lumpur. MDEC's plans for Cyberjaya to be a 'global community living 
at the leading edge of the 'information society' comes with specific ideas on 
who is included and excluded. The Star (04.07.1997) noted this global 
community is aimed to be 'international citizens working and living in this 
new virtual realty packed with latest facilities and amenities of future cities'. 
However, the average Malaysian has been financially excluded through high 
house prices and living costs aimed at the expat market and elite foreign 
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workers shipped into the MSC to drive on creativity and transfer knowledge 
to indigenous workers. 
'At the time it was about research and development. And, as you know 
these people will have doctorates or be professors, they can earn a lot. We 
need to create a space for them. So because of that the properties you can 
see around here are targeted to them and it costs above three hundred 
thousand [Ringgit], so they were targeting at that group. The average family 
can't afford this, but then we are not aiming to them.' 
(Research Interview: Marketing Manager, Cyberview) 
While foreign knowledge workers were to facilitate Malaysia's 'leapfrog' 
Malaysians citizens have been priced out of Cyberjaya and many 'local' 
workers in MSC companies within Cyberjaya either commute from Kuala 
Lumpur, or have been forced to live in closer commuter townships nearby 
such as Kajang, Puchong or Bangi where accommodation rents can be less 
than half than those in Cyberjaya. This highlights the invisible material 
consequence and emerging human geographies of so-called 'intelligent' 
development that are actively reshaping the urban landscape across the 
Kuala Lumpur metropolitan region. 
5. 7. Conclusion 
'A futuristic city, a multi-billion dollar test bed wired with the latest 
technology. Blueprints call for a resort like "cybercity" of 240,000, filled with 
citizens bearing "smart cards" for electronic commerce, children in "smart" 
schools, and hospital patients treated by telemedicine - all linked by a $2 
billion network of fibre optic cable, already under construction, and 
connected with other countries.' 
(Asian Wall Street Journal, 11. 06.1997) 
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'The utopian impulse at the heart of so many experiments in city building 
has always proved disappointing, if not downright disastrous in actual flesh 
and stone.' 
(Sandercock 1998:1) 
How successful was Cyberjaya in replicating, and producing a global 
exemplar of utopian urban space? Judging the city in terms of the way it 
departs from existing urban Malaysia, then its success has been 
considerable. However, judging Cyberjaya by its capacity to transform the 
rest of Malaysia according the plans laid out in the MSC, then its success 
has been minimal. Ten years after the launch of Cyberjaya, plans for it to 
become a 'zero emissions city' (The Star, 02.06.1997), or create a 'global 
community living at the cutting edge of the high-tech era' seems 
questionable. While the city has provided the nation with an image of its 
future, it has failed to create a place in which people want to live and work. 
Zoning strategies, spatial segregation, lack of amenities accompanied by an 
overemphasis on digital connectivity over material urban life has produced a 
disciplined space in which citizen-subjects are psychologically disengaged. 
Transnational planning practices, influenced by a utopian urban modernism, 
were grounded on scientific and rational ways of seeing the city and 
deterministic understandings about spatial ordering. 
Like many utopian planning projects, the real Cyberjaya exists in marked 
contrast to the 'intelligent city' imagined in planning documents. In 1996 
when the vision for Cyberjaya was launched, amidst the hype surrounding 
the MSC, these utopian narratives were read as fact, in a deterministic 
manner; the environment would be built, the fibre laid, and everything else 
would follow in a linear manner. However, no utopian city is built precisely as 
imagined as planners cannot account for the financial means of their patrons 
or the actions of residents, or city managers. As my remaining chapters 
illuminate in different ways, utopian modernist planning discourses almost 
220 
forget there are real cities out there, with real people in them that one can 
visit and walk around in. 
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Chapter 6. !Rethinking Cyberjaya: From 'Stocky 
Place' to 'SHppery Space' 
6. 1. Introduction 
Chapters 4 and 5 examined the strategies mobilised by the state to 
discursively frame Cyberjaya as an 'intelligent' urban node connecting 
Malaysia to an imagined 'information society'. Building on this analysis, the 
chapter draws upon the typology of industrial districts outlined by Markusen 
(1996) to examine how Cyberjaya is symbolically and materially positioned 
as an 'investible' location for reterritorialising transnational flows of foreign 
direct investment (FDI) into national space. The analysis is framed in the 
context of selling a new 'global hub', promoted as an extremely 'sticky place', 
where local skills, infrastructure, capital, environmental factors attract R&D 
and corporate headquarters and make them reluctant to leave. The 
technopole was planned to create the conditions for a synergy between 
multinational capital and local enterprise, which in turn, would enable the 
technopole to become an innovative milieu in which high value-added 
activities would be undertaken in creative multimedia, software development, 
and I.T. product innovation. 
However, the chapter argues, upon closer inspection and behind the inflated 
ideal of Cyberjaya as cutting edge 'intelligent garden city' it has become little 
more than an urban zone of disconnected outsourcing spaces and low 
value-added activities. This is what Markusen has called 'slippery space' 
whereby hypermobile back-office operations are precariously positioned in 
the international division of labour and follow the temporal rhythms of the 
global economy 'servicing a world elsewhere'. These operations are 
susceptible to location shifting once running costs and locational advantages 
become more attractive elsewhere as FDI flows are drawn to low cost 
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peripheral regions in order to maximise profit and service the command 
centres of the developed world (e.g. global cities like London, New York, and 
Tokyo). As discussed in Chapter 3, this led to a dual spatial redistribution of 
the centralisation of core high value-added activities in the 'sticky places' of 
traditional global hubs and a parallel decentralisation of back-office 
processes in always peripheral, shifting 'slippery spaces' often found in the 
developing world. 
The structure of the chapter is as follows. Section 6.2 illustrates how the 
construction of Cyberjaya as 'sticky place' was heavily influenced by the 
'global exemplar' of Silicon Valley. Section 6.3 critically examines how this 
technopole model has become akin to, what Easterling (2005) labels, a 
'spatial product' transplanted into local contexts to attract global capital and 
assert national claims to globality. Section 6.4 explores both the symbolic 
(marketing and place promotion) and material (hard and soft infrastructures) 
strategies mobilised to position Cyberjaya as a 'sticky place'. Section 6.5 
observes that despite hyperbolic claims of becoming 'Silicon Valley East'67 
Cyberjaya has in fact become a 'slippery space' characterised by low value-
added shared services and outsourcing industries. 
6.2. The Global Technopole Exemplar: All Roads Lead to 
Silicon Valley? 
'In an era of globalisation, we want to become like Silicon Valley, and 
become an I.T. hub and drive forward the knowledge economy. MSC is 
about making that transition with Cyberjaya as the place for everything high-
tech. Sure the success of Silicon Valley was a big factor for us.' 
(Research Interview: Head of MDEC Cybercities Division) 
'Well if you read the brochures this place was supposed to be better [than 
Silicon Valley], with a real intelligent city. People had the hope when 
67 As opposed to the 'Silicon Valley West' in California, USA. Although this term has never been 
popularised. 
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Mahathir was around that he could do it, people followed his vision. Based 
on the original plans, Cyberjaya would have been much more advanced 
than Silicon Valley. This was based on the intelligent city view. Like 
everywhere is intelligent, all the buildings smart, everywhere is connected, 
monitored. That was the original plan. But they can't compete with Silicon 
Valley, it is so unique. If the plan succeeded, it would have been the most 
high-tech city in the world. It could have been very impressive.' 
(Research Interview: Manager, Friesland MSC Company) 
The emergence and success of Silicon Valley - an area stretching from Palo 
Alto to San Jose in Southern California - as a global I.T. hub has been well 
documented in both the popular press (e.g. Wired Magazine) and numerous 
academic studies (Rogers and Laursen 1984; Saxenian 1994; English Lueck 
2002). These accounts have frequently underplayed the geographical factors 
and historical precursors in the growth of Silicon Valley. Often overlooked is 
the synergy between Stanford University and U.S. government Cold War 
R&D spending in military technology in favour of an emphasis on heroic 
accounts of garage innovators (Bill Gates, Steve Jobs et al) and the rise of 
global I.T. companies (Hewlett-Packard, IBM, Intel, Apple) in a mythical 
culture of free wheeling entrepreneurialism.68 As a consequence, there is 
only a passing reference to the Silicon Valley's historical development rooted 
in: (1) the creation of an industrial base with Stanford Technology Park in the 
1950s; (2) the growth of micro-electronics firms in the 1960s, and spin-offs 
from the first generation of firms along with support from defence industry; 
(3) the consolidation of semiconductor producers and launch of computer 
industry in the 1970s; (4) growing domination of computer industry, 
internationalisation and new round of spin-offs in the 1980s.69 
68 For example, as Castells and Hall (1994) note, in 1965 the government purchased 70% of U.S. 
output of integrated circuits 
69 In the 1980s the national dominance of Silicon Valley was threatened by the emergence of an I.T. 
cluster located around the Cambridge, Massachusetts Institute of Technology in Boston. 
224 
The concern here is not to evaluate the origins of Silicon Valley's success, 
nor to interrogate the dynamics of successful I.T. clusters within localisation 
economies; both of which have been analysed elsewhere (e.g. Scott 1988; 
Saxenian 1994; Malmberg et al. 1996; Malmberg and Maskell 2002). Rather 
the enquiry seeks to approach Silicon Valley as a specific discursive 
formation enrolled by national and regional policy makers in technopole 
planning models. Cyberjaya's attempt to replicate the rapid rise of Silicon 
Valley can be seen in the context of numerous other similar projects, or 
'Siliclones', around the world. A comprehensive list of these can be found on 
the Siliconia Website (http://www.tbtf.com/siliconia.html) which details the 
vast number of technopoles which have used 'silicon-' and 'cyber-' prefixes 
as entrepreneurial place marketing and urban boosterism strategies 
(Graham 2004). Well known imitators include 'Silicon Alley' a new media 
district in New York City; 'Silicon Glen' in Livingstone, Scotland; and 'Silicon 
Hills' in Austin, Texas. Added to this list, are competing claims from urban 
I.T. hubs that they have become national equivalents of Silicon Valley. So, 
for example, northern Sydney is promoted as 'Australia's Silicon Valley' 
(Searle and Pritchard 2005), Bangalore as 'India's Silicon Valley 
(Parthasarathy 2004), or Cambridge Science Park as the UK equivalent 
(Castells and Hall 1994). 
The replication mythology is based on the notion that a spatial cluster of I.T. 
firms characterised by high value-adding can be created by forging links to 
universities, and a supply of venture capital in an entrepreneurial climate 
aided and abetted by localised economies of inter-firm networking. Though 
many of these places have jumped on the Silicon Valley "bandwagon" very 
few can lay claim to becoming genuine 'innovative milieu' as defined by 
Castells and Hall (1994). Often the presence of a loose cluster of a few I.T. 
related companies, a small technology park or one flagship tenant is basis 
enough for local and regional development agencies to 'siliconise' the area 
and (re)brand it as a 'Silicon Valley' of sorts. 
225 
In interviews with Cyberjaya's planners, 'MSC architects' - including MDEC, 
Setia Haruman, Cyberview- all frequently referred to the influence of Silicon 
Valley on the development model for Cyberjaya. As seen in Chapter 4, the 
project associated .itself with Silicon Valley through a number of discursive 
strategies including frequent trips by government officials to Silicon Valley 
(e.g. MDEC, MOSTI), institutional links with Stanford University, formalised 
links to industry leaders (e.g. Bill Gates) through the lAP. Mahathir followed 
in a long line of presidents, ministers, and dignitaries that made the 
pilgrimage to Silicon Valley in well publicised delegations to capitalise on 
social prestige back home. Forging a highly symbolic relationship between 
Cyberjaya and Silicon Valley was largely about legitimising the vision to a 
global audience. The arrival of Silicon Valley companies in Cyberjaya (e.g. 
IBM, HP) was wrongly mistaken as evidence by the state of a migration of 
skills, knowledge workers to Malaysia. While many of these links promised a 
great deal, they delivered little with many companies choosing to invest 
heavily elsewhere (e.g. Microsoft in Singapore, Cisco in China70). 
Cyberjaya has gone further than any other 'siliclone' in an attempt to 
replicate an imagined Silicon Valley "model". This was based on the 
rationale that national territory could be transformed into high-tech industrial 
space given a now familiar list of prerequisites including a pool of highly 
skilled engineering graduates, an immediate supply of venture capital, 
infrastructure provision, support services, incubators for start up companies, 
and the nurturing of informal networks. Cyberjaya's planners and MDEC 
visited numerous technopoles, not only Silicon Valley but also Technopolis 
Project in Japan, Sophia Antipolis in France and Bangalore, India in the 
planning stages for Cyberjaya to examine the 'ingredients' of successful 
technopole planning. This was conceived as a linear process whereby the 
7° Cisco's investment programme in China was estimated at US $ 100 million (PC Magazine, July 
1998}, while Sun Microsystems have concentrated the bulk of their investment in Singapore 
(Businessweek, 22"d March 1999). 
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provision of specific 'hard' and 'soft' infrastructures would create an 
'innovative milieu' for high-tech industries. 
'I mean Silicon Valley works because of the universities right? So we 
created MMU in Cyberjaya. Then we anticipate the talent and skills will 
follow. Silicon Valley is based on the hubbing concept of certain industries, 
so we decided to do this too, and get all the IT and Multimedia to come to 
Cyberjaya. They need the campus-like atmosphere, the green space, and 
the set up that we have here. You know for research intensive companies 
they need a certain type of space, and we tried to provide that here.' 
(Research Interview: Head of MDEC Creative Multimedia Cluster) 
The role of Stanford University was held up as a crucial 'ingredient' in the 
success of Silicon Valley. Cyberjaya's planners decided to build their own 
university based on the assumption that 'new economies' are dependent 
upon the spatial interaction of technology parks, universities, and companies 
(Storper and Walker 1989; Malecki 2000). Cyberjaya's Multimedia University 
(MMU) was hyped as the 'Stanford University of Asia'. It was opened in July 
1999 to become 'a truly world-class institution - to be the catalyst for the 
development of the Multimedia Super Corridor (MSC) and the nation, parallel 
to the Silicon Valley's success in the USA' (MMU website, accessed 
10.07.2007). As the following excerpt from a Mahathir speech demonstrates, 
MMU has been discursively framed to replicate the "Stanford effect" in 
Silicon Valley. 
'The Multimedia University is no ordinary university since it will become the 
cultural heart and intellectual nerve centre of the learning society to be 
created within the Cyberjaya community. Its opening signifies the readiness 
and capability of the MSC to generate a critical mass of quality knowledge 
workers for MSC status companies. It is designed to spawn creative ideas 
and technopreneurs - very much like the role that Stanford University plays 
in the success of the Silicon Valley.' 
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(Mahathir 1999) 
'This is supposed to be like Stanford right, in Silicon Valley. They see a lot of 
I.T. and multimedia companies, and there is a good rapport between 
Stanford and those companies, so we live to copy that situation, that is why 
we moved the campus form Melaka to here. It was a deliberate thing, it 
didn't just happen by chance. This was Dr. Mahathir's idea I think because 
the Stanford and Silicon Valley symbiosis proved to be very successful, so 
we like to be like that. We too want to become successful.' 
(Research Interview: MSC-MMU Relations Division) 
With 8,500 students, and an entrepreneur centre tied to MDEC's 
'Technopreneur Development Programme'71 , MMU was planned to produce 
graduates to compete in global knowledge markets. The development of 
MMU actively consumed the 'mythology' of Silicon Valley of young 
engineering graduates becoming I.T. industry millionaires overnight. In 
interview, MDEC (Research Interview, Technopreneur Division) outlined that 
success for Cyberjaya would be to create a 'Malaysian Bill Gates'. Heroic 
accounts of budding IT entrepreneurs have been constantly replayed in 
numerous books, or magazines, such as Wired, adding to the cult status of 
Silicon Valley as high-tech nirvana. However, ten years after the launch of 
Cyberjaya plans that there would be at least 15 corporate R&D centres, 10 
R&D collaborative centres of foreign companies, local universities, and local 
firms, at least 10 local R&D centres, and at least 1 0 projects for emerging 
multimedia technologies (The Star, 19.06.1997) has failed to materialise. 
Despite its grand claims MMU has not become the "Stanford of the East" 
and Malaysia lags behind Singapore, Japan, Korea, Taiwan, and now China 
in technology innovation. 
71 The programme is to facilitate the development of start ups, technopreneurs, existing ICT 
companies, and to nurture a cluster of competitive ICT small medium companies (SMEs) in 
Cyberjaya's Technopreneur Centre (MSC-TeC) (MDEC 2006). 
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'Ten years on I believe it didn't live up to its hype to be the new Silicon 
Valley. It never benefited the industry in the way that we thought it would. I 
think ten years on the animation, or multimedia industry still hasn't had a 
global success story in terms of entertainment, or intellectual property. In 
terms of the size of the industry it is not much bigger than it was ten years 
ago. So MSC didn't deliver.' 
(Research Interview: CEO of Creative Licence) 
Measuring Cyberjaya in terms of creative output or numbers of local 
companies who went on to become global players suggests a story of failed 
expectations. However, perhaps the desire to simply replicate Silicon Valley 
was misunderstood. Although Silicon Valley's success was underpinned by 
early state involvement, the role of the Malaysian government in Cyberjaya 
has been characterised by management over its citizens and an 
entrepreneurial culture by coercion. The "rock and roll CEOs" of Silicon 
Valley (e.g. Apple guru Steve Jobs) with their sub-cultural lifestyles, sits 
uneasily with the new breed of entrepreneurs which the MSC project 
attempted to create. Furthermore, state planners cannot be expected to 
predict the next "hot technology", nor are they adept at manufacturing the 
risk taking culture that powers the 'new economy'. The likes of Bill Gates 
were not nurtured in government labs, under the watchful eye of state 
'technopreneur' programmes. Furthermore, state policies for the creation of 
Bumiputera high-tech capitalists have welded together political and 
economic interests of protectionism and race politics which sits uneasily with 
the experimental entrepreneurialism of Silicon Valley. 
'They just look to Silicon Valley as this utopian model. In Malaysia people 
don't understand that only a fraction of the start ups can go on to succeed, 
and in some cases go global. So I think we need to get real about this. Not 
only that, the culture of giving back for those who are successful is not there. 
Also there is a misunderstanding about what venture capital (VC) is. Most 
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people think VC is something that the bank does. It must give them specific 
returns at specific times. That's the logic of banking but not of VC.' 
(Research Interview: Vice President, MDEC Technopreneur Division) 
The quote exemplifies problematic cultural differences in Malaysian attitudes 
to risk and venture capital which hindered the replication of an 
entrepreneurial culture in the MSC. The lack of an entrepreneurial culture is 
acutely experienced by the Malays for several reasons. Firstly, of Malaysia's 
three ethnic groups, Malays were marginalised in Malaya's (as it was known 
prior to 1963) colonial economy by the British in order to consolidate their 
own position of power. Their failure to improve their economic standing after 
independence led to a rise of Malay nationalism in the 1960s, culminating in 
the ethnic riots of 1969. In response the government initiated the NEP to 
improve Bumiputera economic competitiveness via a number of positive 
discrimination measures. Such policies included ethnic quotas favouring 
Malays for employment in government sectors and private corporate 
enterprises, for stock ownership in corporations and for government 
contracts (Gomez 1990; Gomez and Jomo 1997). 
Secondly, as a consequence, from 1970 to the time of writing, state semi-
authoritarianism and economic intervention has stifled any genuine 
entrepreneurial culture that could have fermented amongst or between 
ethnic groups.72 The UMNO dominated government succeeded due its ability 
to control and distribute economic resources; a process which Crouch (1996: 
37) labels its 'patronage dispensing function'. Furthermore, as Jomo (1990: 
231) observes 'it is now widely believed that most new opportunities for 
wealth accumulation are crucially determined by political access rather than 
any entrepreneurial ability'. As a consequence, there is virtually no private 
venture capital industry within Malaysia or the MSC. The state has provided 
72 The NEP was replaced in 1990 by the National Development Policy (1991-2000), then the National 
Vision Policy (2001-2010), both of which continued NEP pro Malay affirmative action policies. 
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a venture capital fund through an MDEC subsidiary - MSC Venture Corp73 
and nurtured start ups in the government offices of Cyberjaya's high-tech 
incubator. However, attitudes to risk taking and entrepreneurialism are 
culturally ingrained and cannot be changed overnight, or even in years, 
through state led projects such as the MSC. These cultural and political 
differences -added to the shortage of skilled graduates - have hindered the 
creation of a new generation of risk taking start ups hatching innovative 
ideas. 
6.3. Creating a Simulated Urbanism: Cyberjaya as a 'Spatial 
Product' 
'They appear so similar - outside Cambridge, England, or Cambridge 
Massachusetts; Mountain View, California or Munich, Germany - that the 
hapless traveller, dropped by parachute, would hardly guess the identity of 
the country, let alone the city. The developments they represent go under a 
bewildering variety of names which invariably permute a few key elements 
like Techno, Science, 21 51 Century, Park, Plaza, Polis, and -topia.' 
(Castells and Hall 1994: 1) 
'The shining temples and palaces of I.T. parks of Arabsat and lndosat in 
Dubai or Malaysia seem to clinch the familiar political argument that these 
enclaves often elude locality, generating apolitical forms of urbanism, 
incubating or laundering data and resources like a Swiss bank account for 
technologies.' 
(Easterling 2005: 24) 
The goal to replicate the Silicon Valley "model" has led to a proliferation of 
projects that are equally generic and devoid of local character. These 
technopoles have come to represent a formulated entrepreneurial strategy 
for economic development; something of an 'urban recipe' for the material 
73 A non-profit company that funds start up companies in the Malaysian ICT industry. 
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preparation of 'post-industrial' spaces. The 'global intelligence corps', 
highlighted in Chapter 4, are akin to 'celebrity chefs' creating new 
architectural spectacles for global consumption. The urban recipe for 
technopole projects follows several simple steps. For example, take 5 
square kilometres of flat land; prepare the land with landscaped 'resort style' 
urbanism, wire with fibre optic cables and a desired amount of office space. 
Finish up with lakes, green spaces, a few fountains for good measure and 
serve up to the consumers of global capitalism. These blueprints often 
parachute into local spaces ignoring or attempting simply to write over local 
histories, geographies and cultures with their hegemonic narratives of high-
tech modernity (though this is rarely successful). 
Cyberjaya is one of a long line of 'offshore real estate cocktails' (Easterling 
2005: 3) that have been exported around the world via transnational 
planning practices to house MNCs in low-rise, low rent campuses where the 
usual raft of tax-free financial incentives apply. Corporate campuses offer 
both prestigious locations for firms and provide specialist infrastructures 
such as firm owned power redundancies, satellite link-ups, and in-house 
facilities for employees. From Dubai to Cyberjaya, Hong Kong to Hyderabad 
these projects have been eagerly prepared by aspiring national governments 
for a new age of 'digital capitalism' (Schiller 1999) and consumed by 
increasingly footloose multinationals searching out profit wherever the urge 
should take them. Public claims that Cyberjaya will become the "new Silicon 
Valley" (how many times has this been heard in the past ten years?) serves 
to mask underlying spatial disjunctures. These shiny new technopoles seek 
to 're-scale' (Swyngedouw 1996) global capital and reassure its needs 
through the provision of cutting edge infrastructure combined with the "five 
star" luxury of a garden city. Splintered urban enclaves have been 
meticulously prepared by local institutions (e.g. MDEC) in consultation with 
MNCs to produce the best kind of "landing strip" for capital so that: 
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' ... the global information economy with its advanced technology and 
transnational corporate culture reigns supreme and dominates the physical 
as well as the social image of the metropolis' 
(Berner 1997: 99-1 00) 
As examined in Chapters 4 and 5, Cyberjaya has manifested as a zone of 
socio-political fragmentation subject to new government policies geared to 
promote the city as a conduit for global flows and investment. As a 
consequence, the physicality and design of Cyberjaya's environment aspires 
to reach "global standards" (constantly referred to as "world-class" in 
promotional materials) in order to attract the 'new economy' web-shapers; 
i.e. those MNCs that excel in innovation, research and development of I.T. 
and multimedia products. MDEC is quick to emphasise the presence of 
foreign MNCs as a tool for attracting further rounds of investment and 
promoting synergies with local industry. The presence of global I.T. and 
multimedia companies carry their own symbolic capital as ready-made 
tenants for technology parks around the world. The MDEC website has a roll 
call of its 67 'world-class' tenants which includes the likes of Nokia, Siemens, 
Motorola, Oracle, Ericsson, Dell, DHL, Shell, IBM, HSBC, Panasonic, BMW, 
Fujitsu, Intel, NTT, Compaq, NEC, Microsoft. Importantly, the presence of 
MNCs is more important than what these companies actually do (i.e. back-
office functions). 
To facilitate transnational connections, Cyberjaya was promoted as an urban 
node for the pursuit of a national high-tech strategy reliant on foreign 
investment. It created a new simulated urbanism for global consumption 
which, like other 'spatial products' 'lacks an authentic consciousness of place 
and time' and 'is largely subservient to the dictates of Western cultural and 
intellectual cues' (Tay and Goh 2003: 16). This is not so much the realisation 
of the 'anytime/anywhere' dream but also the elsewhere dream whereby 
technopoles create a 'hyperreal' (Eco 1987) spatiality often dislocated from a 
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local context. Similar examples includes shopping malls (Shields 1988; Goss 
1999) or paradigmatic U.S. cities which seek to imagineer 'other worlds' 
spatially. Case studies include Soja's (2000) work on Orange County, 
Gottiedener (1997) and Hannigan (1998) on Las Vegas as the perfect 
simulated urban space, and Archer (2001) on spatial imagineering in 
Orlando. 
Such places are deterritorialised and unfettered by the traditions of the past. 
The urban design, layout, and architectural form are engineered to create a 
new imagined spatiality. This partly 'emptied out, abstract, codified space of 
the city' (Lash and Urry 1994: 17) of high modernism and internationalism 
produces a space of dizzying disorientation. This mode of urban planning 
can be theoretically linked to Eco's (1987) work on the 'hyperreal' and 
Baudrillard's (1983) theory of 'simulation' which focuses on the production of 
new post-modern cultural spaces without historical referents: 
'Abstraction today is no longer that of a map, the double, the mirror or the 
concept. Simulation is no longer that of a territory, a referential being or a 
substance. It is the generation by models of a real without origin or reality: a 
hyperreal.' 
(Baudrillard 1983: 2) 
'Spatial products' create new versions of the city through urban spectacles 
(Debord 1970) that are inauthentic, divorced from context, and often 
completely artificial. This process is what Castells (2000b) has labelled a 
'real virtuality' to describe when virtuality becomes the key component of our 
symbolic environment. This applies to the whole concept of the 'information 
society' itself which is the perfect embodiment of Baudrillard's 'desert of the 
real'. Cyberjaya is the perfect simulacrum - a simulation of a reality that 
never existed. The 'intelligent city' is ultimately baseless, rooted in the false 
logic of technological determinism, and a utopian belief in ICTs and their 
power to create a progressive society. 
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Cyberjaya's planners strived to create a place that was globally orientated in 
terms of urban form, population composition and architecture style to create 
a sense of an imagined utopian elsewhere - Silicon Valley - in Malaysian 
space. 
'You know we want to create a special kind of place here, when people 
come to Cyberjaya they have this feeling they are entering the future. The 
city feels different from elsewhere in Malaysia, it has a different style, unique 
architecture, and lots of foreign influences.' 
(Research Interview: Senior Planner, Setia Haruman) 
The juxtaposition between Kuala Lumpur and Cyberjaya is something that 
was observed in early fieldwork diaries during the first few weeks exploring 
the MSC. 
'The first thing I noticed, just driving around Cyberjaya and Putrajaya, is it 
creates a very different experience from driving around KL (Kuala Lumpur). 
These cities are much less chaotic, they have the appearance of being well 
managed, and are visibly manicured by an army of gardeners and cleaners. 
At the same time, something is lost as here. Cyberjaya in particular 
produces a sanitised space, too contrived, too corporate and as a 
consequence rapidly loses all the things I like so much about Malaysia 
exemplified in the urban vitality of KL.' 
(Field Diary extract, 12.08.2006) 
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Figure 19: Fujistu Office in Cyberjaya Exemplifying the 'International Style' 
(Source: Author's Photograph) 
Ironically as each 'siliclo.ne: aspires to replicate the sam~ imagined 
elsewhere they give birth to what Koolhaas (1995) has described as a 
'generic city' - a mode of global placlessness whereby, despite geographical 
distances, each development looks remarkable similar in style and form 
(Figure 19)-. Cyberjaya is characterised by bl~md corporate offices, large 
manicured green spaces, and a sterile working environment. Consequently, 
the city lacks a sense of place or authenticity because it was deliberately 
designed not to have one. As examined in Chapter 5, the transnational 
planning processes reduced urbanity to the ideal type of garden suburb - an 
exclusive work paradise for technocratic elites whereby its uniform 
composition, rational arrangements of space, and symbolic architectural 
form are designed to place it in the cultural and territorial 'ideal' of 
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technopoles (Wakeman 2003). Although promoted as a national project, the 
urban vision of Cyberjaya seeks to meet the requirements of global capital. 
'Ironically, while these megaprojects attempt to represent cities, or discreet 
spaces within them, as centres of innovation or cutting edge design, full of 
intelligent buildings or lifestyle distinction, they seem to look and maybe 
even feel increasingly the same.' 
·(Jones and Carranco 2007: 145) 
Global capital dictates that these projects must be understood by decision 
makers in a corporate environment who are unable, or unwilling, to 
understand the complexities of different urban contexts. These are the 
country managers of large MNCs in collaboration with their CEOs deciding 
which new locations may be suitable sites for expansion. Castells (1996: 
428) labels this as 'structural schizophrenia' whereby managerial, 
technocratic, and political elites demand landscapes which are ahistorical, 
acultural and highly sanitised. When choosing a location, green spaces, 
lakeside living in gated communities, secure corporate enclaves which "keep 
the natives out" are all seen as desirable features for an ideal globalised 
live/work environment (Chapter 7). In order to draw in the global capital that 
these business elites are connected to, local narratives are downplayed, and 
a new competitive image dreamed up by planning firms promoting the 
modernism of the 'International Style'. The glossy imagineering of 
promotional brochures and discursive linkages to Silicon Valley was 
advanced to add value to the otherwise peripheral Cyberjaya. 
This was confirmed in interviews with representatives from MSC companies 
who repeatedly mentioned they liked the 'resort feel' of Cyberjaya and cited 
that the 'green spaces' were important for their staff. One manager of an 
Australian firm recalled "flicking through the marketing brochures" with his 
senior management and before making the decision to relocate to Malaysia 
(Figure 20). He commented that "foreign executives couldn't fail but to be 
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impressed by Cyberjaya's urban vision". During interview, he sardonically 
contrasted these seductive images of futuristic looking offices in green 
locations with his office view overlooking an empty plot of land awaiting 
further development. Like several of the early movers into Cyberjaya, his 
company invested based on potential of the development model promoted 
by MDEC and local developers. However, the 'intelligent city' vision has 
failed to materialise. 
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Figure 20: Promotional Brochure for Cyberjaya (Source: Setia Haruman) 
Through urban boosterism strategies and mechanisms of transnational 
governmentality localised features are consciously erased, or downplayed, 
as technolopoles are deliberately designed to assert the physicality of a new 
modernity. The ostentatious marble and glass office entrances serve to 
differentiate Cyberjaya from the surrounding areas, and superficially mark its 
space as 'modern' while masking the expanding power of MNCs over non-
sovereign territory. For example, a secesionary effect occurs in corporate 
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enclaves in Cyberjaya. For example, Shell I.T. required self-contained 
live/work amenities in a secured site in order to relocate to Cyberjaya. Shell's 
two buildings in Cyberjaya are connected by a "skywalk" so that Shell 
employees don't even have to leave the sanctity of the air conditioned office 
when they are travelling around the corporate 'campus'. Chapter 7 explores 
further how the goal was to produce a hermetically sealed, work environment 
conducive to maximum productivity. The architectural design creates a 
homogenous 'global corporate' environment which both partially withdraws 
from, and is alien to, the local surrounding but similar to the design of 
technopoles the world over. In the case of Cyberjaya its urban spaces are 
'de-Malaysianised' i.e. where local resonances are downplayed to satisfy the 
aesthetic demands of MSC companies. 
Technopoles function as 'perfect servants' (Easterling 2005) for MNCs and 
their imperialist logic of global expansion. It is here that '"winning" access to 
global capital may come at the price of "losing" national and regional 
identities through the homogeneity of design' (Jones and Carranco 2007: 
145). What is produced in the urban design for technopoles is a backdrop 
akin to those found in T.V. car commercials. For example, a specially 
commissioned book produced by Setia Haruman (2003) titled 'Cyberjaya: a 
city inspired' details 'the architectural and technological achievements of the 
city, enhanced with the essence of inspired Malaysian fashion'. The book 
contains pictures of models posing in some of Cyberjaya's trademark office 
buildings such as the BMW regional headquarters. Here attractive female 
models are set against a corporate backdrop of glossy glass and steel 
offices of MNCs striking sultry poses (presumably to seduce potential 
investors) (Figure 21). 
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Figure 21: Photograph From 'Lines and Curves: Cyberjaya a City Inspired' 
(Source: Setia Haruman) 
However, the chapter does not reduce Cyberjaya's development to mere 
Silicon Valley replication, unproblematically implanted into national space by 
transnational actors with state consent. Moreover, the thesis emphasises a 
more nuanced transnational planning history to acknowledge: 
'A combination of historical, cultural , social and spatial practices are brought 
together in a particular territory by a particular set of people (agents) and 
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social and political institutions to construct from out of the "imagined 
community" of the nation, the city, town or any other kind of settlement.' 
(King 2003: 5) 
' ... people are never passive recipients of external initiatives, but rather 
struggle within their own immediate contexts of constraints and opportunities 
to produce a meaningful life with their own particular values and goals.' 
(Goh 2002: 15) 
Cyberjaya is a project that requires textural examination of the conditions 
under which it was inserted into existing economic, social, political, and 
cultural landscapes. The state played a dual role of, on the one hand, 
promoting Cyberjaya as site for neoliberal engagement and transnational 
connection in a globalised world, and on the other, devising Cyberjaya as a 
national project exemplary of 'intelligent' Malaysia. The state functions as a 
mediator between the placeless architecture and globalism of a 'space of 
flows' and the cultural symbols of national identity (Appadurai 1996; Boey 
2002). Its role is to balance the conflicting forces of a predatory inward 
migration of globalised capitalism and an indigenous capitalism seeking to 
internationalise. The state, therefore, sought to create a space that was 
business orientated in function but culturally and historically embedded in 
localised contexts. 
The chapter avoids labelling this practice of hybridisation as post-modern 
because, following King (1976; 2003; 2004), the mixing of different histories 
of cultures emerged long before the 'modern movement' (e.g. colonial 
architecture and design). Rather, thinking with Bhabha (1994) the notion of 
'hybridity' describes how space is constituted through elements of encounter 
that transform each other. Therefore, Cyberjaya can be considered as a 
'third space' which combines transnational cultural-economic flows with 
localised narratives. This 'third space' has the potential to be a site of 
resistance. 
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The compulsion to assert 'local' design elements implies that, although the 
orientation of Cyberjaya is overtly global, the power still lies with Malay 
dominated rulers who are categorised by the state as the 'sons of the soil' 
('Bumiputera'). These indicators of nationhood manifest in several ways in 
the MSC. In Cyberjaya, the centrally located MDEC headquarters 
incorporates local vernacular into the architectural design (Figure 22). 
Notably the sloping roofs resembling a traditional design for a Malay house 
(Figure 23) that would' not look out of place in Kelantan, a city famed for its 
Malay heritage. 
Figure 22: Multimedia Development Corporation HQ, Cyberjaya (Source: 
Author's Photograph) 
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Figure 23: Traditional Malay House (Source: Author's Photograph) 
' ' 
Discrete state mobilised narratives of Malay hegemony convey political 
messages to the local population which are lost on a global audience 
disengaged from Malaysia's complex cultural politics. For example, design 
plans for the Petronas Towers contain a series. of Islamic motifs with the floor 
layouts are based on Islamic geometric traditions. The design for the 
undulating roof structure on KLIA reflects traditional Malay architecture. 
Rather than reflecting the ethnic mix of Malaysian society .the architecture 
reaffirms the political hegemony of the Malays and contradicts any notions of 
the MSC as an ethnically inclusive national1 project. Architecture in the MSC 
has become symbolic of Malay engagement with a world of global 
commerce, b~siness and the arrival of the Melayu B.ahru ('New Malay') 
generation (Bunnell 1999; King 2007). The most overt display of 'Malay 
llionumentalism' is showcased less than 5 km from Cyberjaya in Putrajaya 
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through a series of signature buildings including the Masjid Putra, Melawati 
National Palace, Prime Minister's office, and the Palace of Justice. As King 
(2007) documents, it is here that the Bumiputera claims to nationhood 
manifest themselves in full form. The Masjid Putra ('National Mosque') in 
Putrajaya is designed according to Islamic-Arabic vernacular and is a public 
signifier of Malaysia's orientation towards Islam. The presence of Malay-
Islamic architecture at the symbolic centre of the MSC publicly confirms 
Mahathir's pronouncement that the MSC will not be a 'global free-for-all'. 
Although, paradoxically, constructions of Malay identity have been produced 
through foreign architects in the case of KLIA (Kurokawa) and KLCC (Pelli). 
These interpretations have produced a "Disneyfied" effect whereby the 
landscape of Cyberjaya has become a pastiche of different styles and 
narratives. The tension between state re-workings of modernity, indigenous 
narratives and exogenous political-economic forces continues in the next 
section with the example of the Saladin MSC branding strategy. 
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Figure 24:- Promotional Picture for MSC Malaysia at KLIA with (from the left): 
KLIA Terminal Building, 5th Malaysian Prime Minister Dr. Mahathir Mohamad, 
Masjid Putra in Putrajaya, 6th Malaysian Prime Minister Abdullah Badawi, and 
KLCC Towers (Source: Author's ·Photograph) 
6.4~ Constructing Cyberjaya as a 'Sticky Place' 
Cyberjaya was a territory positioned by the state as a 'sticky place' for the 
much heralded 'new economy· within the global capitalist system. This was 
based on a set of assumptions outlined in Chapter 3 concerning how 
globalisation creates a need for strategic spatial sites for the 
reterritorialisation of mobile flows - e.g. Harvey's .(1982, 1985, 1989) 'spatial 
fixes' or Sassen's (200.1) 'new spatial unit'. Evidence examined how 
technopoles have been mobilised as exemplary urban nodes for· grass 
rooting the 'information economy'. This directly contradicts the anti-territorial 
internet hype embraced by the state to promote the original MSC vision 
(Chapter 4). Analogous to the way that 'poverty can lead to r:Hostitl.Jtion' 
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(Koolhaas 1995: 1031), MDEC set about implementing discursive and 
material strategies to correspond to the locational preferences of 
transnational capital as local conditions were "sold" by the state to create an 
adhesive urbanism to which companies, labour, capital would stick. 
6.4.1. Creating a Competitive Image for Cyberjaya as 'Sticky Place' 
'If you want to get the best girl at the ball, you have to wear a good tuxedo.' 
(Research Interview: Head of MDEC SSO Division) 
As previously examined, a range of urban place marketing and urban 
boosterism strategies are mobilised by states to promote technopoles as 
knowledge intensive, globally competitive, and world-class sites (Doel and 
Hubbard 2002). Discursive strategies were an essential mechanism through 
which Cyberjaya has been positioned as a 'sticky place' - constructing the 
image of success, is as important as success itself. Through the circulation 
of promotional materials, overseas promotion by MDEC, the establishment 
of a global network of MDEC offices, and public events at home Cyberjaya 
was discursively positioned as a dynamic new media hub. According to 
MDEC's self-congratulatory promotional brochures Cyberjaya is en route to 
reaching its goal of becoming an I.T. hub. Lists of new MSC status 
companies, plans for the opening of new R&D centres74 are circulated to 
boost claims that Cyberjaya can become Southeast Asia's premier 
technopole. For instance, a wave of excitement greeted sycophantic local 
media reports that Hewlett-Packard would be opening an 'applications 
development centre' in Cyberjaya rumoured to house an eventual 1,000 
knowledge workers (The Edge Magazine, 08.05.2006). 
The section addresses the symbolic effects of one specific 'flagship' place 
promotion strategy mobilised by MDEC. MDEC's Creative Multimedia 
74 Plans were mooted that several MNCs would relocate to or open R&D facilities in Cyberjaya. This 
famously included Microsoft, but also, British Telecom, IBM, DELL, Cisco. 
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flagship seeks to attract MSC companies using multimedia and digital 
technologies to develop, create, add value to, and deliver content 
(http://cmc.msc.com.my/) in Cyberjaya's 'Digital Media Zone'. The zone 
contains the state funded Creative Applications and Development Centre 
(CAD-C) which includes a virtual reality centre, creative multimedia lab, and 
high performance computer. To promote Cyberjaya as a global multimedia 
hub the state funded an animation project (www.saladin.tv)75 to promote the 
'global brand' of Cyberjaya. The 'Saladin project' is an animation series 
based on the life story of Salah AI-Din Yusuf Ibn Ayyub who united Muslims 
in a holy war during the 12th Century Crusades. Saladin is planned to market 
the 'MSC-Cyberjaya brand' to a worldwide audience by producing 'world-
class' intellectual property (IP). 
The goal of the project was to produce an animated feature film for 
worldwide cinema release that would serve as a branding tool for the MSC. 
This was to be bolstered by spin-off projects such as video games, mobile 
content, a comic book series, a children's storybook, original soundtrack, 
merchandising, and education programmes. ln.total it is planned the 'Saladin 
project' will create 31 original products for 'multimedia export' over a 5 year 
period, create 773 jobs, 240 new trainees and collaborations with 18 
different local companies (Research Interview: Saladin Director). After three 
years of planning, production began in 2006, and episodes are being made 
by Malaysians in collaboration with 'imported' foreign experts including an 
Australian Director. The contribution of the 'Saladin project' to the branding 
and promotion of the MSC can be summarised by the quote below from its 
director. 
750riginal plans that Saladin would be a feature film were shelved as it was decided an animation 
series would be more manageable. The series consists of 13 episodes each consisting of 22 minutes 
in length. The original plan had been to develop a feature animation but this was shelved after fears 
were voiced that the project would have been too ambitious. Now the animation series is being 
developed and the production team are still in the early stages of production. The entire production 
process will take 1 and a half to 2 years to complete. 
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'Malaysia isn't yet on the radar screen in terms of being a location. If Saladin 
can be successful, then other animators will ask: "Where it was made?"; 
"Malaysia"; "Where the hell is that?". So it will help to put Malaysia on the 
map, with Cyberjaya as the creative hub. If Saladin becomes an 
international success, if seen globally, and it becomes part of popular 
culture, then it could for sure. Success tends to drive success. Saladin is a 
visible thing, it is a piece of entertainment, so everybody can see it. 
Everyone can enjoy it. People know what the latest movies, are, but they 
don't know what is the latest technology, so that's how it is.' 
(Research Interview: Saladin Director, 2006) 
Saladin is promoted by MDEC as a model for collaboration between foreign 
expertise and local brainpower. The project employed a team of more than 
150 people and sets out to nurture Malaysian animators through exposure to 
production on an international project (Figure 25). Once completed, these 
animators would be encouraged to create their own start ups and 'galvanise 
the Malaysia Creative Industry through the coordination of local and 
international expertise' (Research Interview: Creative Multimedia Cluster). 
Therefore Saladin was imagined as both a focus of, and stimulus for the 
creative multimedia industry within Cyberjaya. It forms part of the ongoing 
MDEC strategy of what they refer to as "filling the pipes" with local content. 
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A HJSTORtOAL fig.me. from the Crusades. A team of enthusiastic and talented 
animatc)_rs . A .nationa.1 proj,ec:;t. 
Figure 25: Screenshot from Saladin Animation Series (Source: MDEC) 
At first glance the project appears to be a global marketing device to 
promote the MSC and celebrate Malay!)ia's a!)pirations of becoming a 
multimedia content hub. However, closer inspection suggests that the project 
functions as a scalar camouflage that masks underlying political agendas 
and tensions: between global aspirations and national. integrity; between 
competing conceptions of Malaysian national identity; anc;i diverging claims 
for cultural ownership of the MSC Malaysia project. Firstly, the project 
embodies Mahathir's calls for 'post-colonial resistance' heavily promoted at 
the launch of the MSC (Chapter 4). Mahathir .was keen that local content 
would act as a b1.1lwark against the potentially harmful effects of 
'Westernised' global cultures through content that may not be suitable for a 
Malaysian (majority Muslim) audience. Souchou (2001) notes, for example, 
how Mahathir's distrust of the Western media became a radical gesture by 
the colonised subject to demand its ex-colonial masters to answer their sins. 
The 'Saladin project' can therefore be interpreted as another public 
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spectacle exemplifying Mahathir's 'Malaysia Boleh' sloganeering. Malaysia 
could 'tell her own stories' (Research Interview: Head of MDEC SSd 
division) rather than import them from overseas. Pushing local content 
production would have the dual effect of emphasising the 'Malaysian-ness' of 
the MSC project and reasserting the states control over inward flows of 
g lobalisation. 
Secondly, the choice of an Islamic war hero to assert the MSC's global 
ambitions serves to reaffirm Malay hegemony politico-cultural and reflects 
the growing racialisation of national high-tech development in recent years. 
During the 2006-2007 fieldwork period, the MSC was increasingly caught up 
in the localised politics concerning Bumiputera participation in the I.T. 
economy. As of April 2007 there were a total of 1733 MSC status companies 
(MDEC 2007). Of these 326 were companies with a 30% or more 
Bumiputera equity share - the minimum requirement for private companies 
outside the MSC. Due to the perceived under-representation of Bumiputeras 
in the I.T. and multimedia sectors positive discrimination strategies have 
been promoted - under political pressure - to redress the balance and boost 
the overall number of Bumiputera I.T. companies in the MSC. MDEC has set 
up a new initiative (http://www.bumisme.coml) to promote entrepreneurialism 
amongst Bumiputera's within the ICT industry. This move encroached on 
government guarantees to companies that the MSC's special legal 
infrastructures would be exempt from labour laws affecting the rest of the 
country. Contrary to the rhetoric of embracing a 'free flow of knowledge 
workers' (The Star, 02.08.1996) the Bumisme ·initiative has endeavoured to 
promote specific ethnic groups and vested interests. 
Seen from below, the MSC is far from a politically neutral space, but rather is 
bound up in localised political issues. At the time of writing, a growing sense 
of Malay nationalism was exemplified by Young Turks within the ruling 
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UMNO-party, led by Khairy Jamaluddin76 who had repeatedly voiced public 
criticism of the MSC. Malay ultras argued that the MSC had served to 
undermine broader Bumiputera economic policies in the rest of the country 
(e.g. NEP) with its open labour laws and relaxed ownership regulations. In 
their eyes the MSC was in danger of creating an unregulated global space in 
which real growth is experienced by MNCs (including Chinese Malaysian, 
Hong Kong, and Singaporean capital), and where Chinese and Indian 
Malaysian participation has come at the expense of the Malays. Saladin was 
initiated to counter this criticism and reaffirm the 'Malay-ness' of the MSC 
vision. In the wake of rising ethno-nationalism directed at the MSC the 
Saladin story presented a heroic Muslim narrative that directly appeals to a 
Malay audience to valorise Bumiputera support for the MSC. 
Furthermore, the 'Saladin project' seeks to present a more acceptable image 
of Islam to a global audience. The project, though based on a historical 
context, is aimed at children and family audience. The animation series 
contains fictional everyday stories about Saladin which are unrelated to the 
historical events of war, conflict, and inter-religious strife. The project's goal 
is to promote an understanding about Islam via 'globally marketable' content. 
If successful it will serve to bolster Malaysia's claims to represent a 
moderate face of modern Islam. This is in line with Prime Minister Abdullah 
Badawi's promotion of 'Islam Hadhari' ('civilised Islam') as a progressive 
form of moderate Islam (Badawi 2008). In a post 9-11 world of extremism 
and growing lslamophobia Malaysia's self-positioning as a moderate Islamic 
state can be interpreted as a strategic measure to enhance global 'sticky-
ness'. This can serve to further bolster the MSC brand and appeal to a 
global companies increasingly factoring in 'political stability' on their list of 
locational requirements. 
76 Khairy Jamaluddin is the son-in-law to the Prime Minister and a controversial politician within 
UMNO. He currently holds the position of deputy chief of the UMNO youth which is an influential 
organisation in Malaysian politics linked to the ruling party. He has been labelled by Jeff Ooi, 
Malaysia's most read blogger, as a new 'Malay ultra' due to his ethno-nationalistic opinions. 
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In summary, the 'globally marketable' content that the MSC seeks to 
produce is contested and reappropriated across both local and global scales 
according to different power geometries. Globally, Saladin is symbolically 
positioned as a brand of global proportions and exemplary of 'Malaysia 
Boleh' aspirations to develop its own 'world-class' intellectual property. 
Saladin seeks to emulate the success of Japanese Manga, or Korean 
cinema which have achieved global successes. To fulfil this. ambition Saladin 
must 'go global' in order to promote the 'made in Malaysia' brand and 
support the state's MSC vision (Research Interview, Head of MDEC CMC 
division). As a promotional strategy, this will encourage foreign companies 
to relocate to Cyberjaya's 'Digital Media Zone', and in theory, enable 
synergies with local industry in the production of more global content. 
However, this content must of course be suitable for Malay-Muslim 
sensibilities. Nationally, Saladin is reworked through a narrative for 
promoting 'local' content and telling indigenous stories. This content is seen 
as a buffer against Western centric cultural flows (currently 80% of 
multimedia content is imported). The Islamic overtones in Saladin reassert 
the Malay-ness of the MSC vision in the face of public critiques from UMNO 
figures and Malay ethno-nationalists. 
Saladin can be interpreted as a symbol of ambition straddling two conflicting 
directions: inwards to the politically dominant but economically backward 
Malays, outwards to a global economy dominated by the West which 
Malaysian strived/struggled to join but also resist as the neo-colonial face of 
a new world order. The 'Saladin project' together with the promotion 
strategies highlighted in Chapter 4 (Mahathir's world tour, promotional 
events by MDEC) were symbolic events geared towards re-branding 
Cyberjaya as 'sticky place' across multiple scales to reaffirm the imagined 
links between Cyberjaya and multimedia innovation. These promotional 
strategies are not value free but are used to promote specific political 
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agendas by vested interests. They represent a transcultural discursive space 
where local and global cultures meet, collide, and create multiple 
disjunctures 
6.4.2. Asset Seeking or Plugging In? Material Strategies for Building a 
'Sticky Place' 
'The Malaysian government has spent billions of dollars creating the 
infrastructure here to make sure that when you talk about a world-class 
environment, you have it here in Cyberjaya.' 
(Research Interview: Head of MDEC SSO division) 
Despite political posturing and state attempts to reassert the 'Malaysian-
ness' of the MSC project, or hollow talk of promoting indigenous innovation 
and a new generation of Malaysian technopreneurs, the material preparation 
of Cyberjaya was driven by a simple economic reality: to attract foreign 
investment for the greater good. The material strategies for building 
Cyberjaya as a 'sticky place' followed three main mechanisms; 
environmental, legal and infrastructural. These provisions were produced in 
a specially differentiated extra-territorial urban enclave separated from the 
wider nation where global inflows of capital, people, and information could be 
encouraged on the one hand, but controlled on the other. This is a process 
akin to what Boyer (1992; 1996) describes as the 'Mini-Max' strategy 
whereby certain privatised, protected zones are promoted by local planners 
to maximise private gains at the expense of a collective good by minimising 
the maximum risks of doing business in a specific area. The classic example 
of this is in U.S. cities is the rise of 'Business Improvement Districts' (BIDs) 
which privatise city spaces and marginalise impoverished groups (e.g. the 
homeless) to promote economic development. 
Consequently, Cyberjaya is materially 'splintered' from its surrounding locale 
through the creation of a new fortified urbanism (gated communities, 
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corporate enclaves, self-enclosed campuses, techniques of surveillance and 
control), a new legal environment (no censorship, cyberlaws, freedom of 
ownership, freedom to source capital globally, relaxed labour laws}, and 
special infrastructures (fibre optic backbone, CCC, smart homes, schools 
etc). These strategies. have been mobilised by the state as asset seeking 
strategies for FDI; i.e. MNCs investing capital in foreign countries, buying 
extensive assets or building new factories. This is a process described by 
Greider (1997: 81) as follows: 
'When a multinational corporation seeks to shift production to low wage 
labour markets, a process of political bargaining ensues with governments 
competing for the new factories. Concessions are offered, deals are made, 
investment follows.' 
In the light of this the state strived to create the 'ideal conditions' for foreign 
direct investment. Firstly, the urban planning and design of Cyberjaya 
created a locale for value-added globalised work practices. Chapter 5 
discussed how utopian planning practices had the effect of creating a 
fortified suburb based on the garden city ideal. This was imagined to 
produce both a psychological space for innovation and a disciplined space 
dedicated to work practices. The resort style, business campuses of 
Cyberjaya were designed to appeal to the needs of MNCs. 
Secondly, in Cyberjaya the state re-scales its activities via new politico-legal 
frameworks to attract multinational capital and knowledge workers 
regardless of their ethnicity or nationality. As a consequence state 
interventionism through the NEP was, temporarily at least, halted in all of the 
MSC to promote transnational connections. The state has strived to create 
the conditions favourable to foreign direct investment, reproducing global 
conditions in the domestic market, and delivering workers to MNCs. In the 
1980s Mahathir resorted to state repression against labour union organisers 
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within the electronics industry to secure foreign investment in Malaysia. 
Strategies in the MSC have been (to date) less extreme, and focused on the 
'Bill of Guarantees'. These allow for unrestricted employment of local and 
foreign workers, exemption from local ownership requirements, the freedom 
to source capital globally, financial incentives for MSC companies including 
investment tax allowance, ten year tax exemption, government grants for 
R&D activities, exemption of duties on imports of multimedia equipment, 
special new laws on intellectual property, no censorship and provision of 
globally competitive telecommunications tariffs. According to these 
incentives, the state is 'forced' to adopt neoliberal creeds in their economic 
management of a new territorial space and undertake structural forms for 
deregulation and privatisation or otherwise be excluded from global 
investment capital. 
Thirdly, infrastructure became a 'strategic weapon' through which Cyberjaya 
is materially constructed as premium networked 'sticky space'. The provision 
of globe spanning, networked telecommunications infrastructures articulated 
with the new spatial-scalar imaginary of economic globalisation organised 
through networks, flows, and hubs (Chapter 3). Cyberjaya was wired with a 
2.5-10 Gigabits per second fibre optic backbone to plug into global data 
spaces, information flows, and communications. Infrastructures were 'sunk' 
into Cyberjaya with the goal to produce a strategic global node for 
'informationalised capitalism'. The high bandwidth connection allows for the 
transmission of high volumes of voice, data and video to ease collaboration 
between I.T. companies. These infrastructures function both as marketing 
tool frequently cited in promotional materials, and facilitate the offshore 
service economy. 
'If you look around at other areas like Puchong, Dengkill [surrounding 
areas]. These don't have this infrastructure. Here everything is ready. 
Basically if you want to come in, you can do this, just build the building, and 
you can come in. It has the fibre optic, it is linked to the CCC, then to the 
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LAN, the internet, so these are provided and make us unique. We can just 
hook you up to the network. Then on top of this on the BOG side, the Bill of 
Guarantees. This is promised by the government, these ten things, it is not 
given to any other places. It differentiates us from the others. Truly unique.' 
(Research Interview: Jaffrin, SH Technology) 
However, these networked infrastructures create a 'tunnel effect' (Graham 
and Marvin 2000) linking Cyberjaya to other intelligent spaces across the 
world, while deliberately excluding the national territory in between. 
'So from one building in Cyberjaya to access their branch in U.S. for 
example they will need a direct link from here to US, probably California. So 
we have the fibre underground, like submarine cables. The connection will 
enter Malaysia via the international gateway which is in Pahang. This comes 
in through submarine cable via fibre which can access anywhere in the 
world. If the company is getting data from Silicon Valley it comes through 
Pahang, then down to Cyberjaya. This is what the big companies demand 
these days. These are corporate networks, big business, so they need to be 
quick, reliable, and secure.' 
(Research Interview: Zaid, SH Technology) 
Firewalled fibre optic networks create privatised telecommunications tunnels 
that allow direct firm to firm transactions, traversing the local to facilitate 
anytime global connections. As Sassen (2000; 2001 c) observes the 
emergence of networked 'sub-economies' cutting across borders and inter-
connecting corporations complicates any notion of a 'smooth' digital 
economy or universal cyberspace. ICTs allow corporations to operate 
globally and 'offshore' their back-office operations to less economically 
developed countries at a reduced cost. The embeddedness of these 
transactions entails the formation of large concentrations of infrastructure at 
strategic points across the globe that intersects and disregards broader 
national economies. Here the hierarchy that exists between core and 
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peripheral economies is replayed through the digital architecture of global 
informational hubs, and bypassed places. Malaysia becomes a host space 
through which transnational information flows traverse to and from specific 
strategic points but add little value. The 'new economy' that facilitates key 
sectors within the global economy such as the global outsourcing industry 
occurs through digital private networks that bear little relation to the public 
internet. 
The 'enclave effect' is further supported by redundancies on network 
provision, electricity supply, and water supply. These provisions are viewed 
as essential prerequisites as MNCs demand guarantees in terms of supply 
and network security. In an age where global corporations are increasingly 
aware of the threats of terrorism, and the perceived vulnerability of global 
cities as business hubs, Cyberjaya offers a sanctuary for global data and 
core service operations. It has the twin advantages of being a disconnected 
urban space but highly connected through networked infrastructures. In the 
event of a mass power failure in Malaysia, Cyberjaya will still be servicing 
the global economy 24 hours a day to meet the needs of global capital. The 
above strategies were designed to position Cyberjaya as regional hub for I.T. 
and multimedia industries through the creation of a climate with 'the 
socioeconomic assets, innovative capacities, technological infrastructures, 
specialised skills, institutional networks, and sociocultural milieu upon which 
leading sectors of transnational capital depend' (Brenner 2004: 19). 
6.5. Cyberjaya as a 'Slippery Space' 
'Do we seriously .think that leading I.T. companies will transfer their research 
bases out of the U.S. and Japan into Malaysia? Or will the MSC end up as 
just another free trade zone for low end multimedia products?' 
(A/iran Monthly, May Issue 1997) 
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In Cyberjaya, a concentration on spectacle and image had short-term 
political gains but masks the underlying condition of Cyberjaya as 'slippery 
space'. Beneath the hype of place promoting Cyberjaya as a 'multimedia 
utopia' it has become a global hub for offshore back-office, call centre, and 
data centre activities. Cyberjaya forms one of a number of newly constituted 
remote spaces in a globalising world; the other side of the geographical coin 
from the global 'command and control' centres like Silicon Valley. Unlike the 
'sticky places' which drive global economic flows Cyberjaya is servicing them 
by managing data, customer service and accounts. Mirroring the spatial 
redistribution of electronics manufacturing, the back-office operations of 
MNCs have travelled around the world seeking out low cost labour at the 
geographical periphery of the global economy (i.e. developing world). 
Malaysia has openly embraced these inward flows of FDI both historically to 
boost export manufacture capability and today in its quest to promote a 
domestic high-tech sector. 
Rather than invoke the power of MNCs in economic globalisation, the 
empirical enquiry sought to recover the material conditions, and crucially, the 
human geographies of these emerging 'slippery spaces'. In 
reconceptualising Cyberjaya as 'slippery space' the chapter seeks to do two 
things. Firstly, to highlight the disjuncture in the discursive construction of 
Cyberjaya as a 'sticky place' juxtaposed to its development as back-office 
hub. Secondly, to examine everyday practices in these globalised live/work 
spaces through ethnographic accounts with residents in Cyberjaya and staff 
within MNCs (Chapter 7). 
6.5.1. Building a Cargo Cult: Cyberjaya and the Flawed Logic of 
Excess 
Like Mahathir's other trademark mega-projects, Cyberjaya sought the 
headline, positioning itself as the most cyber, high-tech, siliconised, 
expensive, biggest, cutting edge, state-of-the-art technopole in the world. 
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The discursive construction of Cyberjaya and its material preparation was 
based on excessive hype and ambition. 
Firstly, the corporate headquarters, resort urbanism and elite premium 
spaces of Cyberjaya were built on an excess of cheap capital, labour and the 
provision of a vast array of financial incentives for foreign companies (RM 5 
billion spent by the state infrastructure alone). These strategies were to 
entice the regional headquarters of MNCs, the R&D divisions of global I.T. 
companies, and create a global hub for multimedia content creation and 
production. In the first five years of roll-out utopian MSC Malaysia branding 
strategies were almost limitless in their quest to attract capital and mobilise 
investment. Talk was of a space being prepared especially for economic 
dynamism, the creation of new products, and laboratories for innovation. 
However, ten years on from the hype, this utopian vision resembles a 
Malaysian high-tech fantasy. 
The construction of Cyberjaya as 'sticky place' resembles something akin to 
a 'cargo cult' waiting for a payload that never comes.77 This was based on 
excessive hope that Cyberjaya could become a new global hub and that 
Malaysia would create a new generation of start up multimedia companies. 
'So we are looking to the creation of another Yahoo, or another Google. This 
is what we are pushing for sure. Why can't we? I think we are talking about 
creating a company which can dwarf the GOP of a country.' 
(Research Interview: Head of MSC Relations Unit, Multimedia University) 
77 The original cargo cults came to prominence during the period of the Second World War when 
native islanders in Polynesia encountered western artefacts dropped into the jungle for Allied soldiers 
as rations. Items such as Coca Cola bottles, radio transmitters, medicine, clothing, and basic tools 
were sources of fascination amongst tribes which had been previously completely untouched by 
western civilisation. The most famous example was from the islanders of Tanna located in the South 
Pacific. During this period, islanders were used as guides by invading forces and also worked to clear 
the jungle and build camps. The islanders were awestruck by solider's clothing, machinery and 
technologies. After the war the cargo drops stopped. However, in some cases tribes built mock air 
strips in the hope that it would attract more cargo to be dropped on their islands. Islanders would paint 
their bodies in the style of an American soldier and perform rituals which they thought would increase 
the likelihood of planes coming into land and dropping more cargo. 
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In this way, the state envisaged Cyberjaya as a virtual "landing strip" 
prepared for foreign capital, MNCs and labour to "land" in Malaysian territory. 
The 'MSC architects' worship the "gods" of Silicon Valley and their 
mythology plays heavily on the discursive construction of Cyberjaya as 
would-be innovative hub. Mythic tales of Bill Gates and a generation of 
Silicon Valley start ups turning into global players making overnight 
millionaires have inspired the 'leapfrog logic' of 'Wawasan 2020'. While their 
companies are transnational the Silicon Valley godfathers have become 
transcendental figures in the 'new economy' discourse. The Western 
artefacts worshipped in the MSC are MNCs, silicon chips, personal 
computers, software applications. Cyberjaya wanted to create its own 
mythology by becoming a new innovative milieu, like Silicon Valley, but 
better. However, like cargo cult members in the South Pacific the 'MSC 
architects' are waiting for planes that never came. The elite knowledge 
workers decided not to pack up and leave their corporate campuses in Palo 
Alto behind and exchange the Californian sun for the tropical heat of 
Malaysia. 
Frustrated by this lack of progress Mahathir tried to literally transplant an 
entire R&D complex to Cyberjaya, with now disastrous effects. lnvent-Q-
Jaya is not a company mentioned in marketing brochures for the MSC. Dr. 
Sadeg Mustafa, a Berkeley University graduate, was a personal friend of Dr. 
Mahathir's. His company in the USA, named Reveo Inc, had a track record 
of 200 patents, and another 200 pending. Mahathir had visited the company 
in New York in 2002 and was so impressed with the work being undertaken 
that he invited Dr. Sadeg to relocate to Malaysia. He fitted the bill for 
everything that Mahathir strived to create in Malaysians: a Muslim 
entrepreneur, a technical expert, 'waving the Islam flag' (Research Interview: 
Editor, NetValue Magazine). Mahathir had become increasingly frustrated by 
the lack of indigenous R&D coming out of Cyberjaya so financial incentives 
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were offered to tempt Dr. Sadegs' company to relocate to Cyberjaya. lnvent-
Q-Jaya was created as a joint venture between the Malaysian government 
and Reveo Inc. In return, lnvent-Q-Jaya would offer frontier technologies, 
expertise, and know how. In theory patents would be transferred to Malaysia 
and open the possibility for future spin-offs to emerge. This was anticipated 
to be the start of developing a 'Made in Malaysia' brand of high value-added 
products. 
However, when the patents were not forthcoming the government accused 
Dr. Sadeg of going back on promises made to the government. 
Subsequently the companies' bank accounts were frozen and a winding up 
petition filed against lnvent-Q-Jaya over a RM 242 million 'debt' owed to the 
Malaysian Government. There were allegations from the Malaysian 
government that Dr. Sadeg unlawfully transferred RM 50 million from lnvent-
Q-Jaya to his company in America. At the time of writing court proceedings 
are ongoing between the two parties involving numerous allegations and 
counter allegations. The merits of the case are not important here but rather 
what is interesting are the desperate measures which the state went to in 
order to promote research and development activities in Malaysia. This 
ultimately failed, and with it any hopes that Cyberjaya had of replicating even 
a small slice of the Silicon Valley "effect". Now, the annual rituals of lAP 
meetings, self-congratulatory progress reports are nothing but an empty 
mirage of 'information age' hype. 
Secondly, excess is based on the abandoned projects which were halted as 
money ran out or ambition simply overtook achievable goals in Cyberjaya. 
As utopianism rapidly overtook realism projects escalated on an excess diet 
of hype, expectation and often blind futurology. In the MSC projects were left 
half finished or simply abandoned as utopian visions were incompatible with 
material constraints. Cyberjaya is awash with half finished roads that lead 
nowhere in particular that have been constructed with 'future potential 
262 
development in mind' (Research Interview: Team Manager, MDEC 
Cybercities Division). 
Excess was exemplified in the case of E-Village (Entertainment Village) 
which was planned, and built to become a premier hub for multimedia 
production in Asia-Pacific. E-Village was promoted via extravagant 
marketing campaigns and the project was launched with a spectacular 
fanfare (predictably billed as "Southeast Asia's answer to Hollywood"). 
Costing some RM 3 billion ($789.5 million) and covering 485 hectares E-
Village was located in a sleepy rural backwater within the MSC called 
Dengkil. The vast complex contains Asia's largest sound stage, a virtual 
studio for animation production and there are plans for eight studios and 
other post-production complexes plus a training academy. Other than the 
'Studio Precinct', two further phases involved the construction of theme 
parks, convention centres, health farms and shopping complexes. The 
opening ceremony drew in Hong Kong movie star Jackie Chan and a host of 
local 'celebrities' paraded by the government as constitutive of international 
approval for the project. E-Village was heralded by Mahathir as a new 'field 
of dreams' (Asiaweek Magazine, 17.08.2001) and represents yet another 
aspirationallandscape in the MSC. 
'For Malaysia and Malaysians this must easily be one of the more 
momentous occasions for us, as we stand here in the Sound Studio in E-
Village to signify the beginning of an exciting new entertainment era and 
industry for our country. The development of E-Village and particularly the · 
virtual and Sound Studios clearly demonstrates our ability to keep up with, if 
not be ahead, of a burgeoning IT industry and growing market.' 
(Mahathir 2000) 
The vision for E-Village mixed Disney, Silicon Valley and Hollywood in one 
fantasy cocktail for urban planning. It is not surprising that the plan failed 
with catastrophic effects and became yet another 'slippery space' in the 
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MSC. It is unclear why the 'MSC architects' thought that Hollywood or Asian 
film industries (India, Taiwan, Hong Kong, or even Thailand) would relocate 
production to an otherwise disconnected spatial milieu far from the city. 
Furthermore, the Malaysian film industry operates on a low budget and is not 
large enough to support the E-Village project. The offer of cheap production 
overheads, government support, and a good pool of local talent was not 
enough to persuade companies that E-Village would be "where it's at". 
The project was a joint venture between the Malaysian government and a 
local property tycoon Ibrahim Abdul Ghaffar. His company, Datuk Keramat 
holdings (DKH) was well connected to Mahathir and awarded the contract to 
develop E-VIIIage- even though questions were being raised about whether 
Ibrahim had sufficient expertise or finance to carry the project off (Asiaweek 
Magazine, 17.08.2001 ). The DKH group owns London's Leavesden studies, 
where Star Wars: Episode 1 - the Phantom Menace was made. The 
company planned to was to transfer expertise from Leavesden to E-Village, 
but following a power struggle Ibrahim was removed from the DKH board. 
Despite this MDEC decided to give the project to Ibrahim to go it alone even 
though he no longer had access to Leavesden's know how. His company 
quickly ran short of cash and MDEC was left to find new investors to restart 
a scaled down version of the development. When no investors could be 
found, just months after the initial phase of construction in May 2000 the 
project ground to a halt. 
Upon visiting the E-Village site during fieldwork in 2006 it was clear that the 
project that had been disbanded with nobody present except two security 
guards stationed at its 'closed off' entrance. 
'After several hours of searching for a place that has been all but wiped off 
the map, and armed with some directions from a critical Malaysian journalist 
I finally made it to the site of the once hyped E-Village. What is abundantly 
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clear on first viewing is the project has been abandoned. A project which 
once sprung up in the middle of the jungle has now been reclaimed by the 
jungle.' 
(Field Diary extract, 18.09.2006) 
It is highly probable that E-Village will never see the light of day again since 
its buildings have run into a state of disrepair and flooding has overtaken 
parts of it. 
'We don't talk about E-Village anymore. It is like an evil stepchild and it was 
terminated. The content industry can't be put in one location. That is why the 
rest of the MSC is being rolled out with more cybercities and cyber-centres 
so it is not location centric. This is the same with Creative Multimedia 
Cluster. We want to create companies coming up, regardless of location. 
Creative industries cannot be tied to locations. We want to see expansion 
around the regions.' 
(Research Interview: Head of Creative Multimedia Cluster) 
While critics would argue that the entire MSC concept has been a giant white 
elephant, E-Village is the most public manifestation of this claim. It 
represents a highly embarrassing failure for the Malaysian government and 
sums up the blind faith which was invested in mega-projects during the 
Mahathir era. It represents the archetypal 'slippery place' where foreign 
studios were invited to come and produce content but failed to arrive. 
6.5.2. Servicing a World Elsewhere? Becoming a Global Back-Office 
Hub 
Behind the urban boosterism of creating a "landing strip" for global capital 
which, combined with local enterprise was to become a dynamic 'sticky 
place' for multimedia production and innovation, is an alternative 
development history to Cyberjaya. Contrary to the logic of Silicon Valley 
replication, Cyberjaya has become a 'slippery space'- a physically splintered 
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urbanism locked together in competition over the spoils of economic 
decentralisation. Ultimately MNCs chose not to speculate on something 
which might not exist - the El Dorado of "Silicon Valley Asia" - and instead 
Cyberjaya has been quickly re-branded in a new inter-urban competition to 
become a globally visible location for back-office processes and SSO 
industries. In turn, financial incentives, telecommunications infrastructures, 
tax-breaks, a docile, often non-unionised workforce have become carrots for 
luring these industries into national spaces. 
The shift of SSO industries and back-office work offshore appears to be a 
newer version of the export processing model of industrialisation embraced 
throughout much of Asia from the 1970s onwards in the guise of offshore 
branch plants for electronics manufacturing and assembly. Echoing earlier 
rounds of international competition, economic survival drew the state to re-
brand Cyberjaya as back-office hub, driven by fears that, by staying out of 
the game, Malaysia would have been left to fester at the edge of the global 
economic system. MDEC is now actively re-branding Cyberjaya as Asia-
Pacific's 'premier outsourcing hub' for MNCs. These claims were buoyed 
when Malaysia was voted third in a list of global outsourcing and shared 
services locations in a survey by consultants AT Kearney (2005) -
immediately behind China and India - due to her competitive cost structures, 
developed infrastructure and political stability. The results of the report were 
widely circulated in MSC promotional materials and featured in the 
international press as evidence of the success of this new industry in 
Malaysia (Figure 26). 
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Figure 26: 'Offshore Attractiveness' Index (Source: AT Kearney) 
There are 120 MSC status companies involved in SSO, accounting for 40% 
of all MSC jobs (Badawi 2006), with the majority choosing Cyberjaya as their 
regional base. Cyberj_aya has become a hub for four main types of back-
office operations. Firstly, Cyberjaya contains the global service :delivery 
centres for large global companies looking for a regional base or global and 
regional service deliver centres for MNCs including Shell I.T. International 
(global I.T. helpdesk), HSBC (global electronic data processing), DELL 
(global service centre), DHL (Asia-Pacific I.T. services), IBM (Asia'-Paclfic 
customer support). Secondly; global SSO companies such as EDS (USA), 
Satyam (India) and ACS (USA) provide business ·process support services 
for domestic and MNCs. Thirdly, a number of emerging Malaysian SSO 
companies provide multilingual contact centres (Scicom, Vsource), I.T. 
support and management services (EA-CAP) and SSO services for foreign. 
and domestic companies (Vantage Point) . Fourthly, the need for secure, 
peripheral, isolated locations to house the web servers, data storage 
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facilities of global corporations has given rise to Cyberjaya's pre-eminence 
as a data centre hub (e.g. CSF, BMW). 
The growth of Cyberjaya is symptomatic of a national boom in the SSO 
industry with Malaysia home to an estimated 320 contact centres with over 
12,000 employees clustered around financial services, telecommunications 
and the I.T. sectors (Ng and Mitter 2005). The total revenue for these 
centres grew from RM 28.5 million in 1999 to RM 43.4 million in 2004, and is 
projected to increase to RM 185.5 million by 2007. With falling technology 
cost barriers by 2010 the expected job market for these industries is 
expected to grow to 100,000 and account for around 10% of new jobs in the 
technology sector (The Edge Magazine, 08.05.2006). To capitalise on the 
growth of the industry the state has relaxed its requirements that companies 
moving into the MSC should: (1) be a provider or heavy user of multimedia 
products and services; (2) employ a substantial number of knowledge 
workers, and (3) transfer technology, or knowledge, to Malaysia or otherwise 
contribute to the development of the MSC and the Malaysian economy. 
There is therefore a growing acceptance that Cyberjaya is becoming 
Malaysia's 'new Bangalore' rather than Silicon Valley. For example, a piece 
in The Star (20.09.2006) ran under the headline that Cyberjaya was 'virtually 
there' in its quest to overtake Bangalore's crown as the number one global 
offshore service delivery centre for MNCs. Ten years on from imitating 
Silicon Valley as the blueprint for technopole planning the state's discursive 
positioning of Cyberjaya has shifted. Cyberjaya version 1.0 failed to replicate 
Silicon Valley but Cyberjaya version 2.0 is experiencing modest success as 
a back-office hub. Now Cyberjaya is rated in numerous 'offshore 
attractiveness' indexes by management consultants (e.g. McKinsey, AT 
Kearney, Frost and Sullivan) and repositioned in an urban hierarchy of 
competing SSO hubs in the region that comprises not just Bangalore but 
also Chennai, Hyderabad, Pune, and Kolkata in India; Cebu City in the 
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Philippines; Ho Chi Minh City in Vietnam; and Colombo in Sri Lanka 
(Services 2008). As a consequence, the city is at the forefront of efforts to 
promote Malaysia's emerging global visibility as a back-office location with 
its abundant supply of cheap, multilingual, non-unionised, skilled labour. The 
dislocation of this recent development - an ironic reversal of Mahathir's 'there 
is no alternative' sloganeering (Chapter 4)- vis-a-vis the promotional rhetoric 
of Asia's Silicon Valley has been glossed over by the state. 
'I don't think it will become a content hub, now you have many back-office 
operations there. Now most companies do this, they need a hub, and a 
space, and the infrastructure. These companies need to put up a building 
with 2000 people and need lots of space. They need a greenfield site, 
whereas content developers don't need this. They are different they need 
other things. It wasn't the way we planned it, but now our competitive 
advantage is with SSO, and the back-offices so we have to go with this, and 
make the most of the investment.' 
(Research Interview: CAD-C Manager, MDEC Creative Multimedia Cluster) 
The failure of Cyberjaya to become a genuine R&D hub is down to an 
oversight in the most important aspect of R&D culture - a high quality skill 
base. Despite the establishment of MMU, at the time of the MSC launch 
Malaysia had a shortfall of 35,000 to 40,000 'expert workers' required to 
make the MSC work (Businessweek, 01.09.1997). Compare this with India 
which produces two million university graduates per year, 80% of whom are 
English speaking (The Economist, 13.12.2003). There are also more I.T. 
engineers in Bangalore (150,000) than in Silicon Valley (120,000). While 
Malaysian graduates with engineering Masters cost one fourth of those in 
the U.S. the Indian graduates in Bangalore's top universities were twice as 
cheap as their Malaysian counterparts (Greider 1997). There is also a 
shortage of platform professionals such as Java programmers, Cisco experts 
and SAP consultants. Furthermore, the legacy of a protectionist, closed 
economy only now 'opening' to global forces has had a negative impact on 
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development. The government still has reservations about letting so many 
(non-Muslim) foreigners coming into the country despite the MSC's claims to 
become a global centre. One solution was to encourage the gradual return of 
Malaysian expatriates to work in Malaysia (the "brain gain" effect), but there 
was little tangible progress. 78 
It was perhaps inevitable that Malaysia's low cost, English speaking 
workforce would be ideally suited to call centre and service delivery 
operations. MDEC has tasked a specific Shared Services and Outsourcing 
Team (SSO) to attract more companies in a bid to cement Cyberjaya's 
reputation as a new 'global service centre hub'. Cyberjaya has sought to 
carve out its own niche in the global hierarchy of 'slippery space' locations 
for value-added back-office operations aimed at premium customer to 
business, business to business operations, and internal support (knowledge 
process outsourcing) - this is what MDEC terms 'high value outsourcing 
activities'. For example, several MNCs have offshored their entire back-office 
support operations to Cyberjaya (e.g. Shell, BMW). Added to this call centres 
in Cyberjaya are more focused on premium customers on high value tariffs 
serviced by specialised call centres where customer service is more 
personalised, and waiting times are quicker (e.g. Nokia). 
MDEC has been quick to realise that Cyberjaya cannot compete with China 
or India in terms of volume or costs (the cost per transaction is 54 cents for 
Malaysia, compared to 53 cents for China and just 29 cents for India (Ng and 
Mitter 2005). Though Malaysia's cultural proximity to the two countries is 
emphasised in the multicultural marketing for the MSC. 
'Malaysia has a multicultural and multi-religious population of 26 
million, the result of a colourful history. Three main races - Malay, 
78 Since 2001 estimates suggest that just 300 Malaysian technical experts have returned. Many 
Malaysians overseas have been discouraged to return by the low wages on offer by working in 
Malaysian universities or public sector bodies (The Star, 23.03.2006). 
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Chinese and Indian - make up the largest segments of the 
population. Because of its multicultural mix, most Malaysians are 
multilingual, and most speak at least two languages.' 
(www.msc.com.my, accessed 26-07-2007) 
Malaysia's multilingual workforce seeks to attract specialised offshore 
services in order to 'move up the value chain' and differentiate the location 
from transactional call centres of Hyderabad or Bangalore servicing Western 
banking, finance, and insurance companies. Although as previously 
highlighted, this multicultural rescripting of national identity is a superficial 
measure which deflects attention from Mahathir's desire to promote science 
and technology primarily amongst the Malays as set out in his book on the 
'Malay Dilemma' (1970). 
The growth of the back-office industry confirms Cyberjaya's peripheral status 
on the edge of the global economy - 'servicing a world elsewhere'. Offshore 
locations are chosen solely to provide cost effective inputs for the corporate 
headquarters of the source nation. The infrastructure provisions have been 
complicit in sealing Cyberjaya's fate as a service centre. Fibre optic links to 
corporate headquarters in Europe, North America and Asia Pacific and 
redundancies on power, water, telecommunications facilitates global 
connectivity 24 hours a day, 365 days a year. These facilities are essential 
for offshore enterprises that are reliant on being connected electronically to 
their core operations. The urban isolation of Cyberjaya has been to the 
advantage of data centre and disaster recovery operations which are eager 
to locate in secure locations around from their core operations in urban 
centres. Furthermore, open spaces for development allow for large 
complexes to house 1 ,000 to 2,000 workers handling customer and business 
support operations. 
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Another major locational advantage for SSO industries is the ability to cover 
multiple time zones (Figure 27). In the promotional materials for MDEC's 
SSO cluster Cyberjaya's temporal position is privileged over its actual 
geographical location due its ability to seamlessly service MNCs round-the-
clock. Cyberjaya is 7 hours from Europe, or 13 from the USA which means 
when Cyberjaya is online the rest of the world is offline. So the back-office 
processing can take place 'out of hours' to ensure work tasks are completed 
by the following working day. This process is known as the 'follow the sun' 
system where teams work during extended local business hours and assign 
or electronically hand off tasks at the end of their day to teams (at another 
location) that are just starting their day, effectively yielding a 24 hour 
development clock. IBM has been a pioneer in this method and their 
Cyberjaya contact centre is structured along these lines. This is taken one 
step further in HSBC Cyberjaya which operates a 36 hour shift in its 
electronic data processing centre to cover working practices across all three 
major time zones (3 times 12 hour shifts corresponding to Europe, North 
America and Asia-Pacific). Companies in Cyberjaya work on a round-the-
clock basis because many are servicing the global corporate operations 
across all time zones (e.g. Shell, DHL, HSBC). This, as Crang (2007: 72) 
notes, is one step closer to the corporate dream of using geography so work 
'can be done around the globe, each worker sending off material to be 
processed by another while the sender is absent, to be awaiting him or her, 
completed, upon his or her return.' 
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Figure 27: Position of Malaysia in World Time Zones (Source: Gartner 
Consulting) 
In the case of P2i0nline is an outsourcing company serv1c1ng North 
American Newspaper corporations. The company employs 130 local staff 
and provides a classic example of how Cyberjaya's SSO companies work 
round-the-clock to service global economic flows. P2i0nline headquarters is 
located in Pennsylvania, USA and the company has offices throughout North 
America. The Cyberjaya office is the only offshore operation in the company 
and was chosen due to its low costs, good level of English within the local 
workforce. Before the company opened the Cyberjaya branch in 2001 there 
was a similar office located in Yorkshire, England. However, this office was 
closed due to rising costs and it was decided that an offshore branch should 
be opened in Asia. Numerous locations were discussed but India was ruled 
out due to perceived 'saturation' in the market in 2001. Cyberjaya was seen 
as a good location partly due to its temporal position 13 hours in front of New 
York, 16 hours for Los Angeles. 
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The company converts newspaper content from Los Angeles Times and 
New York Times into internet acc~ssible content for their online editions. The 
newspapers 'dump' content with P2i0nline at the end of their working day, 
the files are processed and converted from text to PDF files and sent back to 
host servers in the USA for them to host it on their websites by the next 
morning. The company works on a 24/7 basis with two teams covering daily 
12 hour shifts. For example, one shift will cover when the period when the 
New York Times (10 pm Malaysia time) and Los Angeles Times (1am 
Malaysia time) come 'online' in the morning. These will be processed during 
the Malaysian evening and ready to be sent back to the offices by the 
following working day in the USA. Another team will be on hand to pick up 
work at the end of working day at 5pm in New York (6 am Malaysia time) 
and Los Angeles (9am Malaysia time). 
24/7 working to service overseas markets is symptomatic of the process of 
'colonisation by time' (Adam 2002) whereby SSO industries follow the 
hegemonic beat of a time zone elsewhere. For example, in the entrance to 
Shell I.T. in Cyberjaya there is a display of 'global time zones' denoting the 
locations of other Shell offices around the globe. This includes Houston, The 
Hague, London, New York, and Bangalore. The display can be read in two 
ways. Firstly, the row of clocks presents 'a smooth working global economy, 
held back only by time zones, and a software operation which seamlessly 
manages a variety of transnational connections' (O'Riain 2004: 16). The 
display symbolises 'friction free capitalism' (Gates 1995) transcending place 
and distance integrating planetary transactions 'anytime/anywhere'. 
Secondly, paradoxically, the display merely reaffirms Cyberjaya's status on 
the periphery of the imagined and actual grids of global time zones. 
Cyberjaya functions as a night zone in the temporal economy of outsourced, 
peripheral processing activities. While back-office operations are conducted 
on a 24/7 rolling shift basis many SSO companies do the bulk of their work 
during the night shift. Cyberjaya's workers come online during the night-time 
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hours in order to service these economies and ensure that when the staff of 
offices in New York, The Hague, or London come online tasks have been 
completed in Malaysia. 
Time becomes a resource that is open to commodification that is controlled 
by the interests of capitalism and MNCs who require synchronous 24/7 
servicing of their back end, low value-added operations. The temporal gap 
between Cyberjaya and the latter is seen as an advantage to allow 
Cyberjaya to plug into global flows during the 'night shift' to service the 
global economy (as seen with the example of P2i0nline). While international 
companies have their transactions embedded in the real-time of a global 
24/7 always on global informational economy, time for local workers is still 
very much embedded in localised ·social contexts. As following chapter 
explores, this affects family relationships, health, and everyday living 
practices in Cyberjaya. Workers on the night shifts are detached many social 
spaces which only function during daytime hours when many workers are 
catching up on their sleep. Servicing a 'space of flows' often serves to 
disrupt the relationships between the temporal-social rhythms of Cyberjaya 
and those of the workplace. 
While Cyberjaya's back-offices highlights the immobility of time in the 
capitalist system. There are also points to be made concerning the flawed 
nature of 'anytime/anywhere' 'new economy' discourses. The increasing 
sophistication of global telecommunications networks across space has not 
created a kind of 'placeless globalism' (Parks 2004) in which all capital is 
necessarily footloose and production locations equally substitutable. This 
has not resulted in MNCs relocating their operations to absolutely anywhere 
where there is a pool of untapped cheap labour. These 'new economy' 
myths have been prone to a form of 'economism' (Pratt 2000) where it is 
assumed that economic factors are the only consideration in location. If this 
were the case then surely Africa would be the dominant global hub for SSO 
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activities in the global economy? Despite predictions regarding a 'weightless 
economy' (Leadbeater 1999) leading to cost free production or electronic 
commerce, locality is still important in the global economic system. While 
P2i0nline can do its telework anytime it cannot do it anywhere. 
Decentralisation along the lines of the 'new international division of labour' is 
leading to an increasingly embedded global economy. While capital has 
become increasingly volatile, transnational in nature it touches down in 
strategic places, where territory offers the best scope for creating value for 
capital - what McKay (2001) calls 'neoliberal localisation' . 
'Global integration leads to a concentration of power and control and, thus, 
to the rise of centres. Although this process is transnational, it is spatially 
anchored at particular places that are located within major cities or 
metropolises.' 
(Berner 1997: 99) 
Cyberjaya's emergence as a back-office hub demonstrates that while SSO 
industries embody 'distance-shrinking technologies' they are drawn to, and 
rooted in, very real places necessitated by the search for material 
infrastructures and human capital. 
'Thus, although technological developments at the heart of call centre 
operations render them relatively "footloose" in locational terms, the search 
for specific labour supply characteristics and the need to be close to existing 
concentrations of allied activity and premises make certain areas more 
attractive than others.' 
(Bristow et al. 2000: 512) 
This reflects the economic reality of FDI asset seeking which is still 
concentrated in around 20 countries, few of which have shown significant 
growth over the past 30 years (Sussman 1998). SSO industries prefer low 
cost politically stable locations in which the population speaks English to a 
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level required for the global back-office. Call centres increasingly rely on 
language, communication skills, cultural knowledge and I.T. infrastructures 
to guarantee customer service quality. As the quotes below from MSC 
companies suggests, Malaysia was seen as a place that 'fits the bill' for 
back-office operations. Cyberjaya offered an attractive package for these 
types of operations compared to other potential back-office hubs in India, or 
elsewhere in Southeast Asia. In short, contrary to the globalisation speak 
highlighted in Chapter 3 geography still matters. This is highlighted in the 
following quotes from MSC status company executives which highlight how 
multinational capital has become spatially embedded at strategic sites. 
'We looked at a whole range of countries in that region (Asia-Pacific), and 
the criteria they set up was that it had to be stable and peaceful, and 
whatever. It had to be a place where we already had a presence, to make it 
easier to set up. It had to have the right quality of people and it must be cost 
effective. So they quickly ruled out Australia and New Zealand, because 
costs wise too high. They looked at other places like Singapore, China, 
Japan, and Hong Kong. Singapore wasn't good enough for the pool of 
talent, China is has problems and a lot of politics. Japan was too expensive. 
Hong Kong the same. The English also not good. We sub-edit the material 
here, so the level of English has to be at editor standard for Australia or UK. 
So it must be good. So with Malaysia we felt we could find a) the right level 
for people and b) the government was willing to sponsor a lot of it, and 
provide a lot of help, like tax benefits. The government painted a good 
picture for Cyberjaya. We felt geographically it was central, connected in 
terms of telecommunications and politically stable. Also the labour costs, 
while not the cheapest, they were for sure competitive.' 
(Research Interview: Country Manager, WoltersKiuwer) 
'Don't come here if you want to hire 10,000 people for a call centre. If you 
need this go to India. For a couple of thousand, it has its own advantages 
here. I think this can be a good thing. Malaysia is multilingual, so you can do 
this from Malaysia, you also have much better physical infrastructure here. 
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The government support is here. India and China they are taking off, but its 
unplanned. They have a massive population. Malaysian doesn't have one 
billion people, so it just needs to keep in the top 5 locations for this kind of 
activity, and build the ecosystem. Cyberjaya can coexist with its competitors. 
It doesn't need to fight the giants, just to play along with them. You can't 
compare Malaysia to these countries. Malaysia needs to learn from them 
and strive to get business from them.' 
(Research Interview: Country Manager, Satyam) 
While Cyberjaya has become a hub of sorts for SSO industries its 'sticky-
ness' is qualitatively different from a traditional 'innovative milieu' where 
companies, universities, and people are tied together through strong bonds 
of 'institutional thickness'. Companies are ingrained in the fabric of traditional 
innovative milieu through recursive educational networks, career linkages, 
and the mutual sharing of ideas (as found in Silicon Valley). 
Empirical research found this to be extremely limited, or non-existent, in 
Cyberjaya with forward and backward linkages to the local economy 
minimal. For example, joint ventures in Cyberjaya were supply dominated, 
labour intensive, and took advantage of the low cost skills provided by the 
local labour market (e.g. Fujistu Cyberjaya). Such arrangements were 
invariably mobilised to enhance market entry for technology suppliers than to 
promote the technological capability development of host countries. The 
failure to produce innovative capacities in Malaysia can be partly attributed 
to a historical legacy of 'export-oriented' industrialisation whereby foreign 
companies used Malaysia as an offshore manufacturing base. As Malairaja 
and Zawdie (2004) observe, despite 40 years of Malaysian industrialisation, 
as one of the leading recipients of FDI in the world, there has been virtually 
no technology transfer to indigenous companies. The lack of industrial 
innovation has resulted from inefficient technology transfer agreements, the 
weak bargaining positioning of the state, few backward economic linkages 
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from FDI, and inherent problems of learning and skill development to 
prepare local companies for the move up the value chain. 
The back-office operations of MNCs function as economic islands. In 
interview with the MSC companies, no evidence was found of cross flows of 
collaboration, information exchange or inter-company communication. 
Although MDEC organised monthly meetings between companies these 
were addressed at tackling wider community issues in Cyberjaya ranging 
from provision of car parks to negotiations about bandwidth. In back-offices 
there is no need for cross-fertilisation when companies are engaged in fairly 
rudimentary service oriented functions and vertically integrated with the 
wider company at large. Alongside infrastructure the main local input these 
industries use is labour which is low cost, compliant, and well disciplined. 
With vast financial incentives capital investment is very small in MNC terms. 
Companies rent their office space, infrastructure is leased from state owned 
Telekoms Malaysia so little capital is sunk into the landscape. If political 
(instability) or economic (recession, financial crisis) conditions in Malaysia 
were to change MNCs would be able to withdraw their SSO operations from 
Cyberjaya and relocate to a suitable location elsewhere. These companies 
demand such strategic territorial enclaves to service their global operations 
(i.e. mobility requires fixity). 'Spatial products' the world over are providing 
safe havens for SSO operations leading to abundance of locational choice 
for MNCs. 
Like the Export Processing Zones (EPZs) which preceded it, Cyberjaya has 
openly embraced private industrial markets and export-oriented development 
in the form of back-office services for foreign subsidiaries. A similar pattern is 
repeated here with Malaysia's EPZs of the 1980s when places like Penang 
became manufacturing hubs for the global electronics industry. Electronics 
were at the time hyped as being part of the advanced order of high-tech. 
However, despite a 25 year legacy of export-oriented electronics 
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manufacturing Malaysia received little technology transfer or skills training 
from the sector (Sussman 1998). As Mahathir acknowledged, these 
schemes have not facilitated a shift up the value chain: 
'Despite the most rapid development in the free trade zones, insignificant 
demand has been generated fro local intermediate products. There is little 
value-added, too much simple assembly and production.' 
(Mahathir 1991) 
For example, a study by Bell et al (1996) found technology transfer 
capabilities including joint ventures did not enhance local innovative 
capabilities in Malaysia due to the heavy reliance on the export-oriented 
electronics sector which thrived based on R&D intensive imported 
technologies. Behind MDEC's claims that progression from manufacturing 
plants to call centres is a step up the value chain are fears that Cyberjaya 
will occupy a precarious position in the global economic system. The criteria 
outlined in the above quotes from MNC executives could have equally been 
applied to electronics manufacturing plants in Penang 20 years ago. 
MNCs were enticed by cheap labour and the incentives offered up as part of 
the MSC vision. While the arrival of DHL, Shell, and HSBC were heralded as 
'big wins' by MDEC there is no guarantee that these corporations will stay in 
the aftermath of further rounds of global neoliberal restructuring (Jessop 
1999, 2004) or that they will contribute the broader goals of Malaysian 
economic development (as framed in the utopian 'Wawasan 2020'). It seems 
a case of not if Malaysia will lose its competitiveness in SSO industries oust 
at it did with electronics manufacturing to China) but when; and with the rise 
of new SSO players in the region (e.g. Philippines, Vietnam) the clock is 
already ticking. If Cyberjaya becomes increasingly 'slippery' it may well 
develop into a rudimentary business park or, in worst case scenarios, 
disbanded altogether. 
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Mobilising national development goals through technopole development 
reliant on FDI asset seeking is a risky strategy. Often these global 
corporations are disconnected from the lives of their immobile employees 
and have no vested interest in their 'host' country. As The Guardian 
(15.1 0.1994) noted over ten years ago: 'although often dressed up as 
altruistic, the motives for the company are usually self-interest'. In this light 
the chapter has argued that rather than producing the utopia of a globally 
inclusive 'information society' it is more likely that planetary 
telecommunications networks will further divide the global economy into 
economic zones of the developing world which 'serve as enclaves in 
information processing, rather than as equal members of a global knowledge 
community' (Skinner 1998: 64). 
6.6. Conclusion 
The chapter has argued that the branding of Cyberjaya as Silicon Valley 
style technopole were 'scale-making' strategies to appeal to globally mobile 
investment capital, MNCs, and workers. On this basis urban space and 
infrastructures were prepared to create a 'packaged' urban environment to 
meet the needs of global capital, and state politico-legal frameworks were 
customised accordingly. Such processes were also based on technologically 
deterministic assumptions about the possibility of ICTs to allow for new wired 
urban spaces to plug into global flows through networked infrastructures. 
The chapter has directly critiqued the high-tech utopianism of an 
'anytime/anywhere' 'new economy' through the critical lens of Malaysia's 
failed vision for turning jungle into a R&D hub of global proportions. Attention 
focused on how the global economy is always embedded, partly localised 
and globalised, producing new 'glocal' hybrid spatialities (e.g. urbanism and 
architecture) and temporal modes of being (e.g. back-offices). In the case of 
Cyberjaya's shift to SSO, locality is increasingly important, but it is a locality 
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reappropriated for the needs of multinational capital in a space of tension 
with politically infused localise narratives (e.g. Saladin, MDEC building) 
The latter half of the chapter has demonstrated that beneath the excessive 
hype of creating a 'sticky place' for capitalist globalisation, an alternative 
narrative emerges. While the MSC has produced some "success stories" 
(e.g. Iris Technologies, a Malaysian company developing smart cards and 
electronic passports) these are isolated cases. Beneath the messianic 
fa<;ade of ICT urban boosterism strategies lies a disconnected corporate 
enclave servicing a world elsewhere. The chapter has argued 'slippery 
space' occurs through multiple mechanisms: physically through urban 
disconnection and infrastructural splintering; politically through state role 
back from the MSC; economically in low valued-added routinised work 
practices; and temporally in servicing a 24/7 offshore economy. 
However, the thesis seeks to avoid substituting the utopianism of Cyberjaya 
as 'multimedia utopia' with an equally dystopian vision of the global back-
office as a 'dark satanic mill'. As Ng and Mitter (2005) note, although the 
wage of workers are lower than their counterparts in the global North, call 
center workers are paid on a par with, if not more than other graduates in 
Malaysia. Simplistic arguments on the 'information society' which views the 
growth of SSO industries as a new mechanism in 'cyber-colonialism' (Sardar 
1996) should be avoided. As the following chapter demonstrates, back-office 
staff learned new skills and became exposed to Western management 
techniques, work environments and practices. Examining the disjuncture 
between the symbolic construction of Cyberjaya as 'sticky place' and. its 
material reality as 'slippery space' is the first alternative narrative for 
technopole planning practices in the thesis. The following chapter examines 
the experience of "lived everyday-ness" in Cyberjaya drawing upon 
ethnographic research with back-office workers and Cyberjaya's smart home 
residents. These accounts further challenge the wobbly discursive 
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architecture of technopole planning strategies and the utopian promises of a 
new 'information age'. 
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Chapter 7. Towards "Intelligent" Live/Work 
Spaces? A 'View From !Below' in Cyberjaya 
7. 1. Introduction 
The chapter examines Cyberjaya's claims to create the 'world's intelligent 
city' through ethnographic fieldwork of everyday living and working practices 
in the city. The chapter illuminates the experiences from two different groups 
who reside in the Cyberia Smart Home Complex in Cyberjaya. Firstly, 
following analysis in the previous chapter, Sections 7.2 and 7.3 attend to the 
technologically mediated everyday work practices of back-office labour in 
MNCs. In the second half of the chapter, Section 7.4 draws upon in-depth 
interviews with smart home residents in Cyberjaya to examine everyday 
encounters with information technology in the home. Both the corporate 
workplaces for MNCs and the smart homes of Cyberjaya were designed to 
produce globalised, high-tech spaces for 'intelligent' living and working in 
Malaysia's 'information society'. However, as the chapter proceeds to 
explore in both examples, they produce paradoxical spaces that are far 
removed from the techno-urban imagination promoted by the 'MSC 
architects' and the planned predetermined effects the city would produce on 
its citizens (Chapters 4 and 5). 
The chapter explores these disjunctures by examining the everyday 
practices of individuals living and working in a transnational space that is 
globally orientated both discursively (e.g. as the 'world's intelligent city') and 
in material terms (via networked infrastructures, urban planning models, 
MNCs). These flows are transnational in reach in the sense that they 
transgress national borders in a multitude of ways. This occurs in obvious 
ways, such as the import of urban planning models and architectural designs 
(Chapter 5) or the global reach of the telecommunications grid (Chapter 6), 
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but also in less obvious ways. Examples discussed in the chapter includes 
the spatia-temporal consequences of 24 hour shift working in MNCs, 
affectual responses to habitation in Cyberjaya's bucolic high-tech urbanism, 
and the circulation of promotional materials for Cyberia condominium units to 
potential investors overseas in Hong Kong, and Singapore. The analysis 
examines the disjunctures that arise when global flows meet, rub up against, 
and intermingle with local cultures, places. The chapter shifts analytical 
focus from the discourses of technological utopia mobilised in promotional 
materials to the everyday textures of the globalising places we inhabit. 
According to Smith (2001 ), such disjunctures result in confusions about the 
spatial and temporal context in which 'locality' is lived and experienced in our 
globalising, transnationalising world. Rather than place the 'local' 'or the 
'global' in antagonistic terms as a binary opposition, the research engages 
with the social and cultural constituents of urban transformation in 
Cyberjaya. To this end the chapter challenges technologically deterministic 
assumptions about the socio-cultural 'impacts' (Chapter 5) of ICTs in 
Cyberjaya and elucidates emerging human geographies as they are 
experienced "from below". 
7.2. Producing the 'Information Economy': Everyday Work 
Practices in the Global Back-Office 
The first vignette examines globalised work practices in Cyberjaya's Shared 
Services and Outsourcing (SSO) Industry and the transnational networks of 
social practice that maintain and service the global offshore economy. This 
draws upon participation observation of, and in-depth interviewing of, two 
groups of back-office support workers recruited in Cyberjaya. Firstly, a group 
of Malaysians employed in the Shell I.T. global support centre. Secondly, a 
group of Indonesian call centre workers employed in the IBM Asia-Pacific 
contact centre. These back-offices can be conceptualised as exemplary 
spaces of globalisation integrating transnational information flows, globe 
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spanning telecommunications networks and local infrastructures in a fixed 
spatial milieu. For 'hyperglobalists' (Held et al. 1999) back-offices are the 
living embodiment of how the 'space of flows' supersedes a 'space of places' 
somehow disembedding social relations across time and space, eradicating 
geographical distances in the process. Challenging this overtly deterministic 
reading of high-tech globalisation, the chapter reveals the spatia-temporal 
disruption that suffuses everyday work practices and their effects on staff 
whose connections span the globe whilst being strategically 
concentrated/isolated in a specific place. To this end, the back-offices of 
MNCs produce another paradoxical space of disjuncture and difference in 
Cyberjaya. 
The empirical approach critiques meta-narratives of a "top down" 
globalisation project by focusing attention on how globalised processes are 
achieved, and by whom. Too often the process has been conceptualised in a 
deterministic manner proclaiming the onward march of neoliberal capitalism, 
all powerful MNCs dominating and mastering the global 'space of flows' for 
their own ends. It is often depicted that at the bottom of the global pecking 
order are underpaid, undervalued workers in the 'slippery spaces' of the 
developing world whose role it is to service, and manufacture for the global 
economy. What these accounts overlook is that these global processes are 
not self-generative but instead are actually produced (Sassen 2000) in 
strategic sites like Cyberjaya. 
This move reflects, and is supportive of, a burgeoning literature critical of 
'globalist' representations of economic and social transformation to examine 
how globalisation processes are grounded and experienced through the 
everyday (Amoore 2002). By probing at these practices of globalisation the 
chapter seeks to 'reveal the intersecting effects and material consequences 
of so called globalisation in a particular place' (Katz 2001: 1214). Through 
qualitative methodologies the sections analyses the role of back-office staff 
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in processing transnational information flows, the contribution of these work 
practices to new identity formation, and the gendered and racialised politics 
of work in MNCs in Cyberjaya. Examining these processes can help to 
uncover further 'cracks', as Sassen (2001 a) argues, that occur at the 
margins of the global system. Calling to attention these cracks underscores 
the paradox between the representation of Cyberjaya as 'multimedia utopia' 
and its position as a 'slippery' economic space in an emerging urban 
hierarchy of offshore service centres (Chapter 6). 
While there is a lacuna of research on back-office labour practices in the 
Malaysian context, other prominent accounts include Freeman's (2000) 
research on female identity and back-office work in the Caribbean and 
various studies of Indian call centre workers (Mirchandani 2004; Taylor and 
Bain 2005; Shame 2006; Poster 2007). Gender studies have focused on 
feminist politics or resistance to the perceived patriarchy of neoliberal 
economic globalisation (e.g. Mullins 1999; Bergeron 2001; Bonds 2006). 
Meanwhile work in management studies emphasised the emotional and 
psychological pressures of working the night shift and the demands this 
entails (Taylor and Bain 2000; Deery et al. 2002). However, the labelling of 
back-office staff as 'cyber coolies' or an 'offshore proletariat' (Stanworth 
1998; Gaerlan 2004; Gurumurthy 2004) obscures the wide variety of labour 
processes and transnational connections found in global back-offices (Taylor 
and Bain 2005). Thinking with critical globalisation scholars (Hay and Marsh 
2000; Ley 2004), who have attempted to bring the subject back into 
contemporary debates, the research examines the technologically mediated 
nature, and spatia-temporal consequences, of globalised social relations as 
they are produced in the daily work practices of these staff in Cyberjaya. The 
'view from below' brings into focus the often invisible 'labour in the making of 
the information society' (Sussman and Lent 1998). 
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Far removed from the R&D activities of the knowledge brokers in California's 
Silicon Valley, Cyberjaya's back-office staff are plugged into computer 
terminals on rotating 24/7 shifts to ensure that the information economy 
never goes 'offline', and that no time is lost in the effort to accumulate profit 
and circulate capital. Forming the bottom tier in the 'new international 
division of labour' (Frobel 1980) these back-office workers are trapped rather 
than mobile, isolated in corporate offices. In the case of the communities of 
IBM and Shell workers these individuals are plugged into flows of information 
that serve to enable the smooth operation of MNCs who are global in reach, 
yet locally situated in Cyberjaya. 
As the quote below from the then Deputy Prime Minister, Abdullah Badawi, 
illustrates the arrival of Shell IT was heralded as evidence the location could 
compete globally and symbolised Cyberjaya's growing status as a 'leading 
service delivery hub'. 
'If you travel across Malaysia today you will see a semblance of our nation's 
transformation from agriculture to industrial based, as you weave through 
plantations and paddy fields, and come to large manufacturing plants and 
industrial estates. But here in Cyberjaya you witness something more - the 
bold stroke, the stark vision of our aspirations - to transform yet again, and 
become a knowledge based, information led society. The launch of Sheiii.T. 
today continues in this vein and marks yet another milestone in the progress 
and growth of Malaysia's I.T. landscape.' 
(Badawi 2002) 
Shell's arrival has been incorporated into the (re)branding strategy to 
promote Cyberjaya as the 'new Bangalore' rather than a failed 'siliclone' 
(Chapter 6). The Shell Corporation is an operation with a global span 
covering over 140 countries, and employing over 108,000 people across 
multiple time zones from USA, to Europe, to the Far East. The spatial 
organisation of the MNC mirrors that of the global economy, which is 
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simultaneously partly deterritorialised, but also deeply territorialised: 'they 
span the globe, but they are strategically concentrated in specific places' 
(Sassen 2000: 225). The company's Cyberjaya office is the information 
technology contact and support centre for the entire Shell operation 
worldwide. The Cyberjaya location was chosen over 8 other location options 
(including Singapore and Hong Kong) to become the base for its 24/7 I.T. 
business support services comprising 1,000 staff. With an emphasis on 
'building a multinational with a Malaysian heart' (Badawi 2002) 70% of the 
Shell Cyberjaya workforce is Malaysian. It is estimated that the company 
worldwide has some 75,000 desktop computers and 1,500 servers that need 
to be maintained and supported round-the-clock (Research Interview: Saiful, 
Shell). Prior to the centralisation of I.T. support in the Cyberjaya office, this 
function was undertaken at the regional level by contact support centres. 
Since the opening of operations in March 2002 the building receives an 
average of 11,000 calls per month, 24 hours a day with uninterrupted 
service. 
Saiful is a Shell I.T. manager in charge of a team supporting a vital Shell 
software application which is used by staff across Shell worldwide. His 
journey to Cyberjaya is a transnational flow in ·itself. After studying abroad in 
Australia, he joined IBM working in Melbourne. However, Saiful wanted to 
return to his native Malaysia to find a job within a MNC with a local office. He 
jumped at the chance to work in Cyberjaya with Shell with the expectation it 
would provide him with the skills to succeed in the local job market and offer 
better pay compared to a local company. Empirical research illuminated 
three features of everyday work practices of back-office staff from Shell and 
IBM in Cyberjaya. These globalised work practices were characterised by: 
(a) the colonisation by time; (b) behavioural decoupling of time zones; (c) 
location-masking. Following a discussion of these practices the chapter 
examines their intersections with identity formation for Cyberjaya's new 
generation of 'intelligent' citizens. 
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7.2.1. Maximising Global Productivity or the Colonisation by Time? 
The birth of 24 hour operations amongst MNCs can be seen in the context of 
two important trends. Firstly, is the acceptance, and gradual adoption of 
clock time as the organising mechanism for the globalised capitalist system. 
As Bartky (2000) and Kern (1983) argue, the imposition of a standard time 
replaced the myriad of local times, and regimes that preceded it. Now 
standard time, time zones, and the notion of world time has become a major 
organising principle for globalised capitalism (exemplified in the 24 hour 
trading regimes of global finance markets). Secondly, increasingly there has 
been what Adam (2002) terms the 'commodification of time'. In short time is 
money. The transition to clock time as the organising principle for capitalism 
has meant that the twin forces of time-space compression (Harvey 1990) 
and rationalisation are king. This has led to a range of time money saving 
economic processes such as Taylorism, Fordism, just-in-time production 
methods to name but a few. 
We can add to this list the proliferation in the last ten years of offshore 
information production sites which enable the core economies of Europe and 
North America to function round-the-clock. As Crang (2007: 62) observes 
'ICTs not only allow global reach but also use space to overcome time' as 
they have evolved from a tool for facilitating distanciated relations to one for 
capitalizing on this by integrating different time zones to enable round-the-
clock working. In this latest phase of high-tech rationalisation time becomes 
a resource open to commodification which corporations strive to control and 
master in their quest for maximum efficiency. Malaysian workers can 
undertake the mundane, low value-added tasks whilst their better paid 
counterparts are tucked away in their beds in the affluent suburbs of global 
cities. The logic of powered up 24/7 global capitalism bears little thought for 
its potentially disrupting or dislocating local impacts. 
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As stated in the previous chapter, Malaysia was developed as an ideal back-
office location due to its temporal position traversing multiple time zones 
allowing it to service multiple markets (e.g. P2i0nline). A prominent feature 
of everyday work practices in Cyberjaya's back-office is the need to 
negotiate multiple time zones to service the global operations of the MNC. 
Traditionally globalisation scholars have been blind to the effects of time on 
human actors as it is experienced 'on the ground' (Bauman 1998). By 
rendering explicit the 'shadowlands of practice' (Adam 2002) that constitute 
globalised economic processes the chapter promotes Cyberjaya's back-
offices as another paradoxical space within the MSC. The corporate 
campuses once built with the rationale of plugging Cyberjaya into a 'global 
space of flows' have produced a range of unintended spatio-temporal 
consequences. Specifically, the high-tech infrastructures that were to 
facilitate cutting edge research and development have pulled Cyberjaya into 
the orbit of the 24/7 offshore service economy and enabled a process of 
'colonisation by time' to take place. In Cyberjaya, the SSO operations dance 
to the tune of networked global time which dictates when deadlines must be 
met, and which hours the staff must work. As a result, while the global flows 
of information that filter in and out of Cyberjaya are undeniably global in 
nature, the labour force which maintains them is rooted in local time-space. 
These workers experience massive temporal dislocation as they are caught 
up in complex entanglements of scale acted out through what Massey 
(1993) terms 'the power geometry of time-space compression'. 
To cover multiple time zones Saiful's team of 30 staff are divided into three 
smaller teams which alternate 8 hour working shifts to provide 24 hour IT 
support round-the-clock within Shell. Saiful's daily routine consists of working 
the day shift from 9am to 6pm during core working hours for the Asia-Pacific 
time zone. However, Saiful will be at his workstation during the night shift if 
there is a specific issue that needs to be discussed with the North American 
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time zone and is 'on call' 24 hours a day to deal with any problems that may 
arise with the software application that his team maintains.79 On a daily basis 
he would consult with the Shell headquarter office in The Hague, 
Netherlands through email, telephone calls, or when needed, 
teleconferencing. Email and telephone conversations are key mechanisms 
through which problems are, solved and regular communication with Shell 
offices worldwide maintained. 
'My staff are working 24 times 7, I am working 9 to 5 supervising them, so I 
manage them. Some of them work round-the-clock. Most of the 
communications we do are mainly outside, since this is where we are 
orientated to. The project people and management are in the Netherlands, 
but the users are global. Those people in the Netherlands are the 
management level people. We use a lot of emails, if not that then 
teleconferencing I think. This is not too much, only when we talk to the big 
boss, because it is costly, and we only have a few rooms that can do that. 
So it is mainly telephone and email.' 
(Research Interview: Saiful, Shell) 
This illustrates the transnational technologically mediated links between the 
'decision city' (in Europe) and the 'service city' (in Malaysia) (Rossi et al. 
2007). In this context, ICTs have enabled the near instantaneous 
dematerialised movement of information from Cyberjaya to the classic 
'command and control' centre which integrates and manages the Shell 
network worldwide. Contrary to 'end of the city' (e.g. Pascal 1987) 
predictions, telecommunications infrastructure has served to reaffirm and 
strengthen an urban hierarchy structured around command hubs, 
intermediary nodes, and peripheral service centres. What has changed is 
how ICTs have brought about telepresence so that it takes as much time for 
Saiful to email, or call, head office in The Hague as it does for him to walk to 
79 The exact nature of the application that the team maintained was not disclosed due to confidentiality 
concerns. Although it was my understanding it was an essential software application 
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the meeting room in Cyberjaya. As Sassen (2000: 226) argues this creates a 
'relation of inter-city proximity operating without shared territory: proximity is 
deterritorialised' so that Cyberjaya is more orientated to global networks than 
to its surrounding hinterland. 
Saiful participates in a daily briefing at 3.30pm, which is 9.30am European 
time to discuss the day's work activities and ongoing transnational projects 
with head office in The Hague. Normally this will be done by conference call 
with other management level staff within Shell IT. This is a busy time of day 
for his team when problems are relayed from Europe to Cyberjaya. Here 
ICTs are not seen to be eradicating locality but rather intensifying linkages 
between globally disperse places. As Giddens ( 1990: 17-21) notes, the 
social organisation of time and space has been abstracted or 'pulled away' 
from locales in conditions of modernity. Yet this does not necessarily to lead 
to the loss of place. As Riain (2004: 17) observes 'the globalisation of the 
information technology (IT) economy is seen not to result in a virtual 
economy, but in a global industry organised around and through certain key 
places and regions'. Thus the command and control centre of Shell HQ in 
the Netherlands is tied into the work practices of Cyberjaya via 
telecommunications links. Evidence suggests that these informational 
workplaces are characterised not by the disappearance of time and space as 
realities of work life, but their increasing importance and intensification. For 
example, Saiful referred to the 'ramping up' of daily work practices in the 
afternoon when Europe comes 'online': 
'If we talk to the Netherlands if it is 3pm here, then there it is 9am. A lot of 
management people work 9 to 5 so we have a window of 2 to 3 hours before 
we finish to do what we need in that day. If we can't it would be via emails. 
So we block the last part of the day to "go global", and talk to these people. 
This happens nearly everyday. Often we go at night if the project person is 
in the U.S .. So the U.S. starts at 9pm here, so we need to be around for that 
if it's urgent. We try our best to get every time zone in one day. We can 
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catch three time zones of AP [Asia-Pacific], Europe, and America most 
days. This happens probably at 1 Opm during KL time. This means we can 
align with three continents so it is the busiest time for us. But the team 
always has to be online 24/7 to deal with problems.' 
(Research Interview, Saiful, Shell) 
On an average day there will be at least 1 0 staff from Saiful's team working 
through the Malaysian night servicing the software application. Working 
shifts for Shell staff in Cyberjaya operate on a 24/7 round-the-clock basis 
such as 12 noon to 8pm, 8pm to 4 am, or midnight to Bam. Many staff in 
Saiful's team start work later in the day in order to cover the European time 
zone and later in the evening the American time zone which normally comes 
'online' at 9pm (East Coast) Malaysian time. Staff in Saiful's team often work 
irregular working hours and are required to be flexible in terms of work 
practices. 
Saiful regularly logs onto Shell's virtual private network (VPN) from his home 
in Cyberia later in the evening to check if any potential problems or issues 
have arisen since North American Shell users came online. Often 
consultation with American colleagues can be done at home for which Shell 
provides an allowance to cover communications costs, though there are 
occasions when he will travel to the Cyberia office to continue working in the 
evening with his 'night shift' team. Management staff can access Shell's 
corporate intranet by entering a password and username at the log in page 
which allows them to work online from home when 'out of hours' 
communication is deemed necessary. This is another mechanism through 
which Cyberjaya telecommunications grid becomes privatised whereby 
premium access is reserved for firewalled corporate intranets for MNCs who 
demand, and pay for the biggest bandwidth, quickest speeds etc. Moreover, 
the wired homes of Cyberia merge domestic space and the workaday world 
with the effect of colonising leisure time when work tasks are mediated 
through the telecommunications network. Networked infrastructures mobilise 
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a new matrix of spatia-temporal relations which complicates, overlaps with, 
the domestic architecture of the home creating an 'ontology of everyday 
control' (Allan 2004) in which Shell's staff are never out of the loop. 
7.2.2. 'Behavioural Decoupling' of Time Zones: Working the Night 
Shift in Cyberjaya 
Joe is a member the Shell I.T. helpdesk providing 24/7 assistance to Shell 
staff worldwide. This is an essential operation enabling the day-to-day 
transnational operation of the MNC. 
'Let's say you have a problem with your machine anywhere in the world, you 
would give a call or send an email to the I.T. helpdesk, and they will use this 
software to log all the information from you as a user. All this information is 
logged in this service centre. So my role is to support this tool, make sure it 
is running, up and stable, back end and front end. This services the whole of 
Shell worldwide, and the service is critical. If the helpdesk is not running 
smoothly, then Shell cannot do what it needs to do.' 
(Research Interview: Joe, Shell) 
Joe often works the night shift, though his shift patterns rotate from month to 
month according to three major time zones - North America, Europe, and 
Asia-Pacific. Rotation occurs so that no workers get stuck with the night time 
shift, but also so that workers do not take up second jobs. At work, 'cyber-
time' writes over and penetrates the local time-spaces in which back-office 
staff undertake their daily lives. Working the night shift is a process 
symptomatic of what Laguerre (2004) terms 'behavioural decoupling of time 
zones' where an individual adjusts daily working practices to follow the 
hegemonic beat of a time zone elsewhere. Electronic connectivity has made 
it possible for individuals living in one time zone to service the needs of 
individuals living in another without awareness of time differences- i.e. team 
members takes calls from people unaware of which time zone he is in. 
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These networks produce a sense of 'timeless time' as Castells argues (1996: 
469), creating a temporal context where the time on the local clock is of no 
importance. As the Malaysian working day draws to a close, Europe, then 
North America comes online and 'timeless time' presents a new set of 
problems and challenges that need to be attended to by (fatigued) Malaysian 
staff. 
'It can be quite tough. We work already for 6 hours, and then we have to 
align with different time zones. So by this time we are tired, and then other 
people they are just starting up, like in Europe for example. There is a rush 
as these users contact us with their problems. But we just have to get used 
to the pressure and managing the workload.' 
(Research Interview: Kazly, Shell) 
Call centre staff are at the front line of a telemediated world that has 
mobilised a shift from temporal orders of 'duration and succession to 
simultaneity and instantaneity' (Adam 1992: 187). Conflict arises as Joe's 
personal temporality at work is in disharmony with local temporality meaning, 
as Negroponte (1995: 89) observes, 'Sunday is not so different from 
Monday'. 
'When I got the job in Shell I was pretty happy you know. I think most 
Malaysians want to get a job with one of the big boys. They have this 
impression that the salary and benefits will be so much better. But, working 
shifts can be hard. I have two young kids and I get home from a night shift 
and just sleep during the day. It messes up family life a bit. I have a different 
routine to most people, working unsociable hours, you know, like this.' 
(Research Interview: Joe, Shell) 
The constant movement back and forth from local time to 'virtual' global time 
fragments everyday relationships between the workplace and the home. 
Many staff expressed similar problems with family life, and adjusting daily life 
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patterns according to variable shift work. Joe's wife works according to the 
cadence of the local time but he follows a different temporal rhythm meaning 
he is isolated from family life. He spoke of spending more time (work and 
social) with his colleagues who were plugged into the same temporal 
rhythms than members of his own family. For instance, when he returned 
from work in the morning Joe came home to an empty house, slept during 
the day then left to travel to the office late in the evening for the night shift. 
Temporal dislocation led to a high burnout rate amongst Shell staff who 
experience problems balancing night shifts handling hundreds of calls and 
offline family life - particularly among women who were under represented in 
the workforce as a result. Evidence suggests the above can lead to health 
problems as patterns of eating and sleeping are disrupted for long periods 
(Taylor and Bain 2005). This is compounded by extensive periods 'trapped' 
in the air conditioned micro climates of corporate offices exacerbated by 
temperature and humidity extremes outside. This situation is worsened by 
long commutes (rising to one and a half hours at peak times) from Kuala 
Lumpur to Cyberjaya which further adds to the time away for workers who 
already complained about the negative effects of night shifts on their daily 
lives.80 
The perspectives from back-office staff directly challenge Harvey's (1990) 
'time-space compression' where telecommunications are bringing temporal 
orders closer together. Rather, the effect is one of competing temporalities-
global times, national times, and local times interacting in one place (Sassen 
1999a; Crang 2007). As Lash and Urry (1994) and Virilio (2001) observe, 
new technologies enable the 'instantaneity of time' whereby movements in 
physical space no longer become necessary. While this may be true of 
MNCs whose transnational connections are mediated through the 
80 MDEC recently lobbied a local transport company, Rapid KL. to change their Cyberjaya service to 
run through the night from Kuala Lumpur to ease public transport concerns for Cyberjaya workers. 
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'telepresence' of physical offices, time is not necessarily speeding up for the 
staff of Cyberjaya's back-offices still embedded in the local time-space of 
Malaysia. These staff experience disembedding or what Giddens (1990: 21) 
terms the "'lifting out" of social relations from local contexts of interaction and 
their restructuring across infinite spans of time-space.' 
Cyberjaya contains two conflicting temporalities which run parallel one 
another, but barely intermingle or touch. Firstly, MNCs operate according to 
the logic of what (Virilio 1995b) calls 'globalised time' whereby everything 
now happens in the perspective of real-time. Cyberjaya's back-offices 
operate according to this logic, making decisions, enabling transactions, 
reporting a fault at the click of a mouse. Their everyday work activities 
function according to capitalist global time where the clock is ticking and time 
equals money. However, the reality of global corporate time is that most 
people live their lives outside it, always on the periphery. Secondly, on the 
ground the temporal gaps between different worlds seem to be getting 
bigger, rather than converging. Back-office staff are detached from everyday 
social spaces, but deeply connected to global flows through 
telecommunications. Globalisation fosters uneven temporalities; plugged in 
corporate time is simultaneously juxtaposed to the disconnection 
experienced by workers on the night shift. For Joe, it dislocates circadian 
rhythms, and serves to disorientate the human subject caught up in its order. 
Outside the temporal vortex of the corporate office, the local is left not so 
much 'strung out in a wire', to coin Cosgrove's (1996) phase, but 'strung out' 
at the end of a wire where the 'space of flows' comes to an abrupt halt at the 
entrance to lobby of Sheiii.T.'s office. 
Working the night shift is also one of the more unseen elements of circadian 
rhythms in Cyberjaya. When the day shift staff scurry out from their offices at 
5pm after a regular working day the night shift workers in various parts of 
Kuala Lumpur are preparing to start their evening in the service delivery 
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economy. At the margins of the global economy, working the night shift 
becomes a form of temporal entrapment constraining the daily practices of 
those who work it. It also produces new night time geographies akin to what 
Scott (1990) terms the 'hidden transcript of globalisation'. The 24 hour Indian 
'Mamak' restaurant is the only food outlet that stays open round-the-clock in 
Cyberjaya. During the evening it becomes a hive of activity for workers on 
'lunch breaks' in the middle of the Malaysian night. The nascent night time 
geography challenges assumptions concerning who is in place and out of 
place. 
For instance, the insertion of female subjects into the nightscape subverts 
normative understandings about space and bears striking similarities with 
the experience of female labour in Indian call centres (Patel 2006). In 
Malaysia the presence of females alone during these hours is equally seen 
to be improper (especially in the case of Malay-Muslim's) and, despite the 
provision of transport from home to work, unsafe. Women who work the 
night shift in back-offices face resistance from disproving family members 
who deem the job inappropriate, but are also concerned about damaging 
their own 'status' within the local community. Socio-cultural attitudes explain 
why a small number of women worked in these back-offices, estimated at 
less than 30% of the relevant personnel for Shell and IBM. The 
stigmatisation of female night shift workers serves to reconstitute the global 
back-office as a uniquely 'un-Malay' space and undermine state attempts to 
"sell" local conditions and proffer its labour for foreign direct investment. 
In sum, as globalisation touches the ground, men and women are being 
inserted into the urban nightscape to meet the needs of the global economy 
with diverging consequences. Joe talked about the difficulty of 'coming down' 
from the night shift and getting used to daily life again within Cyberjaya. As 
shifts change every few months, body clocks take longer to adjust to new 
working patterns. Women, however, struggle to reconcile variable shift work 
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with cultural pressures and the duties of family life. Paradoxically, 
technologies, rather than liberating the nation from the shackles of 
colonialism, have merely reaffirmed the country's peripheral position. 
Workers have been enrolled in neo-colonial relationships of dependency and 
service, mediated through computer terminals to service transnational 
information flows. These unintended consequences are disconnected from 
the dream of a high-tech Malaysian modernity. As the dream of becoming 
Asia's Silicon Valley fades Cyberjaya has accepted its own fate, with MDEC 
busy re-branding it, behind the scenes as the world's premier SSO location. 
7.2.3. 1Location-Masking' as the Erasure of Geographical Difference 
Like Shell, the arrival of IBM (International Business Machine.s) in Cyberjaya 
in 2003 was heralded by MDEC and the Malaysian government as another 
feather in the cap for the MSC. Here was one of Silicon Valley's 
heavyweights coming to establish an office in Cyberjaya. One of the largest 
I.T. corporations in the world, IBM is the living definition of a multinational LT. 
company. It holds more patents than any other U.S. company, and eight 
research laboratories worldwide. Despite the fanfare, IBM's Cyberjaya 
operation is a call centre that deals with customer queries from individuals 
and company clients81 . The Centre supports four business functions -
teleweb sales and marketing administrative support services, back-office 
customer support services, integrated technology support services which 
cover the ASEAN region, and provides a strategic outsourcing helpdesk 
which supports the Asia-Pacific region. Cyberjaya is one of IBM's nine 
contact centres worldwide, all but three of these are located in Asia82. IBM 
Cyberjaya deals with pre-sales and after-sales customer enquiries for IBM's 
Asia-Pacific markets. 
81 In 2006 IBM set up a RM 10 million innovation centre in downtown Kuala Lumpur, and not in 
Cyberjaya. 
82 The contact centres are located in Australia (Brisbane, Sydney, Ballarat), China (Dalian, Shenzen), 
Japan (Okinawa), Korea (Seoul), Malaysia (Cyberjaya, Philippines (Manila). 
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Arief (team manager) and Auyu are two of some twenty Indonesia staff 
working in IBM Cyberjaya providing 24/7 pre-sales and after-sales support 
for IBM products and services helpdesk for Indonesian clients. As well as 
working round-the-clock IBM contact centres staff are required to 'mask' their 
location to incoming callers. Staff who were interviewed speculated that this 
was done in order to reduce the likelihood of racism from customers who 
may only want to deal with a representative from, or within, their own 
country. Fears of racism are not unfounded since some workers who were 
interviewed within IBM did cite problems that occurred when callers 
established that the call centre was in an offshore location. Some callers 
from Indonesia for example couldn't understand why the centre was 
relocated to Malaysia, and perceived this to be symptomatic of the trend of 
local jobs going abroad. Often this 'emotional labour' (Leidner 1999) adds to 
the pressure of the working experience as staff are trained to 'follow the 
script'. Location-masking is also done to protect companies who may 
encounter customer dissatisfaction if it is revealed they have 'offshored' to 
low cost locations. In Indian call centres which service North America or UK 
markets it is common for extensive location masking to occur. Staff often 
take on American pseudonyms, accents and even go so far as inventing new 
'localised' identities in order to mask the location where they are receiving 
the call (Mirchandani 2004). IBM Cyberjaya does not go to such extreme 
measures. The location masking occurs through two main strategies. 
Firstly, IBM users are given a local customer support number for pre- and 
after-sales support with every IBM purchase. Customers will call what 
appears to be a local number charged at a local rate. However, once the call 
is made the customer is connected to the IBM contact centre in Cyberjaya, 
Malaysia. In a technological sleight of hand, when the calls come into the 
helpdesk they are filtered by country code and channelled to the team 
responsible for that country. For example, if an individual or business from 
Indonesia calls the local contact number for the IBM support helpdesk it will 
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be routed to the regional support centre in Cyberjaya and the call will be 
dealt with by a member of Ariefs team. 
IBM employs mostly expatriate labour with specific language skills to service 
individual markets within Asia-Pacific. The high presence of expatriate labour 
is another example of a transnational flow in Cyberjaya. Often these are 
educated bilingual staff paid more than equivalent local staff (Ariefgets paid 
six times more than an equivalent job in Indonesia). The helpdesk can 
provide language capabilities in English, Bahasa Indonesian, Bahasa 
Malaysian, Cantonese, Hindi, Japanese, Kannada, Korean, Mandarin, 
Tagalog, Tamil, Telugu, Urdu and Vietnamese to service the entire Asia-
Pacific region. 
'In the contact centre we have many different nationalities. Japan, 
Indonesia, Thailand, Philippines. All of these people work here, so we can 
see on the display of our system where the call is coming in from, so then 
the relevant person will deal with it. For me, I can speak with the person 
calling from Indonesia in Bahasa Indonesia. These are calls with 62 dialling 
code if I am not mistaken. Or we can speak English if they prefer. We can 
ask them what happened with their machine or product.' 
(Research Interview: Arief, IBM Malaysia) 
IBM staff in the pre-sales support section provide technical, configuration 
information that individuals require about IBM products before purchase 
section. Staff work according to the time zone of the specific market they are 
servicing since customers normally call during normal working hours (e.g. 
Bam to 6pm) 
'The 24 hour time shifts is used to cover the different time zones. For me in 
pre-sales, I work for Indonesia market, so there is a time difference of 
maybe one hours, so I can work a normal shift, like 10 am to Spm. It works 
like this. The Japanese agent he has to work when Japan goes online. For 
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after-sales support though it must be available 24 hours online. This is what 
we do. It is an essential operation so it runs 24 by 7.' 
(Research Interview: Arief, IBM) 
This contrasts with Auyu in the after-sales support team that provides 
essential technical support and hardware support on IBM products. His 
Indonesian team works alternating shifts to cover a 24 hour work cycle. Like 
Joe in Shell IT, he switches between night (6pm to 6 am), and day shifts 
(1 Oam to 7 pm) every other week. This meets the need of companies who 
have information management systems serving multiple markets running 
round-the-clock every day of the year. These technologies never go offline, 
and when there is a glitch, Auyu and the help desk are the first port of call for 
fielding and responding to fault reports from IBM users in Asia-Pacific. In this 
instance ICTs allow for 24/7 synchronised connectivity where any IBM user 
in the region can connect to the Cyberjaya support team simultaneously and 
instantly. 
'I.T. companies never sleep. The server is live 24 hours, so if the system 
goes down, we must be on standby, this is non-negotiable. If there is a 
problem, like the server goes down in a company, their I.T. officer will call 
us, and we can try and fix it. If we can't assist on the phone the engineer will 
go out. He must be available 24 hours, maybe he is asleep, but we call him, 
and tell him to go to the company which has the problem. So it is simple. It 
must be there 24/7.' 
(Research Interview: Auyu, IBM) 
Secondly, when Arief and Auyu receive a call from Indonesia they introduce 
the call through a scripted response of "Welcome to the IBM Asia-Pacific 
contact centre". Recognising a "local accent" at then end of a local number, 
callers assume that they are speaking with an IBM representative in their 
own country. Arief told me there were occasions when callers conversed 
about local topics (e.g. television, the weather, current events) with which he 
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was unfamiliar. IBM doesn't have a policy of keeping its staffers abreast of 
current affairs in local countries. If asked the staff will inform customers that 
the call is being received in the IBM Asia-Pacific contact centre in Cyberjaya, 
Malaysia. There is a more relaxed mentality here because IBM Cyberjaya is 
servicing mainly ASEAN countries and not dealing direct with British or North 
American customers who may be more sensitised to dealing with 'foreign 
call centres'83 . However, staff are still trained how to avoid answering 
questions about location and told not to give away information about 
themselves. On some occasions Arief had been greeted with callers who 
insisted on speaking with someone in their own country. This is rare, and in 
general the local masking strategies employed by IBM are successful in 
creating a homogenous corporate space in which locality is 'written out', or 
seen as undesirable. 
Both examples from Cyberjaya's SSO industries illuminate how the 
globalisation of work praCtices is experienced from below by staff caught up 
in 'slippery space' of transnational flows in the global back-office. This 
process is characterised by hybridity: the mixing of real-time/virtual time; 
physical presence and telepresence; flexibility of connecting anytime from 
anywhere; and the ubiquity of going everywhere virtually but remaining in 
one place. These workplaces create a paradoxical space and produce a 
dislocating effect on the lives of workers in non-technologically mediated 
offline spaces as they negotiate the temporal orders of the global and the 
local at work. 
7.3. From the Local to the Global (and back again): Negotiating 
· Spaces of Identity 
In negotiating these global information flows through transnational work 
practices staff construct new hybridised identities; partly deterritorialised to 
the global scale, but also simultaneously bounded, and fixed, at the local 
83 In response to customer dissatisfaction several UK companies have now switched back to local call 
centres. 
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level. Back-offices function as 'an interstitial zone of displacement and 
deterritorialisation that shapes the identity of the hybridised subject' (Gupta 
and Ferguson 1992: 18). These hybrid identities are not overtly 'de-
Malaysianised' to the degree found in Indian call centres where local 
identities are actively erased by companies through processes of accent 
training and 'cultural neutralisation' (Mirchandani 2004; Shome 2006). 
Rather the chapter argues that through globalised work practices with MNCs 
local workers reconstitute their own identities as globally orientated 
'knowledge workers'. Many staff, when interviewed differentiated Cyberjaya 
as a 'global' space versus the surrounding national territory which they saw 
as 'local'. Furthermore, this putative sense of globality was promoted by 
MNCs who claimed once staff entered their offices they were "leaving 
Malaysia behind" and connecting to a globalised economic space, part of the 
offshore service economy. The emergence of Cyberjaya as a new 'global 
space' relates to several factors discussed in earlier chapters concerning the 
urban design and planning of the city, the large presence of MNCs and 
foreign staff, prolonged exposure to global time and English as the dominant 
language of business. As a result, individuals who work in Cyberjaya saw 
themselves as part of a unique global community. 
Importantly, the physical appearance of the secured corporate citadels of 
Shell and IBM in Cyberjaya were self-consciously designed to symbolise 
'global' corporate capitalism. These boxy office buildings - think futuristic 
glass, steel designs bearing the brazen corporate logos of MNCs - are 
emblematic of the foreign investment to which Malaysia wants to connect 
(Figure 28). Both inside and outside a new global aesthetic is created 
through post-modern architectural styles, interior design, and furniture. The 
contrast between 'home' (Malaysia) and 'away' (the international office) is 
exemplified through the architectural and environmental features of the 
corporate campuses of MNCs. They function as time-space bubbles where 
staff are virtually transported into a new deterritorialised 'global' in closer 
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relational proximity to offices outside Malaysia than to Cyberjaya itself. Once 
inside the glossy glass lobbies of these MNC staff are transported into a 
global (read Western) space of corporate capitalism with its open 
workstations, IKEA furnishings, and an 'international ambience' of coffee 
bars etc. As Shame (2006) argues about Indian call centres, these tensions 
subvert traditions notions of diaspora because the 'away' to which these 
workers travel is not another nation but a new global space which the 
technology parks signify. 
'The spatial landscapes of these technology parks - where call centres are 
often housed - are deliberately designed to assert the physicality of a new 
modernity and cosmopolitanism (read: Americanisation) brought about by 
global technology, and to distinguish that modernity from the rest of the city 
(and the nation).' 
(Shame 2006: 116) 
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Figure 28: DHL Global Data Centre in Cyberjaya (Source: Author's 
Photograph) 
However, just minutes away from these back-offices, the marginalised 
kampung dwellings of nearby areas such as Dengkill are ramshackle at best. 
Cyberjaya's overlooked hinterlands are not connected to the high speed 
information super highway that facilitates the offshore service economy. As 
time speeds up and intensifies in the corporate offices for the kampung 
residents living cheek by jowl with Cyberjaya, local time is cut off, and 
everyday life is slowed down. These villages are akin to what Boyer (1996) 
termed 'lag-time places' characterised as temporal breaks in the imaginary 
matrix of the cybercity. When driving through these villages it was visible 
how untouched, or disavowed, they have been by both the MSC project and 
the so called information technology 'revolution' with all its talk of 
hypermobility. They serve to exemplify that Malaysia's 'information society' 
is, at best, a partial condition and, at worst, a work of fiction dreamed up by 
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the state for its own political ends. This undermines the MSC's claims to be a 
national project and reinforces earlier discussion that it has manifested in a 
'strategic' geography of globally orientated splintered urban spaces. 
While the word outside of the (neo-colonial) corporate enclave, and 
Cyberjaya, remains disconnected the architecture and high-tech 
infrastructures of the Shell and IBM offices are emblematic of a new 
powered-up modernity. Once individuals enter them they are transported to 
a new real and imaginary space of globalised capitalism and reconstitute 
their identities as global back-office staff. Arief leaves his condo in Cyberia, 
takes a bus ride to the IBM office just 10 minutes away, and enters through 
the corporate entrance of IBM Cyberjaya. Once inside he proceeds to a 
large hall lined with computer screens. He takes his normal seat, puts on his 
headset and plugs into the global offshore service economy. Within seconds 
his workstation is flashing to alert him to an incoming call from Indonesia. He 
greets the caller with his scripted response of "Welcome to the IBM Asia-
Pacific service delivery centre, Arief speaking, how can I help you?" 
It is here the spatia-temporal circadian rhythms of the local collide with global 
24/7, 'anytime/anywhere', 'informationalised' time-space. Identities become 
reformed through a transnational regime of telematics traversing spatialities 
of the local and global. In the global back-offices of Cyberjaya workers such 
as Arief, and Joe experience Malaysia by day and Europe or North America 
by night. While at work they are physically located in a specific time and 
place which is constantly transgressed through their, always virtual, daily 
connections to different places strung out across multiple time zones. There 
are no physical/material connections with these global operations flows that 
are enacted through virtual electronic migrations circulating information 
across borders. For example, while Saiful has built up close working 
relationships with management in Shell headquarters in The Hague yet he 
has not once been there, nor will he ever go. Surrounded by the physical 
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topography of Malaysia he projects his identity as 'global knowledge worker' 
onto a world elsewhere through virtual connections. He is 'disembodied 
labour' (Bauman 2000) par excellence allowing the smooth extra-territorial 
operation of Shell worldwide. He can do everything that needs to be done to 
run his team through telecommunications. If there is a problem then they can 
call, email, or teleconference if needed. 
Bearing this critique in mind, working in a global back-office in Cyberjaya is 
not akin to a 'dark satanic mill' (Kinnie et al. 2000) or an 'electronic 
panoptican' (Taylor and Bain 1999) for the post-industrial age. Fieldwork 
evidence contradicts the dystopian predictions about workplace coercion, 
'information age' Taylorism or omnipotent surveillance from managers. 
Contrary to the popular visions of oppressed staff in developing world 
locations working under strict conditions in back-offices I found no evidence 
of this in Cyberjaya. 84 In interview, when asked about their working practices 
and environments all were complimentary about their companies. The only 
dissenting voices were about working the night shift and the impacts of 
variable shift work on social and family life. However, all workers accepted 
this as part of their job requirement. This was compensated by the fact staff 
were paid a generous wage, and received benefits for working in one of 
these companies. Arief received an allowance for his accommodation in 
Cyberia, and staff had their home internet connections paid for by their 
companies85 . In Malaysia working for a multinational is a source of pride but 
also simultaneously a source of stress and temporal dislocation when 
working the night shift. However, it offers the promise of a respectable, 
white-collar job with good financial rewards compared to other service sector 
jobs. In the marketplace, competition between local graduates for such jobs 
with big companies is intense and if successful application is viewed as a 
prestigious achievement. Although these jobs represent a step up from the 
84 For example, Ng and Mitter (2005) have argued that female employment in call centres in Malaysia 
has served to partially liberate, and empower, women who have learnt new skills. 
85 This was because management level staff needed access to the corporate intranet for home. 
309 
factory work of the manufacturing operations found in FTZs, the workforce 
remains passive. Cyberjaya has failed to foster an R&D culture to match 
Mahathir's intended vision of 'intelligent' work practices 
This new generation asserts Malaysia's claims to a global market in two 
ways. Firstly, these transnational work practices are not necessarily part of a 
new dark (neoliberal) world order, but instead become important in globally 
re-orientating the nation towards the international economy and repositioning 
Cyberjaya in a new urban hierarchy of offshore service centres. Cyberjaya 
has created a hub of sorts for the SSO industry, and partially, at least, has 
fulfilled Mahathir's goal of creating a (controlled) multicultural space for 
integrating Malaysia to the global information economy. However, the types 
of flows and processes to which the MSC has connected are not the planned 
high value-added research and development. Despite this, the presence of 
skilled, English speaking labour is a key strategic infrastructure for 
channelling multinational capital into Malaysia in its bid to become a 
dominant global outsourcing hub. Secondly, Saiful and his colleagues, are 
not Malaysia's 'far away others' who have simply 'gone global' in the 
abandonment of the nation. It is exposure to the MNC, not the smart home 
(next section) that has allowed Cyberjaya's workforce to prepare themselves 
for the global economy. As a worker in Shell Cyberjaya commented in 
interview, the MSC has created a new generation of more globally 
competitive Malaysian workers. 
'I think you look at the broader perspective, and all of us who work here and 
are Malaysian, we wouldn't have had this opportunity otherwise, so it must 
be a good thing I think. It is a good thing, we are now exposed to this, the 
MNCs. So from that perspective we have gained a lot of skills, we have built 
networks, we are now competitive, I can now take away my set of skills that 
I learned from BMW and go to anywhere or some other place, and they say 
oh this guy is from BMW so he know what he is doing, so that's true. 
Without the MSC we would not have had this opportunity otherwise.' 
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(Research Interview: Venky, BMW) 
Exposure to MNCs, Westernised work practices and management 
techniques were seen by staff as positive features of working in Cyberjaya. 
However, the process of becoming globally orientated citizens was often 
bifurcated along ethnic lines vis-a-vis the racialised politics of Malaysian 
high-tech development. Empirical evidence indicates Indian and Chinese 
Malaysian staff comprised a large component of Cyberjaya's I.T. community. 
The perceived lack of participation of the Malays in the I.T. economy, has led 
to calls for NEP positive discrimination policies to be implemented in 
Cyberjaya. These have not been accorded to MSC spaces, in keeping with 
the original provisions in the 'Bill of Guarantees'. Outside of the MSC, pro-
Bumiputera policies are hindering the global competitiveness of Malays who 
have developed a 'mentality of dependency' (Mahathir 1970). Originating in 
the 1970s, the NEP has only served to handicap Malays in the global labour 
marketplace (Chapter 6). As the following quote from Malaysian-lndian I.T. 
manager in BMW demonstrates, the pro-Malay education and labour policies 
have held back the global competitiveness of this ethnic group. 
'You need to bring in the proper, really smart people, people on the cutting 
edge of I.T. you know. You look at the standards of our universities here and 
they are poor. The local universities. This is a very deep problem, our 
education system is useless. We have people who are not qualified getting 
into public universities by virtue of the colour of their skin, they get degrees, 
what have they done? I say this acutely as a non-Malay, and I had to work 6 
times harder to get where I am. That is okay, because it just made us more 
competitive, and I am using the rhetoric of "us" here, but that is the reality. In 
Malaysia you have two sets of people. One set of people who are very 
highly qualified, who can make it anywhere in the world by virtue of the fact 
they have to work harder to get where they want to be. Then you have 
another set of people who just ease through.' 
(Research Interview: Vijay, BMW Malaysia) 
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Racial politics permeates the MSC, and Cyberjaya, just as it does in other 
discursive and material spaces elsewhere in Malaysia. Pro Bumiputera 
policies in education, the economy, and government institutions have forced 
Malaysia's other minorities to work harder and push themselves further 
against the mechanics of discrimination to reach the top. Several back-office 
workers interviewed during the study were returning Chinese and Indian 
Malaysians who had abandoned the Malaysian higher education system to 
be educated in foreign universities in the UK, USA, and Australia. 
Consequently, in the companies of Shell, IBM amongst others it is the 
Indians and Chinese who have risen to the top fastest, and prepared 
themselves as high quality labour for the global economy. The 'view from 
below' suggests it is these groups, above others, that have the potential to 
become Malaysia's next generation of truly 'intelligent citizens' having 
already made the step from the local to the global and back again. 
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7.4. Welcome to Cyberia Smart Homes! 
-, 
Figure 29: Entrance Sign. to Cyberia Smart Homes, Cyberjaya. (Source: 
Author's Photograph) 
The second half of the chapter addresses a different mechanism for creating 
a new generation of globally competitive 'intelligent citizens' . Together with 
flagship applications, smart schools, city command centres, (CCC) smart 
homes were conceived as a spatial milieu for creating globalised live/work 
spaces in which all Malaysians could invoke technologically interactive 
lifestyles. The MSC planning guidelines set out by the JPBM required every 
home in Cyberjaya to be a 'smart home'. Although the exact specifications 
on what constituted a smart home were never clarified beyond a requirement 
that homes should be 'broadband ready'. Elsewhere the smart home has 
been defined as: 
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'A residence equipped with information technology which anticipates and 
responds to the needs of the occupants, working to promote their comfort, 
convenience, security, and entertainment through the management of 
technology within the home and connections to the world beyond.' 
(Aldrich 2003: 17) 
Historically smart homes have been linked to utopian experiments in 
futuristic forms of living. As Spigel (2001) observes, they have a long 
sinuous history dating back to the 'homes of tomorrow' (Horrigan 1986; 
Haddow 1999) in science fiction futurology and Edward Bellamy's (1888) 
Looking Backward to Le Corbusier's 'machines for living'. Recently, 
corporations such as Panasonic, Microsoft have presented exhibits of smart 
homes to promote their corporate vision alongside promises that homes will 
lead to technological liberation and economic power. For example, Bill 
Gates, a government advisor as part of the lAP (Chapter 4), described his 
own digitally powered Seattle smart home (or mansion) in his bestseller The 
Road Ahead (1995) with the obvious intention to persuade the reader to 
adopt his vision of the future. This appears successful in Malaysia where the 
state co-opted smart homes as a planning exemplar - just as it did with the 
garden city and technopole 'models' - into the urban development of 
Cyberjaya to produce a set of imagined predetermined socio-spatial effects. 
Smart homes ushered in a wave of utopian predictions promising residents 
an eco-friendly, greener environment, heightened security systems, lifestyle 
enhancement and greater electronic mobility. 
When launched in Malaysia during the late 1990s the homes were symbolic 
of national investment in the 'information society' which had I.T. as its 
zeitgeist. In Cyberjaya the experimental bucolic urbanism of technologically 
saturated smart homes in a garden city setting was inextricably linked to 
notions of national progress and modernity. Consequently, the smart home 
became the primordial site for the (re)construction of a new form of 
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'intelligent' Malaysian citizenship by promoting an alliance between ICTs, 
domestic life, and everyday practices. 
The first smart homes were constructed in Putrajaya where government 
ministers were encouraged to lead by example and embrace a new 
technological era by becoming the first generation of smart home residents 
(The Star, 31.07.2007). The emergence of the smart home concept 
articulated perfectly with Mahathir's (1997a) claim Cyberjaya would be 'an 
attempt at creating an environment not just for testing technologies, but a 
new way of life itself. The famous video link up by Mahathir to the Malaysian 
nation was symbolic of a 'new era' which saw ICTs entering Malaysian 
domestic life, with potentially revolutionary effects. Promoted at a time when 
most Malaysians had not yet logged onto the internet, the smart home was 
the manifestation of Mahathir's high-tech push at the household scale where 
citizens could connect with the flagship applications symbolic of 'information 
age' Malaysia. 
By focusing on the Cyberia smart home complex the section examines 
another paradoxical space in the MSC following two analytical strands. 
Firstly, despite the launch of smart homes as a site in which all Malaysians 
were cordially invited to participate, in reality, smart living was achievable 
only for the privileged populations. Public claims linking smart homes to 
social and cultural development were undermined by developer's fixation on 
a target population of foreign knowledge workers. Secondly, rather than 
domesticating new forms of 'intelligent living', the homes have mobilised 
unintended textures of ICT usage and insurgent forms of digital citizenship. 
Both examples reveal further discursive disjunctures between the ideology of 
high-tech modernity and its 'everyday' geographies. 
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Figure 30: Aerial View of Cyberia Smart Home Complex (Source: Google 
Earth) 
Developed by MK Land86 , Gyberia was launched in 2000 as the 'flagship' 
smart home development in Cyberjaya. According to its marketing tag line 
Cybefia smart homes create a 'space ag~ environm~nt for ultra modern 
living' (Advert, MK Land, 2006) saturated with high-technology. The 
development is located on a 60' acre freehold site and currently has a 
residential population numbering approximately 7,000 residents. Cyberia is a 
gated community consisting of a mix of high-rise condominiums and low-rise 
town viii~_ residences with communal facilities which include a children's 
playground, tennis courts, swimming pools, gym and basketball court. 
According to the management, its 'USP' (Unique Selling Point) is its claim to 
have created Malaysia's first 'wired' community. Each unit shares a 
86 At the time of writing li~tE)d as the biggest developer on th_e Malaysian stock exchange. 
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standard list of 'intelligent features': a broadband connection, a home 
automation system, access to Cyberia Online community Portal and 24 hour 
security monitoring. Residents can upgrade to other features like wireless 
broadband internet access in communal areas, Voice Over Internet Protocol 
(VOIP) capabilities, connection to the CCC, remote operation of the home 
automation system, and the video-conferencing capability. In the years since 
its launch several of these features have gone 'offline' including the 
community portal since July 200487 and many of the CCC services have 
been halted due to a lack of funding and expertise. Development phases A 
and B were 1 00% sold with phase C ('Cyberia Crescent') currently nearing 
completion. 
7.4.1. "Going Global": Creating an Enclave Space for the International 
Community 
Cyberia was designed for, and marketed to, a high earning community of 
'managerial-technocratic-political elites' (Castells, 1996: 401) and any 
aspiring middle-class Malaysians who could afford the living costs of 
'intelligent living'. This signals a disjuncture in the utopian rhetoric of 
Cyberjaya as national 'test bed' versus the political economic reality of the 
city as a 'world-class' spatial milieu for the well-heeled. This paradox is 
reflected in the high purchase costs of an average home, from RM 250,000 
for a condominium to RM 360,000 to purchase a Town Villa.88 In addition, 
the monthly rental prices of between RM 1 ,000 and RM 1 ,5000 are more 
than double those found in comparable properties in the surrounding 
townships of Puchong and Kajang. 
87 The URL for the online community portal is www.cyberia.com.my and has been offline for several 
years. According to Cyberia's management the original portal contained bulletin boards for community 
events, interactive services with Cyberia management and a fault reporting systems for Cyberia 
homes. 
88 By way of conversion the average price for a Cyberia smart townhouse is RM 360,000 with equates 
to £51,000. In terms of local property market these are high prices. 
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In interview, MK Land described how they initially marketed the Cyberia 
development to an exclusive clientele of foreign 'knowledge workers' from 
MSC companies. The promotional campaign for Cyberia as a locale for a 
'luxurious living experience for those with a fast paced lifestyle' (Advert, MK 
Land, 2006) tied in with original development plans that Cyberjaya would 
emulate Silicon Valley and attract the brightest I.T. brains on the planet to 
live and work in the city. For example, the planning guidelines identified the 
target population as 'industrial I.T. innovators and knowledge workers' to 
comprise a 'global community living at the leading edge of the information 
society' (Malaysia 2000: A 1-2). This strategy was self-consciously designed 
to differentiate the physicality of Cyberjaya from previous manufacturing 
spaces (e.g. EPZs) which had characterised Malaysian global economic 
engagement prior to the MSC. In turn, the clustering of Cyberia, MMU and 
MSC status companies was optimistically framed as leading to the creation 
of a 'smart suburb' where expatriate knowledge workers would intermingle 
with Malaysia's would-be 'intelligent citizens'. Capitalising on this, 
promotional materials for Cyberia imagined a locale where I.T. professionals, 
academics and students would live together to create an innovative 
neighbourhood milieu (think Menlo Park or Mountain View in Silicon Valley). 
'Cyberia, the only residential development that is directly next to Multimedia 
University. A unique address. Undoubtedly a prime property in the future. 
Where the university lecturers, visiting professors staff and students can 
walk or bicycle easily to the campus next door. Where the staff of MSC 
status companies can congregate. Just as Stanford University is the heart of 
Silicon Valley, Cyberia will become the social hub for Cyberjaya with MMU 
close by.' 
(Cyberia promotional leaflet, MK Land 1998) 
Cyberia was promoted as the condominium of choice for the high earning 
expatriate community of Cyberjaya. Developers furiously promoted the 
concept of the 'eco-friendly high-tech city' (The Star, 02.06.1997) to 
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overseas property investors. The developer, MK Land, spoke of emulating 
exclusive expatriate urban enclaves like Bangsar, or Mount Kiara in Kuala 
Lumpur which house international staff working in the city. However, rather 
than constructing an open residential development, conducive to local 
engagement and intermingling, developers sought to provide a suitable living 
environment to meet the international standards of MNCs and their staff. In 
these terms, Cyberia was designed as a gated community, or what Caldeira 
(1999) terms a 'fortified enclave' with self-contained amenities and non-place 
specific, 'international style' architecture which serve to give residents the 
sensation they can set up home anywhere in the world (Figure 31). 
Furthermore, developers played on a growing anti-urban fear about crime 
and security in the Kuala Lumpur metropolitan area to justify their gating 
strategy and actively encouraged the secessionary movement of middle-
class groups out of the city into Cyberia (Chapter 5). 
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Figure 31: Cyberia Townhouse Condominiums (Source: Author's Photograph) 
Like the offices of MNCs in the previous section, neoliberal capitaiism has 
impacted upon the urban transformation and physical design of the built 
environment of Cyberjaya. Both the corporate enclave and the gated 
community are globalised spaces that seek to elude or partly erase locality in 
different ways. In Cyberia, developers sought to provide expatriates with a 
familiar space of produced global urban culture - e.g. luxury condominium 
living in a gated community. This appealed to a transnational community that 
shares similar behaviour regarding housing, dress, consumption patterns 
and cultural orientation in general. Allied to the physical form, the provision 
of globally recognised brands and amenities is demanded by residents 
where the attractiveness of a potential addresses is measured by the 
presence of Starbucks. As one worker from a Cyberjaya company 
commented to me: 'what is the use of all these infrastructures in Cyberjaya if 
there isn't a place I can go and get a latte every morning before work?' 
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These real estate developments are deliberately planned, globally orientated 
suburban spaces, what King (2004) has called 'globurbs', where 
transnational communities aspire to replicate a recognisable urban structure, 
housing style and architectural layout. This is the latest manifestation of 
urbanisation on a global scale, a process that King (1995) first identified with 
his work on the historical spread and diffusion of the colonial bungalow 
suburb. 
Globurbs articulate with Easterling's (2005) typology of 'spatial products' of 
technology parks, gated enclaves, leisure resorts that symbolise the 
emergence of a global urban culture. The globurb is equally packaged, as 
artificial, striving to elude locality as 'spatial products' and exemplifies the 
global diffusion of specific modes of living produced by the globalised 
economy. For example, King (2004) details the growth of expatriate suburbs 
containing 'European style' villas in Beijing which house the foreign staff of 
companies such as Siemens, Nokia, BP, IKEA etc alongside China's 
nouveau riche. These globalised live/work spaces are akin to what Smith 
(2001) labels 'translocalities' in the sense that they generate trans local 
discursive, material and spatial practices. This takes numerous forms 
including the global diffusion of planning exemplars, but also incorporates 
other transnational flows such as the promotion of Cyberia to overseas 
property investors in Hong Kong and Singapore, and, everyday work 
practices in the offshore service economy that serve to enmesh geographies 
of the local and global in Cyberjaya. 89 
89 King (2004) cites examples of Washington suburbs close to the region's high-tech industries which 
have become home to large concentrations of ethnic American-Indian populations. Silicon Valley is 
one such other example with its high concentration of Japanese, Taiwanese, Chinese, and Indian 
diasporic communities (Saxenian 2006). 
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Come up to a new living 
experience where 
space is your frontier 
Actua.J comer U"'it 
High Ceiling High-tech High-end 
lntrodudng the new Town Villas @ Cyberia 
Crescent. Radiating a strong and consistent 
sense of design both outside and inside. 
Where space Is heightened to raise the 
standards for today's ultra-modem lifestyle. 
1hese innovative Town Vi9as are incorporated 
with some of the most sophisticated features. 
\Nireless broadband. A modemistlc clubhouse 
with Roating POOl and CyberGym. Security 
services. 2 cqvered carparkS. And with only 
100 units, these prestigious Town Villas ensure 
complete privacy with the exclusivity of low 
density IMng. The most innovative home in the 
most Innovative environment in Malaysia. 
So check out this rare investment opportunity. 
Let your Mure home be one that blends with 
the Mure. 
Figure 32: Cyberia Sales Brochure (Source: Paramoden) 
The promotional rhetoric promoting Cyberia directly appealed to the rootless 
nature of the imagined target audience (Figure 32) when the project was 
launched in 1996. These were imagined to be members of Sklair's (2000) 
'transnational capitalist class' of individuals who were seen to be increasingly 
rootless in terms of mobility and residential patterns. Promotional adverts 
depict ICTs as central to the lives of smart home residents who were 
imagined to be 'always on the move'. For example, by Phase 3 (2010-2020) 
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of the MSC's development, staff in Cyberjaya would be deeply connected to 
transnational R&D communities found in 'intelligent' cities across the word 
(e.g. Silicon Valley, Taiwan, India, China). However, as examined in the 
previous chapter Cyberjaya developed as a 'slippery' space as it struggled to 
attract the foreign knowledge workers and research and development 
divisions of MNCs that were to spearhead the creation of 'Silicon Valley' 
Asia. Consequently, a mass migration of transnational technocratic elites 
into Cyberjaya never materialised and was replaced by three others type of 
transnational migration flow. 
Firstly, as Cyberjaya has struggled to live up to its own hype, interest from 
Malaysian property investors in Cyberia has diminished. As a result, the 
development has been promoted to potential property investors overseas, 
notably in Singapore ahd Hong Kong. The utopian branding mobilised by MK 
Land to promote Cyberia functions as scalar camouflage serving to mask the 
slow down in Cyberjaya's development in the aftermath of the Asian financial 
crisis, the burst of the dot.com bubble and the retirement of Dr. Mahathir 
from office. Large plots of land remain undeveloped, and MDEC has 
struggled to attract new companies to relocate to Cyberjaya. This had a 
knock-on effect in Cyberia, while Phases A and B sold well, the latest phase 
has been poorly received. The concept of an 'intelligent city' replete with 
smart homes, e-lifestyles and ubiquitous computing is a promotional tool still 
used for creating interest overseas where potential investors are less 
attuned to local conditions. Foreign interest has been attracted by the 
promise of high rental returns of 7 to 8% per year due to the high demand 
from the student market in Cyberjaya. 
'I think they should do it there [overseas]. Because we, as Malaysians, we 
know what's happening. I mean we are sensitive to the experience. We 
know that in 10 years nothing is happening, selling the same old concepts, 
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so we sell the concept to Hong Kong or Singapore then they will go "ah 
something new", or think this is something interesting.' 
(Research Interview: Director, C2Media emphasis in original) 
'Most of the time it is targeted to investors like expat magazine, airline 
magazine, my second home magazine, Singapore magazines. Very 
specialist. The market for this kind of thing is very niche and small. So 
people with platinum cards are either investors or have extra money, and 
they don't know what to do with the money. You know, so. We go for this 
type of magazine. They like our brand, the I.T., that kind of thing. I don't 
think it would work with the local investors.' 
(Research Interview: Marketing Manager, Cyberia) 
Secondly, Cyberia is home to a proportion of international staff from the SSO 
industry. This includes the country managers of MNCs in Cyberjaya who are 
sourced from head office typically on 2 to 4 year contracts to manage 
offshore back-office operations. Although the majority of individuals 
interviewed still chose live in Kuala Lumpur, rather than in Cyberia, to be 
closer urban amenities. Their occupational lifestyles are in contrast to the 
back-office workers of the previous section who typically share apartments to 
cut down on living costs and are characterised by their electronic mobility 
versus physical stasis, and irregular working hours following the temporal 
rhythms of a world elsewhere. Thirdly, international students of Cyberjaya's 
private universities are part of an educational elite sent from poorer countries 
from the region (e.g. Bangladesh, Indonesia) - or increasingly Africa - to be 
educated overseas. These students come to study at two of Malaysia's 
leading universities in their fields; the Limkokwing University College for 
Creative Technology and the Multimedia University. 
Despite claims that Cyberjaya would create an egalitarian 'knowledge based' 
community, Cyberia has become a domain for the privileged few. The latter 
are differentiated from the surrounding community based on their ability to 
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pay rather than to innovate. Cyberia is another 'premium networked space' 
(Graham 2000), like the offices of MNCs in Cyberjaya, splintering away from 
their proximate urban landscapes as they simultaneously connect with 
international circuits of economic, social and cultural exchange. It is a space 
which has forgotten about its hinterland. The surrounding spaces are 
'superfluous landscapes' (Nielsen 2002) that have been left behind, or 
abandoned by global capitalism. The example of E-Village from the last 
chapter is the most obvious example of an abandoned utopia. We can also 
include the neglected spaces of surrounding kampungs which are set 
outside the MSC vision by virtue of their 'non-intelligence'. 
7.4.2. Mobile Privatisation in the Networked World of Cyberia? 
The section illuminates the imagined effects technologies of the smart 
homes were planned to have on its target audience of: (a) a transnational 
technocratic elite; (b) would-be Malaysian 'intelligent' citizens. These socio-
spatial effects were framed in a technological manner by the state to create 
'intelligent' live/work practices in Cyberjaya. 
Firstly, the technologies of the smart home were planned as a mechanism 
for facilitating electronic mobility and global connectivity for a transnational 
technocratic elite. As examined in Chapter 4, these individuals were 
enthusiastically targeted by the state through a number of discursive 
strategies. Promotional pictures for Cyberia depict Western expat executives 
sitting in their ultra modern Cyberia living spaces punching away on laptops, 
presumably plugging into Castells' global 'space of flows'. These 
transnational elites only a click away from checking mail or logging in via 
their PDA at all times. In this context, the private individual sets the terms of 
engagement with the (global) external networked world while simultaneously 
maintaining secure (local) boundaries from the comfort of the smart home. 
The perceived constraining, disconnected locality of Cyberjaya was to be 
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overcome by ICTs thus providing these individuals with a global reach from a 
local setting bringing them closer to the 'anytime/anywhere' dream of 
digitised capitalism. The distance from Kuala Lumpur, or the world, can be 
overcome by teleworking to collapse the traditional boundaries between the 
office and the home, work and rest. With internet connectivity at home, 
workers would seamlessly connect to the privatised corporate intranets of 
the office to keep in touch with latest transnational R&D projects. Smart 
homes were synonymous with the ultimate goal of ubiquitous computing 
leading to technological liberation from place and geography so that 
residents do not have to leave the house at all. 
In the above terms, Cyberia was prepared as a capsule environment (de 
Cauter 2004) where human, machine and technology create a networked 
space electronically linked to other parts of the city (e.g. the office, the city 
command centre, Cyberia management). As Morley (2005: 438) notes, 
smart homes create a place where 'where comfort, safety and stability can 
happily coexist with the possibility of an instantaneous digitalised "flight" to 
elsewhere or the instantaneous importation of desired elements of 
"elsewhere" into the home'. This reworks Williams (1975) 'mobile 
privatisation' whereby homes in Cyberia substitute geographical mobility 
through communications technologies but privatisation through domestic 
architecture, and the creation of a secured community. In this sense smart 
forms of domesticity are predicated upon a retreat to a cocooned wired 
locale that allow us to go anywhere from nowhere. 
In Cyberia the smart home functions as both a physical and virtual capsule. 
Firstly, it is part of a segregated urban zone; a gated community where 
access is restricted, and security guards parole the perimeter in order to 
keep the location secure. This is symptomatic of 'enclave spaces' (Sidaway 
2007) in the developing world which house expatriate communities in 
secured, often militarised residential compounds (e.g. expats in mineral 
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economies in Africa, or the Oil industry in the Gulf region). Secondly, the 
smart home functions as a virtual capsule whereby the outside world is 
mediated primarily through the computer screen. City development plans 
imagined that residents would interact with the Cyberia community, pay their 
bills, and alert management of a problem remotely. Through the screen there 
is essentially very little that cannot be done. Digital connectivity is seen to 
replace the need for physical proximity to the city in the planning of Cyberia 
smart homes. This is the end state utopia employed by futurologists like 
Negroponte (1995) to mobilise anti-urban, end of the city scenarios 
discussed in Chapters 5 and 6. 
Technologies are imagined to create new kinds of 'a-lifestyles' that connect 
people to each other, to buildings, and the network with the technologies of 
the smart home. By investing in 'high-ceiling, high-tech, high-end' (Cyberia 
Advertisement, MK Land 2006) living, residents can fast-track themselves 
towards ultra modern living. The interactive world of the smart home is 
rephrased as a 'space-age living environment' in which residents can live a 
stress free simplified existence through 'intelligent' ICT usage focused on 
'new economy' practices. As the following Cyberia marketing slogans show, 
being plugged in, wired to the network is an essential component of 
everyday life - though as the remainder of the chapter suggests, this 'gee 
whiz' futurism outlined below is never realised in practice. 
'There is no better place to immerse yourself in everything high-tech.' 
(Advertisement, MK Land 2004) 
'Imagine going about your daily life from within your home or outside. 
Whether it's doing your banking transactions or communicating with 
business associates, you now have the freedom to move about as you 
please. And still stay connected.' 
(Advertisement, MK Land 2006) 
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Secondly, Cyberia was constructed as both an ideological and material 
space for producing 'intelligent' citizenship where would-be local residents 
could also 'be part of the wired world' (Advertisement, MK Land 1999). The 
project was billed as 'more than a property development' (Research 
Interview: Cyberia Marketing Manager) self-consciously promoting itself as 
constitutive of the MSC's broader socio-cultural goals of national 
development. The homes were the symbolic front line for the transition 
towards becoming a developed, technologically savvy nation. Advertising 
slogans aimed at domestic investors strike a nationalistic cord with buyers 
where the purchase of smart home was marketed as an investment in 
national social development; thereby preparing the self and the family for an 
imminent 'information society'. This links back to the discursive architectures 
promoted by Mahathir to sell the project as an economic and social 
imperative at the national scale to which 'there is no alternative' (Chapter 4). 
Cyberia's advertising constructed an aspiration landscape upon which 
Malaysians could assert their new national self-confidence. Although smart 
homes have traditionally been a toy for the wealthy here - with some price 
cuts - they are available to middle-class consumers. The promotional 
rhetoric appeals to a new generation of (mainly Malay) middle-class 
Malaysians asserting their new found prosperity through material wealth 
such as property (Jomo 1995). 
'Embark on life in the future of the nation.' 
(Advertisement, MK Land 2006) 
'As the world surges forward in high gear towards developing absolute 
lifestyles. Cyberjaya progresses imminently to building the generation of the 
future. Come, invest in the k-economy. And join the ranks of those who have 
chosen to set up their home in the wired community. Own a property at 
Cyberia Smart Homes in Malaysia's I.T. City.' 
(Advertisement, MK Land 1998) 
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Interviews with MDEC, and Cyberview outlined two effects smart homes 
were designed to produce. Firstly, residents of smart homes will become 
heavy users of ICTs in their everyday lives and utilise the flagship 
applications. This is framed in a technologically deterministic manner 
whereby the provision of ICTs is to produce specific effects so that residents 
vote, communicate, conduct business, innovate, pay their bills, all online. 
This perspective homogenises Cyberjaya's population and neglects the 
influence of gender, age, education on technological adoption. Furthermore, 
it assumes residents have relevant technological expertise and knowhow. 
Secondly, immersion in a technologically saturated environment will enable 
residents to both become and pioneer a new 'intelligent' generation. As 
Bunnell and Coe (2005) observe, promotional materials for the MSC 
frequently featured children to appeal to the desires of 'suitably affluent, 
middle-class parents ... and the nurturing of intelligent, global families'. The 
MSC policy makers conceptualised a linear progression for a new generation 
of would-be 'intelligent citizens' from the smart school, to the smart home, to 
the knowledge economy. Following this technologically determined path, 
generational 'leapfrogging' articulates perfectly with Mahathir's 'Wawasan 
2020' which imagined Malaysia would become: 
'A scientific and progressive society, a society that is innovative and forward 
looking, one that is not only a consumer of technology, but also a contributor 
to the scientific and technological civilisation of the future.' 
(Mahathir 1991) 
However, Cyberjaya was framed as both a national 'test bed' and 
experimental site for 'intelligent' living. On the one hand it was promoted 
according to utopian premises of freedom and technological liberation and 
on the other it facilitates state control and monitoring as a differentiated zone 
of state (neoliberal) governmentality (Ong 2000a; 2000b; 2004; Bunnell and 
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Coe 2005; Ong 2006; 2007). As discussed in Chapters 4 and 5, Cyberjaya 
was conceived as an extra-territorial zone for limiting potentially harmful 
effects of I.T.-facilitated global flows into local places in 'information age' 
Malaysia. The infiltration of information technology in the home can be read 
as an extension of techniques of disciplinary power by the state which is 
keen to use this city scale electronic panoptican for its own ends. 
For example, the CCC was planned as a giant surveillance centre which 
electronically monitors, controls and surveys the city through a giant screen 
of live video feeds from Cyberjaya's CCTV system. The CCC also monitors 
internet traffic in smart homes and has direct links to the community services 
provided in Cyberia. In this context, the smart home can be recast as a locus 
in the production of new systems of production and control for 
'informationalised capitalism' (e.g. teleworking) and a site for more pervasive 
means of state social regulation and management. 
'The boundaries between individuals and individual's sense of privacy in the 
home, between institutions and corporations, are indistinct and permeable, 
constantly crossed by traffic of information flows, undermining completely 
the model of the private individual ensconced in an enclosed private space.' 
(Allen 2004: 269) 
Specifically, the smart home can be interpreted as a mobile technology for 
the (invisible) management and regulation of 'intelligent citizenship' and a 
firewall against harmful outside influences to Malay(sian) value systems, 
culture, and religion. The smart home is a further means by which to keep 
the community under control (via electronic surveillance, covert censorship) 
and limit any negative spill over effects of. foreign influence (e.g. political 
dissent) to the wider nation. True 'intelligent' socioeconomic development 
through genuine educational change and electronic freedom could have 
posed a threat to the government, as occurred before with online 
mobilisation of the "Reformasi" movement in 1998 (Chapter 5). However, the 
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promotional rhetoric ignores the implications of home automation for 
increased data collection, socio-spatial division, and the monitoring of 
individuals in favour of the simple celebration of opportunity and techno-
liberation. 
Added to the above, networked infrastructures supplying the smart home are 
configured in highly selective and unequal ways, their distribution reinforcing 
existing spatial division in the landscape. Utopian rhetoric glosses over how 
the city excludes 'non-intelligent' others through physical boundaries and 
gates but also the electronic terminals that monitor - and thus secure - the 
boundary between insiders and outsiders, home and not home. Smart 
homes may provide better connectivity, for some, but they also drive 
economic and social marginalisation for others. For example, Cyberjaya 
marginal socioeconomic groups include former plantation workers now 
employed as cleaners or security guards servicing corporate headquarters 
and exclusive condominiums and the imported construction workers from 
Indonesia living in shanty towns on the periphery of Cyberjaya (Figure 33). 
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Figure 33: Construction Worker Housing in Cyberjaya Located Against the 
Backdrop of the HSBC office (Source: Author's Photograph) 
Grand technological claims to universal connectivity obscure the uneven 
infrastructure provision within Cyberjaya. For instance, the wireless network 
is privatised and in order to connect to the network residents must pay a fee 
and subscribe with the local internet service provider, MyKris.90 Though 
Cyberia homes are broadband ready residents have to contact a local 
internet service provider in order to get connected. Normally internet is 
provided by Telekoms Malaysia which has a virtual monopoly in the 
Malaysian internet market. In Cyberia a subsidiary company called MyKris 
lease bandwidth from TMNet and resell internet to residents at a higher cost 
90 There are several wireless networks in Cyberia owned by residents that. if not password encrypted, 
offer unrestricted access. They are popular with residents who hack into these networks for free 
access. 
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than is normal.91 This sits comfortably with neoliberal practices which divides 
those provided with low bandwidth public infrastructures from those 
connected to privatised telecommunications networks. For the marginalised 
groups at the bottom of the global hierarchy these telecommunications 
provision are completely out of reach. Most of the individuals servicing 
Cyberjaya (e.g. cleaners, bus drivers, security guards) remarked in casual 
conversation that they had never used a computer. 
Evidence indicates beneath the egalitarian hype of internet access for all 
there is a clear 'political economy of cyberspace' (Luke 1999). The power of 
who owns and controls the networked technological infrastructures is 
ignored in Cyberjaya's touting of its own potential via the excessive rhetoric 
of the 'information age'. The operational architectures of Cyberia as fortified 
enclave and privatised network set limits on who is inside/outside, access 
granted/ access denied, and which citizens are compatible/incompatible with 
'intelligent living'. By focusing on the prestige market, developers have 
ignored the practical uses of smart applications, or wider societal benefits. It 
is unclear just how 'ordinary Malaysians' can participate in this version of 
high-tech modernity; but the message is those that do will have to pay. 
These high-tech enclaves and premium network spaces exist in stark 
contrast to the abandoned landscapes of the excluded in the MSC. 
7.4.3. Disentangling the Symbolic Production and Material Effects of 
ICTUsage 
Building on the above arguments, two discursive disjunctures in Cyberia's 
smart home utopia can be identified: (a) non-adoption of 'intelligent' home 
automation systems; (b) urban disconnection and emerging insurgent forms 
of digital citizenship. These features of everyday textures of ICT usage in 
91 More information about MyKris can be found at http://www.mykris.neUweb/main.html 
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Cyberia undermine Cyberia's promotional hype and help socio-spatially 
situate the experiences of individuals living in Cyberia. 
Firstly, there was a low adoption rate of home automaton systems amongst 
residents interviewed. Lack of education, a shortage of local experts, the 
absence of training hindered the cultivation of 'intelligent' forms of living at 
the household scale. Most property investors purchased homes based on 
their investment potential then rented homes to students or workers in 
Cyberjaya and cared little about if, or how, the technologies would be used. 
This contrasts to the initial excitement described by 'early adopters' before 
moving into the Cyberia smart home complex. Their expectations were 
informed by promotional brochures which played heavily on high-tech 
futurism. 
'I remember when we moved into Cyberia, we were all excited, it is called 
Cyberia smart homes, so it is suppose to be an intelligent homes, we 
thought it would be like James Bond type gadgets.' 
(Research Interview: Cyberia resident 4) 
'Well what do we mean by smart? I think if you want to walk in and clap, or 
say "lights on", then it happens. In Cyberia it is not like that, you know like a 
house that can understand you. Voice recognition, thumb or eye scanning. 
These things. Alarms are high-tech. This is the technology right. Many 
things like this. This is the picture from the brand. I expected a lot from this 
place, but so far I didn't find much of it, it has been disappointing.' 
(Research Interview: Cyberia resident 6) 
Another resident imagined that the home security systems would be more 
advanced than entering a pin to enter. 
'Okay for example, I think we thought that for a smart home building it 
should be a very new design, and they are using new stuff. Like swipe cards 
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instead of punch cards, and these kinds of technologies. Like also for the 
house, they are using not a key, but just to use their thumb to scan to enter. 
So it is easier. This is my vision of how life in Cyberia should be. It's like 
beyond our imagination, really cutting edge.' 
(Research Interview: Cyberia resident 6) 
The smart home system was developed by a local company called 
Strandcom Technologies Sdn Bhd92 in collaboration with MK Land. Each 
home is operated via an 'lntellipad' located on the wall close to the entrance. 
The home automation system has several main functions: an alarm system 
with interactive instructions for human voice operation, an answering 
machine function for incoming calls, home automation of lighting and air 
conditioning. The system can be upgraded to enable remote access using a 
mobile phone, or PC to connect to a home web interface. 
During ethnographic fieldwork, 30 in-depth interviews were conducted with 
Cyberia residents. Results found limited adoption of smart home automation 
systems. The main obstacle to usage appeared to be a lack of knowledge 
about both the functions of the system and how to use it. Every home should 
be provided with an instruction manual but with a high turnover of residents 
amongst the population many manuals had been lost, or passwords for the 
system forgotten. In interview, Cyberia management distanced themselves 
from any responsibility to maintain or educate residents about the smart 
home features. One resident remarked how she cut the power supply to the 
lntellipad because she feared that it would run up her electricity bill, while 
another resident disabled his alarm and was then burgled. These findings 
are consistent with prior research on the adoption of smart home 
technologies that highlighted the influence of perception, expertise, and prior 
92 A Malaysian company that specialises in 'smart home solutions'. 
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knowledge on usage (Mathieson 1991; Taylor and Todd 1995; Brown and 
Venkatesh 2005; Brown et al. 2006).93 
Residents often had unrealistic expectations. They drew upon the on the 
imagery of smart homes in promotional posters where residents inhabited a 
technological utopia living futuristic e-lifestyles always plugged in to one form 
of technology or another. After a while many residents found limited usage 
for the in-built technologies. Gadgets such as turning lights on remotely 
rapidly lost their appeal once the limited practical uses were revealed. One 
resident, a government worker in Putrajaya saw these as gimmicks used by 
the developers to entice investors in without every considering how residents 
would actually use the technologies. These potted incidents serve to 
illustrate how the project of 'intelligent' citizenship is unmade from below. On 
the ground resident interaction with the smart home is characterised by 
technophobia. Many were ignorant about what the technologies did, or 
exhibited general apathy regarding how turning lights on and off remotely 
can benefit their in daily lives. There appears to be little regard on the part of 
the designers as to what kind of smart home residents wanted to live in or 
how usage of an 'lntellipad' would create a new generation of 'intelligent' 
citizen's. 
Secondly, while few residents used the home automation systems research 
found a high concentration in Internet usage both in terms of penetration and 
number of hours spent online. Every Cyberia resident recruited in casual 
conservation or formally interviewed (30 residents) had Internet access at 
home, and all were regular users of the Internet in their everyday lives. For 
interviewees being connected was a coping strategy for dealing with 
atomised daily life and feelings of being isolated or disconnected. This 
evidence builds on my argument from Chapter 5 concerning the design of 
93 The research also highlights the influence of age, gender, education on adoption. Although in 
Cyberia this is less relevant as all interviewees were non-adopters. 
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Cyberjaya as a disciplined space in which non-work distractions were 
removed. Emotional detachment is compounded in Cyberia's gated 
community which is physically detached from the outside world. Cyberia is 
deliberately designed as a self-sufficient complex94 secured by guardhouses, 
and walled by perimeter fence from the outside. Cyberia's location is far from 
local amenities and transport links to nearby Putrajaya are poor. Many 
residents in interview referred to feeling unhappy because it felt like 
Cyberjaya was 'closed off from the world'. 
'Cyberjaya is cut off, it can be quite a boring place. My computer connects 
me back to the world. I think [since] 2003. It changed slowly, now I wait for 
my friends to go online, and then talk to them. Now I never switch off my 
computer, 99% of my friends are the same. We are always connected or 
something. This is a new culture for me.' 
(Research Interview: MMU student 8) 
Urban disconnection led communities of residents to mobilise digital forms of 
connectivity to compensate for their perceived and actual physical stasis. 
Like technologies before it- e.g. the telephone (de Sola Pool 1977; Fischer 
1988) - the internet is used to overcome geographical constraints across 
space and in time. ICTs were used by residents to transcend the limitations 
of Cyberjaya's geography as disconnected space. In particular technologies 
were adopted to address distance to the city, and Cyberjaya's separation 
from Kuala Lumpur. Being connected digitally was a substitute for the offline, 
physical spaces of the city. Heavy usage of the internet had two main 
implications for daily routines amongst Cyberia residents. Firstly, being 
online became a form of recreation in Cyberia. Residents volunteered to 
keep simple of diaries of their everyday routines charting which technologies 
they used at which times. Many students returned home from class in the 
afternoon and 'went online' to 'pass the time' by downloading films, listening 
94 Cyberia has 3 restaurants, 2 convenience stores, laundry facilities, and a gym. 
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to music. 95 Residents spent time catching up on news from their home 
countries or communicating with people back home. Plugging into 
transnational information flows across 'cybertime' (Laguerre 2004), or 
communication with friends and family gave residents the feeling of being 
connected to the world through tele-presence. As with the previous example 
of SSO workers, 'disembedding mechanisms' restructure social activity 
beyond localised contexts and re-orientates them across time and space. 
Secondly, residents participated in virtual communities through software 
applications such as MSN Messenger96 or online gaming groups. MSN 
became an important mechanism through which Cyberia residents would 
feel connected to a wider imagined (often transnational) community beyond 
the boundary of Cyberia, or the city. This speaks to Bauman's (2001) 
assertion that the home is no longer an 'enclosed' space but now a 
'phantasmagoric space' where electronic means of communication are 
bringing closer spaces of the near (e.g. household) and far (e.g. global). By 
'being online', as their MSN status would show, they were in the social 
network but also simultaneously facilitating the radical intrusion of global 
networks into domestic spaces of the home, or the 'domestication of 
elsewhere'. 
Ariane was an Indonesian student studying in Cyberjaya. Her experience 
was typical of others in Cyberia. In interview she noted how her textures of 
ICT usage had changed since she moved from Kelana Jaya in metropolitan 
Kuala Lumpur to Cyberia. 
'Yes, it is very funny now, I open my MSN and my friends are always online, 
24 hours a day, they have nothing to do. It's broadband, it is always 
connected, and we can use it without restriction. Most evenings people will 
95 This high network usage of downloading films may help to explain the slow internet speeds in 
Cyberia. 
96 An instant messaging software application, first developed by Microsoft in 1995, that allows users 
online to type messages and converse with one another in real-time. 
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be chatting online. It is the culture here, how we pass the time. If the internet 
connection goes down for example, we are very bored at home, nothing to 
do, just very bored. Before when we lived in KJ [Kelana Jaya] we would just 
go to the city and hang out. Cyberjaya doesn't have things to do like in KL, 
so we are isolated here.' 
(Research Interview: Cyberia resident 13, my emphasis) 
This example demonstrates how Ariane experiences the offline (situated, 
disconnected, embedded) and online (mobile, connected, virtual proximity) 
spaces of Cyberjaya in different ways. Living in Cyberia evokes physical 
stasis through urban disconnection but electronic mobility through new 
textures of ICT usage. This contrasts to her previous experience as an active 
user of offline spaces as a resident of Kelana Jaya which is connected to 
downtown Kuala Lumpur by LRT97 within a 10 minutes. Although regularly 
checking her emails and course timetables online Ariane perceived ICTs in 
terms of their functional use. Now as a resident of Cyberia she feels 
disconnected from the city both materially in terms of distance to Kuala 
Lumpur, and imaginatively through her labelling Cyberjaya as a 'ghost city'. 
This sense of physical isolation is compensated through virtual connections, 
and being 'always available' through the computer. Therefore, Ariane 
substitutes her physical proximity to friends in Kuala Lumpur - which are a 
four-hour round trip away on public transport - with virtual proximity. 
Research in Cyberia found a culture where residents felt a constant need to 
be connected to the network, to be 'always be online'. Ariane would leave 
her computer online 24 hours a day and rarely turned the machine off. When 
out of the house she would change her MSN status to 'away' which meant 
she still appeared online, and her friends could still message her. She spoke 
about feeling anxious if she was away from her computer for too long, as 
being 'offline' meant in effect that she was out of the social loop for friends 
and organising activities. Reliance on the internet for recreation led to 
97 Kuala Lumpur Light Railway Transit (LRT) system covers the Kuala Lumpur Metropolitan Region. 
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increased privatism as individuals were isolated in their homes, but 
connected online. 
In another example, Lance was an administrator for an online discussion 
forum for Cyberia. He was part of a community of online gaming adopters in 
Cyberia and frequently organised online games against other Cyberia 
residents98 . Interviewees were mostly male, and all were students from 
MMU. This led to the development of nascent communities practicing of 
online gaming (Figure 34). Online gaming was another means through which 
residents in Cyberia would come together virtually for recreation. Often 
games would last for several hours every night and became a regular 
mechanism for 'passing time' in Cyberjaya. Some garners described having 
their life taken over by an addiction to online gaming. This evidence speaks 
to a growing literature on the cultural and social impacts of online gaming 
communities (Kline and Alridge 2002; Manninen 2003). 
98 Online garners favoured role playing games such as Medal of Honour (an army simulation where 
participants fight against each other as individual soldiers) or sports simulations (mainly football). 
340 
Figure 34: Wire in Cyberia Connecting a Community of Online Garners 
(Source: Author's Photograph) 
Evidence suggests urban disconnection and the creation of a sensorially 
impoverished environment led to inertia where the most important piece of 
smart home furniture is the chair. This resonates with Virilio's (1987a) 
assertion that high-tech immersion has made human bodies superfluous, 
disabled and sedentary. These would-be 'intelligent' citizens were not 
necessarily spending their free time in Cyberjaya's 'innovative' green spaces 
or engaged in the MSC's range of flagship applications. Both narratives 
demonstrate how technologies in Cyberia are being reworked, and 
reappropriated from below through everyday practices of resistance. 
Through online gaming communities, or using the internet as a recreational 
tool, ICTs are being used in a number of unintended ways and have led to 
the creation of insurgent forms of digital citizenship where residents 
appropriate ICTs for their own ends. This is at odds with technologically 
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determined plans for how the state imagined the smart home would be 
embedded in the national landscape. The goal to connect Cyberia residents 
to flagship applications didn't materialise, but instead new forms of digital 
connectivity have materialised through patterns of Internet usage whereby 
going online becomes a substitute for physical activities and interactions in 
Cyberia. 
This raises broader questions concerning what constitutes 'intelligent living'? 
Firstly, Cyberia residents did not make a correlation between heavy usage of 
the Internet and leading 'smart lifestyles', or becoming more technology 
sawy citizens. These technologies were part of the mundane, taken for 
granted life worlds of residents. Computers, mobile phones have become so 
ubiquitous for Cyberia residents that they are considered banal and have 
'produced the ordinary' (Amin and Thrift 2002). Upon asking residents if they 
felt they were living more high-tech lifestyles since coming to Cyberjaya, all 
said no, they were not. Residents did not correlate 'being online' with 'being 
smart'. Logging on to the Internet on a daily, or hourly basis was an activity 
which most residents simply took for granted. Secondly, the state defined 
'intelligent living' as more than simple internet usage and articulated the 
concept with broader social and economic development goals. However, the 
high-tech futurism through which the MSC Malaysia project was launched 
failed to address the practical implications of: (a) what constituted 'intelligent' 
living beyond a tight focus on usage of flagship applications; (b) their 
contribution to the economic development goals outline in the state's 
'Wawasan 2020'; (c) how 'intelligence' could be measured or evaluated; (d) 
technologically determined plans for societal transformation. 
7.5. Conclusion 
The chapter has challenged the social construction of neoliberal 
globalisation and transnational political-economic forces 'from above' by 
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illuminating everyday practices that cut across Cyberjaya's landscape to 
produce disorderly, unexpected human geographies. The chapter addressed 
globalised working and living practices as a critical lens to how the high-tech 
spaces of the city are socio-spatially situated and imagined by its residents. 
Through the two vignettes the chapter has further shown the disjuncture . 
evident in Cyberjaya's claims to produce new forms of 'intelligent' living and 
working. 
Firstly, in-depth research with staff from MNCs examined the everyday work 
practices of the global back-office. This showed how I.T.-facilitated 
globalised work practices technologies are dislocating the individual 
experiences of local time-spaces and leading to the production of new 
hybridised identities. Secondly, through the narrative of the Cyberia smart 
homes fieldwork evidence questions Cyberia's claims to produce a 
globalised residential space and a national site for 'intelligent' living. To this 
end, fieldwork evidence revealed how residents experience everyday life in 
Cyberia and appropriate technologies of the smart home for their own ends 
in the production of insurgent forms of digital citizenship. 
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Chapter 8. Conclusion 
8. 1. Introduction 
The final chapter draws together the overall conclusion of the thesis. Section 
8.2 outlines the main empirical findings of the thesis. Section 8.3 discusses 
the main policy implications of the study. Section 8.4 suggests agendas and 
avenues for undertaking further research, both within the specialist field of 
technopole planning in Southeast Asia, and the broader research field of 
ICTs, urban development, and urban futures. The final Section, 8.5, is the 
postscript. 
8.2. Empirical Findings 
The aim upon which research conducted was to disentangle the symbolic 
and material effects of technopole planning practices in Cyberjaya. 
Accordingly, the thesis sought to answer the following four research 
questions: 
1) What is the nature of the Malaysian 'information society'? 
2) How are the discursive architectures of the 'information society' 
inscribed on the landscape? 
3) To what extent does Cyberjaya's discursive framing map onto its 
existing everyday geographies? 
4) How is everyday life technologically mediated in Cyberjaya? 
Chapters 4 and 5 addressed research questions 1 and 2 and critically 
examined the discursive mobilisation of the MSC as a textual space, 
focusing on how specific discourses were mobilised, by whom, and to what 
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effects. Chapters 6 and 7 addressed research questions 3 and 4 as the 
empirical enquiry critically unpacked the planned vision of Cyberjaya as 
'intelligent city' to dissect how the development was experienced 'on the 
ground'. Three significant geographical consequences of technopole 
planning were identified: (a) the variegated 'splintering effects' - e.g. gated 
communities, enclave spaces, and urban securitisation - operational in the 
development of Cyberjaya; (b) the political economic geographies of 
Cyberjaya as 'slippery space' in becoming a new global back-office hub; (c) 
the technological mediation of everyday life and its unplanned spatia-
temporal effects on staff in Cyberjaya's SSO industries and residents of the 
Cyberia smart home complex. 
The main theoretical argument of the thesis has been to move from an 
emphasis on the abstract capabilities of information technology per se, to the 
complex processes through which technologies are appropriated in 
technopole planning practices, the political-symbolic work they undertake, 
and how this interrelates with contemporary urban development. The thesis 
has focused on both the discursive forces shaping technopole planning 
practices, and has promoted an analytical sensitivity to their material 
consequences in the built environment. This is an important field of enquiry 
because often empirical studies have failed to critically unpack the urban 
consequences and political ramifications of techriopole planning practices as 
'information society' discourses have been appropriated in regional and 
national development plans. 
The context for the empirical enquiry was threefold. Firstly, the project was 
driven by a conceptual critique of 'information society' discourses and their 
theoretical laxity towards technological determinism. This theorisation tends 
to obfuscate the complex ways in which technologies and cities interrelate, 
with varied political, economic, social and spatial consequences. Secondly, 
the study emerged in response to the proliferation of technopole planning 
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strategies in East and Southeast Asia promoted by governments as strategic 
urban sites for plugging into a hyped, globalised 'new economy' with 
imagined universal benefits for all citizens. Thirdly, the research critically 
focused on how notions of state developmentalism, high-tech modernity, and 
national socio-cultural transformation were woven together in Malaysia's 
MSC mega-project. 
The main empirical findings were discussed in Chapters 4 to 7 respectively. 
By synthesising empirical evidence with the individual research questions 
identified above three main thesis conclusions can be identified. 
(a) The MSC as a Textual Space Mobilised Through the Utopian 
Discursive Architectures of the Information Society' and 'New Economy'. 
In response to research questions 1 and 2, the first conclusion observes that 
place marketing strategies for the MSC far exceeded the project's material 
capabilities or limitations. Moves from the state and Mahathir to position 
MSC as a symbolic flagship project incorporating notions of neoliberal 
globalisation, regional inter-urban competition, and post-colonial 
technological independence were reflexive, self-conscious strategies. 
Utopian claims that the MSC would create a global 'test bed' in which the 
'the whole world would be invited to realise the benefits of ICTs' were 
entirely symbolic or imaginative, partly driven by Mahathir's vanity, and 
grandiose in the extreme. The projection of Cyberjaya as the flagship site for 
'intelligent-led' development were designed to promote the global visibility of 
Malaysia and position the city as an investible location for I.T. industries. 
These place promotional strategies were a key resource for the state priority 
of projecting an image of 'information age' Malaysia as a 'world-class' 
location. 
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Chapters 4 and 5 examined the processes by which 'information age' 
imaginings were mobilised and inscribed on the landscape by transnational 
planning firms as the 'intelligent city' was superficially positioned by the state 
as a locale free from Malaysian vested interests and a proposed physical 
hub for R&D activities. Technopole planning was conceived as a linear 
process through which a global economic node would be created, which 
would attract foreign companies which, in turn, would transfer expertise and 
technology to local industry with the effects of fast-tracking national 
development to a proposed 'Wawasan 2020'. These imagined 
socioeconomic impacts were mobilised through a series of 'information age' 
myths that were packaged and sold across multiple scales in an effort to 
'sell' the MSC. Firstly, there was the myth of technological determinism and 
neoliberal spatial transcendence in which investment in ICTs were seen to 
move Malaysia from the periphery to the centre of the 'anytime/anywhere' 
global economy. Secondly, it was assumed that the creation of a wired 
environment set within an 'intelligent garden city' would foster the 
entrepreneurial conditions for Silicon Valley replication and the creative 
development of a 'new economy'. Thirdly, that investment in ICTs would 
enable the country to 'leapfrog' up the value chain and become a developed 
nation by the year 2020. In turn, ICTs would produce wider social and 
cultural benefits enabling Malaysia to become an 'intelligent' nation. 
Although, beyond an emphasis on I.T. as a future driver of national 
economic competitiveness, the criteria by which 'intelligent' development 
was to be judged was never defined by the state. Fourthly, that the Malaysia 
state was powerless in the face of neoliberal globalisation and must respond 
to this 'new era' or be left further behind in the race for economic 
development. 
Chapters 5 and 6 illuminated how this discursive framing mapped onto 
everyday experience in Cyberjaya and examined: (a) how living, breathing, 
corporeal human beings inhabit 'intelligent' live/work spaces; (b) the material 
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effects of producing a deregulated, neoliberalised space when the state 'rolls 
back', and multinational capital moves in; (c) the spatial outcomes of 
technopole planning when projects are put in the hands of private 
developers and interests. Empirical material critically examined how socio-
spatial transformations mobilised in the MSC were deliberately camouflaged 
in a cloud of 'information age' hyperbole. Underneath this seductive gloss 
the project facilitated an urban secessionary movement of MNCs and 
technocratic elites to a 'resort style' urban enclave at massive state expense 
and social and political costs for those groups unlucky enough to be in the 
way. Research examined how the discourse of 'intelligent development' 
functioned as a political vehicle for maintaining specific vested interests 
which manufactured the baseless image of Cyberjaya as 'intelligent city' to 
differentiate the city vis-a-vis its economic competitors. However, this urban 
futurology fetishism has functioned as spatial camouflage by masking critical 
geographies of socio-spatial splintering that have accompanied the 
production of neoliberal place making strategies in Malaysia. 
(b) Cyberjaya as a 'Slippery Space' in the MSC's Emerging Landscape of 
Neoliberal Modernity 
Through a range of urban entrepreneurial strategies the Malaysian state 
sought to create 'fixing point' to both rescale national development at the 
urban scale and reterritorialise global economic flows in national territory. To 
this end, Cyberjaya version 1.0 was conceived as wired, interconnected 
urban zone and an 'ideal environment' for I.T. facilitated 'new economy' 
processes and conducive to innovative live/work practices. The 'garden city' 
and 'cybernetic city' planning models were fused together via transnational 
planning practices that were to create an 'exemplary' global technopole to 
embody Malaysia's putative 'information society'. In response to research 
question 3, evidence has highlighted the disjuncture between the symbolic 
positioning of Cyberjaya as 'sticky place' in the global economic system and 
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its material reality as 'slippery space'. The research has observed that 
contrary to state led rhetoric of creating a global node and an inclusive 
national site for 'intelligent' high-tech. development, Cyberjaya version 2.0 
has become little more than a disconnected, foreign direct investment 
enclave characteristic of emerging neoliberal modernities in Southeast Asia. 
Beneath the hype of the 'intelligent city' sloganeering the development more 
accurately resembles a mundane business park. The concept of 'national 
development' has been reduced to the privileged property rights of foreign 
capital with the Malaysian government a willing actor in proffering its labour 
for MNCs. 
Cyberjaya's technopole planning strategy has created an 'enclave urbanism' 
symbolically and physically splintered from surrounding national territory 
through three mechanisms. Firstly, Cyberjaya has become an extra-territorial 
space governed by distinct political and legal infrastructures, as set out in the 
'Bill of Guarantees' that do not apply to rest of the country. Secondly, these 
guarantees together with a range of financial incentives were deliberately 
mobilised to encourage MNCs and their staff to relocate to a delimited 
spatial milieu where they could be effectively managed by the state. This has 
produced a fortified 'intelligent' urbanism characterised by the presence of 
MNCs housed in secured corporate campuses which are provided with 
specialist networked infrastructures to enable them to link up to the global 
informational economy. Management level expatriate labour was 'imported' 
from overseas to run the back-office support functions and is housed in 
gated communities in Cyberjaya or downtown Kuala Lumpur. 
Thirdly, the thesis has avoided any suggestion that Cyberjaya has become a 
'global bubble' simply inserted into Malaysia thereby producing a 
decontextualised space that writes over local histories, geographies or 
politics. Cyberjaya has become a hybridised site which is partly 
deterritorialised to the global via its connection to, for example, transnational 
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flows of foreign direct investment and global circuits of information 
exchange; but is also deeply territorialised in the spatial milieu and cultural 
politics of the local. As Chapters 5 and 6 observed, Cyberjaya's 
appropriative technopole model of globalising economic development has 
also found ways of imbricating 'indigenous' tradition (e.g. 'Disneyfied' Malay-
Islamic vernacular) with global ambition in the practices of urban modernity. 
The state functions as a mediator between the conflicting forces of a 
predatory inward migration of globalised capitalism and an indigenous 
capitalism seeking to internationalise. These processes are further bound up 
in Malaysia's contested geographies of nation building and complex 
racialised politics that the thesis has engaged with. 
In identifying Cyberjaya as a 'slippery space', the thesis does not seek to 
replace the utopianism of the 'information society' with an equally bleak, 
dystopian urban picture of neoliberal capital's unfolding production strategies 
in Southeast Asia. For example, despite failing to live up to its own excessive 
hype, the project has become an emerging hub for SSO activities in the 
global economy. Global coalitions of consultants (e.g. McKinsey, AT 
Kearney) have emphasised the potential of Malaysia's low cost, educated, 
multicultural, multilingual workforce in adding value to the aim of becoming a 
new global hub for the offshore service economy. In turn, the unplanned 
growth of this industry has served to create jobs for Malaysians and upgrade 
human capital through exposure to globalised work practices within MNCs. 
However, as the state becomes increasingly reliant on MNCs in the country's 
export economy platform it is unclear, in the event that economic conditions 
altered, just how long would these jobs last. With the rise of regional 
(Vietnam, the Philippines) and global (China) competitors in. the SSO 
industry it appears to be a case of when, and not if, Malaysia loses its 
competitive advantage in the sector. 
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c) Disentangling the Planned Effects of 'intelligent' Live/Work Practices and 
the Technological Mediation of Everyday Life in Cyberjaya 
In addition to repositioning Malaysia for high-tech investment under the 
auspices of the 'new economy' the MSC sought to promote new 'intelligent' 
ways of being and seeing for Malaysians. The state, in alliance with 'foreign 
experts' (e.g. Gates, Ohmae, and the lAP), sought to formulate an urban 
vision for the 'information society' based on the proliferation of ICTs across 
social, economic, and political life. As Chapters 4 and 5 observed, Cyberjaya 
was founded on a modernist governmental faith in creating a new generation 
of 'intelligent citizens' to be nurtured in a new national 'test bed' for 
'information age' Malaysia. Cyberjaya was conceived as an 'intelligent 
garden city' and designed to create a new urbanity in which residents would 
realise the universal benefits of information technology to engage in high 
value-added 'new economy' work practices. 
In response to research questions 3 and 4 the thesis has endeavoured to 
critically unpack these technologically and ecologically deterministic 
narratives and disentangle the utopian visions of the MSC vis-a-vis its 
material effects. Rather than accepting optimistic projections of a Malaysian 
'information society', and the urban utopia of Cyberjaya as its consequence, 
the research mobilised ethnographic methodologies to examine how 
everyday life was technologically mediated. Problematically, state mobilised 
visions of 'intelligent living' preceded the material completion or habitation of 
Cyberjaya, and attention to how people would live there was an afterthought 
in city development plans. There is a lacuna of empirical work examining 
how these built environments interacted with a new generation of residents 
or how the 'information society' discourses used to symbolically clothe the 
city were enfolded into citizen's perceptions and everyday experiences. To 
this end the thesis identified two alternative narratives that deviate from state 
mobilised development scripts positioning Cyberjaya as emblematic of a new 
351 
Malaysian urban modernity onto which all Malaysians could eventually be 
mapped. 
Firstly, the thesis has argued against projections of a placeless globalism, in 
which the 'new economy' functions as an inevitable process operating in 
some 'rarefied stratosphere', by examining the practices through which 
transnational economic processes are constituted. Research captured 
everyday geographies of transnational back-office staff and identified three 
practices symptomatic of worker experiences at the margins of the global 
economic system: (1) colonisation by time; (2) the behavioural decoupling of 
time zones; and (3) geographical location-masking. Ethnographic research 
with back-office staff captured the lived experience of individuals caught up 
in and mediating the offshore information economy. These narratives 
elucidate the spatia-temporal 'splintering' effects as they are experienced 
through the micro processes of 'the everyday' in Cyberjaya. The research 
has highlighted in contrast to the 'intelligent' R&D work planned for 
Cyberjaya version 1.0, in Cyberjaya version 2.0 technology has enrolled 
Malaysians into routinised back-office work · practices underpin by a 
postcolonial relationship of Malaysian dependency on Western cultural-
economic flows. 
Secondly, Cyberia smart homes were conceptualised as a wired locale 
where the planned effects of 'intelligent living' with ICTs could take shape. 
Chapter 5 explored how 'intelligent' branding strategies were seized upon by 
developers to add value to residential developments. However, behind the 
place promotion hype of Malaysia's premier 'dot.com' property development, 
research examined how the inadvertent linguistic conflation with Soviet-style 
banishment to hostile environments was more than just a coincidence. 
Cyberjaya was deliberately planned as a disciplined space and high-
productivity work camp dislocated from metropolitan Kuala Lumpur. While 
the 'intelligent city' planning did create order and functional segregation it did 
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so at the cost of producing a sensorially impoverished, culturally destitute 
and bland inauthentic environment exemplified through resident experiences 
of urban alienation. 
Building on this critique, Chapter 7 illustrated that smart home systems soon 
became obsolete or were under-utilised because residents found little 
practical usage for them. In contrast, many residents were heavy internet 
users as a means of compensating for the sense of isolation experienced 
living in Cyberjaya. Both lines of empirical enquiry illustrate counter-
hegemonic narratives and suggest the increasing banalisation of I.T. usage 
both at work and in the home. Ten years on from the hype of a 'multimedia 
utopia' the internet, mobile phones and numerous other gadgets have 
become taken for granted artefacts and unremarkable features of everyday 
life in Cyberjaya, as elsewhere. 
The dystopian realities of 'intelligent living' can be set against the utopian 
development plans of Cyberjaya as an 'exemplary' global live/work space. 
These counter-hegemonic narratives of technopole planning make an 
important contribution to analysis of the MSC in the semi-authoritarian 
context of Malaysia where the state controls the popular press and restricts 
academic freedoms. 
8.3. Policy Implications 
The MSC Malaysia case functions as a critical lens to address the wider 
implications of urban telecommunications policy making through technopole 
planning practices. Caution needs to be exercised in drawing wide 
generalisations from an area specific case study. However, bearing in mind 
the depth of the empirical analysis the thesis provides a valuable position 
from which to speculate on how evidence from Malaysia can provide a basis 
for suggesting lessons for policy makers, urban planners, and national 
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governments when adopting technopole projects for national development 
purposes. Three main policy lessons can be highlighted. 
(a) Problematising the Uncritical Acceptance of High-Tech Futurism by 
Policy Makers 
The hyperbolic rhetoric of a new 'information age' has been used to enrol 
often poorly informed urban policy makers into making local 'partnerships' to 
develop new information districts, communication corridors, and high-tech 
development zones of various sorts (Graham and Marvin 2000). This was 
based on the assumption that technopole development can re-orientate the 
city, or parts of it, as a 'command and control centre' (Sassen 1991) and 
respond to the structural needs of corporate interests. In the 'global south', 
local political actors have been reduced to 'selling' local conditions and 
proffering the labour force to entice the foreign direct investment which these 
projects inevitably rely on. However, as seen with the MSC, once the hype 
subsides it is the multinational I.T. companies who have first option on 
premium infrastructures and are able to reap the benefits of the financial 
incentives while remaining disconnected from the lives of their immobile 
employees and the social needs of their host countries. 
Invariably, these 'new economy' discourses are mobilised through, and for, 
specific interests, and their achievability rarely matches up to the high-tech 
futurology that underpins policy materials and place promotion brochures. As 
technopole planning continues to be appropriated in national urban 
telecommunications policy, further research is required to illuminate their 
socio-spatial consequences, and concomitant political implications. 
(b) The Dangers of Imitation: The Need to be Attuned to Diverging National 
Contexts 
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The case study clearly exemplifies that urban telecommunications policy 
making needs to be more dynamic than simply inserting technopole 
development 'models' onto an existing urban landscape to produce specific, 
predetermined effects. Cyberjaya is one of a long line of technopole projects 
that have attempted to directly replicate the entrepreneurial conditions of 
Silicon Valley with limited success. Through the transnational diffusion of 
planning ideas, state policy makers have been seduced by a belief in the 
paradigmatic examples of specific urban case studies that are wrongly 
interpreted to offer lessons for all other urban areas. Problematically, policies 
geared towards imitation or transnational planning practices assumes a 
degree of inter-urban homogeneity both in the factors leading to urban 
transformation and the processes involved (Amin and Graham 1997). 
The planning of Cyberjaya as iconographic exemplar, symbolic of Malaysia's 
high-tech modernity was problematic because it glossed over the actual 
spatial consequences of: (a) the importation of urban planning models 
through transnational collaborations with 'foreign experts'; (b) assuming that 
the 'intelligent city' would become an exemplar in its own right, and rolled out 
to other locations in Malaysia; (c) the urban consequences of technopole 
planning where 'winning' access to global capital may come at the price of 
over-writing, or excluding local identities. The thesis has highlighted that as 
the state appropriated 'information society' discourses to legitimate for large-
scale urban transformations whereby intelligent development created, a 
splintered urbanism of intelligent fortified enclaves located alongside 
disconnected, 'non-technologised' developments. 
(c) Multimedia Super Corridor as a State Policy Failure? 
The role of the thesis has not been to evaluate the success or failure of the 
MSC Malaysia project. However, it is clear that the project has predictably 
failed to live up to its own hyperbole of becoming a 'multimedia utopia'. The 
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project was poorly conceived, badly implemented and in the planning stages 
there was little effective communication between the ideological architects, 
wider business community or national populous regarding the policy goals of 
the MSC and how these would be achieved. The MSC project was highly 
ambitious and dependent upon: (a) the universal diffusion of highly 
advanced technology infrastructures throughout the MSC to even out 
regional disparities; (b) a critical mass of users who unproblematically 
accepted and took for granted these technological infrastructures. However, 
there is little empirical evidence here or elsewhere (Bunnell 2004; Lepawsky 
2005) to suggest the MSC did either. 
Often grandiose urban telecommunications policy depends on the successful 
development and marketing of specific applications, infrastructures, or 
technological systems. However, over the last ten years the project has 
failed to produce a new generation of 'technopreneurs' or a track record of 
innovative Malaysia start up companies. The project's development eerily 
mimics the growth of the Malaysian electronics industry in the 1980s which 
privileged foreign investment in FTZs but led to little technology transfer or 
domestic value-added enterprise. The Malaysian experience highlights, 
despite the Mahathir's nationalism, and attempts at state autonomy, that the 
economic and politics forces of neoliberalism are proving increasingly 
difficult to resist or even effectively manage by the state in an extra-territorial 
zone like Cyberjaya. 
In the wake of the dot.com bust Cyberjaya's failure to match its own hype 
can conveniently be attributed to 'external' factors. However, Cyberjaya's 
planning history can be read in more critical terms as one of a long list of 
projects that simply did not materialise. From the planned city command 
centre to the E-village, most of the grand ideas were characterised by 
excess and some abandoned in the planning stages (Chapter 6). Ten years 
on the smart school appears to function just as any other in Malaysia. Most 
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citizens have yet to connect with their doctor through telemedicine or 
communicate with the government electronically.99 These policy failures 
represent a massive disjuncture between the technological imagination of 
Cyberjaya as high-tech utopia and the urban imagination of Cyberjaya as 
'intelligent garden city' which has been the central concern for the thesis. 
8.4. Future Directions and Areas For Research 
Future research needs to shift from generalised debates about the impacts 
of globalisation, the 'information society', and ICTs on the built environment 
to more nuanced analyses of the practices through which these processes 
are constituted, and lived out. The scale of future empirical research is 
extensive but needs to be sensitive to cross-national variations, the unique 
localised contexts in which technopole planning occurs, and the multifaceted 
ways these projects are experienced by different actors on the ground. 
Further case study analysis can explore the disjunctures between the 
imagined symbolic effects of these utopian development plans as perceived 
by the architects of these projects compared to the 'view from below' from 
those individuals who live and work in these new, supposedly high-tech 
places. 
The agenda for future research follows two distinct strands. Firstly, there is 
scope for further empirical engagement with the MSC as the project is 'rolled 
out' into wider national space as different states bid to attract their own 
cybercity 'franchise' (e.g. Penang Cybercity, Johor Cyber Port, Kulim High-
Tech Park). Research will critically examine the discursive architectures 
mobilised in Phase 3 of the MSC 'roll out' and its material geographies in the 
production of Malaysia's embryonic 'intelligent landscape'. Secondly, 
research will focus more broadly on the emerging geographies of neoliberal 
modernity throughout Southeast Asia and beyond. Future research can add 
99 Six years after being tasked to set up ePerolehan under the e-government flagship, Commerce Dot 
Com (CDC) has yet to complete the national rollout of electronic procurement which was to be the 
centrepiece of the e-government vision. 
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empirical depth to how neoliberal globalisation discourses function as spatial 
camouflage to mask the intensifying corporate control of cities, or sections 
within, as the state 'unbundles' its infrastructure provision or promotes 
deregulation in order to 'win' global capital. These asset seeking strategies 
physically manifest themselves in the creation of numerous 'spatial products' 
or enclaves for foreign capital (e.g. back-office zones, gated communities, 
business parks). 
The thesis has suggested that the implicit assumptions of technological 
determinism, and high-tech futurism that have long dominated the treatment 
of ICTs in urban studies, need to be avoided by placing technopole planning 
in its full social, cultural, political, economic, and spatialised context. The 
research has suggested that the focus needs to move from an emphasis on 
the abstract capabilities of information technology per se, to the complex 
process through which technologies are appropriated in urban 
telecommunications policy, and the effects these have on cities. 
Furthermore, the thesis has critically unpacked the transnational diffusion of 
planning ideas alongside neoliberal 'anytime/anywhere' discourses to 
examine the urban consequences of technopole planning. There is an 
enormous research agenda on the interrelations between contemporary 
urbanism and ICTs in the light of the transformations undergoing cities and 
the discursive appropriation of new technologies in urban futures. Clearly, 
much work is still required, but it is hoped this study makes at least a small 
contribution to this wider intellectual project. 
8.5. Postscript: The Future Is Here, So What Now? 
Ten years after the fanfare the future is finally here and the impacts of the 
MSC on Malaysian economic, social, political, and cultural development 
have been marginal. Despite the hyperbole, the MSC endeavour has been 
far from revolutionary endeavour and has drifted out of the public 
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imagination in Malaysia just as quickly as it once took hold of it in the mid-
1990s.100 The project was then conceived in a moment of unparalleled 
technological utopianism and relentless speculation about the nature of a 
coming 'information age'. However, we now live in more sobering times. 
Firstly, in the wake of the 1997-1998 Asian Financial Crisis, and the political 
turmoil that followed in the 'Anwar Affair', the national optimism that once 
coined in the phrase 'Malaysia Boleh' ('Malaysia can do it') has since waned. 
Malaysian self-confidence has struggled in the political transition to a less 
spectacular, post-Mahathir era under the 'safety first' style leadership of his 
hand-picked successor Abdullah Badawi. 101 Secondly, the 'dot.com' stock 
market collapse between 2000 and 2002, and numerous financial scan'dals 
that have engulfed several telecommunications corporations, raised serious 
doubts whether Malaysian investment in the 'new economy' was a viable 
long term economic strategy. Thirdly, now many of these once heralded 
technologies have since 'produced the ordinary' (Am in and Thrift 2002: 1 03) 
and become banal, normalised, taken for granted features of everyday life in 
urban Malaysia. At the launch of the MSC the Internet revolution had not yet 
reached Malaysia but now in 2008 Kuala Lumpur is dotted with numerous 
internet cafes, Wi-Fi enabled coffee shops, and a high penetration of 
bandwidth connectivity for those who can afford it. In this contemporary 
scene, talk of a new 'information age' or 'multimedia utopia' appears tired 
and dated. Although massive technological inequalities still exist between 
those wired spaces reorientated towards global capitalism in the MSC and 
its hinterland comprising of numerous disconnected 'lag-time places'. 
So what of Cyberjaya? Once the initial euphoria and urban boosterism 
inevitably died down the 'intelligent city' manifested itself as a rather. dull 
100 Perhaps the biggest indication of how MSC hype has waned is evident with the list of attendees for 
MSC's most recent lAP meeting held in Penang on 1ih to 19th of May 2007. An event which once 
attracted a roll-call of global IT heavyweights now includes the general manager of AI-Jazeera 
children's channel. 
101 At the time of writing in 2008 the Malaysian government had just suffered its worst national election 
result since 1969, carrying a reduced majority into parliament 
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perfunctory business park clone for I.T. related companies - think call 
centres, accounts processing, data centres. The sylvan landscapes of 
endless green lawns, manicured flowerbeds and a sprawl of faceless glass 
and steel office frontages confirmed the worst fears that Cyberjaya had in 
fact become yet another offshore hub for MNCs and their back-office 
operations. Furthermore, for the residents who inhabit it, their experiences 
were characterised by simple boredom and the rapid banalisation and 
obsolescence of purportedly 'smart', 'intelligent', or 'cyber' environments. 
Once the 'shock of the new' subsided residents reported a sense of isolation 
that inevitably accompanies human habitation of a site tailored to the needs 
of multinational capital and geared towards maximising productivity in a 
sensorially impoverished environment where work routines are not just a part 
of life, but are the way of life and the way life is. Therefore, the ultimate 
conclusion is that the MSC has become a discursive device for promoting 
specific real estate and corporate interests that is detached from its original 
claims to create a Malaysian 'information soCiety' and a 'new economy' in 
which Malaysia would become a global hub for information technology. 
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Appendices 
Appendix 1: Fieldwork 
(1) Participant Observation and 'Go-Along' Interviews 
(a) The main sites for participant observation 
• City Command Centre, Cyberjaya. (April to May 2006) 
• Cyberia Smart Home Complex, Cyberjaya. (May to December 2006, 
September to December 2007) 
• Cyberjaya Street Mall, Cyberjaya. (May to December 2006, 
September to December 2007) 
(b) 'Go-along' interviews conducted in Cyberjaya 
• Saiful, Shell IT, Cyberjaya. 'Go-along' conducted around the Shell I.T. 
campus in Cyberjaya. (05/12/2006) 
• Karveen, Limkokwing University, Cyberjaya. 'Go-along' conducted 
around the Limkokwing campus in Cyberjaya. (10/11/2006) 
• Hamdi, Paradmoden, Cyberjaya. 'Go-along' 'conducted during walking 
tour of Cyberia smart home complex. (26/07/2006) 
• Jaffrin, SH Technology, Cyberjaya. 'Go-along' conducted during tour 
of Cyberview resort complex in Cyberjaya. (13/09/2006) 
• Jaffrin, SH Technology, Cyberjaya. 'Go-along' conducted during tour 
of City Command Centre in Cyberjaya. (13/09/2006) 
• Student 12, Limkokwing University, Cyberjaya. 'Go-along' conducted 
around Cyberia following journey to the Limkokwing University 
campus. (09/1 0/2006) 
• Student 9, Multimedia University, Cyberjaya. 'Go-along' conducted 
around Multimedia University campus. (15/08/2006) 
• Student 11, Cyberia Smart Home Complex, Cyberjaya. 'Go-along' 
conducted from Cyberia to the Street Mall complex. (21/08/2006) 
• Student 10, Multimedia University, Cyberjaya. 'Go-along' conducted 
during walk around Multimedia University. 
(2) In-Depth Interviews 
Alongside informal exchanges and conversations accumulated through 
participant observation I conducted a number of formal interviews. All names 
are pseudonyms to protect the anonymity of participants. 
Name Organisation Description Date 
399 
Corporate BMW MSC status 15/10/2006 
Affairs Manager company, 
Cyberjaya 
Venky, BMW MSC status 15/10/2006 
Logistics company, 
Manager Cyberjaya 
Vijay, Logistics BMW MSC status 21/10/2006 
Team company, 
Cyberjaya 
Pang, Manager Fujitsu MSC status 03/10/2006 
Finance and company, 
Sales Cyberjaya 
Craig, Country Freisland Food MSC status 09/10/2006 
Manager company, 
Cyberjaya 
Sarvin, Country P2i0nline MSC status 15/11/2006 
Manager company, 
Cyberjaya 
Cindy, Team Panasonic MSC status 15/11/2006 
Manager company, 
Cyberjaya 
Hati, CEO Dream Team MSC status 16/11/2006 
Studio company, 
Cyberjaya 
Sunni, Division Motorola MSC status 16/10/2006 
Head company, 
Cyberjaya 
Chin, Manager Tech nomen MSC status 17/11/2006 
company, 
Cyberjaya 
Greg, Director CSF MSC status 23/09/2006 
company, 
Cyberjaya 
Pankaj, Country Satyam MSC Status 23/11/2006 
Manager company, 
Cyberjaya 
Peter, Country WoltersKiuwer MSC Status 28/09/2006 
Manager Company, 
Cyberjaya 
Kazly SHELL IT I.T. worker, 06/12/2006 
Cyberjaya 
Joe SHELL IT I.T. worker, 06/12/2006 
Cyberjaya 
Saiful SHELL IT I. T. worker, 05/12/2006 
Cyberjaya 
Manser SHELL IT I.T. worker, 01/10/2006 
400 
Cyberjaya 
Arief IBM I.T. worker, 21/11/2006 
Cyberjaya 
Auyu IBM I.T. worker, 11/10/2006 
Cyberjaya 
Fikri IBM I.T. worker, 20/09/2006 
Cyberjaya 
Karveen, Limkokwing Limkokwing 10/11/2006 
Marketing University (LKW) University, 
Team Cyberjaya 
Sarah, Manager Setia Haruman Cyberjaya 12/09/2006 
for Marketing Master Planner 
Khairul, Senior Setia Haruman Cyberjaya 12/09/2006 
Planner Master Planner 
Suhana, Sepang Local Council in 10/11/2006 
Manager Municipal Cyberjaya 
Council 
Rashid, Head of Cyberview Cyberjaya Land 15/09/2006 
Marketing Owner 
Shaheen, Cyberview Cyberjaya Land 15/09/2006 
Executive Owner 
Hamdi, Head of Paramoden Developer of 26/07/2006 
Marketing Cyberia Smart 
Homes 
Chin, Cyberia Paramoden Developer of 26/07/2006 
Manager Cyberia Smart 
Homes 
Ray, Director C2Media Marketing 29/07/2006 
Consultant for 
Cyberia to 
Paramoden 
Ed, CAD-C MDEC Creative 04/10/2006 
Manager Multimedia 
Saladin Cluster, 
Producer Cyberjaya 
Greg, Saladin MDEC Creative 20/10/2006 
director Multimedia 
Cluster, 
Cyberjaya 
Atief, Division MDEC Shared Services 14/10/2007 
Head and Outsourcing 
Cluster 
Bill, Head of MDEC Creative 19/09/2006 
Creative Media Multimedia 
Cluster Cluster, 
Cyberjaya 
401 
Wee, Head of MDEC Cybercities 29/08/2006 
Cybercities Division, 
Divison Cyberjaya 
Gracie, Team MDEC Cybercities 29/08/2006 
Manager Division, 
Cyberjaya 
Dr. Abu, Senior MDEC Technopreneur 15/10/2006 
Vice President Development 
Division 
Azmam, former MDEC 27/09/2006 
director with 
Setia Haruman 
Jaffrin, SH Setia Haruman SH Technology 13/09/2006 
Technology 
Zaid, SH Setia Haruman SH Technology 13/09/2006 
Technology 
Professor TSO, Multimedia MSC relations 14/11/2006 
Head of MSC University unit 
Relations unit (MMU) 
with MMU 
Student 1, LKW 04/09/2006 
Cyberia 
resident 
Student 2, LKW 07/09/2006 
Cyberia 
resident 
Student 3, LKW 12/10/2006 
Cyberia 
resident 
Student 4, LKW 15/09/2006 
Cyberia 
resident 
Student 5, LKW 20/09/2006 
Cyberia 
resident 
Student 6, LKW 05/10/2006 
Cyberia 
resident 
Student 7, MMU 12/10/2006 
Cyberia 
resident 
Student 8, MMU 14/11/2006 
Cyberia 
resident 
Student 9, MMU 15/08/2006 
Cyberia 
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resident 
Student 10, MMU 28/09/2006 
Cyberia 
resident 
Government Government 05/12/2006 
Worker 11, Worker 
Cyberia 
resident 
Student 12, LKW 09/10/2006 
non-Cyberjaya 
resident 
Student 13, LKW 30/08/2006 
non-Cyberjaya 
resident 
Student 14, LKW 29/09/2006 
non-Cyberjaya 
resident 
Student 15, LKW 30/08/2006 
non-Cyberjaya 
resident 
Cyberia I.T. Worker 01/06/2006 
Resident 1 
Cyberia I.T. Worker 23/04/2006 
Resident 2 
Cyberia I.T. Worker 11/10/2006 
Resident 3 
Cyberia I.T. Worker 01/10/2006 
Resident 4 
Cyberia I.T. Worker 24/11/2006 
Resident 5 
Cyberia MMU Lecturer 21/09/2007 
Resident 6 
Cyberia LKW Staff 21/08/2006 
Resident 7 
Cyberia I.T. Worker 07/07/2006 
Resident 8 
Previn, CEO Zerin Properties Property 05/10/2006 
Consultant in 
Klang Valley 
Monica, IBHD Developer, 1-City 09/11/2006 
Execuitve project in Shah 
Director A lam 
Jamal UKM Intelligent Cities 18/09/2006 
expert 
Shariffudin TH properties, Marketing 19/09/2006 
Bandar Enstek Manager 
403 
Mohammad, 
Syed, CEO 
Pravindran 
TH properties, 
Bandar Enstek 
The Edge 
Magazine 
(3) Time-space diaries 
• LKW student 3 
• LKW student 4 
• MMU student 8 
• MMU student 10 
• Cyberia resident 3 
• MMU student 9 
Appendix 2: Maps 
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Map of Malaysia (Source: Wikipedia) 
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